



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

WESTERN CULTURE IN EASTERN
LANDS

√2162 w

WESTERN CULTURE IN EASTERN LANDS

A COMPARISON OF THE METHODS ADOPTED
BY ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN THE
MIDDLE EAST

BY ARMINIUS VAMBÉRY, C.V.O.

AUTHOR OF 'TRAVELS IN CENTRAL ASIA,' 'HISTORY OF BOKHARA,' ETC

96665
15/6/09

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
1906

P R E F A C E

DURING the many years that I have been engaged in studying the political and cultural questions of Inner Asia, it has often been laid to my charge that, in my criticism and appreciation of the two chief factors of our civilising influence in the East, I have not taken up a purely objective standpoint, and that, because of my partiality to the one, I have not been quite fair to the other.

In Europe the prevailing idea is that the Russians, who in many respects are themselves still semi-Asiatic, are better fitted to undertake the civilisation of Asia, and will be more likely to bring about the transition from one sphere of action to another, than the English, the accomplished representatives of Western culture, who lack the necessary pliability, and whose stiff, proud bearing is supposed to be detrimental to the work of transformation. To prove the erroneousness of this view, and also to defend myself against the accusation of an unjustifiable partiality, these pages have been written.

The comparative survey of the various innovations and reforms introduced by Russia and by England respectively, which I have endeavoured to give, will convince the reader that, in forming my conclusions, I have not been guided by personal motives, but that they are the outcome of a close investigation of what has actually been done by our two Culture-bearers.

No one will deny that the more effective and the nobler are the means at our disposal, the more perfect and the better finished will be the work to be accomplished. In order to teach, educate, and train the mind of others, we ourselves must first have been taught, educated, and trained; and if, looking at it from this point of view, I give the preference to England, which unquestionably occupies the higher cultural position of the two Powers, I can scarcely be accused of partiality.

As my studies have been almost entirely confined to Moslem Asia, I could not help referring also to the future of Islam. For more than fifty years I have been deeply interested in the destiny of the Moslem nations of Asia; and their history, both past and present, as well as some individual phases of mental conflict in which I myself have had a share, may shed many bright gleams of light to serve as guiding-stars in the darkness which surrounds the future.

The picture which I have ventured to place before the public concerning the future of Islam is founded not on vain speculations, but on conclusions drawn from concrete facts.

A. VAMBÉRY.

BUDAPEST UNIVERSITY.

CONTENTS

PART I

THE CIVILISING INFLUENCE OF RUSSIA

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. WESTERN INFLUENCE IN THE EAST - - -	1
II. RUSSIAN SUCCESSES OVER URAL-ALTAICS - - -	7
III. RUSSIA'S CONQUESTS ON THE LOWER VOLGA - - -	14
IV. FORCED CONVERSION OF TARTARS - - -	21
V. RUSSIFICATION AND EMIGRATION - - -	27
VI. CULTURAL EFFORTS IN THE KIRGHIS STEPPE - - -	35
VII. CULTURAL EXPERIMENTS IN TURKESTAN - - -	47
VIII. DEFECTS OF RUSSIAN ADMINISTRATION - - -	58
IX. MORALS AND PUBLIC INSTRUCTION - - -	67
X. SEMI-CIVILISED NATIVES - - -	80
XI. UNEXPLOITED OPPORTUNITIES - - -	89
XII. THE RUSSIFICATION OF SIBERIA - - -	98
XIII. RESULT OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE - - -	117

PART II

THE CIVILISING INFLUENCE OF ENGLAND

I. THE BEGINNINGS OF BRITISH RULE - - -	131
II. THE CONSOLIDATION OF BRITISH POWER - - -	148
III. FIRST STAGE OF REFORMS - - -	158
IV. INCREASE OF WELL-BEING - - -	168
V. PUBLIC INSTRUCTION IN INDIA - - -	179
VI. RESULTS OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM - - -	193
VII. CHANGE OF NATIVE MORALS - - -	202

CHAPTER	PAGE
VIII. NATIVE CRITICS OF BRITISH RULE - -	212
IX. THE EFFECT OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM - -	225
X. STABILITY OF BRITISH RULE - -	240
XI. A COMPARATIVE SYNOPSIS - -	249

PART III

THE FUTURE OF ISLAM

I. OLD AND NEW ISLAM - - -	263
II. THE STRUGGLE OF REFORMS - - -	281
III. DESPOTISM OF MOSLEM RULERS - - -	296
IV. ISLAM CAPABLE OF REFORM - - -	308
V. THE AWAKENING OF LIBERTY - - -	320
VI. WESTERN CULTURE ACKNOWLEDGED - - -	342
VII. THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF ISLAM - - -	355
VIII. CRESCENT AND CROSS - - -	371
IX. EUROPEAN POWERS IN MOSLEM ASIA - - -	387
INDEX - - - - -	397

PART I
THE CIVILISING INFLUENCE
OF RUSSIA

CHAPTER I

WESTERN INFLUENCE IN THE EAST

THERE are, perhaps, no subjects of human knowledge and research in which such progress has been made during the past century as in those of the geography and ethnography of Asia. When we read, for instance, Ritter's intensely interesting and able description of Eastern lands, or study the history of some particular portion of the East brought within our reach by the unceasing labour of modern Orientalists, we realise how poor and imperfect was our knowledge of the old world during the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1848, for instance, on the subject of Central Asia we only possessed the joint labour of Dubeux and Valmont,* whereas we now have elaborate and exhaustive narratives and descriptions upon all possible subjects connected with those countries. In the regions where some decades ago the traveller's life was in constant danger, and where the struggle with the elements and with the natives made his progress necessarily slow and tedious, we now find a well-organised railway system, and in the place of the grunting camel the fiery steam-horse ploughs its way through endless vistas of sandy steppes. When, comfortably seated in our well-upholstered railway-carriage, we gaze upon the Hyrkanian Steppe, upon the terrible deserts of Karakum

* 'Tartarie, Belouchistan, Boutan et Nepal,' par M. Dubeux et par M. V. Valmont. Paris, 1848.

and Kisilkum, we can scarcely realise the terrors, the sufferings, and the privations, to which travellers formerly were exposed. Truly, *Tempora mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis*. And great changes similar to those which have taken place in Central Asia may also be noticed in greater or less degree in other parts and regions of the Eastern world: Siberia, West and North China, Mongolia, Manchuria, and Japan, were in the first half of the nineteenth century scarcely known to us, and where the early martyrs of geographical research, such as Schlagintweit, Hayward, Wyburd, Conolly, Margary, and others, fell victims to barbarism, we now find that the supreme power of the Western world is gradually making itself felt. The walls of seclusion are ruthlessly pulled down, and the resistance caused by the favoured superstitions, prejudices, and the ignorance of the sleepy and apathetic man in the East, is slowly being overcome. If the English poet Matthew Arnold was right when he sang,

‘The East bowed down before the blast
In patient, deep disdain;
She let the legions thunder past,
And plunged in thought again,’*

our present-day Europe, in its restless, bustling activity will take good care not to let the East relapse again into its former indolence. We forcibly tear its eyes open; we push, jolt, toss, and shake it, and we compel it to exchange its world-worn, hereditary ideas and customs for our modern views of life; nay, we have even succeeded to some extent in convincing our Eastern neighbours that our civilisation, our faith, our customs, our philosophy, are the only means whereby the well-being, the progress, and the happiness, of the human race can be secured.

For well-nigh 300 years we have been carrying on

* Obermann, ‘Once More.’

this struggle with the Eastern world, and persist in our unsolicited interference, following in the wake of ancient Rome, which began the work with marked perseverance, but naturally never met with much success because of the inadequate means at its disposal. When we read the words of patriotic enthusiasm and inspiration with which Virgil addresses Cæsar, exclaiming :

‘ et te, maxime Cæsar,
Qui nunc extremis Asiæ jam victor in oris
Imbellem avertis Romanis arcibus Indum’;*

or when, in the ‘Carmen Sæculare’ of Horace, young Roman citizens and maidens are made to sing :

‘ Jam mari terraque manus potentes
Medus Albanasque timet secures
Jam Scythæ responsa petunt, superbi
Nuper, et Indi’;†

or when in many other classical Roman poems we meet with passages of a similar nature, we naturally begin to think that the Roman legions not only conquered the Asiatic world, but also exercised a civilising and beneficial influence over the whole East. This, however, was not the case. We may admire the splendour, the might, and the glory of ancient Rome, we may allow that the glitter of its arms struck terror and alarm into the furthest corners of Asia ; but in spite of all that, it would be difficult to admit that the civilising influence of Rome was ever more than an external varnish, a transitory glamour. Compared with the real earnest work done in our days by Western Powers, the efforts of Rome are as the flickering of an oil-lamp in comparison with the radiance of the sun in its full glory. It may be said without exaggeration that never in the world’s history has any one continent exercised

* Quoted from ‘ Relations Politiques et Commerciales de l’Empire Romain avec l’Asie Orientale,’ par M. Reinaud, p. 141.

† The same, p. 117.

such influence over another as has the Europe of our days over Asia: never were two such diametrically opposed elements engaged in so deadly a strife as is now to be seen in all parts of the Old World. This being so, it appears to me most important that we should realise what is the extent and the purpose of our civilising influence over Asia. We have to consider not only its historical growth and the means employed in its development, but also the results so far obtained, and the ultimate ends to be accomplished. And we are the more anxious to do so as our investigations into the remotest nooks and corners of the Old World have become fairly familiar ground to us all. We are in constant communication with those nations, we are familiar with their thoughts and their aspirations, we know what they think of our civilisation and the value they attach to the innovations which we are proposing to introduce into their lives. Our inquiries will in the first place make us acquainted with the means and the resources employed by the promoters of civilisation in the East. The advantages and disadvantages of our interference in the destiny of Eastern nations will stand out in bold relief, and the purely objective and unprejudiced estimate of the changes already effected may perchance have a beneficial influence upon future political relations all over the world. In the first place, then, we must ask ourselves the question: Have we a right thus to interfere in the concerns of the ancient world; and in the second place, What do the Asiatics think of it?

If we start with the assumption that every man has a right to his own opinion and to the views which best correspond with his ideas of morality and material comfort, our pretended crusade in the name of civilisation must look like an unwarrantable interference. But the correctness of this assumption has so far been contradicted by historical events, for no community can

remain in absolute isolation. Even China, the prototype of a seclusion extending over thousands of years, has before now migrated far into neighbouring lands. If Rome and Greece had remained within the narrow precincts of their native lands humanity would not have reached the present height of culture, and if Western nations had checked their passion for migration the aspect of things in Asia would now be even worse than it actually is. Of course the Asiatics themselves do not view the matter in this light. Many of them look upon our enforced reforms as hostile attacks upon their liberty, and as means to bring their people under our yoke. But the better-informed amongst them, who know what the East now is and what it used to be, will hardly share this view. Humanity in Asia has never known culture and liberty in the sense in which we understand it, and has therefore never known true happiness, which is unavoidably dependent upon these two chief factors of mental and physical well-being.

During the much-extolled golden era of the history of Asia, tyranny and despotism were the ruling elements, justice a vain chimera, everything depended on the arbitrary will of the Sovereign, and a prolonged period of rest and peace was quite the exception. Asiatics, from motives of vanity or inborn laziness, may condone these abnormal conditions, but still it remains our duty to recognise the true state of affairs, and to take pity upon our oppressed fellow-men. Without our help Asia will never rise above its low level, and even granted that the politics of European Powers are not purely unselfish, we must nevertheless, keeping the ultimate object in view, approve of the interference of Europe in the affairs of the East, and give the undertaking our hearty support.

Viewed in this light, we may be thankful that the Christian West for 300 years has been unceasing in its interference in Asiatic affairs. Although the

Italians, Dutch and Portuguese were the first in the field, we recognise in our days only two competitive Powers—Russia and England. The historical development and national and political interests of both these nations are closely bound up with Asia. When I say Asia, I mean Moslem Asia, the Asia which has engaged my attention for years, both in a theoretical and in a practical manner. Non-Moslem Asia will only be occasionally mentioned in these pages.

Asia is necessary to the very existence of Russia and England as Great Powers, and they are therefore compelled to exercise, if not an exclusive, yet a very grave influence upon the fate of the East. In their ethnical nature; their relative standard of culture; their object in view, and in their ultimaté goal of desire, these two civilising influences are, nevertheless, fundamentally different. The one is actuated by purely political motives, while the other is chiefly guided by the economical and commercial results of its actions. Both nations would gladly consider themselves the appointed arbiters of the fate of the East, but, with due allowance for the different motives which incite them, we have to reckon with the actual facts, and we can only look upon Russia and England as those Powers upon which the future of the Asiatic world chiefly depends.

CHAPTER II

RUSSIAN SUCCESSES OVER URAL-ALTAICS

FROM the earliest times Russia has been in touch with the various races of the Ural-Altaic race. This is primarily to be attributed to its geographical position; the intercourse, however, could not at any time have been of a friendly nature, because of the absolute uncongeniality which from the very first characterised these neighbouring elements in matters of religion, politics, and society. We may not think highly of Russian civilisation in the Middle Ages, but we must admit that the Russian State institution, founded on Christian principles, even in those early stages of its existence, gave evidence of certain future possibilities—possibilities which we look for in vain in the ethnical element of Asiatic constitutions. With the adoption of Christianity, although in the form of the Byzantine Church, the Slavs of Eastern Europe unconsciously developed certain characteristics which were peculiar to Western lands even before the time of the Renaissance, not as a consequence of, but rather in spite of, Christianity; and so the Russian world, without desiring to do so—nay, rather although manifesting an absolute dislike to anything that came from Western lands—at a very early date had to act the part of pioneer of the Christian world, and to take its stand as the antagonist of Islam. So long as it merely concerned the resistance of an overbearing, warlike, rapacious nomadic force which overran all the land

from the frontiers of China up to the borders of the Danube, the opposition of these two worlds could not be so prominent. Russia, as a matter of fact, had to yield before the crushing superiority of the Ugrian, Turkish, and Mongol hordes; it had no means of defence against the social and political influences of these primitive Asiatic powers. This is evident from the many words in the Russian language which are clearly of Eastern derivation.*

After the fall of the Golden Horde, which, like the rest of these semi-nomadic States of modern times, without cohesion and without sound foundation, could not be expected to last long, the Grand-Dukes of Moscow took up a bolder position. Family feuds and fratricide in the house of the Princes of Serai emboldened the Tsars of Moscow, as protectors of the deposed Princes of the Golden Horde, to cast longing eyes upon the southern districts. And so it happened, through the protection extended by the Grand-Duke Vasili to Prince Kasim, a brother of the ruler of Kazan (1448), that the khanate of Kasimoff came under the dominion of the Tsars, and afterwards had to supply the auxiliary troops against Kazan. In pro-

* Such derived words are, for instance: *Kasna*, treasure-house, from the Arab 'khazna'; *khalat*, dressing-gown, from the Arab 'khalat,' robe, robe of honour; *hetman*, from the Turkish 'ataman,' chief; *yassak*, tribute, from the Turkish 'yassak,' law, arrangement; *ochak*, from the Turkish 'odjak,' hearth; *kazan*, kettle—Turkish 'kazan'; *kushak*, girdle—Turkish 'kushak'; *bondjuk*, banner—Turkish 'bondjuk,' knob; *yessau*, captain of artillery—Turkish 'yasaul,' lieutenant. Karamsin is, therefore, not quite right when he says that the Russians have taken over nothing from their nomadic neighbours. This is contradicted by the fact that, inasmuch as the French words introduced into the German language point to the influence of an earlier developed nation, in the same way are the Tartar-Russian foreign words, relating to governmental and social matters, a proof of the cultural influence of the Golden Horde in the development of the Russian language.

portion as the corruption of the Court of the Golden Horde increased, the power of the Tsars in Moscow grew. With the help of the discontented and fugitive Tartar deserters, they gradually succeeded in breaking the vital power of the Tartars, the name then given to the mixed Ural-Altai tribes of the Lower Volga. It was a fierce and prolonged struggle, ending in the conquest and subjugation of the remnants of the Golden Horde, weakened by internal strife; and if we would seek for the reason of the ultimate success of the Russian arms, we must mention first the superiority of the arms of Western manufacture used by the Russians, and secondly the greater endurance and persistence of the Russians, and the fixed political purpose they had in view. These traits of character are essentially European, and we find them only very occasionally among Orientals. The Northern nations are specially noted for them, and modern history teaches us that even in other engagements of any national body it is invariably the Northern faction which triumphs over the Southern.

Apart from these advantages on the Russian side, we must also remember the political and social conditions which facilitated the advance of the Grand-Dukes of Moscow against the mixed tribes of Southern Russia. The internal government of the Golden Horde bore a striking resemblance to that of the khanate of Khiva and Khokand in the first half of the past century; but the State machinery of the Golden Horde was so corrupt that it lacked even the strength and cohesion of the Turkish khanates, which at a very early date attained to a certain amount of power and of authority by reason of the religious glamour which surrounds Islam. When I call to mind the licentiousness, the cruelty, the anarchy, of which I have been an eye-witness among the Turkomans of G6rghen and Etrek and in the South of Khiva, and when I think what was

the condition of the State as I observed it at the Court of the Khan of Khiva, I can well imagine what life must have been at Serai, and what was the condition of the government of the Golden Horde. Ibn Batutah and other Arabian travellers have described the capital as stretching over several miles of ground, and resplendent with most beautiful buildings; but this must be taken *cum grano salis* and with the necessary allowance for Oriental exaggeration; for modern excavations have not brought to light any of these marvellous monuments.

It is true that the pictures given of Russian morality in those days are far from pleasing, and Karamsin's description of the Russians makes one's hair stand on end.* Yet the refining influence of Western Europe had left its mark on the Russians. They were roused from their lethargy as early as the fifteenth century; law and order prevailed among them; new inventions and scientific pursuits had had a refining influence on the spirit of society and State, and Russia had felt this influence. Although semi-Asiatic, wild and crude in many features of its internal and external life, Russian society and the Russian State always compares advantageously with its nomadic conquerors and oppressors, and this is chiefly due to its Christian characteristics. The framework of State polity, a combination of the Varangians and the German, was firmly established;

* Temni's reign (Vasili the Blind, 1425-1462) is noted not only for internal disturbances, but also for the great cruelties characterizing the roughness and brutal customs of those days. Two Princes were blinded, two others killed by poison. It was not only the populace which, in its wild fury, without judgment drowned and burned its victims; the Russians even martyred their prisoners of war in this same lawless manner, and legal punishment evinced the same barbarous cruelty ('History of the Russian Empire,' German translation, vol. v., p. 286).

the European spirit might for a time be weakened, but could not be destroyed; and these advantages were so strong that the best-organised Asiatic power could have had no chance of success against them—how much less, then, a wild nomadic horde! Another point in favour of the Russians in their struggle with the barbaric Ural-Altai tribes, apart from the nomadic character of their enemies, which, as Karamsin* tells us, was opposed to all settled conditions of life, was the absence of all religious zeal, which made them lax in their religious observances and adherence to Islam, a fact which may even be noticed in the Turkish nomad of the present day. Too far away from the Asiatic centres of Mohammed's doctrine, they were excluded from close companionship with the Moslem world, which at that time enjoyed a considerable amount of power, nor had they any chance of religious intercourse with their other co-religionists, scattered over the three continents. An energetic, prolonged resistance against the slowly-advancing Christian forces was therefore almost out of the question. There was no united army to oppose them, the nomadic forces being chiefly composed of heathen contingents—Ugrians, such as Chuvashes, Votyaks, Cheremises, and Mordvines, and whilst the Khans of the Crimea, Kazan, and Astrakhan stood in such evil repute that they could find no support from any other quarter, the Grand-Dukes of Moscow, in their enthusiastic devotion to orthodox Christianity, and protected by their firmly-established State institutions, could easily overcome their weakened foes, whose only

* If the Mongols had done for us what they did for China and India, or what the Turks did for Greece—if they had left their steppes and their nomadic life, and had settled in our cities—they might now still exist as a State. Fortunately for us, the raw climate of Russia put any such idea out of their mind (Karamsin, vol. v., p. 297).

object was to gain booty, and who never seriously thought of establishing a State.

The Russians proceeded on their southward course aided by the awakening culture of the West, but in their progress they gained much valuable knowledge from watching the military arts and tactics of the nomads. The Kossacks, a band of cavalry whose name and character at once betrays them as children of the steppes, formed the vanguard *à la Turques*; behind them followed the semi-regular army. And so it was Asia that led the way, and Europe that followed after. If the Osmanli had hoisted their victorious banner a hundred years sooner on the cupola of the Aya Sophia in Constantinople, and had made their power felt in Western lands—that is, in the Christian world—the victory of the Cross over Islam in Russia could never have been accomplished. We know that Mohammed II., and perhaps even more Selim II., had cast greedy eyes upon the Volga district and the Crimea; but when the Russians began their campaign there was no Moslem force strong enough to oppose them, and therefore the Russian annexation of the Volga district proceeded slowly but surely.

When in 1552 Kazan had fallen, the power of the Osmanli under Soliman was in the zenith of its glory, but the nomadic Turks on the Lower Volga were so degraded that prompt and energetic support from their side could not be expected. Notwithstanding this fact, Ivan the Terrible dreaded the possibility of a Turkish attack, as is proved by the obsequiousness with which the head of the Orthodox Church greeted Mohammed's representative on earth. In 1570 he sent one of his nobles, Nowosilzoff, as Ambassador to Selim II., with the following message: 'My Sovereign is not an enemy of the Mussulman faith. His vassal the Tsar Sain Bulat rules in Kasimoff, the Tsarevich Kaibullah in Yuryeff, Ibak in Suroshik, and the Nogai Princes

in Romanoff; they all praise the name of Mohammed freely and openly in their mosques, for with us every foreigner exercises his own religion without reserve.* A remarkable statement on the part of a Prince who had already begun to exterminate Islam by fire and sword throughout his dominions.

* Karamsin, vol. vii., p. 143.

CHAPTER III

RUSSIA'S CONQUESTS ON THE LOWER VOLGA

THE victory of the Double Cross over the Ural-Altai tribes inaugurates a new era in this hitherto uninterrupted stream of ethnical existence. The desolations wrought by Genghis and Timur were first put a check to by the martial exploits of Ivan the Terrible, and against the wall thus raised by him the angry waves of nomadism dashed in vain, and the flood which threatened devastation was stopped in its course. The taming process was far from easy. Ivan the Terrible, after the conquest of Kazan, had to use forcible means to introduce his Russification plans. The Tartars were forbidden to build mosques, and the Christians were not permitted to dwell among the Mohammedans. Next to Ivan himself, St. Guri exercised the greatest influence over the newly-conquered khanates. Even the new Governor, Prince Shuiski, submitted to him, and the natural result of his stringent regulations was that in the year 1556 some thousands of Mohammedans were converted to Christianity. Of more particular interest to us are the methods and manners, the ways and means, by which Russia subdued all these turbulent elements, and at the same time furthered Russian interests in those regions. The ethnical picture of those days must have been very different to what it is now; when we look at the racial conditions as they are now in the regions of Kazan, Samara, Ufa, Orenburg, and Stavropol, and

we note how Russia—more particularly in the middle course of the Volga, which was peopled with the numerous groups of Ural-Altaic elements, such as Tartars, Bashkirs, Cheremises, Chuvashes, and Votyaks—has extended its dominions from the Ural as far as Kuma, that is, as far as the region of the steppes north of the Caspian Sea, we realise that this distribution could not possibly have been so originally. A little knowledge of the spirit which animated the political and social life of the Moslem nomadic nations must convince us that no Christians, and above all no Russians, who even then were much dreaded, would be likely to take up their peaceable abode in the settlements and under the sceptre of the Princes of Kazan and Astrakhan. The same was the case in Bokhara and Khiva, where before the Russian conquest of Turkestan, with the exception of a few Armenians, no Christian community has ever been able to exist. Again, when Kazan fell into the hands of the Russians, only Russian prisoners were found within its walls, who came out to welcome Ivan at the city gates.* Similar relations prevailed in the country of the Bashkirs, who after the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan sent an exclusively Bashkir deputation to Ivan the Terrible offering their subjugation, but Russia did not enforce colonisation upon them until the eighteenth century.† We gather from this that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Russia was but feebly represented on the Lower Volga and in the adjacent southern districts. The Slav element spread very slowly, and

* Karamsin, vol. vii., p. 338.

† This colonisation, however, was no easy matter; for in 1786 the Russian Government, in consideration of their dislike to settle down, had formed these Bashkirs into irregular troops, which were used to guard the frontiers. A portion of this militia took part in the Russian occupation of Paris in 1812, and, as they shot with bow and arrow, the people jokingly called them 'les amours du Nord' (Pauli, *Narody, Rossi*, small edition, vol. ii., p. 306).

it could only gain a foothold in proportion as the civilising methods of the Government took effect, for with the restriction of the nomadic spirit the extension of the Turco-Tartar element could easily be hindered.* This group of the Ural-Altai race never took pleasure in the peaceful pursuits of agriculture; they passionately clung to their nomadic life in the steppes, and when forced to abandon this development, the mere existence seemed impossible to them. Wherever the power of the Turco-Tartaric element was broken and its scene of action narrowed the Slavs gained an entrance. They tilled the ground, they made settled dwellings, and where formerly the traveller might journey for several days without coming upon a town or a village the Slavs introduced all those conveniences of civilisation which, radiating from Russia as their centre, extended far away to the South.

Russia's polity, it should be remembered, spread from West to East, and thus checked the influx of tribes from the Upper Yenissei and the Ob, and from the Tartar-Mongol steppe regions. The numerical strength of the population of those times must be estimated by a different standard to ours, for where we speak now of thousands, it could scarcely be a question of hundreds then; and although Oriental writers and their Christian colleagues mention hundreds of thousands of people, this exaggerated statement must be attributed to Oriental imagination, or to the then prevailing fanatic dread of the wild and foreign warriors. It has now been satisfactorily ascertained that in the army of Genghis only a limited number of Mongols were enlisted, and that the main body consisted of Turks and Ugrians, who had joined the conqueror on his victorious

* Rittich, 'Materiali dlya etnografy Rossiy, Kazanskaya Guberniya,' vol. i., p. 93.

march.* From this point of view it is easy to see how the national Slav element, with its strong domestic proclivities, succeeded at last in breaking the backbone of nomadic existence. And as regards the further means which led to the final decomposition of nomadic society—if we may be allowed to call it by that name—the answer to this problem must be found in the manner in which Russia, in the strength of its superior culture, exerted its influence over the nomads. In Ivan's time fortified places were made whence the newly-conquered districts were governed and kept in check. These places became afterwards centres of colonisation. Thus, *Arska* was founded to check the Cheremises and Tartars; *Laishova*, to check the Nogays and Tartars (1557); *Cheboksar*, to check the Nogays and Tartars (1555), also *Telyush* (1555), *Kozmodemyansk* (1563), *Tzivilsk* (1583), and many others. The first inhabitants of these fortified places were the Stryelzi (archers), who afterwards amalgamated with the peaceful inhabitants. Through these settlements the restlessness of the nomadic element was kept firmly within bounds.† The Grand-Dukes of Moscow could never have dreamed of a voluntary colonisation of the Turco-Tartars; such a thing even in modern times would seem almost impossible—witness the Russian attempts at colonisation in the Kirghis Steppe. But there was another way by which the desired metamorphosis might be effected, and that was conversion to Christianity; for it was believed that if the conquered tribes could be made to adopt the faith of their victors, a gradual merging of the two conflicting elements would be accomplished. In Asia, where religion has always played a more important

* Compare Professor W. W. Grigorieff's treatise, 'The Relations of the Nomads with Civilised States' (*Russian Review*, vol. vii., pp. 321-350).

† Rittich, vol. i., p. 99.

part than nationality, conversion has generally proved successful. Proselytising is the chief strength of the Ottoman Empire, for only through the absorption of the Greek and Armenian elements of Asia Minor has it been possible to instil in the army and in the State that spirit of perseverance which has enabled them to press on towards Europe, and to maintain their independence longer than any of their Turkish predecessors on the road to conquest. The Russians never were in any way inferior to the Osmanli in their religious zeal and proselytising, for it is a well-known fact that the Double Cross has been the most efficacious weapon in the establishment of the gigantic Russian Empire in Asia. Ikonnikoff, in his study of the history of Russia in its relation to civilisation, says that the campaign against Kazan bore an eminently orthodox religious character. Ivan the Terrible said: 'I will not see the destruction of the Christian converts who are loyal to me, and to my last breath I will fight for the Orthodox faith. Trusting in God, in Mary the Mother of God, and in the miracle-working saints, we will go on.' It was the many different religions he had to deal with which made the work so difficult, and to this day the mighty Russian Empire labours under the same difficulty. Wherever the Russians have come into contact with the Finnish-Ugrian tribes, which were for the greater part heathens or else Shamans, the work of conversion was comparatively easy, for the Orthodox Church, if at first only in appearance and in outward form, has gradually occupied all the ground. The conversion of the Chuvashes, a Turkish-Ugrian tribe,* dates from the year 1743; that of the Mordvines, or, as the Russians call them, Mordvas, although begun in the time of Ivan the Terrible, was not completed until the reign of the Empress Elizabeth; but even to this day

* Rittich, vol. i., p. 93.

the Chuvashes retain many of their heathen customs. So also the Votyaks—a tribe which emigrated from Siberia, and is known to the Russians as the 'white-eyed Finns'—were easily induced to embrace Christianity after the conquest of Kazan; but of course they retained many of their heathen manners and customs, as did also the Cheremises, a strong mixture of Ugrian-Turco elements, and who, after much warfare* under Ivan the Terrible,† have in modern times embraced Christianity.‡ Fortunately for the Russians, these isolated tribes of the Finn-Ugrians, and particularly the 'Forest-Cheremises,' although formerly of a warlike disposition, wild and inaccessible, have become at an early date reconciled to settled dwellings. They were at most only semi-nomads, and therefore more open to Russian influence than the essentially nomadic Turco-Tartar elements.

According to Rittich,§ the Cheremises of Kosmode-myansk have become quite Russified, and can, as far as their habits are concerned, scarcely be distinguished from the Russians themselves. A settled or partially settled population is far easier influenced by foreign culture than wandering tribes, for, as the proverb says: 'A rolling stone gathers no moss.' External influences have not much hold upon them; new views of life, new manners and customs, do not appeal to them—

* See my 'Türkenvolk,' Leipzig, 1888, pp. 444-495.

† In the insurrection against Ivan, Votyaks and Cheremises played a conspicuous part; 800 Russians fell in the first battle, and afterwards another 500 under the command of the Wojwod Boris Saltykoff (Karamsin, vol. vii., p. 354).

‡ Pauli (vol. i., p. 168) says: 'Almost all Cheremises belong to the Orthodox Church, although true Christian principles are only found among a very limited number. The greater part of the Cheremises either profess Islamism or else they are idolaters, fetish-worshippers, or Shamans.'

§ Rittich, A. Ph., 'Materiali Dlya Etnographiy Rossiy. Kazanska Guberniya XIV.—Taga.' Kazan, 1870, vol. ii., p. 130.

they do not know what to make of them. Baptism, the first and principal condition for a closer communion with the Russians, made but slow progress. The Archbishop Misail, sent by the Patriarch Nikom to convert the Mordvines and who wanted to use force, was murdered by them.* The Votyaks and other Ugrian tribes in the principality of Kazan also offered fierce resistance at first, but not with the same persistence as the Moslem Tartars. Of course in many instances the Orthodox Church had to close one eye; it had to be satisfied with an external profession of Christianity, for many of these Ugrian converts have to this day remained faithful to their heathen feasts, customs, and superstitions. But this is only a question of time. In proportion as the Russian language becomes more generally taught in the schools, these reminiscences of antiquity will gradually disappear and the Russification of the Ugrians will make rapid progress.

* Pauli, vol. i., p. 122.

CHAPTER IV

FORCED CONVERSION OF TARTARS

WHAT has been said about the Finnish-Ugrian elements does not apply to the Turco-Tartars of European Russia, for in the case of these latter the civilising efforts of the Russians met with two great difficulties, closely connected and in a manner completing one another. I refer to the ethnical and the religious relations of the Turco-Tartars, which have hindered the assimilation, are hindering it still, and, as far as one can see, are likely to hinder it for a good while to come yet. The Turks, the *natio militans* of the Middle East, are only noticeable in the civilising movement where they appear upon the scene in company with Aryan or Semitic elements, as, for instance, the Osmanli, who, after amalgamating with these elements, have created for themselves under the protection of Islam a special form of culture in their political, social, and intellectual life. History teaches, moreover, that the Turco-Tartars, those born warriors of the desert, have never found any delight in a settled life and peaceful occupation, and that in every instance coercion has been the means to bind them to the soil. Where the Turk ceases to rule sword in hand he soon loses his nationality altogether, or else it dies a lingering, miserable death. After the Double Cross had commenced its victorious campaign, the numerical strength of the Turks residing north of the Caspian and Black Seas, which up to that time had been

fairly large, diminishes perceptibly; and although the Nogays, Bashkirs, Crimean Tartars, and Kirghises are occasionally and sporadically heard of, their political existence soon became extinct; so likewise the Osmanli in the last Russo-Turkish War have gradually retreated from the Balkan peninsula, and are still migrating in the direction of Anatolia. There are a few isolated instances of Turkish warriors who, favoured by fortune, have succeeded in founding new States in various parts of the old world—as, for instance, the Ghaznevides and Timurides in India, the Sefevides and Kadjars in Persia, and the Osmanides in Turkey; but everywhere their dominion depended upon the success of their arms, and where this glamour failed their power was gone. The Turks, then, who came under the Russian sceptre, true to their national character, have hardly given the Russian conqueror a fair chance of civilising them, and except for a few towns-people engaged in trade before the advent of the Russians—as, for instance, the Tartars in Kazan, Astrakhan, Tomsk, and Tobolsk, the occasional Russian attempts at civilising the Turks have remained fruitless. There are certain natural and ethical conditions, the result of long custom, which are very difficult to break. The predilection for a roaming life in their boundless desert-home is born and bred in the Turkish blood, and a Turkoman once very aptly remarked to me that ‘it would be easier to pin every grain of sand to the soil than to make a Turkoman into a man of settled habits.’

By means of the fortified places built in the conquered khanate of Kazan, the Ugrians were first compelled to settle in fixed dwelling-places; and as the Russians freely mixed with the baptised Tartars, Chuvashes, Cheremises, Mordvines, and Votyaks, the present population of the principality of Kazan

forms a mixture of various well-known races.* The Turks, as already mentioned, furnished the smallest contingent, which, apart from their innate love for a nomadic life, is chiefly due to the influence of Islam, which has hampered all Russia's attempts at civilisation. The doctrine of Mohammed, peculiarly suited to the general ideas, domestic and intellectual pursuits of the Asiatic, has always stood apart from other religions; fully persuaded of its own superiority and saving efficacy, it stands firm as a rock where the contest with other beliefs is unavoidable. We have already remarked that the Turk in his nomadic condition is at best but a feeble follower of Islam, but notwithstanding this lack of strength and enthusiasm Christianity has not been able to shake the Moslem faith of the Turks who have fallen under the Tsar's dominion. It is the Russian sword, and not the Double Cross, which has gained the victory over Islam. From the learned and excellent work of Welyaminoff-Zernoff† about the Tsars and Tsareviches of the House of Kasimoff, we learn that of the Tartar Princes who enjoyed the favour of Tsar Vasili the Blind, and who had the rule over various principalities, very few fell away from Islam, although they maintained their vassalage from the middle of the fifteenth to the end of the seventeenth century. Among the baptised Moslem-Tartar Princes mentioned in history we find the name of Khudai-kul, who on December 21, 1505, received the sacrament of Baptism, and with it the name of *Peter*,‡ and a month later

* Rittich, vol. i., p. 103.

† Welyaminoff-Zernoff, W. W., 'Izsljedowaniye o Kasimowskikh Czarakh i czarewichakh.'- St. Petersburg, 1863-1866, three volumes. The first volume has been published in German translation under the title of 'Untersuchung über die Kasimofschén Zaren und Zarewitsche, von W. W. Welyaminoff-Zernoff.' Translated from the Russian by Dr. Julius Theodor Zenker. Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1867.

‡ The same, vol. i., p. 181.

married Eudoxia, sister of the Grand-Duke Vasil Ivanovich. He was a son of Shah Ali, by the Russians called Shigali; his second son, Melik Tahir, remained true to Islam all his life, while two other sons adopted Christianity, and received the names of Vasili and Fedor. The latter two Princes, however, did not adopt Christianity from choice, but under the Russian jurisdiction Christianity was offered as an alternative to death in cases where Tartars had been convicted of some breach of confidence.

When Shah Ali was exiled on account of secret and treacherous dealings with Kazan, his wives, children, and relatives submitted to Baptism in order to escape torture and martyrdom. In note 98, vol. i., of the above-mentioned work—'The History of the Tsars and Tsareviches'—we read the following details: 'In this same year (17043—*i.e.*, 1535) in the month of June (26 and 27) seventy-three of Shah Shigali's (Shah Ali) Tartars were cast into prison, and afterwards condemned to death and executed. Amongst these were seven children, who were strangled by day, and at night their bodies were thrown into the water. Eight prisoners were kept in confinement, but had neither food nor water given to them, and were finally also put to death.' In another account we read: 'The Grand-Duke Ivan Vasilevich, in a fit of anger with the Tartars at Novgorod, threw more than eighty of them into prison; they all died five days later with their belief unchanged. In the same manner died seventy persons in Pekoff, and only one amongst them acknowledged the One Holy and Orthodox Church, and he received the name of *Michael*, whereas his former name was *Hasan*.' In Novgorod forty-three women and thirty-six children, in Pekoff fifty women and children, were on that occasion forced to enter the Orthodox Church.*

* Welyaminoff, vol. i., p. 283.

Concerning other Princes of the House of Kasimoff, we know that Seid Burhan, son of Arslan Shah, joined the Christian Church between 1653 and 1655, and took the name of Vasili. Together with him a relation of his, Prince Altun-Ay, a son of Kōchūm Khan, and his family, accepted Christianity. During the reign of Seid Burhan, who died in 1680, the conversion of Moslems of the House of Kasimoff appears to have made rapid progress. 'The Russian propaganda'—thus writes Welyaminoff*—'had in all probability started before that time. The Orthodox element preponderated over all other beliefs under Arslan and Seid Burhan, and the change to Christianity, if only in outward form, was accomplished quietly and gradually. Under the reign of Vasili the struggle between the Orthodox Church and other religions began to spread. On the part of the Russian Government measures were taken for the conversion of the Tartars, more particularly of the heathen Mordvines. These people, obedient to the voice of the Government and the clergy, embraced Christianity by whole villages at once, sometimes of their own free will, sometimes after long and serious fighting.' The author of the 'History of the House of Kasimoff' remarks that these first steps towards the merging of the Tartar element into the Russian were made possible because the Princes set a good example and embraced Christianity. Thus, for instance, after the taking of Kazan, the conversion of Yadigyar Khan led to a large body of Moslems accepting Christianity. Russian historians would have us believe that these conversions were voluntary acts, but this is contradicted by the noteworthy fact that the number of Tartars who forsook Islam, and whose descendants to this day are called 'Kreshcheni Tartars' (baptised Tartars), now, after a lapse of

* Welyaminoff, vol. iii., p. 425.

nearly 500 years, only amounts to about 30,000.* The Tartars baptised in the time of Ivan the Terrible were distinguished by the Russians as 'Stari-Kreshcheni' (old-baptised), in contradistinction to the 'Novo-Kreshcheni' (new-baptised). The fact that throughout the first centuries of their amalgamation, in spite of the continuance of so many of their old-world customs, Christianity preponderated, is to be attributed, as Rittich rightly remarks, to the existing difficulties of intercourse with the rest of the Islamic world; for the Orthodox Church always has had, and still has, but a loose hold on them. As regards the newly-baptised, it is fair to suppose that on the whole they incline more towards Islam than towards Christianity. The Russian Church has made much of these Tartar converts, and holds them up as encouraging examples for the further conversion of the Volga Turks. We owe much of our knowledge on this subject to the Russian Orientalist Nikolai Ivanovich Ilminski.† His disquisitions deserve special attention as revealing the chief motives of the Russian efforts at civilisation.

* Rittich (vol. ii., p. 7) speaks of only 27,901 souls.

† About the life and the works of this distinguished Russian scholar two excellent books have been written: (1) 'Na Pamyat Nikalaye Iwanowiche Ilminskom o dwadzatipyatiletyu Bratstwa Swatitelya Guriya. Bratchika N. Znamanskago. Kazan, 1892' (In remembrance of N. I. Ilminski, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Brotherhood of St. Guria, by M. Znamenski, a member of the Brotherhood). (2) 'Nikolai Iwanowich Ilminski. Izbraniya Myeste iz pedagogicheskikh sochineniy, nyekotoriya swyedyeniya o yego dyeyatelnosti i o poslyednikh dnyakh yego zhizni. Kazan, 1892' (selected passages from his pedagogic works, and instances about his work and the latter days of his life).

CHAPTER V

RUSSIFICATION AND EMIGRATION

THE classification into old and newly baptised, dates, correctly speaking, from the year 1740, when, for the benefit of the Moslem Tartars, a special mission was organised in connection with the Convent of Swiyask.* In places where the newly-baptised lived in close vicinity to the Russians, Christianity became fairly well established, but where they lived at greater distances from the Russian bases they soon turned back to Islam. Many of them continued their Moslem practices in secret, attended the mosques, and held clandestine meetings with the Mollas. Moreover, they often had both Christian and Mohammedan names, as was the case with the pseudo-Mohammedans near Trebisond and Salonica. Under these circumstances one could hardly expect a close bond of union to exist between the converts and the Russians. As a rule the Christian Tartars lived quite apart from the Russians; intermarriage was almost unknown, while marriages between the Russians and baptised Cheremises, Votyaks, and Mordvines did not belong to the exceptions.† For a long time the Government placidly accepted these conditions; nay, more, by the Ukas of 1773, proclaiming religious tolerance, the propagation of Islam was practically encouraged. In 1778 the Government established at Ufa a kind of Russian Sheikh-ul-Islamate, and not only did the number of mosques rapidly

* 'Na Pamyat,' iii., p. 327.

† Rittich, vol. ii., p. 7.

increase after that, but Islamism spread unchecked among the Kirghises and Bashkirs, who until then had been Shamans. The Russian ethnographer Rittich remarks on this point that the reign of Catherine II. has done more for the furtherance of Islam than the khanate of Kazan during the whole time of its independence. The real object of the Government in thus favouring Islam was to induce the nomads to take up more settled habits, in the belief that the religion of Islam, being more in keeping with the Asiatic mind, would lend itself better as a first step towards civilisation. This tolerance naturally turned out to the disadvantage of the Orthodox Church; a reaction was bound to follow, nor was it long in coming.

The first really serious attempts at a systematic conversion and Russification of the Tartars in Kazan and neighbouring districts date from the year 1854, when it was decided to establish at the Academy of Kazan a mission in four divisions, viz.: (1) Anti-Moslemic, (2) anti-Raskolnik, (3) anti-Buddhistic, and (4) anti-Heathen, the latter being directed against the Chuvashes and Cheremises, who had remained faithful to their old heathen beliefs.* At the head of the anti-Moslemic division was the learned Orientalist N. I. Ilminski, already referred to, assisted by Professor Sablukoff. Ilminski, who was the moving spirit of this division, insisted that, in the Tartar dialect of the Kazan Tartars, Russian transcription, although not fully meeting all the requirements, should be used in preference to the Arabic writing, which was both foreign and incapable of conveying the full sound of the Turkish tongue.† All superfluous Arabic-Persian expressions and words were to be eliminated and replaced by old Turkish ones, so that the language should become

* 'Na Pamyat,' p. 95.

† In the Russian language the sound of *ö* and *ü* does not exist which in Turkish plays an important part.

simpler and bear a more decided Turkish national character, and eventually assist the work of Russification.

Apart from these linguistic reforms, Ilminski took care that his pupils—the future missionaries and teachers of the natives—were also made familiar with the doctrines of Islam, and for this purpose he delivered lectures on *Mukhtassar-ul-Wukaye*, *Fikh*, *Feraiz*, and others, also on other subjects discussed at the Moslem Universities. In short, he instituted a kind of polemic course of training, whereby the missionaries schooled in the religious knowledge of the Moslems would be qualified to enter into discussions with the Mollas, and to refute the tenets of the Koran and the Sunnah. Apart from the very problematic value of this project—for in the art of religious argument Christian clergy, and the Russian clergy in particular, are but poor bunglers compared with the Mollas—the plan of the learned Russian Orientalist found but little favour with the Orthodox Church. When, in 1857, Canon Ivan, afterwards Bishop of Smolensk, took over the management of the institution, Ilminski received a severe reproof. The new Rector, who was both fanatic and ignorant, argued that the future missionaries need have no knowledge whatever of Islam; the learned Orientalist, he said, was far too sanguine; he had entered far too deeply into the mysteries of Moslem theology, and appeared singularly attracted by the doctrines of Mohammed. It is characteristic of the spirit of the seminary that, of the sixty students whose names were entered in 1858, only fifteen interested themselves in the course of the anti-Islamic lectures. And yet Ilminski was perfectly right in the methods he had adopted. It is only when possessing a minute knowledge of the Koran and the Sunnah that the missionary has a chance of being heard by the Mohammedans. He can certainly never do any good by

ignoring their tenets or by using rigorous measures such as the Russian clergy employed. It remains a fact that the Russian philologists Ilminski, Chestakoff and Zolotnitzky, in their endeavours to improve the popular speech, have contributed more to the Russification of the motley mixture of nationalities in the principality of Kazan than all the violent measures which the Synod has put into practice. The former, at any rate, accomplished this, that amongst the baptised Tartars of the present day there is much less falling back than there used to be, and that the Moslem Tartars learn to speak and to write the Russian language far more easily than before. To the majority of the Kazan Moslems the Russian tongue is quite familiar; the women perhaps make an exception. The elementary and higher schools are attended by the Moslem children, although always under compulsion; for the parents are still afraid for their children to have intercourse with the Christians, lest they should acquire habits which are contrary to the doctrines of Mohammed. Young Tartars are taught the elements of geography, history, physics, and arithmetic, but their belief is not interfered with. The first instruction is given in the Mekteb, or Mohammedan school, supported by private donations. A school of this kind is found in connection with every mosque, even in the smallest communities.

Although the system inaugurated by the Synod for the conversion of the Moslem Tartars has proved a failure, the efforts of the Educational Department, under Count D. A. Tolstoi, who in 1866 and 1867 visited the Volga district and Odessa* for this purpose, have not been without success. He has carried the Ilminski system into effect, and in so far as this was possible in the face of the fanaticism of the Volga Tartars and Crimean Tartars, incited by the Turks and Central Asiatics, Tolstoi has raised the education of

* 'Na Pamyat,' p. 217.

the Tsar's Moslem subjects in South Russia on to a higher level. Notwithstanding the secret and deeply-rooted hatred of all that is Christian, and particularly of the Russian Government, the Moslem Tartars of South Russia, especially the towns-people, are in point of modern culture far in advance of their co-religionists in Central Asia and in the eastern regions of the Ottoman Empire. The Volga Tartars and Crimean Tartars distinguished themselves by their industry, economy, and sobriety; they are keen tradesmen, mostly in a small way, and throughout the vast Russian Empire they have the reputation of being reliable and fair in all their dealings. Perhaps it may be attributed to their submissive nature and their inclination towards culture that the number of Kazan Tartars, instead of decreasing, has considerably increased, as may be seen from the following table :

1858 (according to Lapteff)	...	444,509
1868 (according to Rittich)	...	482,809
1897 (last census)*	625,847

This numerical increase is the more striking because in other parts of the Russian Empire—for instance, among the Crimean Tartars, in the Caucasus, and also in Siberia—the number of Moslem Tartars has remarkably decreased.† This phenomenon, however, may be partly explained by the geographical position of these Moslem groups—that is to say, the nearer they live to the frontiers of the independent Ottoman Empire, the easier it is for them to emigrate, and consequently the more Moslem subjects are being lost to the Russian

* ‘ Raspredyelenie Nasseleniya Imperii po glawnim wyeroizpowyedaniam ’ (Division of the people of the Empire, according to the Principal Confessions of Faith). Whether the Meshcheryaks, Tepters, and Babilis are included is not certain.

† According to Mohammed Fatih, in his work ‘ Kirima Siahat ’ (Journey to the Crimea), Orenburg, 1904, about 300,000 Tartars have emigrated to Turkey.

Empire.* Two hundred years ago the number of Moslem Tartars in the Crimea and Tauria must in any case have been considerably greater than it is now. The Turkish element pervaded very nearly the whole region from the Pruth to the Volga, extending southward as far as the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, and northward in sporadic groups as far as the borders of the Slav district. Only in this way can we account for the great political influence of the Khans of the Crimea in their intercourse with Russia, Poland, and Turkey, and this also explains the existence there of a standing army, many thousands strong, with which they were able to invade the neighbouring lands and penetrate far into the interior of Poland and Hungary.†

Now only a small remnant of this once strong national element is left, partly in the Crimea, and partly to the north-west of the Caspian Sea. The same methods which in the principality of Kazan crippled the nomadic element and established the Slav colonies in this instance supplanted the Turkish elements and drove them back into the steppes. Nogays and Turkomans form the scanty remnant of a force which at one time filled all South Russia with terror, and the number of genuine Crimean Tartars, a mixture of Turks, Greeks, and Cimrians, has perceptibly decreased. Pauli‡ in his ethnographical work speaks of 276,000; according to Telfer,§ they num-

* In a review of the correspondence of the Khans of the Crimea with Russia, as given in 'Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire du Khanat de Crimée, par Weliaminof-Zernof, St. Petersburg, 1864,' we marvel as we read of the enormously large troops at the disposal of Bagchesarai, and which from time to time made incursions into Russian Poland and Hungary. Even allowing for a great deal of Oriental exaggeration, the nomadic populace which furnished these troops must have been of remarkable numerical strength.

† Pauli, vol. i., p. 277.

‡ The same, vol. i., p. 272.

§ 'The Crimea and Trans-Caucasia,' vol. ii., p. 214.

bered 127,682 in the year 1874; Semennoff in his geographical-statistic dictionary of the Russian Empire (vol. v., part i., 1875) estimates them at 100,000; according to the official figures for 1864 there were 164,900, and according to the census of 1884 142,000.* The Russian census for 1897 gives the Moslem population in the whole province of Tauria as 190,514 souls. In some Russian descriptions of the Crimea, Pauli's amongst them,† the view is expressed that the Crimean Tartars, as soon as they shall be made thoroughly familiar with all the conditions of a settled life, will resemble the Russians so nearly that amalgamation with them will follow as a matter of course. But this is decidedly a mistaken view; for when Russia in 1764 incorporated the Crimea into the Tsar's dominions, Sumarokoff states that about 300,000 Tartars emigrated to Turkey.‡ After the Crimean War emigration received a fresh impetus, and for the Taurian peninsula alone amounted to 192,360 persons, so that in the course of the nineteenth century the number of South Russian emigrants (Crimean Tartars and Nogays) must be estimated at 500,000 souls at least; and emigration goes on even now, as we shall have occasion to notice again in the course of this work. Apart from the decrease in numbers caused by emigration, the compulsory colonisation and the aggravated conditions of nomadic existence must be taken into account as important factors for the decline of the Turkish element in the south and south-east of European Russia. At present the number of Tartars and Bashkirs collectively amounts to two and a half millions, and when we remember the important part these tribes played in

* 'Zamyetki ob etnicheskom sostavye tyurskich plemen i narodnostey i swyedeniya ob ich chislenosti by N. A. Aristow.' St. Petersburg, 1897, p. 129.

† Pauli, vol. i., p. 302

‡ Aristoff, 'Zamyetki,' p. 129.

the Middle Ages, and also in modern times, in the large territory between the Ural and the Pruth, before the intrusion of the Slavs, the conviction is forced upon us that the Ural-Altaic race *has lost at least two-thirds of its former numerical strength, and is in some places destined to destruction.* We see, then, that the slavonising of Eastern Europe, commenced by Ivan the Terrible with so much skill and energy, has steadily continued ever since, and that the Ural-Altaic race has been the largest contributor to the extraordinary increase of Russian Slavdom.

CHAPTER VI

CULTURAL EFFORTS IN THE KIRGHIS STEPPE

OUR sketch of the influence of Russia upon the Turkish element in the European portion of the Tsar's dominions may suitably be completed by tracing the corresponding phenomena in the Asiatic territory of the Turco-Tartars, and our attention is directed in the first place towards the operations of Russia in the Kirghis Steppes. Here the Russian interference is of comparatively recent date. It is only in modern times that they have taken the matter energetically in hand, for with the exception of the nominal submission of the Kirghis chieftain Albukhair Khan, in 1734, the actual interference of Russia in the administration of the steppes dates from the year 1845, when General Obrucheff constructed the line of small forts by means of which he could keep a check on all that was going on, and, except for a few occasional outbreaks, succeeded in bringing the hitherto independent nomads under the Russian yoke. But all this was, necessarily slow work, and the final subjugation and incorporation of the Kirghis Steppe into the Tsar's dominions was only made possible when, with the taking of Tashkend, in 1865, the steppe region, inhabited by the Kirghises, was closed in on all sides as by an iron fence. The methods employed by the Russians for the civilisation of the Kirghis Steppe were from the first quite different to the means used in the previous century for the subjugation of the Turco-Tartars

and the Ugrians. Then compulsory baptism and the propagation of the Orthodox Church was held to be the only salutary course to pursue, but in modern times those in authority began to think that in a less rigorous, more roundabout manner the desired results might be obtained equally well, and they commenced to educate the people and to build schools. As early as 1859, General-Lieutenant Glukhoff* had suggested that schools should be built in which the nomad children could receive tuition in the elementary subjects in the Kirghis tongue. At that time the Kirghises had already their own schools, the so-called *Mektebs*, which were always close to the mosques, and under the supervision of the *Mollas*. As a matter of course, only Moslem subjects were taught there. The schools were generally managed by Tartar *Mollas* from Kazan, or sometimes from Bokhara or Tashkend, and they became hotbeds of fanaticism and hatred against the Russian *Giaours*, for only thus could the doctrine of Islam be upheld among the wild nomads, who always had a leaning towards Shamanism. The Tartars from Kazan and Orenburg had for a long while been trading in the steppes, but apart from their commercial pursuits they had been busy as missionaries for Islam. They did duty as reciters and expounders of the Koran Law, and thus formed a serious opposition and hindrance to the Russian plans. The schools for the children of Russian soldiers and colonists, erected

* For the particulars here given concerning the Russian schools in the steppes and in Russian Turkestan, I am chiefly indebted to a work of the learned Russian Orientalist, N. P. Ostroumoff, which appeared at Tashkend in 1899 under the title of 'K'istoriy narodnago obrazovaniya v'turkestanskom kray. Konstantin Petrowich von Kaufmann, ustroyitel turkestanskayo kraya. Litchniya vospomenaniya' (History of the Education of the People in Turkestan. Konstantin Petrovitch Kaufmann, the Builder of Turkestan. A personal reminiscence, 1877-1881). This treatise will in future be referred to in this work under the title of 'Ostroumoff.'

in Rehimsko, Kazalinsk, Karmakchi, Kamish-Kurgan and Perowski, had found no favour with the Kirghises, for the parents were afraid that their children would turn against Islam and become Christians. One case only is recorded of voluntary entrance into one of these schools, namely, of a Kirghis youth of twenty years of age, Kul-Mohammed Utaganoff by name, who attended the school in 1862.

In order to overcome these prejudices the Governor-General of Orenburg and Samara, and General-Adjutant Katenin, decided to build a Kirghis seminary, in which twenty-five young Kirghises could be accommodated and brought up on strictly ritualistic Moslem principles. They were to be dressed in a special uniform, with the exception of the Kirghis Tobetei (small round cap). A four years' course of training was fixed upon, after which the young men could enter the military school at Orenburg. This plan, however, was not carried out until 1863. All included, only fourteen Kirghises consented to let their children be educated at the seminary; ten of these belonged to the Bis—*i.e.*, the upper classes—and four to the lower class. The seminary was opened by General Wereffkin (read Weryoffkin) with the following address:

' Bis, Gray-beards, and Distinguished Kirghises !

' By command of the Government I herewith open this first school for Kirghis pupils. I consider myself fortunate to have this duty to perform, for I am firmly convinced that this school will be of great benefit to your children. It is to be regretted that so far the intention of the Government has not met with the sympathy it deserves from you, for up to now only fourteen pupils have applied for the twenty-five free places. To some extent I can understand your hesitation; I know that many of you have been born and brought up in the districts of Khiva and Khokand. There

you were accustomed to see that the authorities only looked after their own interests, and cared nothing about your welfare. But your former experiences and observations do not apply here. I pray you not to forget that you have the good fortune to be the subjects of the Russian Emperor, whose chief care and joy it is to do good to all his children without distinction, no matter whether they be Christians or Mohammedans, Russians or Kirghises. We, His Majesty's servants, therefore consider ourselves bound to promote your future welfare to the best of our ability, and to diffuse among you such useful knowledge as is indispensable to a happy life. For this purpose the Government has thought well to open schools for the education of your children at State expense; no money will be asked from you nor any other sacrifice; all that you are asked to give is your confidence and co-operation. The children who enter this school will at the end of the course return to you free and unbiassed. This I promise you faithfully; do not, therefore, believe those who tell you differently. In the school the children will only learn such things as they are likely to need in their after-life; they will be made wiser, better, and more useful men; they will be a comfort and a joy to you. I believe also that the children themselves, after their education here is finished, will always look back with pleasure upon their school-days; I and my fellow-workers will do all we can to let this be so. I beg of you, whenever you feel inclined, to come and visit the school, so that you may judge for yourselves what your children do, how they are instructed, how they are treated; and you will then be fully convinced that in establishing these schools the Government has only your interest at heart. Any remarks, requests, or suggestions which you may have to offer regarding the instruction or the maintenance of the pupils will

receive my fullest attention. My house is open to everyone; I shall be pleased to see any of you, and I can only ask you not to hesitate to let me know your wishes. In conclusion, I desire to thank all who have given us their confidence; they shall never regret it.*

This address merits our respect as coming from a man who, like General Wereffkin, had won for himself much glory in the campaign against Khiva in 1873, but it also proves how strong was the mistrust of the inhabitants of the steppes with regard to the educational movement. As a matter of fact, the results have not been worth all the trouble and expense bestowed upon it by the Government. Wherever steppe schools have been erected in close proximity to khanates, they meet with very little encouragement; but, on the other hand, in the neighbourhood of strictly Russian communities they find more general favour. In the school of Kazalinsk,† for instance, only ten Kirghis pupils attended, while in Orenburg the number was considerably larger. On the whole, I think that the Government has been too sanguine about the success of their colonising and civilising methods among the nomads. The experience of the French with the Kabyles of Algiers is not exactly a stimulating example. General Kaufmann, the most zealous of civilisers, who stood at the head of the Russian administration in Turkestan, took every conceivable trouble to educate the Kirghises by means of Russian schools. He had more confidence in this tribe than in the Sarts, who,

* Ostroumoff, p. 249.

† The same, p. 258. Ostroumoff attributes this circumstance to the fanaticism of the Kirghis teacher Gul Mohammed Baidjanoff, who was soon after dismissed and replaced by another Kirghis Molla, Mumin Baidasoff. We have some difficulty, however, in accepting this view, as the time seems far distant yet that the Kirghis Moslem will feel any drawing towards Russian education.

although more susceptible to culture, were so absolutely under the influence of Islam that he regarded a closer intercourse with Russian civilisation almost impossible. This view, however, was not quite correct, for although the nomad of Central Asia has been for more than 500 years under the influence of Islam, his knowledge of it is at best but superficial, and he still clings to the remnants of Shamanism. However, even the veneration of Islamism has so great a fascination for the Oriental *pur sang* that Christian culture has not much chance of breaking through the barrier. It is not so much the Mollas, the secular clergy educated in the Medresses (colleges), and who are more or less familiar with the tenets of Islam, but rather the Ishans (head-friars), dervishes and Kalenters, who exercise the greatest influence over the simple nomad. Their outward appearance, their familiar, grotesquely tattered garments, their wailing and howling, and their pretended magic power, have a wonderful charm for these simple children of the desert, and vividly remind them of the Bakhshi (troubadour, magician, physician, etc.), a relic of Shamanism, strictly prohibited by Islam. Moreover, it is but natural that any attempts at civilisation, and particularly by foreigners, should be resented by the Kirghises, who have always been used to a wandering life. Where Islam has so far been unsuccessful, Christian culture has not much chance. In the schools of Tashkend, Chimkend and Aulia-Ata, Perowski and Kazalinsk, existing since 1878, only sixty-three natives have studied, while these schools have been attended during that time by 2,193 Russian children,* and this in a district where the number of Christians, including the soldiers, is estimated at 42,819, and that of the Mohammedans at 1,413,114 souls.†

In the face of these undeniable signs of a strenuous resistance against enforced conversion, it must seem

* Ostroumoff, p. 109.

† Russian Census for 1897.

somewhat strange that Russia always looks upon the Kirghis state as virgin soil, eminently suitable for experimenting upon. General Kaufmann* wanted the 'History of Russia' to be translated into the Kirghis and Sart tongues, in the hope thereby to promote a certain intimacy with, and affection for, Russia. Again, the loyalty of the Kirghises, expressed in language in which one cannot fail to recognise official pressure, is far too much paraded by the Russians. I quote from Ostroumoff,† who says that when General Kaufmann, in 1878, was preparing for the expedition to the Djam, which virtually meant an expedition against India, the Kirghises of the Syr Darya district presented him with a new tent (Akoy), and the following address :

'To His Excellency the Chief Commander of Turkestan, Governor-General Kaufmann.

'Upon our plans God has created high mountains from whence run down brooks and streams of purest water. These waters we lead into our meadows and steppes in order to obtain from them bread for our sustenance and abundant fodder for our beasts. The Emperor has raised thee to be above us all ; he has made thee a Yarim Padishah [vice-Emperor] over us, and we are sure that our fields and our farms, under thy gracious, benevolent, and merciful administration, will yield abundantly and turn out to our advantage. We have heard that the Emperor has commanded thee to go on a long journey, and on the way thou wilt have to traverse wide steppes and high mountains. Graciously accept therefore from us, your subjects, this tent to be a protection on thy journey through our steppes. It is our own handiwork, made from the wood grown on our steppes and the wool of our cattle. This white tent will shield thee against the heat of the scorching sun, against rain and wind, even as the

* Ostroumoff, p. 104.

† The same, p. 60.

power and the law of the White Tsar shields us against the fire of our enemies, against the shedding of tears, against highway robbery and the quarrelling and brawling so common amongst us.'

Underneath were forty-six seal-stamps and forty-seven signatures.

It is very doubtful whether this manifestation of the Kirghises was founded on real sympathy. I believe they merely wanted to show that Turkestan, in case of war with England, would not revolt, and not cause Russia any trouble. In this sense we must also look upon the voluntary offerings of the steppe dwellers for the Red Cross—viz., to support Russia in the war against the Turks. The Kirghises in the Perowski district are said to have contributed Rs. 10,000, those of Kazalinsk Rs. 10,000, and those of Aulia-Ata Rs. 10,418. The Kirghises of Semiryeche were supposed to have sent, moreover, 2,000 horses to oppose the Khalifa, the sacred head of Islam, who, under the title of Sultani-Rum, is universally respected throughout Central Asia.

Candidly speaking, the Russians in their efforts to civilise the Kirghises had no need of such subterfuges and deceits. From the very first the Government at St. Petersburg has tried to improve the condition of the nomads, and to open the hitherto closed gates of the Old World to trade. The history of the negotiations carried on in the first half of the eighteenth century with the Khans of the three hordes, as related by Lewchine,* who founds his facts on the data furnished by Rytchkoff in his history of Orenburg, are a brilliant proof of the efforts, the friendly intentions, and also of the disillusionment, of the Russian

* 'Description des Hordes et des Steppes des Kirghiz-Kazaks ou Kirghiz-Kaïssak, par Alexis de Lewchine. Traduite du Russe par Ferry de Pigny.' Paris, 1840, pp. 165-300.

administrative power. From the first the authorities at St. Petersburg were fully aware that these wild, plunder-loving nomads could only be reached by the introduction of small settlements, and the fortresses already alluded to were the beginning of their colonisation system. The Government also realised that treaties made with the nomads, and addresses of devotion presented by them, could not be relied on. The Russian plans were frustrated, in the first place, through the geographical difficulties of the territory—an advance into the boundless steppes was not so easy as the advance from the khanate of Kazan to the South had been; in the second place, the numerical strength of the Kirghises* and their warlike temperament were a hindrance to their forcible repression and subjugation; and, finally, the Kirghises were encouraged and stimulated not only by the adjacent khanates, who naturally looked upon them as a wall of protection, but also by Constantinople,† in their hostile attitude towards Russia, known as the arch-enemy of Islam. Russia's sphere of power could therefore expand but slowly, and it was only after years of fighting and many vicissitudes that the Russians succeeded in obtaining a firm foothold in these regions, and were able to take the work of civilisation properly in hand. In the place of the Khans and 'White-bones' (Ak-söngek, as the native

* According to Aristoff (p. 116), the number of Kirghises not only under Russian dominion, but also under Khiva, Bokhara, and Chinese rule, are estimated at 3,236,394 souls.

† Very characteristic are the letters of Shah Murad, the ruler of Bokhara, published by Lewchine (p. 380), in which the Kirghis Khans are all individually exhorted to make war against the Russians because the Sultan of Turkey, the representative of God on earth ('Zil illahi fil arzi'), has ordained it. The Emir of Bokhara accuses the Kirghises of negligence in the observance of the doctrine of the Prophet, and is of opinion that the Universities of Bokhara, attended by students from far and near, are not appreciated by the Kirghises.

nobility is called), we now find Russian jurisdiction fairly well established in the steppes, and notwithstanding the great deficiency of the Russian officials, a decided step forward is made on the road to civilisation.* The terrible practices of the Barantas (marauding expeditions) indulged in by some of the tribes against each other, and through which large tracts of land were devastated, are never heard of now; peace and security prevail more and more, and under the cover of the railway from Orenburg to Tashkend, now opened to traffic, and by means of the projected line in conjunction with the Siberian Railway viâ Petropaulovsk, a brighter future is in store for the once dangerous district between the Ural and the Yaxartes.

In order to attain as near as possible to the fulfilment of their purpose, the Russians will have to take a lesson from the Kuramas in the so-called Kuraminsk district. These Kuramas (according to the etymology of the word, 'mixed race') consist correctly of real and semi nomads, who in consequence of their long intercourse with the settled population—*i.e.*, living within the sphere of Moslem culture—have themselves adopted settled habits. In order to effect nomad colonisation, therefore, Islamism, and not Christianity, as is often supposed, should be resorted to. In this sense the Edict of Tolerance issued by Catherine II. acted in the right direction, for under its auspices Islam flourished, and in Orenburg, as well as in the steppes, mosques and Moslem schools were established. To the nomad mind the words Turk and Moslem have the same meaning, just as Russian and Christian are synonymous; and it is

* The regulation Act concerning the administration of the Kirghis Steppe consists of 10 chapters and 319 articles; it dates from the time of Catherine II., and has necessarily in course of time undergone many alterations (see Lewchine, p. 467).

only because the doctrine of Mohammed is more in accordance with their views of life that this seems to be the best and most suitable instrument for bringing about the colonisation of these tribes. The results so far obtained by the Russian schools are too small and too insignificant to be of any weight. The Kirghis educated at one of these establishments will in after-life soon forget the impressions of his youth in the constant intercourse with his relations and tribesmen, and he will continue a faithful son of Mohammed. An occasional exception may occur among those who have been alienated from their tribe and have spent the whole of their life among the Russians. As such I would mention the Kirghis Altinsarin Ibrahim, a pupil of Ilminski's, who in 1859 made the acquaintance of the Orientalist W. W. Grigorieff, and served for a long time as Government interpreter at Orenburg : later on he visited St. Petersburg, where he was pleasantly received, and presented to the Imperial Family ; Yakob Petrovich Yakovleff, a Russified and baptised Kirghis, who worked in conjunction with Altinsarin and received employment in the Educational Department ; also the explorer Captain Welikhanoff, who in 1859, disguised as a Khokander merchant, traversed East Turkey, and afterwards described it ; W. W. Nalivkin, the deserving author of various philological, historical, and ethnographical works about Central Asia, who, as he told me himself, was of Kirghis birth, and left his wandering life in the steppes to enter the military service ; Katanoff, who possesses a thorough knowledge of the East Turkish dialect and of most of the Ural-Altaiic tongues, and has enriched this field of research with many valuable contributions.

No doubt there are many others besides these, of whom I have no knowledge, but the fact remains that the number of Russified or baptised Kirghises is

insignificantly small, hardly worth mentioning, in comparison with the number of nomads who, since the Russian occupation, have voluntarily adopted a settled life, and of whom further mention will be made in this work when we sum up the results of Russian civilisation. It must seem strange that, of the so-called Djighites*—*i.e.*, the Kirghises—who have served, and still serve, the Russians as guides, attendants, and escorts, and who are familiar with the language, customs, and habits of the conqueror, only very few have become Russified. The nomad may be a weak disciple of the Prophet's doctrine, but he can scarcely ever be induced to apostasy.

* Djighit or Yighit, meaning youth or hero, is the name given to nomads who used to serve as escorts to the traveller in the steppes from one halting-place to another.

CHAPTER VII

CULTURAL EXPERIMENTS IN TURKESTAN

EVEN as the triumphal march of the Russians from the Kirghis Steppe into the interior of Turkestan—*i.e.*, into the three khanates—may be considered the natural outcome of a long premeditated scheme, so also the foreign influences which forced an entrance from the North were bound at last to stir up the Central Asiatic world, hitherto closed to all influences emanating from Western lands. Two distinct systems of civilisation, absolutely foreign to one another, here came into collision. If the orthodox Christianity of Russia contains much of Oriental fanaticism and Asiatic credulity, the Islamism of Turkestan exhibits the most grotesque forms of Mohammedan zeal ever fostered by the doctrine of the Arabian Prophet; neither in Bagdad during the golden era of the Khalifate, nor in the sacred cities of Mecca and Medina, have they ever assumed such eccentric proportions. Greater contrasts can hardly be conceived than the two which here, in Turkestan, were opposed to one another. The night between June 14 and 15, 1865, in which General Chernayeff captured the city of Tashkend with 1,501 men and 12 old cannon* against a hundred times superior hostile force, marks the commencement of

* Franz von Schwarz, in his book 'Turkestan, die Wege der indogermanischen Völker,' written after a sojourn of fifteen years in Turkestan (Freiburg in Breisgau, 1900, p. 147), gives the number of the Khokandian troops at 15,000, that of the inhabitants at 90,000.

that interesting phenomenon, the collision between two independent civilisations, which is now reaching its culminating-point, and upon the various phases of which we will here endeavour to throw some light.

All that Russia and Turkestan knew of one another in past ages was confined to a mutual aversion, fear, and hatred. Turkestan merchants were allowed to trade in Russia, and from the earliest times they visited the annual fairs of Mesku (Moscow) and Mekeria (Nishni-Novgorod), but the Russians knew the khanates only as the dreaded regions of eternal slavery, and even the Tsar's Ambassadors fulfilled their missions at the risk of their lives. I was told in Samarkand, only two years before the capture of Tashkend, that 'so many saints are resting in the soil of this city, so hallowed is every inch of ground by the dust of the blessed, that the infidel who dares to force an entrance here must perish on the spot.' In Tashkend similar fond hopes were entertained, and when that which seemed impossible did take place, and the city was taken, it is not surprising to hear that the natives, utterly overcome, expected no less a fate than to be slaughtered by the Russians, or at the least forcibly converted to Christianity. According to the native idea, the Russians were incarnate fiends with one eye in the centre of their foreheads and many other infernal attributes,* and they were therefore agreeably undeceived when none of their terrible forebodings were realised, but when they found, on the contrary, that the Russians were friendly disposed, and that General Chernayeff, on the first day after he took possession, visited the public baths, attended by only two Cossacks, and a few days later called upon Hakim Khodja, the Kazi-Kelan (Chief Judge).†

* 'The Sartes Ethnographical Materials' (in Russian), second enlarged edition, with portraits of Sartes, p. 141.

† The same, p. 142.

When we consider a little more closely the momentous results of the foolhardy, almost miraculous exploit of Chernayeff, we can understand the profound astonishment which filled the Turkestanis, and made their blood run cold, so to speak. We also realise that the safety of the small company of Russian heroes amid the overwhelming numbers of natives rested upon the fame of the White Tsar's power, which had gradually spread throughout the oases, and made energetic opposition on the part of the Turkestan people practically impossible. Far be it from us to question the bravery, the death-defying courage, of the gallant little band of Russians; but, on the other hand, we must not forget the unparalleled cowardice of the Central Asiatics, and especially of the Sarts and Tadjiks, degraded and disheartened as they were by centuries of tyranny. Central Asiatics, with the exception of the Turkomans and the Kirghises, do not bear comparison with the warlike Rajputs, Sikhs and Mahrattas, nor with the Arabs and Osmanli. The Central Asiatic simply submits to the first regular army that attacks him, and when, contrary to his expectation—for, according to Asiatic notions, the fate of the vanquished is, to be slaughtered—the conqueror shows himself merciful and generous, the natives are necessarily filled with wonder and amazement. When, in 1873, General Kaufmann took Khiva and asked the Khan to come over to him to negotiate, the Khan felt quite certain that he and his companions would be murdered. And in Tashkend the people expected the same fate; but when they saw that the Christian conqueror laid no hands on the inhabitants or their possessions, that he respected the national customs, and, instead of attacking the institutions of Islam, confirmed them and extended his protection to the Mollas and the Reis, and established the Kurbashi and Aksakals in their former position and rights, it

was only natural that a feeling of security and of quiet submission to the unfathomable ordinances of fate (Kismet) should begin to prevail amongst them. A Turkish proverb says: 'The hand thou canst not cut off; kiss it reverently, and lay it on thine head.' And the Tashkenders acted upon this wise counsel. The day after their surrender they sent a deputation to do homage to Chernayeff. They assisted in housing and nursing the soldiers, and in outward appearance, at any rate, bore themselves as if nothing extraordinary had happened. And, indeed, the Tashkenders—in fact, all the Turkestanis—had no reason to assume any other attitude with regard to the Russians than that of quiet submission, obedience, and acquiescence; for the yoke of their new infidel masters was quite bearable, much easier, and more to their own advantage, than the régime of the native Khans, Emirs, and their Sipahis (officials) had been. The strict laws of a despotic Government are always easier to conform to than the uncertain rule of a vacillating Sovereign who is still imbued with the patriarchal spirit; for while the former insures at least public peace and security, the latter, where everything depends upon the arbitrary mood of the tyrant, renders the most peaceful and industrious citizen uncertain of his life from one day to another. However licentious and corrupt the Russian *Pristav* or *Nachalnik* may be, his rule has never been so absolutely bad as that of the native authorities in Persia and in the *knanates*. I have seen how innocent, defenceless people, whose wealth excited the avarice of native Princes or superior officers, were robbed without ceremony, thrown into prison, and murdered. The only escape these poor victims could hope for was by means of a general revolution or through the intercession of influential priests or scholars; but how frequently have not the *Kazi-Kelans* in Turkestan, and the thickly-turbaned *Much-*

tehids in Persia, under this cloak of mediation, played into the hands of the avaricious authorities ?

Under the Russian régime in Central Asia, these cruel, irregular practices of the native Government were put a stop to ; but instead of at once rejecting the existing native laws, reforms in the police supervision, in general jurisdiction, and in the collecting of taxes and similar matters, were introduced, and eventually replaced by Russian institutions. I have been assured by Mohammedans from Turkestan, whom I have met of recent years in Constantinople, that the taxation of the Russian Government is less oppressive than was that of the native Princes. The Zekiat and Tanab tax is one, in the collection of which even the Russian officials are not free from bribery, and the Kazi-Kelan in his administration of justice can pervert the Sheriat (religious law) to the advantage of himself or his favourites ; but behind all this stands the Russian law, ready to be appealed to. Of special advantage to the Central Asiatic of the present day is the freedom, the security, and the facilities of trade and traffic which he now enjoys. The long-distance journeys which in former times had to be made by caravan, in constant warfare with the elements and the natives, and which took several weeks to accomplish, can now be done by rail in as many days, without fear of being killed by robbers or of dying of thirst or in sand or snow storms. The facilities of travel now at their disposal are naturally made use of less in the interest of trade with the outside world than in the interest of pilgrimages to the holy cities of Arabia. The number of Central Asiatic Hadjis has considerably increased since the opening of the Transcaspian railway.* In

* I learn from a Turkish quarter that in the last few years the number of Turkish pilgrims to Mecca has varied from 10,000 to 15,000, while formerly, on account of the many risks and the great

the commercial intercourse between Turkestan and the outer world Russian merchants still take a prominent part; for whether he be Sart or Tadjik, the Mohammedan of Turkestan never feels drawn to visit the Christian world. The increased productiveness of the soil, or, rather, the increased value of some special products, cotton in particular, has benefited the Russians greatly, and they will continue to profit by it for many more years to come; for the sleepy, fatalistic Oriental, with his predilection for his religious fanaticism, and happiest in a dreamy *laissez aller*, cannot possibly be changed as by a *deus ex machina* into an energetic Westerner. Least of all could this change come about through Russian intervention; for the Russian himself is in many of his characteristics, thoughts, and actions, still under the ban of Asiaticism, and is therefore not wholly qualified to be the propagator of the European spirit of civilisation.

Although gladly acknowledging the many advantages for which Central Asia is indebted to Russian influence, and although readily admitting that, speaking generally, a decided improvement has been effected in the once utterly miserable condition of the population, we cannot conceal from ourselves the fact that it is the fault of the semi-Asiatic nature of the Russians *that the three*

expense involved, their numbers never exceeded a few hundreds. It is probably owing to the greatly increased intercourse with the holy cities of Arabia that the Russian Government has thought fit to appoint Ish Mohammed—in Russian called Ishayeff—to the Russian Consulate in Djedda, a post which was formerly occupied by Shahimerdan Ibrahimoff, Councillor of State. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Neva considered it necessary, in order to prevent anti-Russian propaganda on the part of the Porte, to entrust the guardianship of the true believers to a native Mussulman. This, however, was quite an unnecessary precaution, for the lazy Turkish officials have never troubled themselves to harm their arch-enemy in this roundabout way. The action, however, has proved Russia's tolerance, in that it gave a diplomatic office to a native Mussulman.

khanates of Turkestan, after forty years of Russian administration, are very far from having reached that degree of intellectual and material development which might have been attained, considering the adaptability of the subjugated peoples and the means at the disposal of the Russian Crown.

In the first place, the fundamental principle underlying all the actions of the Russian Government hitherto has been self-aggrandisement, without at least such a measure of zeal for the well-being and progress of the natives as has been displayed by other European Powers in Asia. None of the Powers have been actuated by purely unselfish motives, but in many respects they have better understood their duty to humanity as regards freedom and culture—the boast of Western lands—than Russia has done. The Russian railways have been built for strategic-military purposes, and with a view to future conquests; but as for the highways, they are still almost in the same condition as they were in my time, and traffic is carried on by means of the unwieldy arabas over rough roads—in winter through thick mud, and in summer through foot-deep dust.* The bridge system has not fared much better. Von Schwarz† tells us that up to the present the Russians have only built four bridges, which more than once, at high-water, have been carried away by the floods. Again, where England, for instance, has spent millions in India on the canal system and the irrigation of the soil—and in

* Von Schwarz (p. 168) says: 'In Tashkend the streets of the Sart towns are considerably better than those of any other Central Asiatic cities; but even here the conditions are such that once in the principal street eleven women were drowned through an unfortunate accident. While driving through a deep puddle the carriage broke down, and they were unable to extricate themselves out of the clammy slime. If such is the condition in the capital, what must it be in other towns?'

† The same, p. 418.

this respect stands out as a praiseworthy example*—Russia has left this matter, of such vital importance for the agriculture of Central Asia, in the hands of the Aryk-Aksakals (canal graybeards), without troubling to introduce the latest hydraulic inventions; nay, more than this, where Russian authority has tried to interfere it has done more harm than good.† The awkwardness, carelessness, and extravagance of the Russians in their attempts at canal-digging is best illustrated by the exploitation of the irrigation of the Famine Steppe, called by the natives *Bet-pak dala*—i.e., barren plain. Without doing the necessary levelling, they intended to dig a canal from the Syr Darya below Jizzak. The undertaking has so far swallowed up 20,000,000 roubles, and the wilderness still hungers and thirsts!

When we take into account the great importance of irrigation for the agriculture of Turkestan, the suitability of the soft sandy soil for canal-digging, the negligence of the Russian Government cannot be too severely censured, and they are put to shame by the native Princes, who, notwithstanding their insatiable greed, have devoted care and money to the maintenance of their canals. So far the Russian Government has only exerted itself in this matter where it affected its own immediate interests, as, for instance, for the cultivation of the cotton trade, which is supported and encouraged to such an extent that in many parts of Turkestan there is no room to grow sufficient corn for the maintenance of the people, and the Government comforts itself with the thought that, after the connection with the Siberian Railway shall

* Henri Moser, who makes no secret of his Russian sympathy, says in his book entitled 'L'Irrigation en Asie Centrale' (Paris, 1894, p. 276): 'Ce que fait dans l'Inde le rival de la Russie sur le domain de l'irrigation, est digne d'admiration.'

† Von Schwarz, p. 342.

be completed, grain can be imported from other districts.

So also it lies to the charge of the Russian Government, that, in a land where it has met with blind obedience and silent submission during the forty years of its administration, nothing has been done to banish the prejudices and superstitions of the natives, and to correct the many existing abuses and errors by useful innovations. The number of people who, in the art of building and furnishing their houses, have copied the Russian example may, even in Tashkend and Samarkand, be counted on one's fingers. Alcohol and prostitution, on the other hand, which in my time were unknown things in Central Asia, have now assumed terrible dimensions there. Half a century ago brandy was never heard of in Turkestan, and wine was only found among the Jews, who made it for ritualistic purposes. To-day brandy distilleries abound. According to an official report,* the import of spirits in one year is 308,924 firkins, the export 75,327 firkins. That the Mohammedans assist in the consumption has been confirmed by several travellers, who state that the Kirghises are particularly partial to the Russian national beverage.† But more surprising even than the spread of alcohol is the increased prevalence of prostitution. In olden times this vice was punished by death, but now, under protection of the Russian Government, it has free course. Friedrich Duckmeyer

* 'Sputnik Turkestanza. Karmanni Kalendar i spravochnaya Knizhka turkestanskago General Gubernatorstwa na 1900 god' (The Travelling Companions of the Turkestani. Pocket Calendar and Directory of the Turkestan General Provinces for the Year 1900) p. 29.

† The progress of brandy-distilling may be seen by comparing former returns with the present. According to Dr. Max von Proskowetz (p. 361 of his work 'From Newastrand to Samarkand,' Vienna and Olmuz, 1889), 555·5 gallons (one gallon = two pottles) have been produced in the year 1885-86.

writes:* 'In the place of Kōknar (opium) we find beer and brandy, and immoral intercourse is greatly encouraged by the numerous modern Bordelles. At festive times not a few followers of Mohammed get drunk on brandy and beer (wine is not so much in favour); they go reeling and shouting through the streets, visit bad houses, misbehave themselves in every way, and generally finish up the festival with a day or two in the police-station.' The Russified Kirghis Nalivkin says† that the public houses are patronised not only by the Russians, but also by the Sarts, and preferably in the sacred month of Ramazan. With the advent of the Russians prostitution has entered, and has spread rapidly, even in the family circle. What must the Reis (Chief of Police) think of this innovation in a land where formerly the faintest suspicion of illegal sexual intercourse was punished in the most cruel manner? It is also significant that many travellers, even those who are friendly disposed to Russia, blame the negligence of the Russian authorities in various questions connected with education and morality. F. H. Skrine,‡ whose object it is to picture *res russicæ* in rosy colours, writes: 'Russia has carried its policy of *laissez faire* to the extreme where it concerns the education of the natives, which is simply left in the hands of a class of people who are professedly the bitterest enemies of the infidel rulers. . . . Splendid buildings, the theme of Oriental poets, have been allowed to fall into hopeless ruin, and so on.' The same Englishman further complains that Russia exer-

* See supplement of the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1901, No. 250.

† 'Ocherk bita zhenchini osyedlago tuzemnago naseleniya Fergani' (Sketches of Female Life among the Settled Population of Fergana), by W. Nalivkin and Mrs. M. Nalivkina. Kazan, 1886, pp. 236, 237.

‡ 'The Heart of Asia: a History of Russian Turkestan and the Central Asian Khanates from the Earliest Times,' by Francis Henry Skrine and Edward Denison Ross. London, 1899, p. 411.

cises no civilising influence whatever over the subjugated khanates of Bokhara and Khiva ; that barbarism, tyranny, and slavery are allowed free scope, in order that these lands may be the easier incorporated. Henry Norman,* the English member of Parliament, expresses himself in similar language where he describes the horrors of the prisons of Bokhara, notwithstanding his Russophile proclivities, which culminate in the following passage : 'The twentieth century must count Russia as one of the greatest factors in the reformatory movement of human society.'†

However friendly disposed one may be towards the Russians, it is impossible to ignore the evil effect of the indifference of which the Russian Government has been guilty in its capacity of civiliser of Turkestan, a land where their word ought to be sufficient to veto many a barbaric law of the feudal rulers.

* 'All the Russias : Travels and Studies in Contemporary European Russia, Finland, Siberia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.' London, 1902, pp. 314, 315.

† The same, p. 457.

CHAPTER VIII

DEFECTS OF RUSSIAN ADMINISTRATION

IN all fairness, however, we must remember that even the best intentions of the Russian Government must often fail through the unreliability, corruption, and arrogance of its organs. In the hierarchy of the Tsar, among the representatives of the starving multitudes of Asia, decked out in the glittering garments of European culture, there are but few who are actuated by a real desire to promote the good of the natives, or who possess a spark of love or enthusiasm for the work of reformation they are undertaking. Many of them have no conception of the task which awaits them. Distinctions and promotion, cards, and drinking bouts, are the high ideals which rise up before their mind's eyes and enthral them. To some extent this may be attributed to the fact that the administration of Turkestan is in the hands of the military. Formerly an appointment in Turkestan was looked upon as a kind of exile; even a Prince of the Imperial House has had to atone for the follies of his youth by a sojourn in Tashkend. Formerly this was the abode of doubtful characters, and the name of Tashkenetz (Tashkender) was given to charlatans of the worst kind. Passing in review the officers or officials—words which mean the same thing, owing to the military administration of the land—who have become prominent in the history of Turkestan, there are but few who can be said to have distinguished them-

selves by that refinement, perseverance, and charitable purpose, which are the necessary attributes of the true civiliser. Among the leading personalities who have taken an active part in the Government during the forty years of Russian occupation, the Governors-General Kaufmann, Rosenbach, and Wrewski, and the Generals Abramoff and Ivanoff, deserve special mention. Their humane treatment of the natives, and their endeavours to ameliorate the intellectual and material condition of the populace, are worthy of high comment. General Kaufmann especially distinguished himself in this respect during the fifteen years of his administration (1867-1882), and he fully deserves the title of *Ustroitel Kraya* (Founder of the Country) bestowed upon him by the Russians.

Although not sharing in every respect the sentiments of his biographer and admirer, the eminent Orientalist Professor N. Ostroumoff,* we are bound to admit that this accomplished German officer—in many ways more Russian than the Russians themselves—fulfilled his mission with much tact, ability, and philanthropy. The very fact that he made a confidential friend of Professor Ostroumoff, at one time Preceptor at the University of Kazan, testifies to the lively interest entertained by the Governor-General for the education movement. No matter how busy he was, he always admitted Ostroumoff at once to his presence, and gave the fullest attention to his reports. His leading principle—often acted upon—was that ‘we desire for Central Asia European civilisation, not Russian orthodoxy.’† Hence he was no promoter of the mission movement, but, on the contrary, made himself particularly agreeable to the Moslem clergy and scholars. On the occasion of a reception of *Khodjas* in Tashkend, he asked them whether they were acquainted with their new fatherland, and pro-

* See note on p. 18.

† Ostroumoff, ‘*K’Istorij*,’ etc., p. 44.

mised to send them teachers to instruct them in the history and geography of Russia. At another time he received and entertained at breakfast the Hadjis returning from Mecca, and conversed with them upon political questions, always, of course, exalting Russia's power and greatness, and disparaging England's claims.* His affability has become proverbial. In his addresses at public examinations or on other special occasions, he always made reference to the great love and care of the White Tsar for his Moslem subjects, and often took the latter under his protection against the Russians. Very striking is the case of a Sart prostitute who was baptised by the Russian priest Wisotzki against the wish of the General, for, said Kaufmann, 'Russification must be carried out by means of the schools.'†

His kindly feeling for the natives of Turkestan has been shared by other high-placed officers, but with the majority of Russian officials these sentiments have found no response. According to a widely-prevailing notion in Western lands, the assimilation of Russians and Asiatics is made easier by the fact that the Russians, in consequence of their low standard of refinement, do not approach the natives in an arrogant, offensive manner, and that an intimate intercourse between ruler and subject can therefore more readily be established. Modern accounts of non-Russian eye-

* His hostile feelings against the English are evident from many parts of the biography previously mentioned. On the occasion of a reception of an Afghan mission from Shir Ali Khan in 1878, he said that he was sorry that the Tsar had not sent him to Afghanistan, for he would surely have destroyed the English. He told them that he might have gone with a very small detachment of soldiers; but, as he was no Yermak, his eventual defeat would have done harm to the Russian prestige. General Kaufmann is of opinion that the *Druzei Albiona*—i.e., the friends of Albion at the Court of St. Petersburg—had blackened his reputation and frustrated his plans, etc.

† The same, p. 107.

witnesses, who have lived for years in Turkestan, emphatically contradict this view. The German astronomer F. von Schwarz, who has spent fifteen years in Turkestan, and has traversed the country in all directions, expresses himself in the following terms :* 'The natives fare worst at the hands of the common Russians, the servants, soldiers, and Cossacks. Small tyrants are always the most tyrannical, and to their untutored minds it would seem that the Sarts, Tadjiks, and Kirghises are created for the express purpose of being bullied by them. A native who is not quick enough to get out of the way of a Russian immediately feels the whip round his ears, and from this treatment not even the Arabakeshes (drivers) are exempt. With their heavily-loaded Arabas (carts) they have to evade not only vehicles and horsemen, but also Russian pedestrians, if they wish to avoid making the acquaintance of the riding-whip or the walking-stick.'

The contempt with which the Russians regard the natives is best illustrated by the two following cases, which have been related to me as authentic by a distinguished Turkestan General who is in a position to know. When General Grodyekoff, soon after his appointment as Governor-General of the Syr Darya district, inspected the State prison at Tashkend, he found there a number of Sarts who had been acquitted many years before, but up till then had not been set at liberty, merely because the Captain of the town had been too lazy to drive to the prison to order the release of a few Sart prisoners, and afterwards had forgotten all about them. It does not belong to the exceptions—in fact, has become almost a rule—to keep native prisoners for years under arrest, until the examining judge thinks fit to hear them. The following case, which took place in the Tashkend prison, is

* Von Schwarz, pp. 488, 489.

of a still graver nature. Every year the criminals condemned to deportation and forced labour are transported in large batches from Tashkend to Siberia. Once a transport consisting of thirty-two men was to leave the Tashkend prison. When the names of the prisoners were called, it was found that two men were missing. In order not to be censured for neglect in the supervision of the criminals, the keeper of the prison sent a soldier to the bazaar to fetch two labourers, who, in the happy anticipation of a good day's work, at once accompanied him with their spades and hoes. On their arrival at the prison yard, these labourers were enrolled and transported to Siberia to work in the mines in the place of the missing robber and murderer. When afterwards the matter became known in higher quarters the injustice could not be repaired, because the names of the two ill-used labourers were unknown.*

A worthy counterpart to this picture of 'humane' Russia is furnished by the clever author Friedrich Duckmeyer,† who for many years was Professor at the college at Tashkend. In his description of the festivities at the time of the Coronation in May, 1896, we read as follows: 'The ecclesiastical procession approached the square, which was surrounded by trees, and in the middle of which the tribune was erected for the chief representatives of the Government. The people hovered all round. I stood under a tree by a canal (Aryk). The voices of the choristers were heard in the distance; wreaths and banners became

* Von Schwarz, p. 489.

† See Friedrich Duckmeyer's article in the supplement of the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 257, 1901. This is Appendix III. of his beautifully-written article entitled 'Unprejudiced Remarks on Russo-Turkestan.' It is to be regretted that this eminent writer, who is also a poet of no small merit, has not described the work of the Russians in Central Asia a little more at length.

visible. Suddenly the Russians made a rush upon the Asiatics, pulled the white turbans from off the heads of venerable old men, threw these head-coverings into the canal, and pushed their victims in after them. Covered with dirt and shame, the Mohammedans left the city of the Christians, accompanied by the kicks and blows of their tormentors. I witnessed the attack, and could not contain myself. I rushed forward crying, "Are you Christians? Do you not see the Cross over you?" But they only thought of their own cross, and took me for a madman. One, who was better educated than the rest, called out, "Look at the Don Quixote!" and true enough my parade sword was of soft iron, a mere toy weapon. The populace, however, was awed by my coat as well as by my sword, just as the Arabas had been by the caps of the French soldiers under the valiant Prince Gregory, whose acquaintance my brave cousin, M. Tartarin of Tarascon, made in Algiers. The Turkestan Government paper, describing the celebrations of the Coronation Day, says in the copy of May 18, 1896: "Our city is unusually festive with garlands, flags, and inscriptions. The church bells ring incessantly. Animated crowds of Russians and natives may be seen everywhere. There is merry excitement on all sides. The solemnity and the great significance of this celebration of the accession of the Tsar brings out very strongly the union which exists between the Tsar and his people."*

The Government itself has set the example of slighting the natives by the mean and miserly manner in which Princes and other high dignitaries, who have come under the Russian protectorate, are remunerated. We read that the children of Khudayar Khan, the last ruler of Khokand, receive a pension of

* Friedrich Duckmeyer in the supplement to the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 263, 1901.

only 30 francs per month. There are others who receive even less than this, and the Afghans who, after the war between Abdurrahman and his vassals, took refuge with the Russians complained bitterly about the hard-heartedness of the Urus.

In pre-Russian times the Turkestanis were frequently exposed to outbreaks of tyrannical caprice and roughness from their own native Sovereigns, but those spasmodic violent measures were then the exception in the Asiatic world, and the cruelties perpetrated were often in keeping with the patriarchal spirit of society; moreover, the better classes never looked down upon their inferiors with such profound pride and scorn as the Russians are in the habit of doing upon their own countrymen of a lower station than themselves, and where it concerns the subjugated Asiatics their contempt is naturally more marked and cruel still. One must have some conception of the utter contempt and scorn with which the Russian, whether he be officer, cleric, or merchant, regards the miserable plebs, to form an idea of the manner in which the different gradations of the fourteen classes of Russian society associate with one another, and to realise how the conquered non-Christian nations (*Inorodzi*) are treated by the Russians. Insults, jeers, and buffetings meet the Sart and the Kirghis wherever he goes, and when the poor victims bring their complaints before the magistrate, they are not infrequently sent about their business with such words as: 'And thinkest thou that we shall punish a faithful Christian for the sake of a vile dog?'

In the very highest official circles such inhuman treatment may belong more to the exceptions, but with the great mass of the inferior authorities they are quite common occurrences, for there is nothing more terrible than to be under the dominion of those who once were slaves, brought up in servitude, and who

have afterwards risen to power. In the Asiatic world, as far as I have learned to know it, pride and arrogance are quite unknown among the governing classes. The Turkish officer in the Osman army is *frère compagnon* with the common soldier; he eats, smokes, and plays in company with him, nor do the Khans and Mirzas in Persia use any restraint in the social intercourse with the Kasib (artisan) and the Dihkan (farmer). In Central Asia I have found exactly the same state of things. One may therefore imagine how deeply hurt and degraded the Asiatic must feel under the treatment of the Russians. Professor Ostroumoff is quite right in saying in his obituary notice of General Kaufmann:* 'The Russians commit an error when they expect to find only submissiveness among the Sarts. The Sart is not like the Russian Muzhik. Apparently he bears patiently the stroke of the whip, he is silent, but his sense of honour is deeply offended, much more than it ever was under the strokes of his Moslem master. The Russians also make a mistake in not paying due respect to the Mollas; for these men are very proud, and consider themselves far superior than the lower Orthodox clergy. Upon this subject F. Duckmeyer† writes: 'Against the few isolated cases in which the educated Mohammedans have been guilty of contempt of Russian "Intelligence," we find a wholesale scorn of all Asiatics on the part of the Russians. The smallest, most insignificant Russian official considers himself far above the Emir of Bokhara or the Khan of Khiva, although such Russians, in point of education, may be no better than the native cart-driver. Even the well-informed, non-official Russian "Intelligence" shows the same lack of appreciation with regard to the most deserving of Oriental scholars, "they simply ignore all Asiatic claims," and the gentlemen

* 'K'Istorij,' etc., p. 206.

† Supplement, *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 257, 1901.

of Kazan—which in Europe already counts as Asia—speak with the deepest scorn of “Asia in Turkestan.” Are these the signs of brotherly affection, of congeniality and a closer relationship between Russians and Asiatics ?

Thus, it may easily be proved that the Russian administration in Asia does not distinguish itself either by kind treatment of the natives or by a keen sense of justice, and, moreover, that it lacks the smoothing influence of patriarchal social forms. Strictly speaking, therefore, the Russian administration is neither European nor Asiatic ; whence, then, comes the notion that *Russians, as semi-Asiatics, are the appointed civilisers of Asia, and are eminently qualified to propagate Western culture in the East ?*

CHAPTER IX

MORALS AND PUBLIC INSTRUCTION

IF the Russian administration in Central Asia would substitute justice, honesty, and freedom from bribery—qualities which the natives appreciate in the unbelievers—for the pride, arrogance, and haughtiness which in the eyes of the Asiatics are hateful, and are looked upon as the necessary attributes of unbelief, perhaps much of the harm so far done by the foreign rule might yet be put right. But, unfortunately, the Russian official world is in many respects more Asiatic in its administration than the native Government was.

The greatest evil in Turkestan, and from which the natives suffer most acutely, is bribery. The deficiency in the income of the comparatively ill-paid Russian officials has to be made good by the native inhabitants—that is, by the Mohammedans. The tax is exacted quite freely and openly—in fact, it is looked upon as a perfectly legitimate claim, and whoever does not pay gets no justice. This abominable custom, which even the Russophile Frenchman M. de Cholet* censures, bears a pronounced Oriental character,† with this difference, however, that where the Osmanli calls the gift which he brings to the Russian official Kapyalti

* See 'Excursion en Turkestan et sur la Frontière Russo-Afghane.' Paris, 1889, p. 103.

† A Turkish proverb says: 'If thou appearest empty-handed before thy superior, thou wilt be told that he is asleep; but if thou appearest with thine hands full, thou wilt be welcomed with a "Grace be unto thee."'

(under the door), because it is surreptitiously pushed behind the door, the Central Asiatic puts his Silau (love-gift) personally into the hands of the Pristaff or Nachalnik, and when the gift is not considered large enough he has to increase it. Here in Europe we are sometimes under the impression that, in the intercourse with Asiatics, a little irregularity—bribery, for instance—need not be looked upon as exactly immoral.* But this argument does not hold good, for although bribery is a very common evil in Asia, the words of the Koran, ‘Laanet ullah al’ar rashi w’alal murtashi’ (The curse of God rests upon the briber and the bribed), are very often quoted in warning. The dishonesty of the authorities in the interior of the Russian Empire has become a byword, but the evil is even worse in the distant provinces, because of the absence of proper control, and because in the estimation of the Russians the natives are created for the sole purpose of being fleeced and robbed by them. A Hadji in Constantinople once told me that his passport had cost him as much as the half of his journey from Khodjend to the shores of the Bosphorus, and that a complaint to the authorities would only have involved him in greater costs than formerly.

Under these conditions it is not surprising that the native plaintiff prefers to abide by the judgment of the Kazi rather than go to the Russian authorities, and that in many other respects the Turkestanian has no confidence whatever in the dealings of the Russian Court of Justice, and the less he has to do with the latter, the better pleased he is. This feeling is shared by the Europeans who are settled in Turkestan or who are officially there. Mr. F. von Schwarz† tells the story of a policeman to whom he complained that his tea-urn had been stolen. The policeman cut him

* See Curzon, ‘Russia in Central Asia,’ p. 392.

† ‘Turkestan,’ p. 521.

short by saying: 'Well, you are a queer fellow! In my district this night sixty-eight tea-kettles, a dozen horses, a noble lady, and many other things, have been stolen, and you make a fuss because one solitary tea-urn has disappeared.'

The corruption of the Russian officials, which cannot be too severely censured, will naturally not be noticed so much by passing tourists, but it is all the more realised by those Europeans who have been appointed by Russia to some office in Turkestan, and who see with their own eyes the rotten condition of things there. Indeed, the picture they disclose makes one shudder; it is disgusting in every detail. A rich merchant of the name of Ivanoff held for a long time several high-placed Turkestan officials at his mercy. The postmaster had for many years lived in his house without paying rent, and even General Chernayeff was amongst his debtors. Colonel Yanoff, the leader in the first Pamir Expedition, had in the exercise of his office incurred a debt of 40,000 marks (£2,000);* Major Gerasimoff, the former Commander of Kuldja, spent every year on champagne alone twice the amount of his pay. Others, again, fall victims to gambling at cards—in short, the extravagance and the licentiousness of the Russian officials in Turkestan defies all description; and this side of the Russian character is certainly not calculated to set a good example to the natives, especially as, in most cases, the natives have to pay for it. We are justified, then, in asking: Are these the qualities which are likely to attract the Asiatics towards their Russians masters, and is it by such means as these that civilisation will be more readily accepted than through the medium of other European Powers? Not only in Central Asia, but also in Manchuria, lately occupied by the Russians, experience contradicts the popular notion that the

* 'Turkestan,' p. 494.

Russians are best fitted to deal with the Asiatics. The traveller B. L. Putnam Weale says* that the relations between the Russians and the Chinese are at present much more strained than they used to be. The Chinese gladly takes the Russian wage in return for his labour—he has even learned a kind of pidgin-Russian; but nevertheless he hates and abominates his new master; he thinks himself intellectually his superior, and will never see in him a type of a higher culture. Without being absolutely biassed and prejudiced, no one could admit that the prevailing notion about Russia's superior civilising power is correct, and the results so far obtained by the Russian Reform Party do certainly not confirm it. Everyone will gladly concede that in many quarters of the ancient world, where anarchy, robbery, and starvation formerly reigned, the Russian régime has created a certain amount of order; it has made peaceful intercourse possible, and given Europe access to many formerly inaccessible regions. But it would be difficult to see in these and many other advantages of civilisation, which chiefly benefit the Russian Government, a ground for believing that the intellectual elevation and enlightenment of the Asiatic can and will be brought about under the guardianship of Russia. It is only by the refining influence of culture, and the indefatigable and continued efforts in the matter of education, that any good results can be expected, and in this respect the Russian Government has been most deficient. While geographical researches for politico-strategical purposes have found ample support, such subjects as, for instance, the ethnography and philology of Central Asia have been almost entirely neglected. Very few Russian officials are acquainted with the native tongue, and those who know it will

* 'Manchu and Muscovite: Being Letters from Manchuria, written during the Autumn of 1903,' by B. L. Putman Weale. London, 1904.

not use it, for fear of losing the respect of the natives, who might explain the foreigner's use of the native tongue as a sign that he wants to ingratiate himself with them or court their favour.* The national monuments of art are neglected, and as for the vaunted educational movement, far more attention is given to the instruction of the Russians residing in Turkestan than to that of the natives.

Turkestan possesses the following educational establishments, which are under the supervision of one Chief Inspector, assisted by a secretary and two subordinates. The native schools are classed into three divisions, and entrusted to the care of three State Councillors. In order to give a general idea of the condition of education in Turkestan, we transcribe the list of existing schools, with the number of teachers and pupils, as it appeared under Table IV. of the official calendar for the year 1904 (see table on p. 72).

The local division is as follows :

In Tashkend : One college for boys, one college for girls, one technical school (under protection of the Emir of Bokhara), one teachers' seminary, one municipal school in four classes, one artisans' school, one parish school for boys, one parish school for girls, one school for natives, one Russo-Jewish school, and one Russo-Tartaric school, besides a few private schools.

In the Syr Darya district : In Aulia-Ata, Djulek, Kazalinsk, Karmakchi, Kaufmansko, and in other smaller places, there are everywhere parish schools and schools for natives ; in Petro-Alexandröwsk one municipal school and one parish school ; in Perowsk and in Turkestan there are one municipal school in three classes, one parish school, and one school for natives.

In Samarkand : One boys' college, one girls' college,

* Thus, Von Schwarz says that General Kolpakovski, although a native Kirghis, always avoided to speak his mother-tongue with the natives.

Names of the Educational Establishments.	Number of Schools.	Number of Teachers.	Number of Pupils.
Boys' colleges	5	86	1,269
Technical schools	1	17	363
Girls' colleges	5	149	1,599
Teachers' seminaries	1	12	68
Artisans' schools... ..	1	6	123
Municipal schools	19	122	2,407
Parish schools founded on the Ustaff of 1828... ..	10	24	671
Parish schools for boys and girls	95	193	4,747
Schools founded on the Instruction of the year 1875	19	36	826
Railway schools consisting of one class for men	8	15	280
Railway schools consisting of two classes for men	6	13	492
Russian schools for natives ...	80	186	2,427
Private schools, Standard II. ...	1	7	44
Private schools, Standard III....	2	6	102
Government schools for women	1	1	24
Tashkend naval schools	1	7	125
Parish schools for girls	25	113	1,838
Railway schools for women ...	4	17	343
Total	284	1,010	17,748

one parish school, two schools for natives, and one Russo - Jewish school. Further, in Jizzak, Kette Kurgan, Ura tepe, and Khodjend, one parish school, one municipal school, and one school for natives.

In the Ferghana district : In Mergolan one boys and girls' college, one municipal school in four classes, one school for natives, and one parish school. Further, in Endijan, Khokand, Namengan, Osh, and Old-Mergolan, one parish school and one municipal school, besides schools for natives.

In the Semiryeche district : In Wyerny one boys and girls' college, several national schools, and one Russo-Dungan school. Further, in Lepsinsk, Narinsk, Pishpek, Przhevalsk, Sergiopol, and Tokmak, schools for Russians and Kirghises.

In the Transcaspian district : In Askhabad one boys

and girls' college, one municipal school in three classes, one girls' school in two classes, and one infants' school in the Turkoman division of Kosh. Besides these there are parish schools in all the larger garrison towns, such as Kizil-Arvat, Kakhka, Merv, Sarakhs, etc.

With regard to the subjects taught in the colleges, the European system is followed. The same applies also to the technical schools. In the girls' schools most stress is laid on modern languages, music, gymnastics, and dancing; while in the schools for natives a knowledge of the Russian language is a first requirement, because these schools have to produce the future interpreters and translators. Generally speaking, the more advanced establishments are attended almost exclusively by Russians, only occasionally by natives, for when we realise that, of the 5,260,000 natives, only 2,427 attend the so-called national schools, this does not speak well for the popularity of the schools established by the Government. Of course the Russians cannot be blamed for any neglect in this matter. The ministry for the public instruction of the people has spared no expense, and during the last ten years (from 1893 to 1903) education in Turkestan has cost 3,432,200 roubles, not including local contributions. Whether the results so far obtained justify the expenditure, whether the schools have the civilising influence upon the natives which this Government undertaking was intended to have, can as yet not be estimated with certainty. Personally I have serious doubts about it, for, curiously enough, in the list of the teaching staffs now before me I find very few names of teachers of the Mohammedan faith—that is, of natives trained to be teachers, and as such the most suitable mediums for imparting the knowledge of Western lands. Other European culture-bearers in Asia have made the same mistake, in that they, either

intentionally or unintentionally, have overlooked the fact that teachers of a different faith and a different nationality can never exercise so great an influence over the native scholars as their fellow-countrymen and co-religionists would.

Reshid Pasha, the distinguished patriotic Turkish statesman, was, as far I know, more than any other reformer impressed by this truth. At the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century, when he commenced his work of reformation in Turkey, he sent two Softas* to be educated in France, in order that they might afterwards become teachers in the newly-established schools at Stamboul. These two were soon followed by other Turkish students, desirous to be instructed in European knowledge, and thirty years sufficed to supply the higher and middle schools of Turkey with native teachers. What was found to be a necessity in the Turkish capital, where a constant lively intercourse with Western lands is kept up, is surely far more urgently needed in Central Asia, where fanaticism and hatred against all that is foreign is so tenaciously persevered in. From among the native Mollas some should be selected to be educated and qualified as teachers. And this would be no easy task, for only modernised Mollas who remain faithful Mohammedans, and strenuously adhere to all the outward observances of their religion and their national customs, can be expected to have any influence over the Moslem youth, and to succeed in gradually lessening among their pupils the hatred and

* Softa, or more correctly Sukhta, meaning 'consumed'—*i.e.*, one consumed by the passion for learning—is in Turkey the name given to scholars in theology who distinguish themselves by their fanaticism. The Softas here referred to, Shinassi Efendi and Emin Efendi, were personally known to me. They returned home as free-thinkers, but the former made his name chiefly by preparing the way for the simplification of the Osman dialect, and by his assistance in the nationalisation of the Ottomans.

aversion of all Western knowlege, and thus hastening the accomplishment of the difficult work of mental transformation. When I remember the deep scorn with which the thickly-turbaned Khodjas of Central Asia used to express themselves to me about Western civilisation, how they ridiculed and despised everything that came from Europe, and how they placed their Moslem learning far above our European knowledge, I can well understand their obstinate dislike and dread of the Russian schools. Schools in the East, we must remember, are chiefly, almost exclusively, used as the vehicles of religious knowledge. All that is taught is in connection with religion, and to attend the Russian schools is therefore naturally looked upon as conversion to Christianity—in fact, as apostasy. And this view has much truth in it, for many of the modernised, cultured Mohammedans become sceptics or agnostics, and for this reason the Sart and Tadjik parents refuse to send their children to the Russian schools. The few who have so far done it have been prevailed upon by the authorities or enticed by material advantages, and even then they have been ashamed of the step they had taken, and kept it secret from their fellow-believers. Thus, we are told* that in 1895 the rich and distinguished Muhyi-ed-din Khodja, the Kadi of the Tashkend quarter called Sibzar, wanted to send his youngest boy to the college, but for fear of being stigmatised as a renegade he resorted to a subterfuge. Every morning the Kadi's son rode to the door of the college dressed as a Mussulman. At the college he divested himself in an inner room of his turban, and changed his clothes for the dress of a Russian student,

* See 'Candid Observations on Russo-Turkestan,' by Friedrich Duckmeyer, in the supplement to the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 257, 1901; also N. P. Ostroumoff's 'Sarti, Ethnographical Materials,' etc., p. 104.

for students wear a special uniform at these colleges ; when the lessons were over he returned home transformed again into a Mussulman.* The universal dislike of the natives for the Russian schools is further confirmed by Ostroumoff,† the Russian Inspector of Schools, and considering the deep gulf which separates the two religions, the Orthodox Church of Russia and the Islam belief of Central Asia, the dislike is quite explainable.

All that has been done so far to advance the educational movement among the natives must be attributed either to the pressure of the authorities or to the allurements of material gain. At first the heads of Sart society encouraged the masses by their example. In the native schools opened in 1884 in Tashkend, close to the Russian quarter, at first only thirty-nine pupils were entered, although the rich and influential merchant Seid Azim Bey had led the way some time previous by allowing his two sons, Seid Kerim and Seid Gani, to receive instruction in the Russian language. So also the Sart Abulkasim Khan, who died in 1892, spent 30,000 roubles on the building of a Russian school in the Bishagach quarter of Tashkend, and, deploring the decline of Moslem learning, he says: 'As man cannot live without nourishment, so the human intellect must die for lack of knowledge.'‡ Arif Khodja, the son-in-law of Azim Bey already referred to, also persistently favoured Russian education, and sent his children to the Russian school. But, after all, these are but isolated cases, and, generally

* A similar case happened at Constantinople, when at the end of the fifties of the last century the girls' schools were opened. As attendance was obligatory, one pious father dressed his daughter in boy's clothes, and preferred to send her to the boys' school in order not to conform to the godless custom of sending a girl into public life.

† 'K'Istorij narodnago obrazovania,' p. 215.

‡ Ostroumoff, 'Sarti,' etc., p. 127.

speaking, we find that the nomads, known to be feeble followers of Islam, are more easily persuaded to attend the Russian schools than the settled population. In the year 1896, in the Syr Darya district, where the Kirghis population predominates, 506 scholars were entered, and in the municipal school of Kizil-Arvat in the Transcaspian district, 62 Turkomans are educated, as against a total number of 184 pupils.* Duckmeyer† writes that in the technical schools and the national seminaries for teachers the Mohammedan attendance is more numerous. The students of the seminary once acted Pushkin's drama 'Boris Godunoff' in their school, and one of the actors was a Kirghis. The Tashkend Government paper of January 8, 1898, naturally proud of the event, gave a leading article upon it. In the same year a modern Russian drama was played in Tashkend by Mohammedan actors and actresses at the house of an officer of Kirghis origin. At already stated, the Kirghises have shown themselves less averse to the Russian innovations than the strictly conservative Turkestanis, but these few drops in the mighty ocean do not justify any feeling of pride on the part of Russia in the results thus far obtained. They are but the isolated sparks forcibly produced in the pitch-dark night in which the mass of the people of Turkestan is still enveloped. I believe I am not far wrong in saying that private philanthropy has had more effect upon the natives than all the official schemes of civilisation put together. Russian lady doctors and accoucheuses, practising among the Sart women,‡ and doctors dispensing medicines gratis, do

* Skrine, 'The Heart of Asia,' p. 335.

† Supplement to the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 257, 1901.

‡ Under the title of 'The Women in East and West,' C. Duckmeyer, of Kienitz, has furnished an interesting article in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* of April 18, 1904, in illustration of the fate of women in Turkestan.

more to dispel superstition and fanaticism than all the Ukas enforcing compulsory education. But in order to work really successfully, the Russians must make themselves more familiar with the language, religion, customs, history, and characteristics, of the natives, and have a more intimate intercourse with them than has been the case hitherto.

Praise is due to the upper class of officials for now and then exerting itself to enlighten the masses, both the Russians and the natives, but, after all, their best endeavours are a delusion and a bad copy of Western ways. Under this category in the education scheme come the public lectures for natives in imitation of the English Sunday-schools. These lectures are attended by the highest Russian dignitaries and Generals. The most learned and distinguished Asiatics, Kadis and Mollas, have previously been informed by the police that they are expected to attend the lecture punctually and in full force, accompanied by their diligent (?) children; consequently they are all 'voluntarily' present. The European professor discourses upon the origin of the world, of course in the Russian language, which only a few of the natives understand, and that imperfectly. He exhibits a globe, which at a slight touch of the learned hand turns in the desired direction. Then follow some experiments in physical science, perhaps with an electrical insulating stool; the 'interested' Asiatics shake their turbaned heads, and mutter something unintelligible in their gray beards. In conclusion the General-in-Chief gives an address which begins with the origin of the world, and ends with a eulogy on the White Tsar. All cry 'Hurrah!' and return to their houses well satisfied.* We repeat, the intention of the Russians is worthy of praise, but the carrying out of it is a fallacy, a cultural comedy. No

* See supplement to the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 257, 1901.

one is deceived by it, and it will convince no one that the Russians are the fit organs for educating the Asiatics. Considering the hard and unceasing struggle which Western civilisation has to carry on in other parts of the Islam world, these educational comedies must appear ridiculous and childish in the extreme.

Only he who has drunk deep from the fountain stream of culture and enlightenment can expect to perform great things as the mediator of a new civilisation.

CHAPTER X

SEMI-CIVILISED NATIVES

A SOBER and unprejudiced judgment, therefore, must lead us to the conclusion that the forty years of Russian government in Central Asia have so far only touched the surface of social life. True, they have left a slight impression on the external forms, but they have not penetrated into the inner parts. All that can be seen of reform or modernisation in the life of the Turkestanis is of a superficial and compulsory nature; it emanates from fear of the conqueror, and its chief object is to please the foreign lords, and to make them more friendly disposed. The intrinsic Asiaticism of Moslem Turkestan society has so far not been seriously encroached upon; on the contrary, the pressure from without and the threatening danger of foreign intrusion have strengthened the ancient structure of Asiatic conviction and increased its power of resistance.

Russian critics are naturally anxious to prove the reverse, for it is a temptation to throw dust in the eyes of European inquirers, and in addition to the above-mentioned problematic effects of their civilising endeavours they eagerly point out individual cases of Turkestanis who, through a closer and more constant intercourse with Russians or through travels in the interior of the Russian Empire, have become convinced of the advantages of Christian acquirements, and who, without deserting their old belief,

have become proficient in Russian civilisation. Besides Muhiyeddin Khodja and Azim Bey and their families, various other show-pieces are paraded to prove the success of the Russian education movement. Such are—

1. The Russian official Sattar Khan,* the son of Abdul Gaffar, who in 1891 published his autobiography in the columns of the *Turkestan Gazeti*,† a newspaper issued in Tashkend at Government expense. He describes with enthusiasm the impressions of his journey to St. Petersburg, and the wonders of the modern world with which he became acquainted in various Russian towns. He relates how everybody, from the Tsar down to the humblest Russian peasant, treated him with kindness, and how he was admired and made much of at the Oriental Congress held at St. Petersburg in 1876. He expresses his boundless surprise at the affability of the Christians, the peaceful social intercourse of people of different nationalities and faiths, and he marvels at the great knowledge which the Europeans possess of the history and languages of the East; and finally he exclaims: 'We Turkestanis have lived in absolute ignorance of Europe until the advent of the Russians, but now, thanks to Russia's intervention, we can

* See 'Sarti,' etc., first edition, Tashkend, 1890, p. 98. Sattar is unknown to me as a Mohammedan personal name. Can it possibly be a corruption of 'Sadr,' meaning highest distinction or chief seat?

† *Turkestan Wilayetini Gazeti*. This Turkestan journal is a weekly paper, founded in 1870 as supplement to the *Turkenstanskiya wypedomosti*, appearing four times a week, twice in the Sart and twice in the Kirghis dialect. In 1887 the former paper, edited by Ostroumoff, became an independent newspaper—a kind of official native organ—with a circulation of 725 copies. These were subscribed to by order of the authorities rather than from real personal interest. It is noteworthy that this paper was boycotted by many Sarts, because in one of its columns appeared a short criticism against the Mohammedan Universities. This is a sign, although a weak one, of the awakening self-consciousness in Central Asia.

approach Europe and take part in the great work of educating all humanity.' The description given by this enthusiast (formerly Mufti of Chimkend and himself the son of a Mufti)* of the first impressions made upon the natives by the violent assault of Chernayeff upon Tashkend is very interesting. He describes how the success of the Russian arms was looked upon as Allah's punishment for the sins of the inhabitants. Sattar Khan, as may be expected, was soon converted to better views. His submissiveness to the Russians became a source of material well-being to him, and, delighted with the treatment of the foreign rulers, he says to his countrymen: 'Thus fares he who stays at home, who does not see for himself how his nearest neighbour lives. We Turkestanis have for centuries lived in seclusion; we have thought that no one was so good, so wise, and so mighty, as we. This view has led to self-conceit, and self-conceit has caused us to retrograde. Indeed, we are like minors. I remember how some Turkestanis and Bokharians, who had been sent as envoys to Russia, upon their return tried to persuade us that Russia was worse managed than Bokhara and Turkestan. Dear fellow-countrymen, I trust that now none of you will any longer doubt the power and the orderly management of the Russian Empire, and especially instructive it is for us to realise that Russia has acquired this power and this orderly administration through its intercourse with the cultured nations of Europe.'†

2. Mirza Bukharin, a merchant of Samarkand, who describes his experiences of a journey in Russia,‡ and who, like his predecessor, in spite of the strict pro-

* 'Mufti' must not be taken in the European sense of the word; it simply means a Molla entitled to grant a Fetwa—*i.e.*, to pronounce judgment in accordance with the Sheriat (religious law).

† 'Sarti,' etc., p. 109.

‡ See *Turkestan Vilayetini Gazeti*, 1888, Nos. 4-7.

hibition of Islam, appears in a photograph decorated with two Russian medals. Mirza Bukharin states that he was a silk-merchant, and when travelling in Russia visited Moscow and St. Petersburg, and saw all the monuments of art, the treasures and collections of antiquities—in short, all that there was to be seen. He expresses his wonder at all these things. He is amazed at the care bestowed by the Russians upon the ancient monuments of Central Asia. Being presented to the Tsar and Tsaritzza, he weeps tears of joy over the great happiness which has befallen him. To anyone acquainted with the condition of Central Asia at that time, when the name of the Christian Sovereign was never mentioned except with a curse, this statement must seem somewhat strange; and, in fact, the Mirza himself, upon his return home, feels that perhaps this account of the splendour, the magnificence, and the goodness of the Russians may not be so readily accepted by his countrymen. Like all Orientals, he is in ecstasies about the knowledge which Russian scholars possess of the literature and history of his native land. Amongst others, he mentions Radloff and Georgiewski, and the narrative of his experiences during the year 1887 are intended to encourage all Turkestanis to visit glorious Russia.

Allusion is made, moreover, not only to merchants and officials, but also to Turkestani, or rather Sart, poets who have tuned their muse to the service of the foreign master, and in decidedly watery poetry have sung Russia's greatness and glory. In an elegy on the death of Alexander III. we read:

'Come near, O ye people of Tashkend, and weep!
 The sovereign of the world is dead; put on mourning for him.
 He was your protector, and you devoted your life to him.
 Even as the Russian people, do ye also shed tears;
 Weep night and day, and pray ever for him.

' In constant anxiety over you, he never took rest ;
 Careful for your welfare, he had no peace in his lifetime ;
 Careful for you, his heart has known neither joy nor pleasure.
 He has had no other thought beyond the welfare of his subjects ;
 Pray, therefore, incessantly for the peace of the monarch's soul.

' All princes have summoned their artificers, and ordered wreaths
 to be made—
 Wreaths in silver and in gold, and inscribed with their princely
 names.
 Their example has been followed by the Emir of Bokhara ;
 Also the King of Persia has sent a wreath.
 On those beautiful wreaths are the names of the Shah and the
 Emir ;
 And Turkestan has sent a wreath by itself.'*

The second elegy is from the pen of the poet Nihani,
 and reads as follows :

' Who in this world has not to drink the goblet of death ?
 Be he Tsar, ruler, or beggar,
 Whether he sits upon a throne or rests on a straw mat,
 Be he good, or bad, or a saint,
 We are all subject to death.

' Have ye not seen that even Alexander the Third,
 Whose rule resembled that of the moon in the sky,
 Whose government was like unto the deeds of Alexander the
 Great,
 That in him also, who by day and by night cared for his subjects,
 God's ordinance was fulfilled, and that he also drank the goblet
 of death ?

' O world ! the life of the Emperor has ceased prematurely ;
 All princes, the Khaliph included, mourn for him.
 His subjects have shed rivers of tears ;
 At his death the moon became darkened,
 And the whole world was wrapped in gloom.' †

As third elegy, we give a chronogram of the Tash-
 kend poet Kiani :

* Ostroumoff, ' Sarti,' etc., p. ix.

† The same, p. xiii.

'The death of his Majesty the Emperor
 Has wrapped all the world in deep mourning,
 For all his subjects
 Have lived in peace and joy under him.
 In his graciousness he has made no difference between
 Moslem and Russian,
 And when he left this earthly existence
 The heart of his people was filled with deep sadness.
 All the great princes of the world
 Are perplexed at the death of the Emperor.
 And when we look for his equal,
 What is Alexander, Darius, or Djemshid?
 What is Behram, the conqueror of the seven worlds?
 What is the Emperor of Rum, or the ruler of China?
 What is Khosru, Perviz, or Hormuz?
 What is the righteous and just Nushirvan?
 All these in their turn have appeared in the world ;
 Some have departed earlier, some later.

'Know ye whither they have gone ?
 Listen, ye offspring of Adam :
 They all have emptied the goblet of death ;
 All have ended their existence in annihilation.
 So also has the Prince of Peace,
 Alexander Alexandrovitch,
 Finally left this earthly existence,
 And has passed into the realms of eternity.' *

It would lead us too far if we were to add to the above the autobiography and poetic effusions of the Khokand poet Zakir-Jan, who under the pseudonym of Firkat (*i.e.*, Separation) eulogises in metre, balls, concerts, and school examinations, at which he has been present. This good man treats us to particulars of his own youthful days—how, from being trained as a merchant, he advanced to be a writer, then a poet, and lastly a Russian statesman. He describes how Russian institutions, manners, and customs excite his admiration, and how happy they make him; and in

* Ostroumoff, 'Sarti,' etc., p. xv. In the original the words : 'Sali fowti shahi aazam'—*i.e.*, Death of the great King in the year 1317 of Hegira (1884).

conclusion he advises his countrymen to live in closer communion with the Russians, for, says he: 'Allah has so ordained it that we shall live together with the Russians.'

It is significant how persistently official Russia encourages these sham professions of loyalty. The world has to be convinced that the Central Asiatics, who even in the Middle Ages were reputed throughout the Islam world as the confirmed representatives of the most extravagant fanaticism,* now, under protection of the Christian conqueror, are supremely happy, and quite easily—nay, even enthusiastically—exchange their Moslem views for those of modern civilisation. In order to convince the reader of this fact, the learned Professor N. P. Ostroumoff† quotes a treatise, entitled 'Closer Union between Sarts and Russians, and Russian Influence on the Sarts,' in which it is stated that the gradual approach of the natives is conspicuous in their acceptance of many Russian manners and customs; that the Reis and the Kurbashi (religious police) do no longer frighten them; that the natives frequent the Russian quarters of Tashkend without any fear; that they are present at church parades and military parades; that they attend balls, concerts, and other places of recreation; and in many other points seem to be totally changed. The natives are expected to look upon the Russian conquest of their land as a stroke of good fortune for themselves. During the festivities held at Tashkend, in 1886, in honour

* Mevlana Djelaleddin Rumi, the founder of the Mevlevi Order, and the most prominent representative of Sufism, says in his 'Mesnevi':

'Bohkara mirevi, divanei, Laiki zendjiri zindankhanei'

(Thou goest to Bokhara? thou art a fool!
Thou deservest to be put in chains).

† 'Sarti,' p. 102.

of the Russian soldiers who fell in the storming of the city, the Mohammedans, especially the Sart women, pressed round to see the sights; representatives from Bokhara were also present, and the then Governor-General, General-Lieutenant Rosenbach, addressed the natives in the following words: 'Twenty-one years ago this land was still in the greatest confusion. The Russians who have fallen here, and those who have remained alive, have given peace to Turkestan; therefore their memory should be dear to you.' To this the late Kadi of Tashkend, Muhyieddin Khodja, replied: 'O Mussulmans of Tashkend! for us, also, this is a memorable day. It is the day on which we came under the protection of the White Tsar, the mighty ruler of the world. When this city was taken, our religion and our legal institutions, according to the law of the Sheriat (religious law), were restored to us. Peace and security now reign everywhere, and we have our own town administration. Hence we can now lead free and quiet lives, and commerce, industry, and agriculture have considerably developed. On the occasion of this festive commemoration we would pray your Excellency to convey to His Imperial Majesty the expression of our dutiful obedience. We pray for the continued welfare of the Tsar, the guardian of the hundred million subjects of the great Russian Empire.' The Ambassadors of Bokhara present on this occasion, Rahmetullah Bi and Mohammed Nassir (Master of the Horse), also offered their congratulations in the name of the Emir, which Rosenbach acknowledged in the following words: 'It gives me great pleasure to see you—the representatives of Bokhara—present here among us. You have witnessed how the bond of unity between Russians and Asiatics has been confirmed. You see how every man in Turkestan can follow his own religious practices and support himself

by his own labour, without being interfered with. What you have seen here, go and tell to your countrymen.'

Even if only as the official expression of loyalty and devotion, such language as that used by Muhyieddin Khodja and others cannot otherwise than surprise anyone who has known Central Asia as it was in times past. No one will for a moment suppose that these utterances are the genuine expressions of willing submissiveness, and they can only be explained by the fact that these interpreters of the Russian sympathies of the natives, and glorifiers of the Tsar's greatness and power, belong to a tribe which from the first has distinguished itself by its peaceable nature, and has always preferably devoted itself to the pursuits of trade, industry, and agriculture.

CHAPTER XI

UNEXPLOITED OPPORTUNITIES

It was a fortunate coincidence for the Russians that, when they entered the khanates of Central Asia, the first people they came into contact with were the Sarts instead of the Ösbegs or the Tadjiks, who, being less amenable and pliable, would have considerably aggravated the work of pacification. The Sarts, of mixed Iranian and Turco-Tartar origin,* have been known from the earliest times as a commercial people, and amongst the Uigurs the words 'Sart' and 'merchant' had the same meaning. Now, it is not surprising that this portion of the native population, whose occupation had always been of a peaceful nature, and who had suffered much from the chicanery and robbery of the native authorities, appreciated the safety and comparative order secured to them with the advent of the Russians, and that they liked the new régime although under Christian supremacy. The Sart element soon settled down under the Russian administration, and as in times past they had distinguished themselves in Moslem culture above their neighbours of Turkish nationality, so they now accepted without much difficulty the innovations introduced by Russo-Christian culture. The Sart has always had the reputation of being industrious, persevering, sober, enterprising and economical, and in consequence of these qualities was far more open to Western culture

* See my 'Türkenvolk,' p. 370.

than the other Central Asiatics. Professor Ostroumoff, who has the most intimate knowledge of these people, very correctly says:* 'The Sarts are a nation of the future, for their intelligence and capability in all matters of culture is beyond all doubt. We—that is, the Russians—may rest assured that under Russian influence the rough traits of their national character will gradually be smoothed down, and be turned to their advantage, for the Russian conquest has opened a new period in the life of the Sarts. We see even now that the better informed amongst them do not hesitate to recognise the superiority of Russian culture above their own. Upon us, the conquerors of the Sarts, rests the great historical duty of drawing them into closer union with ourselves, after having subjugated them by force of arms. And to this end abundant means are at our disposal; for the Sarts do not shut themselves up against the better side of Russian social influences and the best side of universal culture—*i.e.*, enlightenment. As for the seeming contradictions in the character of the Sart, it is incumbent upon us to bear in mind that the Sart of to-day must be compared with our ancestors of the time of Ivan the Terrible, and that the remark of our historian Solowieff might very aptly be applied to them: "We must not forget the very different conditions of our bringing up, and the bringing up of our forefathers. We must remember that we have now strict rules to guide our life and actions, but we must not expect to see in the subjugated people the same marked stages of transition which we have gone through. The people of past ages have not known those delicate gradations of sentiment; they have unblushingly passed from one conviction to a totally opposite one, and these sharp contrasts we still see in

* 'Sarti,' etc., p. 83.

people who by their nature are nearer to the standard of culture occupied by their ancestors.”

In another passage where Professor Ostroumoff is speaking of the usefulness of the newspaper he published for the Sarts, he points out that the education and enlightenment of these people is imperatively necessary, because the natives still look upon European culture as irreconcilable to their old Moslem views of life. In this respect the Sarts are like the Russians of the seventeenth century who opposed the endeavours of Peter the Great, condemned everything that emanated from the West, and said: ‘Intellectual power does not consist in higher education and in philosophy, but in the resignation to faith. Artificial arguments defile the simple-minded, and such wisdom dishonours the wisdom of God. The Cross of Christ is sneered at. Latin wisdom leads straight to hell. Rhetoric, dialectics, and other heathen—*i.e.*, Western—deceits and subterfuges, are inventions of the devil, and they rebel against the Slav tongue, the mightiest, most productive, and most divinely favoured language in the world.’

The language in which Russian anti-progressionists have denounced the spirit of the innovations of Peter the Great strongly reminds me of the remarks of a somewhat similar nature which I have often heard repeated in various parts of the Islam world whenever the question of the attempted reforms and innovations was touched upon. Most likely in their innermost minds the Sarts are not impervious to sentiments of the same nature, and men such as Sattar Khan, the Kadi Muhyieddin, Abulkasim Khan, and others, who have dared to break with their old-world prejudices, are worthy of our admiration, and testify to the eminent cultural fitness of the Sart nation. Abulkasim Khodja, in a petition presented to Rosenbach, the Governor-General, volunteers to remark how disas-

trous the rule of the native Princes had been; how under their administration anarchy, robbery, and tyranny prevailed; and how now under the Russian régime, in contrast with the past, peace and contentment reign everywhere.* This voluntary accusation of his own native Princes before the Christian ruler is an eloquent proof of the amenableness of the Sarts, and of the facility with which even their Mollas enter into transactions with Christians. In India the Mollas have not yet quite reached this point, and even in Turkey and in Persia, amongst the most zealous advocates of the reform movement, I have rarely met anyone who would sing the praises of European enlightenment at the expense of his own national culture.

As already said, the excessive tyranny and arbitrariness of the native Princes have brought the Sart, who has never had any real national patriotic feeling, into such a condition that he never neglects to praise the Russian régime whenever opportunity offers, and in the face of such promising material to work upon it is somewhat difficult to share in the exultation of the Russian world with regard to the cultural results so far obtained in Central Asia. Both Professor Ostroumoff† and M. Lyikoshin,‡ when referring to this subject, markedly point out that the Sarts have not only discarded their former fanaticism, but that they also neglect many important religious observances. The prescribed prayers five times in a day, the pious ablutions, the fast during the month of Ramazan, and other commandments, are very seldom observed, and the Ishans and Dervishes do no longer

* 'Sarti,' etc., p. 127.

† In several places of the frequently mentioned paper 'Sarti.'

‡ In an article appearing in the great Turkestan Calendar for 1904 under the title of 'Resultati sblizheniya russkikh s tuzemtzami' (Results of Russian intercourse with the natives).

enjoy the same respect and influence which they formerly could boast of. In the daily life of the Sarts, also, many innovations may be noticed. In the formerly blank outside walls of houses windows have been introduced, and in the interior of the dwellings of the well-to-do, furniture, utensils, and knick-knacks of Western manufacture have found their way. Dress also is undergoing a change, and gradually assuming a Western stamp. The women of the upper classes have not only discarded the veil in the privacy of their own homes, but they go about in the street unveiled and openly visit with Russian families. If we are to believe our Russian informants, an entirely new social life is beginning to assert itself in Tashkend, Samarkand, and Mergolan, and, in consequence of the network of Russian schools which now envelops all Turkestan, the Russian language is spreading rapidly. The standard of wealth has also considerably changed, for where formerly a merchant possessing from 10,000 to 15,000 roubles was counted a rich man, now there are many who have millions to dispose of; and considering the constant increase of trade this is nothing remarkable.

All this sounds very encouraging, and the initial mistake of the Russians lies in the fact that the much-vaunted cultural progress in Central Asia is, strictly speaking, confined to a very limited number of rich merchants and natives of high rank in State service, whereas the mass of the population remains almost untouched by the foreign influence, and the natives pursue their lives, as before, under the guidance of their Mollas. Nothing in the world will shake the apathy and indolence of the settled Turkestani. Of chief importance to him is the rare enjoyment of peace, and this finds expression in the usual mode of greeting: 'Aman mi?' (Is it peace?) The Russian Kafir (infidel) has given him permanent peace and lightened

the taxes and duties. Judged from this standpoint, therefore, the Central Asiatic is well satisfied with the Russian administration. It is natural that under these conditions the numerical strength of the population in Russo-Turkestan has considerably increased during the last forty years. According to the report of Colonel Kostenko (vol. i., p. 326), the total number of the population of Russo-Turkestan in the year 1880 amounted to 2,807,974; this figure includes the inhabitants of the districts of Semiryeche, Syr-Darya, Fergana, Zerefshan, and Amu-Darya. As against this, we find in an account of General Wrewski, the fourth Governor-General of Turkestan, that the census of 1880 returns 2,269,520 souls, and rose in 1895 to 3,120,385, an increase, therefore, of 37 per cent.; while in the latest census of 1897 the population of Turkestan, including the Transcaspian district, is estimated at 5,260,000.* Thus we get:

In the district of Transcaspia, on 1 Werst	...	0·8 soul.
„ Samarkand	„	... 10·5 souls.
„ Syr-Darya	„	... 3'3 „
„ Fergana	„	... 11'1 „
„ Semiryeche	„	... 3'0 „

Turkestan therefore is, all considered, not thickly populated, and in this respect resembles South America; while, compared with other localities of the East, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Egypt are three times, and China ten times, more thickly populated. In con-

* According to these returns, the inhabitants of Turkestan count now nearly twice as many as before, which is almost incredible. If I am not mistaken, the return furnished by Kostenko only refers to the male sex, or else it shows that the statistics of that time are not thoroughly reliable. That the town-dwellers have increased, and that the number of Dwor (houses?) is considerably greater, is beyond all doubt; but in this case the *plus* has been recruited from the former nomadic population, and the increase in the settled population should be deducted from the census of the nomads.

sidering the increase of the Turkish population, what strikes one in the first place is the preponderance of the Russo-Christian element, which according to the latest census, in the five districts (Catholics and Protestants inclusive), is estimated at 219,658 souls, the greatest contingent of which is contributed by the seat of the principality (the city of Tashkend); for of its 156,506 inhabitants, 40,000 are Christians. This increase of the Christian population in Russo-Turkestan is the more striking when we consider that in 1880, according to Kostenko, the Christian element in the districts of Semiryeche, Syr-Darya, Fergana, and in the circles of Zerefshan and Amu-Darya collectively, was estimated at 59,283 souls. According to the latest accounts, the number of Russian settlements in Turkestan amounts to about 152, with over 100,000 inhabitants, the greater portion of which belong to the district of Syr-Darya. After the opening of the Orenburg-Tashkend line the emigration of Russians into Turkestan will assume considerably larger dimensions. In the second place it should be noticed that the area of cultivated land is visibly enlarged, for in 1893 the arable land was estimated at 2,079,370 desyatins, on which 48,000,000 pud of grain and 2,000,000 pud of American cotton were grown.

From an objective point of view, we cannot fail to see that Russia's success in Central Asia has so far chiefly been confined to material existence—that is, much has been done to secure the possession of the Turkestan territory to make use of in case of future political developments. But much more could be done to make a profitable use of the vast treasures hidden in this land; for what I said thirty-six years ago—namely, that *Turkestan, for fertility, was as a precious stone set in sand**—is now confirmed by many travellers who have traversed and investigated the

* See my 'Sketches of Central Asia,' p. 181.

country in all directions. The three khanates will in the future be a rich source of wealth for the Russian Treasury, and if the official administration of the empire were not so absolutely rotten and hampered by all the faults and defects of an absolute system of government, the annual deficit of several millions would by this time have been materially lessened. According to the statistics of the Revenue and Expenditure Account, now before me, the costs of the administration of Turkestan from 1869 to 1903 have been each year twice as much as the returns; so that during the last ten years alone—from 1893 to 1903—the deficit has reached the sum of 143,962,665 roubles and 55 kopecks. As against this, M. Stetkevich, in a pamphlet published in St. Petersburg, expresses the opinion that the expenses incurred for the maintenance of the army in Turkestan should be deducted from the deficit, as the soldiers must in any case be paid; and in this manner, instead of a deficit, the State would be able to show a balance. This calculation, however, has found much opposition; for Russians look upon Turkestan as an acquisition the great expense of which can only be equalised by the political and economical advantages it yields. As is generally known, it is because of this deficit that the Russian Government has desisted so far from incorporating the khanates of Bokhara and Khiva, as such a step would necessarily involve a considerable increase of expense. Moreover, for the present there seems no urgent necessity for Russia to take such a step; its supremacy in Central Asia is firmly rooted, and as long as there is no fear of an outside attack it is secure against any revolt of the natives.* The Russians might therefore

* Thus far there have only been two attempts at insurrection or revolt in Central Asia, both of which have been greatly exaggerated by the Russians. The one took place on May 18, 1898, in Ming-Töbe, not far from Endidjan, where the half-dead fanatic Mehemed

cheerfully pay a little more attention to the internal reformation of Turkestan, if only Russian society were prepared to undertake the task, and if such an undertaking could be made to fit in with the colonial and territorial politics hitherto entertained by the Russian Empire.

Unfortunately, however, the intentions of Russia seem to lie in quite another direction, as I will show further on.

Ali Ishan incited the Kipchaks of Khokand, renowned throughout Central Asia for their warlike spirit, to make an insurrection against the Russians, on which occasion twenty-two soldiers were killed and sixteen wounded. The pious Ishan, with many of his companions, had to pay for his adventure on the gallows, and forty-five participators were punished with exile to the Siberian lead-mines. Since then the Kipchaks have kept quiet. Before this, in 1892, there was a revolt in Tashkend on account of the hygienic measures taken at the time of the cholera epidemic, but this was nipped in the bud. Centuries of tyranny have taken all the courage out of the Turkestanis, and one regiment of soldiers can keep thousands in check.

CHAPTER XII

THE RUSSIFICATION OF SIBERIA

IN order to give as perfect a picture as is possible of the influence of Russian civilisation upon Asia, I must not omit to trace its effects upon Siberia, where the followers of Mohammed's doctrine are decidedly in the minority, for ever since the first advent of the Russians Islam has been losing ground there. With ancient Novgorod as starting-point, Russia has been in touch with the western frontiers of Siberia from very early times, but the annexation did not take place until the end of the sixteenth century. The close proximity of the two countries, however, does not entitle us, as is often done in our days, to look upon Siberia as a Russian colony. Colloquial expressions in the Russian language confute such an idea. For instance, where the natives of foreign territories are called Tuzemtzi—*i.e.*, natives—the original inhabitants of Siberia are generally known as Inorodzi—*i.e.*, foreigners or strangers—which indicates that the Russians looked upon the land as belonging to them, and upon the people of the soil as foreigners. When Yermak, towards the end of the sixteenth century, had conquered Siberia, and in 1582 sent his Ambassador, Ivan Kolzo, with gifts to the Court of Ivan the Terrible, there were great rejoicings in Moscow. The words 'God has added a new empire to Russia' re-echoed joyfully through the palace and on the 'red square.' As after the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, in the

happy days of Ivan's youth, so now the bells pealed merrily and thanksgivings were offered. Rumour greatly exaggerated the glories of the exploit; people talked of the hosts of warriors slain by the Cossacks, of the many people they had subjugated, and of the immeasurable wealth they had found. It would seem as if Siberia had dropped down from heaven for the express benefit of the Russians; they forgot that it had long since been known and subject to *us*.* 'Of course Siberia was known to the Russians, but the assertion that it was subject to Russia is questionable. Islam, as moral conqueror, had forestalled Russia; for, as we know, Tobolsk, at that time the *Ultima Thule* of Islam, was morally controlled from the shores of the Zerefshan. Just as Bokhara, in its missionary zeal, has for many years sent teachers from the local Medresses (colleges) to the Kirghises in the steppes north of the Jaxartes, for the propagation and confirmation of Islam, so it has also sent its emissaries in a north-easterly direction ever since the time that Kötchüm Khan, the son of Murteza of the Sheibani branch of the Djinghizides,† had succeeded in founding an empire on the Isker. Thus, supported on the one hand by Bokhara and Khiva, and on the other by Kazan, Islamism might easily have become as firmly rooted in Siberia as it was in the khanates of Central Asia, if it had not been that with the fall of Kazan and Astrakhan the spirit of orthodox Slavism burst the bonds which had thus far enthralled it, and eagerly went in search of fresh conquests. Yermak and his

* Karamsin, 'History of the Russian Empire,' German translation, vol. ix., p. 27.

† Abulghazi calls that part of Siberia which Köchüm ruled over 'Turan,' for he says: 'Tarikhi ming taki üch yilda Köchüm khanning kolindin Turani Urus aldi' (In the year 1003 the Russians took Turan out of the hands of Köchüm Khan). Edition Desmaisons, vol. i., p. 177.

hosts thus entered Siberia just at the right moment; a few decades later it would not have been so easy to overpower the growing strength of Islam.

If Ivan the Terrible, with the advantages which he had gathered from Western methods of administration, and with the help of Western arms, was able to break the strength of the Golden Horde, it was a comparatively easy matter for Yermak to overcome with his fire-arms the wild bands of Tartars and Ugrians coming against him with bows and arrows. It is a historical fact that Yermak commenced his adventurous campaign provided with three cannon, powder, and shot. Powder and shot have also in other parts of Asia, namely, on the eastern frontiers of Persia, changed the course of the world's history; for if Sheibani Khan,* the ruler of the Özbegs, had not been checked by the fire-arms of Shah Ismail, primitive though they were, who can say but that his victorious course might not, like that of Timur, have extended much further westward? The simple children of the steppes have always looked with horror upon the fatal invention of gunpowder. Even KÖroglu, the national hero of West Asia, curses the inventor of gunpowder when he exclaims: 'May poisonous snakes nestle in his brain!' According to his notions, the black grit has destroyed the spirit of true chivalry. It was, then, the superiority of their arms which gave the victory to Yermak's valiant hosts, and made the Russians masters in Siberia. Their dominion was limited at first to the inhospitable northern portions of Siberia, and consisted chiefly of stretches of land where, with the exception of a few small settlements and fortresses, the inhabitants led a nomadic existence. The population belonged partially to the Ugrian tribe, such as

* The battle between the Özbek Prince Sheibani Mehemed Khan and the Persian King Shah Ismail took place in the neighbourhood of Herat in the year 916 (1510).

the Ostyaks, Voguls and Syryäns, and partially to the Turco-Tartars: Yakuts in the high north; and the so-called South Siberian Turks: Altaiers, Teleuts, Kizilitzes, Kachinzes, Uryankhais, Barabas and West Siberian Tartars, besides a fair proportion of the Ugro-Turkish mixed nations, who in actual numbers, however, formed only small groups, and who were always either at war with one another or else made common cause with whatever power was in the ascendancy.*

Encouraged by their first successes, the small victorious army of Russians advanced rapidly, and this was the easier as the Turkish element, the mainstay of Köchüm's forces, was only feebly represented in Siberia. His chief army was composed of Ugrians, or more correctly speaking of Voguls and Ostyaks, who had never distinguished themselves by martial exploits, and who now at once became tributary to the Russians. As Karamsin rightly remarks,† they looked upon the foreign conquerors as charmed, superhuman beings. If this had not been the case,

* The numerical strength of the Siberian Turks of modern times, according to the 'Annotations about the Ethnical Condition of the Turkish Tribes and Families of Siberia, with an Account of their Relative Numbers' (in Russian), is as follows :

Yakuts	221,776
Altaiers and Teleuts	22,796
Kumandins	3,580
Lebedins	514
Black Tartars	3,464
Shors	10,688
Chulim Tartars	500
Descendants of Kuznetz	3,298
Kizilitzes	5,176
Kachinzes	11,363
Sagaians	18,701
Karagas	416
Uryankhais	45,000
Barabas	4,635
West Siberian Tartars...	37,148

389,055

† Vol. ix., p. 28.

if Kōchūm had been able to draw the Kirghises of Western Siberia, then still powerful, within his circle of jurisdiction, the Russians under Yermak would have come off badly at their hands; but with the Ugrian auxiliary troops no good could be done; they were unreliable, and at once surrendered to the Russians. And as for the Turkish elements scattered along the Isker, they were of equally doubtful value to Kōchūm; they had for the greater part adopted Shamanism, and their conversion to Islam was as yet scarcely begun. The work of proselytising was, as previously stated, exclusively in the hands of the emigrants from the khanates of Zerefshan, Mollas and merchants, whose descendants may be found to this day in the district of Tobolsk, Tūmen, and Kara, and also in the localities of Yalutrowsk, Semipalatinsk, and Petropavlowsk. According to Yadrinzeff, they number at present about 8,727 souls.* They were older inhabitants of these districts than the Russians, trade and the propagation of their religion being the primary causes of their settling there. For in the days of Kōchūm Khan they did for Siberia what the people of Kazan did for the Kirghis Steppe, and the Mollas of Bokhara for Afghanistan and India. They had a hard battle to fight with Shamanism, for as late as 1639 the majority of the Siberian Tartars confessed this faith. These messengers from Bokhara and Khiva were also instrumental in promoting the Islamisation of a portion of the Siberian Kirghises. At the time of their greatest prosperity their numbers, according to Georgi, amounted to 20,000; and if their missionary labours had received as much support from Bokhara as Christianity had from Russia, the Russian chances of success would have been very much smaller. Slighted and

* 'Sibirskie Inorodzi ikh bit i sowremennoe polozhenie' (The Siberian Foreign Elements, their Existence and Temporary Situation), by N. M. Yadrinzeff. St. Petersburg, 1891, p. 34.

neglected as they were, the Moslems of Siberia were unable to resist the urgency of the Russian missionaries. Thus, we are told by Yadrinzeff that the baptising of the Turco-Tartars or Turaliner Tartars was partially effected by the Archbishop Philotheus, between 1718 and 1720;* consequently before this—that is, soon after the victory of Yermak—the conversion of the Tartars to the Orthodox faith must have been undertaken by the Government in good earnest. We read further that Ivan the Terrible commanded the Archbishop of Vologda to send ten priests with their families to Siberia, in order to carry on the public worship of the Christian religion there;† they were escorted by 500 archers. Here, as everywhere, Cross and Sword worked together as faithful allies in spreading the culture of the Christian West, and thus began that period in the history of Northern Asia which is now drawing to a close. Islam then was not the only *religio militans*; orthodox Christianity also gladly resorted to force of arms.

It cannot be denied that Russia when entering Siberia had a most difficult problem to face. It had to take up the contest with three different religions, each of which suited the intellect, the views of life, and the ethnical needs of its followers, and which had penetrated into the flesh and blood of this, for the greater part, nomad population. Of these three religions, Shamanism had the least power of resistance, and could only maintain itself where Islamism and Buddhism had not thought it worth their while to proselytise. Such was the case among the Ugrians in the Far North—heathen in the true sense of the word—who worshipped the All-Father (Numi-Tarem) with as much enthusiasm as the Moslems prayed to Allah; yet this natural belief had far too weak a basis to resist the allurements and the overpowering in-

* 'Sibirskie Inorodzi,' p. 25.

† Karamsin, vol. ix., p. 27.

fluence of the Russian missionaries. In a report of the missionary labours of the first Russian clergy in Siberia,* it is stated that during the lifetime of the Archbishop Kiprian Starorussenikoff, in the year 1620, his diocese could boast of 30 churches, 22 convents, 300 priests, and 50 Order brothers and nuns. The same report gives an account of the labours of seventeen Russian prelates in Siberia, the Church being strongly supported by the Government, and in a Ukas of December 6, 1714, we read: 'Wherever idols, idol temples, or idolatrous places of education are found, thou shalt burn them in accordance with this our Imperial command, and all Voguls, Ostyaks, Tartars, and all others who are of foreign nationality, thou shalt convert to the Christian faith with the help of God and by thine own zeal. At the same time I command thee to make this our ordinance known to them word for word; those of the Voguls, Ostyaks, Tartars, and people of any other nationality who come to be baptised, shall receive from our Imperial bounty linen for a baptismal robe, and exemption from the Yasak (fur-tax).† The premium for the adoption of the religion of Christ, consisting of a few yards of linen, cannot be called extravagant, and the results have been correspondingly poor; for although at present the Voguls and Ostyaks as a people profess Christianity, the spirit of the Gospel has taken a slow and very loose hold upon these children of the high North, and in proportion as they became converted they have

* See the article in the *Journal of the Ministry of Education for the Year 1854*, Nos. 2, 3, entitled 'Materiali dlya istoriy christianskago prowjeshcheniya Sibiri, so wryemeni pokoreniya yeya w' 1581 do natchala XIX. Stolyeta' (Materials for the History of the Christian Enlightenment of Siberia, from the Time of the Conquest to the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century), by N. Abramoff, p. 10.

† See 'Earlier Reports concerning the Heathenism of the Voguls and Ostyaks,' by Bernard Munkácsi. Third Report, published at Keleti Szemle, fourth year, 1903, No. 2, p. 172.

also gradually become extinct. The water of Baptism brought the new converts neither intellectual nor material advantages, as we learn from a complaint addressed by an old baptised Chukchi to the missionary Argentoff: 'I was young; the Russians flattered me, and I was baptised. I now look back upon the past with ancestral eyes. What has Baptism done for us? The population is impoverished, the flocks have diminished, the reindeers are extirpated, and the people vanish away. There are hardly any old men now, and most of the people die an unnatural death. No, no; I want to die in a more homely, more human manner.'* Like the pious Spanish padres, who with their Bibles, strongly bound in wooden boards and provided with iron clasps, boxed the ears of the American heathen, crying, 'You black cattle! do you refuse to acknowledge the holiness of this Book?' so, or perhaps even worse, did the popes of the Greek Church set to work to convert the Voguls and the Ostyaks. The man who refused to be baptised underwent the severest punishments, and yet the end in view could not be attained, for everything was confined to outward appearances—all was superficial. The idols were replaced by ikons (holy pictures), to impress upon the people that the gaily-coloured pictures of Christian saints possessed greater miraculous power than the idols which had been handed down to them, or which they had made for themselves. But for the intellectual development of the people nothing was done. 'For two hundred years,' thus writes Munkácsi,† 'not a single attempt worth mentioning has been made to improve the intellectual condition of the people. In all the land of the Voguls there is to this day not one school to be found; and if one of the natives does as an exception go in for higher education, he becomes entirely Russified,

* 'Sibirskie Inorodzi,' p. 225.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 189.

and has henceforth no further dealings with his compatriots. . . . In all that vast land, inhabited by the Voguls, I found on my journey of investigation (1888-89) not a single tradesman—not even a blacksmith, although the South Voguls are horse-dealers. If an epidemic breaks out, whole villages die out, for there is no doctor, no surgeon anywhere within reach,' etc. And so it is with the Ostyaks, says Yadrinzeff,* notwithstanding the fact that within the circle of Berezoff 14,337, and in the circle of Surgut 5,923 Ostyaks, have received Baptism. The greatest blame devolves, of course, upon the Russian clergy, known to be the most illiterate of all the priests in the Christian Church, who in these remote regions, instead of looking after the souls of the people, have inaugurated a regular system of robbery. Professor Alquist† tells us that the Voguls of Pelym lodged a complaint against their priest because he oppressed them by exacting exorbitant fees for the performance of his official duties. His motto was: 'He who cannot pay cannot receive the Church's blessing, or else must be heavily fined.' Moreover, the Orthodox right reverend gentleman was so addicted to drink that for months together he was unable to conduct any service of public worship.

Not only foreigners, but also Russian travellers and investigators, give a most dismal picture of the condition of the Ugrians who have been converted to Christianity. Yadrinzeff‡ is of opinion that Russian missionaries do not trouble themselves about the human beings; all they care for is to proselytise. They say to the heathen natives: Be Russified, and we will look after you. 'Be baptised, and we will show you mercy.' The great poverty and helplessness-

* 'Sibirskie Inorodzi,' p. 225.

† 'Unter Vogulen und Ostyaken,' p. 13.

‡ 'Sibirskie Inorodzi,' p. 155.

ness of these people of the Far North have helped to make the Orthodox Church victorious, as we see from the account of the missionary work of Philotheus Leshtchinski in 1712-1714, during which time, according to Yadrinzeff, about 54,000 Ugrians embraced Christianity.* But, says the same learned writer, this conversion has not greatly benefited either the natives or the Russians. Writing about Siberia, he says: 'The conversion of the heathen, with their superstitions and fantastic notions and representations, is apparently an easy task. The Shamanists are easily brought to the font, hence the large number of converts among the Ostyaks and Voguls, etc.; but we must not forget that these converts have virtually become double-faced heathen. The mythological representations and superstitions do not suddenly disappear from their minds; they leave traces behind. We see this even among the uneducated masses in Europe. As a matter of fact, the Ostyaks, converted more than 150 years ago, still cling secretly to their heathenism. When the pope visits the diocese, the idols are removed and the ikons are put up; but no sooner has the pope left than the ikons are thrust aside and the idols restored to the place of honour. Indeed, the Christianising of the native Ugrian element in Siberia does not reflect much glory upon the civilising powers of the Russians, as we will presently show. Shamanism was evidently no special obstacle to Russification in localities where Islamism and Buddhism were not its rivals. Thus, we find that the Yakuts in the Far North have, as a whole, accepted Orthodoxy, and among the Altaiers also the Altaic mission has already had some success. Some patriots from amongst the ranks of the Yakuts stand out, showing a decided predisposition for culture. In the college at Yakutsk there is a transition course for higher

* 'Yadrinzeff Sibir kak Kolonia,' p. 115.

instruction, and a learned Yakut, Nikolayeff by name, has gained some celebrity by his literary labours.*

The second religion which has caused the Russians in Siberia considerable trouble is Buddhism, which gradually advanced from the Mongolian Steppe, and, according to accounts dating back as far as the year 1741, has spread without interruption, notwithstanding the presence of the Russians, we might almost say at the expense of Christianity. The Buryäts, who formerly professed Shamanism, have under the very eyes of Russia become followers of the doctrine of Buddha. Until the year 1741 there existed among them but 11 convents and 150 Lamas; while 100 years later—that is, in 1845—the number of Buddhists is estimated at about 85,060, and in 1848 at 125,000. In the same proportion grew also the number of convents and Lamas, of which latter there were in 1848 about 4,546. This is the more surprising as the Buryäts, averaging about 200,000† souls, are represented to be a peaceable race—at least, the settled portion of the community, which, although standing under the immediate influence of Russia, has nevertheless thus far resisted all attempts at conversion. Yadrinzeff‡ says with reference to this that the efforts of the Russian Government to restrain the spread of Buddhism have been quite useless, which fact he attributes mainly to the strongly developed national instinct of the people. The Khambo Lama on the Baikal complied only in appearance with the edict of the Tsar, and the consequent oppression only engendered a higher degree of fanaticism. The missionaries, moreover, by using forcible means to convert the Buryäts, have further embittered them. Nor did the English Mission, of

* 'Sibirskie Inorodzi,' p. 223.

† 'Pauli Narodi Rossiy,' vol. ii., p. 493, estimates the total number 190,000 souls.

‡ 'Sibirskie Inorodzi,' pp. 214, 215.

which Cochrane gives an account, fare much better. The English, supported by Nicolas I., went to work more systematically; nevertheless, from 1821 to 1829 they were not able to administer Baptism to one single Buryät, although they translated the Bible and had made themselves fairly familiar with the language and the customs of the natives. The Buryäts accepted their tracts, but never read them. They served the missionaries because these paid and fed them well, but in secret they laughed at the simplicity and credulity of the Christian foreigners. This dislike to Christianity strikes one the more as the Buryäts are noted for their desire to learn and their eminent fitness for acquiring knowledge. Many of them attend the Russian normal and middle schools, and some have even acquitted themselves with success at the Universities. Among the noteworthy scholars, we may mention the celebrated Orientalist Dardji Banzaroff* and the Lamas Gomboyeff, Khangaloff, Dorozheyeff, etc., who, without being converted to Christianity, enter with heart and soul into the modern education movement, and who as members of the Geographical Society of Siberia make many sacrifices in the cause of science, and have distinguished themselves as explorers. Amongst these latter we would make special mention of Tzybikoff, who of late years visited and described Lhasa. How long the Buryäts will be able to resist the attempts made to convert them, how long they will evade this first step towards Russification, is difficult to say. Their national instinct and the propaganda of Buddhism, so zealously fostered by the Thibetans, whose land and language are held sacred by the Buryäts, will not easily lose their power over them. Mean-

* Quite recently the Buryät Dorjieff, the son of this savant, has become famous as the adviser of the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, and the recent English campaign to Thibet must be taken as the result of the intrigues of this man.

while the Buryäts' thirst for knowledge is rendering good service to the Russians, to ethnography and philology in general; nevertheless, Buddhism for many more years to come is likely to hold its own against all the ecclesiastical and national endeavours of Russia.

The third antagonist of Russian civilisation in Siberia is Islam, the doctrine of Mohammed, which, although its territorial conquests there are limited, has so far succeeded in holding its ground with stubborn perseverance against all outside attacks, and notwithstanding that the ruling religion (Christianity) steadily continues to make proselytes. Abramoff* tells us that the Metropolitan Sylvester Glovatski, towards the middle of the eighteenth century, laboured with unflinching zeal in Tobolsk, and converted many Tartars, as well as Raskolniks, to the Orthodox Church, although at that time the Mohammedan tolerance period under Catherine II. was at its height, and he, the Metropolitan, had received strict injunctions from St. Petersburg to desist from any forcible conversion of the natives. Tobolsk was then the centre of the Church missions, and in the nineteenth century it even boasted a Bible Society for the conversion of Tartars and Kirghises. The Government, meanwhile having recognised its error in allowing the Turco-Tartar elements to come into touch with civilisation through the instrumentality of Islam, supported the missionary movement by building churches on the estuaries of the Ishim and Tari Rivers; but in spite of this, Orthodoxy spread very slowly, and between the years 1860 and 1868 only about 331 Tartars† were baptised. So persistently did the Moslem Tartars oppose the Church's attempts at Russification, that even those Tartars who in the

* 'Materiali dlya istoriy Christiyanskago prowyeshcheniya Sibiri,' p. 55.

† 'Sibirskie Inorodzi,' p. 25.

eighteenth century received Baptism, and who lived among a Russian population—as, for instance, in the village of Yamakowo in the circle of Tumen—have always continued to speak the Tartar tongue, and have not amalgamated with the Russians. Nevertheless, as might be expected, their change of religion has not benefited the Mussulmans. Through the loss of the schools formerly connected with the mosques there has been a falling away in matters of religion, for education has always been closely connected with religion. The material prosperity of the people has also suffered by the change. However, it was not only among the settled portion of the Turkish population, but also among the nomads, that enforced Baptism has proved a failure, for with the adoption of Christianity they had to give up their nomadic existence and begin an entirely new mode of life. As is always the case, intercourse with a more advanced state of society aggravates the condition of the people in a lower stage of development; so it was here—the number of settled Tobol Tartars, Tara Tartars and Barabinses has decreased* perceptibly of late years, while the number of Altaiers, Teleuts, Kara Tartars and Kirghises, less easily affected by Russian influences, has increased.† The primary cause of this

* According to Yadrinzeff ('Sibirskie Inorodzi,' p. 211), the number of Mohammedans in the districts of Tobolsk and Tomsk amounted in the year 1890 to 47,326, which, together with the 78,800 Siberian Kirghises, makes a total of 126,126. As against this, the latest census returns of 1897 give for Tobolsk 64,152, and for Tomsk 40,833, a total of 104,985 Mohammedans. This decrease of numbers is the more striking when we remember that the returns given by Yadrinzeff are in all probability incorrect, as the Mohammedans of Tobolsk and Tomsk together would be more than 40,833.

† According to Aristoff, 'Zamyetki ob etnicheskom Sostawye turskikh plemen i narodnostei' (p. 68), there were in 1763, 476 Altaiers of the male sex; in 1804, 1204; in the sixties of the nineteenth century, according to Radloff, 14,000 to 15,000 of both sexes; and according to Yadrinzeff, in the year 1880, 17,014 souls of both sexes.

phenomenon, however, lies in the fact that the intellectual standard of the Russian agriculturists and workmen in Siberia was far too low to impress the native mind with the advantages of civilisation. In many instances they were far better off when left to themselves. As regards the Russification of the settled Turkish tribes, we maintain that the peaceful social intercourse with the Russians had a far better influence than forcible conversion to the Russian Church.

Yadrinzeff* is quite right when he says that in places where there were no missionaries, but where Russian colonisation was extensive, the natives adopted Christianity more quickly and of their own accord. This is proved by the number of Tartars in the district of Kuznetz and Biisk, in the principality of Tobolsk; whereas in the Moslem schools in the Moslem quarters, where religious instruction is always of chief importance in spite of the terrible pressure exercised by the Orthodox Church, all attempts at Russification and the introduction of modern culture have proved fruitless. Wherever the Russian Government has wished to assert its authority, it has always resorted in the first instance to the forcible conversion of the subjugated foreign nations. The reason for this is obvious. The native Russian population lacks that higher culture which has made other Governments successful in their work of colonisation, and in Siberia Russia has found the application of violent measures more efficacious and less troublesome—as, for instance, among the Volga Tartars in the Caucasus and in Turkestan. The fact that the methods hitherto followed and the means hitherto employed were not expressive of the humane spirit of the cultured West is acknowledged even by the Russian scholar Yadrinzeff, who concludes his treatise on the 'Influence of Culture upon

* 'Sibirskie Inorodzi,' p. 223.

the Natives of Siberia' with these words: * 'The true aim of education should always be to cultivate in the individuals a feeling of love towards their tribe, but never to draw them away from the national body; for the ultimate end of that method must inevitably be extinction and decay. Thus far, only very few of the natives have kept intact the bond of unity with their fellow-tribesmen, and so exercised a civilising influence over them. Amongst those few, we would mention Banzaroff, Piroshkoff, Boldanoff, and Dorozheyeff amongst the Buryäts; Nikolayeff amongst the Yakuts; Velikhanoff, Yakowleff, and Altinsarin amongst the Kirghises. These, however, are all isolated instances. The masses have remained ignorant of the higher European culture, although such personalities as those mentioned might have been of the greatest service to their compatriots. In stirring up the desire for knowledge, in rousing the intellect, in teaching them to realise the close connection existing between the present and the future—therein lies the safeguard of national preservation. Such knowledge is to us the very source of life and of salvation, strong enough to rouse even the legendary Samoyedes, expiring in misery and starvation. The spirit of the Siberian native is oppressed; a deep melancholy weighs him down; a gloomy despondency oppresses him; he has no faith in improvement and no hope for the future; and it is only by rousing in him this faith and this confidence that the education of the natives can ever be accomplished. When the native realises that there is no coercion and no danger in education, he learns to appreciate it. We see how natives occasionally send their children to the middle schools—for instance, to the cadet school at Omsk—there are instances, also, of Buryäts sending their children to the college.

'Up to the present, examples of higher education

* Sibirskie Inorodzi,' p. 241.

among the natives are scarce; but we trust that the local Universities of Siberia will attract the attention of leading men. Natives such as Dardji Banzaroff, Velikhanoff, and Katanoff, have already rendered excellent service to Russian science. Without neglecting their own language, they have proved themselves able Orientalists, and have contributed largely to the study of ethnography through their intimate knowledge of their countrymen. But a much larger contingent of learned Orientalists could be produced by the Oriental faculty of Siberia. Natives might be educated to act as translators and interpreters, and a beneficial influence over our Oriental neighbours might be exercised through their intervention.'

It is superfluous to enter into further criticism on the civilising methods employed by the Russians in Siberia. Rightly or wrongly, reasonably or unreasonably, Russia has attained its object in Siberia. It has not only subjugated this vast portion of Asia, stretching from the Ural to the Pacific, and from the Arctic Ocean to the Oxus and Tien-Shan, a territory covering over 6,000,000 of English square miles; but Siberia proper has been inundated by the floods of ethnical Slavism, so that the poor remnant of the original inhabitants is as a solitary island, powerless and forlorn, in the midst of the roaring ocean. Of the present population, amounting to 7,000,000, 6,000,000 have become Slavonised, and only 1,000,000 of the original inhabitants have retained their old national characteristics. In this ancient *Officina Gentium*—for Turks, Ugrians, Finns, and Mongols have all originally come from South Siberia—peace and quietness now prevail, and the all-powerful decree of the White Tsar on the Neva is the shibboleth which controls the ethnical, ethical, religious, and political life. Henceforth internal strife and racial feuds no longer evolve new tribes and linguistic amalgamations. Now there

is no forced emigration, no overcrowding, no total extirpation of entire tribes, such as there used to be in olden times when the natives had to fight the elements, or quarrelled and wrangled among themselves about pasture-lands or hunting-grounds. The magic beat of the drum of Shamanism is almost silent; the Ezan of the muezzin is only heard in faint and timid accents; for the ikons of the true Church have gained the supremacy as the only certain means whereby the happiness of the present and the hereafter can be insured. Just as some 9,000* Voguls and 20,000 Ostyaks in their high Northern home have become transformed by the holy water of Baptism, and by the compulsory acquirement of the Russian language and are gradually becoming Russified, so the time is drawing near when the Buryäts, Kalmuks, and the later Kirghises will have to submit to the total transformation of their cultural existence. With the latter—*i.e.*, the Buddhists and Mohammedans—the evolution will not be such an easy matter; for both these are supported by national bodies of their own persuasion. Lhasa as well as Mecca radiates its light in an almost unbroken line far into the high Northern districts; but in the end the Double Cross will triumph. Russia's influence is practically only now beginning to assert itself in that benighted corner of the Old World, and to shed the light of Western culture in its own peculiar way; not always perhaps in the garb which would appeal to us as the most suitable. The start which Russia has made of late years in these neglected and fallow-lying portions of Asia is most

* Dr. Munkacsi, the most recent Hungarian traveller in Siberia, says that in the district of Perm there were, in 1889, 1,934 Voguls; in the district of Tobolsk, in 1868, 4,444 Voguls. Besides these there are in the Northern Sowa about 2,529 souls, making a total of 8,907 Voguls. But these figures are not absolutely reliable, either, as at the time this census was taken no correct ethnical classification did exist.

promising. By means of the great Siberian Railway the entrance of civilisation will be greatly facilitated. Viewed from the standpoint of political experience, the new acquisitions in the South and South-east of Siberia may be of problematic value to the Russian Empire, for a too extensive frontier State is a heavy strain on political resources; but from the standpoint of civilisation Russia might do much for Siberia, and every philanthropist must on this score wish the mission a hearty success.

Whatever may be our estimate of the standard of Russia's civilising methods, one thing is certain and remains infallibly true, namely, that *Russian culture is always, and in every respect, to be preferred to the primitive culture of the Asiatic.*

CHAPTER XIII

RESULT OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE

IN the above rough sketch of the influence of Russian culture upon the various portions of Moslem Asia which have been made subject to the Tsar's dominion, we have attempted to throw some light upon the civilising methods used by Russia, upon the object they have in view and the means employed. This sketch enables us not only to understand the character and the *modus operandi* of the work, but it also helps us to appreciate at their right value the results so far obtained. Judging dispassionately and without prejudice, as it is seemly to do in matters of such moment, we must frankly acknowledge that the Russians have done much good work in Asia, that with their advent order, peace, and security have taken the place of anarchy and lawlessness, and that, notwithstanding the strongly Oriental colouring of their political, social and ecclesiastical institutions as representatives of the Western world, they have everywhere made a change for the better, and inaugurated an era more worthy of humanity. Whether the Russian Government had this result in view, whether its actions and dealings, instead of being animated by a desire to improve humanity, were not, rather the outcome of greed for territory and power, is a question which we need not discuss here. We contemplate an accomplished fact, and the various phases in the process of evolution must compel all unprejudiced persons to recognise its

merits. From the moment that the Grand-Dukedom of Moscow threw off the heavy fetters by which the Golden Horde held it enchained, the neighbouring Asiatic world has felt the vibrations of the spirit of the West, which has touched the sluggish body of old Mother Asia at short intervals, and which culminates either in evolution or in death. Russia, Poland, and Hungary, whose children sacrificed their lives to defend the soil of Christian Europe in the Middle Ages, and who with their blood stemmed the fury and fanaticism of the barbaric hosts, are, correctly speaking, the first benefactors and promoters of modern civilisation. Our modern world is eternally indebted to them, for we must not forget what would have been the fate of Europe if the descendants of Batu Khan and the Janissaries of Turkey, at the time of their power, had broken through the wall of Slav and Hungarian arms and made a rush upon the very heart of defenceless Europe. What the Hungarians did for the South-east the Russians have done for the North-east of Europe. Rough and wild was the hand of Ivan the Terrible, but he was the right man for the work. After the taking of Kazan and Astrakhan, the influx of the Ural-Altaic warrior bands from Central Asia and Siberia was stayed, and gradually swerved back towards their native steppes. With this feat Russia inscribed its first success in sanguinary letters upon the annals of the world's history. After-events, resulting from the advantages then obtained, show us how the field of action of the early nomads was transformed slowly but surely into a cultivated district with towns and villages. It shows us how trade and traffic gradually gained ground there, and how South Russia, where in past ages Khazars, Pecheneges, Madjars, Kumanians, Cossacks, and Turkomans, wrestled and fought, now steps forth out of the surrounding wilderness and desolation bearing the torch of Western

culture. Metamorphoses of this kind we meet wherever Russia's power has been felt, wherever its sceptre has brought peace and order, the first conditions of civilisation. Thus, the Caucasus, where national fragments of various origins and creeds for hundreds of years lived in bloody strife, has now in modern times at last become pacified. I can remember the time when Sheikh Shamil, the sacred chief of the Lesghians, from his stronghold Gunib, personally directed the fight for freedom and religion against the Russians, which campaign for certain political reasons has been much exalted in the Western world.

Well do I remember how the Abkhases, Addighi, Chechenses, and other Cherkesses, came from Sokhum Kala and Anapa upon the deceitful waves of the Black Sea, and landed in Constantinople in the town-quarter of Topkhane, their small ships laden with the children destined for the slave-market, young boys and girls to be sold to supply the harems of Efendis and Pashas.* Of these problematic Circassian heroes of liberty, who in their time were much celebrated in Europe, no trace is now to be found, for Russia has established order. The Batum-Baku railway traverses a portion of these former robber dens, and although the Karapapaks, Terekmes, and other semi-nomadic Turks of Transcaucasia, do not yet altogether submit to Russian rule, the time of the freebooters has long since passed away, and the pacification of the whole Caucasian territory will be shortly an accomplished fact.

And what shall I say of the condition of Central Asia as reorganised by the Russians—I, who have seen this den of Asiatic barbarism and ferocity in all its original ugliness, and who therefore am able to judge of the changes which have been brought about?

* See my 'Sittenbilder aus dem Morgenlande.' Berlin, 1876, pp. 25, 26.

When in the guise of a mendicant friar, seated in my tent on the shores of the Görghen or the Etrek, and gazing eastward towards the steppe region, the names of such places as Kizil Arvat, Goktepe, Ashkabad, and Merv, were mentioned in my hearing, a feeling of dread and horror would seize hold of me because of the terrible stories I had been told about these places; and gazing in the distant blue which envelops the mountains, my imagination saw the fettered slaves and other miserable creatures wandering round. To-day in most of these places peace and safety are established. Before me lies the *Zakaspiskoe Obozryenie* (Transcaspian paper), a daily newspaper published at Ashkabad, in which European and American merchants advertise articles of fashion and the latest productions of modern art and industry. In the boys and girls' college at Ashkabad classical literature and European sciences are taught; there are clubs, theatres, concert-halls, etc.; in short, in this city, now numbering 21,400 souls, there is nothing to remind them that forty years ago they still lived here the old Asiatic life as in the days of Genghis Khan, and that this 'habitation of love'* (*lucus a non lucendo*) was formerly known as the seat of the bitterest animosity and fanaticism. Of the tremendous changes in Turkestan itself—that is, in the cities of Tashkend, Samarkand, Endidjan, Mergolan, Khokand, and Namengan—much more could be said. In those places where I went round with timorous steps, singing hymns and dispensing blessings in the streets, the Western tourist may now be seen taking snapshots with his Kodak, and the fanatical native who formerly would get into a furious rage at the mere mention of the word 'Kafir' (unbeliever)

* The meaning of the word Ashk-abad is Abode of Love; but Ashk (Love) must here be taken in the Sufistic sense of the word—*i.e.*, Love towards God and Love of Faith. In all probability a Turkoman saint had his abode here in past ages.

now makes respectful obeisance to the Christian foreigner, and is proud when he can pronounce a Russian word.

I could fill pages were I to describe the sharp contrast between Central Asia as I used to know it and Central Asia as it is now. But the little I have said will, I think, be sufficient to convince the reader that I do not ignore or depreciate the new order of things inaugurated by the Russians in Central Asia and elsewhere, but, on the contrary, that I am most anxious not to withhold the praise which is undoubtedly due to their labours. Nothing would be more censurable and despicable than to allow ourselves to be influenced by personal dislike or political considerations in our judgment of the dealings and transactions of a State whose institutions and tendencies displease us. This would be an abuse of sound reason and justice. No, the impartial investigator must be guilty of no such mistake in his comparative study of the cultural missions of individual European States. Our opinion of the political questions of the day must not influence our judgment as to the quality of the methods and results of the culture movement. We most heartily acknowledge that in Moslem localities Russia has done good work, and deserves recognition for the progress made by the people there. But we must not lose sight of the fact that it is Russia in particular which, as far as its own culture is concerned, has not by a long way reached that stage of perfection which would enable it to take its stand as the representative of the true, genuine spirit of modern advancement. Russian culture is only half European, and still half Asiatic, and although modern Russia has produced a few great personalities, *yet, taken as a whole, its education is only half finished, and not matured enough to make it the successful civiliser of other entirely or semi-barbaric societies.* This lack of readiness and the absence of a pronounced tendency

becomes all the more noticeable when another foreign, more advanced culture begins the struggle in the Asiatic world with a society which, guided by its ancient theories, despises all innovations.

Thus far the idea has prevailed that this incompleteness of the culture of the Russians, which we object to, is the best qualification for their successful operations in the East, and that, not being so diametrically opposed to the Asiatics, they are the better able to act as their teachers. The error of this view has been clearly proved by the history of the last 300 years; for when we look into the condition of those nations, which since the first victory of Ivan the Terrible have been under Russian tutelage, we see that the Russian protection, instead of benefiting them, has rather done them harm, because it deprived them of the hope and the possibility of making progress in the field of their own national development, and did not help them forward in acquiring the new foreign accomplishments. Under Russian sway a transformation, a change for the better, could at the best only be possible by forcing the Asiatics entirely to give up their national individuality, by their being swallowed up in the mass of the ruling element—in short, by Russification; and as the Russian State and Russian society always and everywhere have contemplated this kind of sovereignty and absorption, therefore their methods of civilisation have always tended to swell the ranks of Russia's forces, and made the individual nations suspicious of the intentions of their foreign masters, and put them on their guard against them. Hitherto the transition of one world of culture into another has always had to be paid for by national extinction. Can we wonder that some tribes refused to pay this high price and to submit to this fate? Can we wonder that they have resisted all attempts at Russification and have preferred to fall into a slow decline? No

nation, not even an Asiatic one, where religion takes the place of nationality, willingly gives itself the death-stroke by giving up its national individuality. Keeping this fact in view, we can understand why the Moslem Turks of the Lower Volga, in the Crimea and in the Caucasus, will never cheerfully estrange themselves from the cultural and social views entertained at the time of their subjugation to the Russians, and that in all probability this will also be the case in Central Asia. We meet with a few isolated cases in South Russia of Moslems who, perfectly European in their manner of thinking, enter into critical comparisons of the Eastern and Western Worlds, and we are not a little surprised to find that Tartars, Lezghians, and others, sit in judgment on our philosophers, historians, and poets. But these few exceptions should not mislead us. If the sons of distinguished Moslems, on their passage through the school of the cadet corps, have been converted to the Russian Church, and if Tartars, Bashkirs, and Kalmuks, after leaving the Russian colleges and Universities, enter into disquisitions upon the history of culture in general, this does not in any way affect the masses of the Tsar's Mohammedan subjects. Of the true light of Western culture, of our principles of freedom and equality, only a faint glimmering, a tiny spark, has reached the masses; they are as much as ever filled with hatred and suspicion against Christianity, which to them is the personification of oppression, and Western culture, which should ennoble, benefit, and liberate humanity, is looked upon by Asia as the chief cause of all its misery and decay.

Anyone judging of Russia's influence with prejudice and without sufficient knowledge of the true state of things may comfort himself with the thought that the half-culture of Russia is preferable to the many evils of Asiatic society, and is at any rate a step forward

on the way to improvement, for they say, 'The better is often an enemy of the good.' Yes, but when we consider how long, how tortuous, and how toilsome, is the road by which the Asiatic is made to travel before he reaches the so-called Russian 'cross-road,' which will lead him to the true source of modern culture, we cannot be especially enthusiastic about this mode of transformation. The Russian State does not civilise, it merely conquers, absorbs, sacrifices everything to its national Moloch, and thinks only of enlarging its territorial dominions. When this Slav Moloch shall have demolished and consumed the foreign ethnical elements, it may come to pass that Russia also will make progress in the way of modern freedom and culture. It may grow yet to be a true representative of the Western world, and come forward in Asia as the reformer and saviour of oppressed humanity. But that time is far distant yet, and until it comes the accumulation of crude force in the hand of an autocratic-despotic Government is bound to curb the free development of the Russian State and endanger the peace and progress of Europe.

The influence of Russian culture on Moslem Asia therefore can, for the reasons stated above, only benefit Russian State interests and promote Russian commerce and industry; but for the Mohammedans themselves this influence is of doubtful value, because the price they have to pay for it is the loss of their nationality. The present relation between governor and governed is likely to remain unchanged far into the remote future. In the southern frontier districts of the Tsar's dominions the Moslem population has a decided majority over the Slavs, and even in localities where Islamism forms the minority, Armenians and other Christians, but never Russians, have the predominance. According to the census of 1897, out of a total population of 128,924,289, about 13,889,421 belong to the

Mohammedan faith, and the relative proportion of Christians and Moslems in the principalities of the southern frontier is as follows :

	Mohammedans.	Christians.
In the district of Kars ...	145,781	49,295*
„ Eriwan ...	352,351	17,848
„ Tersk ...	484,462	318,776
„ Dagestan ...	540,960	17,313
„ Elisabetpol ...	552,632	10,016
„ Uralsk ...	478,695	109,533
Total	2,556,881	422,781

In Central Asia proper, in the districts of Fergana, Syr-Darya, Semiryeche, Samarkand, and Transcaspia 196,311 Christians live amongst 6,251,836 Mohammedans—that is, 3·72 per cent. of the ruling classes, as against 95·63 per cent. of the subjugated classes. Besides the Orthodox Christians mentioned, there are in Central Asia the following denominations :

Sectarians ...	3,838†
Catholics ...	10,798
Protestants ...	3,880
Other Christians ...	4,831
Jews ...	10,613
Total ...	33,960

—altogether 230,271 non-Mohammedans, which, considering the comparatively short time of the Russian occupation in Central Asia, points to the presence of a considerable number of foreigners, but which taken as a whole will scarcely form a factor strong enough to decompose or transform the original population in

* The Christians here mentioned are not only Slavs, but also include Armenians and other Christian bodies, so that the minority of the orthodox Slavs, as against the professors of Islam, becomes all the more striking.

† The statistic returns here given have been taken from the 'Turkestanski Kalendar' for 1904.

the conquered districts. Admitting, therefore, that the emigration of Russians has assumed far greater proportions in Turkestan than in other districts—for instance, in the Caucasus—and that this emigration is likely to increase still more, this does not alter our former statement regarding the continuance of the present relationship—that is to say, that *Turkestan and the Moslem population will probably for many, many years to come be looked upon as the partes adnexæ of the Tsar's dominions, and that the time is very far off when they will be swallowed up in the ocean of ethnical Slavism.* The absorption into the Russian element will not be quite so effective here as in Siberia, where, as already stated, six-sevenths of the total population is amalgamated in the national element. Nor can the Russians expect the same success as they had when dealing with the Turco-Tartars in the South-west—namely, in Kazan, Astrakhan, and the Crimea—for, in the first place, the Turkish element is far too numerous and compact in Turkestan to be absorbed into the minority of the ruling classes. In the second place, Russia stands there against a solid mass of fanatical Moslems, who, surrounded on all sides by their fellow-believers, will resist all attempts of the Orthodox Church far more tenaciously than ever was the case with the Mohammedans in Kazan, Astrakhan, and the Crimea. In the third place, Turkestan is separated from the Mother Country by the steppe girdle, and Russian colonisation cannot so easily be carried on there as on the Lower Volga, where the territorial and climatic conditions are much more favourable. At the best the Russian possessions in Turkestan can only form an advanced southern boundary-line of the Tsar's dominions, an acquisition which will round off the region of the Ural-Altai tribes which have come under Slav rule. From there farther southwards we trace the spread of the Aryan race, whose destiny

and cultural formation has fallen into the hands of another Power. In the interest of peace and civilisation, it is to be hoped that the two Culture-bearers, who now have approached one another so closely, will continue in peace and harmony their work for the good of all humanity.

PART II
THE CIVILISING INFLUENCE
OF ENGLAND

CHAPTER. I

THE BEGINNINGS OF BRITISH RULE

IN the first part of this work we have attempted to describe the progress of Slavism from North to South, and its civilising influence upon the Moslem portions of Asia. We now come to consider the work of the second Culture-bearer of the West—namely, England in its relation to India. England started in the opposite direction—that is, it began operations in South Asia and worked its way northward. Not only, however, in the geographical direction taken by the conquering hosts, but also in their individuality, in the means used and the ends in view, the two Powers were totally different. The Grand-Dukes of Moscow, after they had shaken off the yoke of the Golden Horde, set to work to avenge the wrongs sustained and to conquer the hostile land. It was, in fact, a campaign of Oriental Christianity against Islam and the warlike element of the Ural-Altaic tribes. At bottom it was a political undertaking in every sense of the word; while England's interference in the East emanated from a company of merchants with private means, who of their own accord, at their own risk, and without a thought of making territorial conquests, set out on the deceitful waves of the ocean to explore the Far East. This company consisted originally of 125 members with a capital of £70,000, which sum afterwards was increased to

£400,000,* and in the charter granted by Queen Elizabeth on December 31, 1600, to the merchants concerned in the undertaking, it was stated 'that they, at their own adventures, costs, and charges, as well for the honour of this our realm of England . . . might adventure and set forth one or more voyages, with convenient number of ships and pinnaces, by way of traffic and merchandise to the East Indies,' etc.†

After Vasco de Gama had effected the passage round the Cape of Good Hope, and in May, 1498, had landed at Calcutta, the wonderful news of the rich treasures of the East Indies spread rapidly; and although the Portuguese remained for nearly 100 years sole possessors of the Indian coast lands, yet the thirst for riches and adventure began to incite other seafaring nations also. Holland, the greatest naval Power of the seventeenth century, was the first to break the Portuguese monopoly, and in the first half of the seventeenth century the Dutch East India Company was established in India, Ceylon, Sumatra, and in the Persian Gulf.‡ England, beginning to breathe more freely after the defeat of the Spanish Armada in the year 1588, was not likely to remain far behind the other seafaring nations of the West. A few English adventurers started operations in India as the trading company already referred to. Owing to the keen competition with their European rivals, who had first appeared upon the scene, the English could make but slow progress; for although at first it was merely a question of securing a few factories, and the acquisition of land was never thought of, yet the

* 'The Indian Empire: its Peoples, History, and Products,' by Sir William Wilson Hunter. Third new and revised edition, London, 1893, p. 428.

† 'The Government of India; being a Digest of the Statute Law relating thereto, with Historical Introduction and Illustrative Documents,' by Sir Courtenay Ilbert, K.C.S.I. Oxford, 1898, p. 466.

‡ 'The Indian Empire,' p. 425.

example of the Portuguese and the Dutch, who under cover of commercial purposes had managed to obtain a good deal of landed property, roused in the English a desire for conquest, and they were consequently looked upon with suspicion by their rivals.

Not until after the contract between the English and the Dutch was made in 1619 did the former begin to take up a more independent position; and although this contract was annulled by the Dutch in 1620, the English had by that time secured a firm foothold at several places on the mainland of India. Thus, the factory at Surat, established in 1612, was followed by factories at Mocha in 1618, at Jask in 1619, at Arme-gaon in 1625, at Masulipatam in 1632, at Balasor and on the Hooghli in 1640, while in 1661 the Portuguese ceded Bombay to the English, and Calcutta was founded in 1686.

It does not lie within our province to recount the historical progress of the English conquests in India, all of which has been so often and so ably told elsewhere.* Our object is rather to throw light upon the causes which have made the English successful, and

* Some of the best-known authorities on this subject are the following works :

1. 'The History of the British Empire in India,' by Edward Thornton. London, 1841, 6 vols.

2. 'The History of the British Empire of India, from the Appointment of Lord Hardinge to the Political Extinction of the East Indian Company, 1844-1862' (forming a sequel to Thornton's 'History of India'), by Lionel James Potter. London, 1866, 2 vols.

3. 'The History of India : the Hindu Mahometan Periods,' by the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone. Sixth edition, with notes and additions by E. B. Cowell, London, 1874.

4. 'The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India,' by Sir Alfred Lyall. London, 1894.

5. 'The Indian Empire : its Peoples, History, and Products,' by Sir W. W. Hunter. London, 1893.

6. 'The Expansion of England' (two courses of lectures), by J. R. Seeley. London, 1884. This applies only partially to India.

which have led to the foundation of the Indian Empire, now rightly looked upon as one of the wonders of the world, compared with which the exploits of Rome and Alexander the Great are as child's play.

The first question which arises is: Why should England, and not Portugal, Holland, or France, all of whom were first on the spot, have been so successful in its operations? And in reply we would remark that the Portuguese, whose national characteristics date from the time of the Moorish conquest, came to India, not as merchants, but rather as robber-knights and crusaders, and looked upon all heathen people as enemies of Portugal and of Christ. Their conduct in India was marked by a fanaticism and cruelty which put even the actions of a Pizarro and Cortes in America in the shade. Moreover, the trade of India was a monopoly of the Portuguese Crown, whose officials from personal motives of greed ill-treated and oppressed the natives in every possible way. The Christian Catholic missionaries did not hesitate to use the most cruel measures in the service of their Church, for these pious men had more regard for the treasures than for the souls of the poor Hindus. It is therefore easy to see that Portugal carried the seeds of decline and destruction in its own bosom, and was bound ere long to disappear from the scene. As early as the middle of the seventeenth century Portugal had ceased to be of any account in India, and its consequent political existence was, as Sir W. W. Hunter* rightly declares, a miserable chronicle of pride, poverty, and high-sounding titles. The record of Portuguese power in India is confined to the contents of the epic the 'Lusiade,' the death-roll of the Inquisition, the conversion of a few low half-caste relatives, and three small pieces of land on the coast of Bombay.†

As regards the Dutch, they acted with more caution,

* 'The Indian Empire,' p. 423.

† The same, p. 440.

perseverance, and ability. In the seventeenth century their naval power was the greatest in the world, and their authority in the Asiatic seas, and in many parts of India and South Persia, was accordingly great. If they had not found such a formidable rival in England, their prestige would not have been so easily overruled. The fall of the Dutch in India was hastened by the puerile spirit of their politics, and Sir W. W. Hunter is about right when he says:* 'The Dutch, like the Phœnicians, have not hesitated to commit the most cruel deeds in order to oust their neighbours, only that, unlike the Phœnicians, they never troubled themselves to introduce their civilisation among the peoples with whom they came in contact.'

In the French the English met more formidable rivals. Ever since 1604 French commercial companies had existed in India. The French had trade interests in several parts of the mainland and neighbouring islands, but there was a lack of adequate support from the central Government. In the beginning Colbert had realised the importance of the factories, but later on those early decrees and privileges were abolished, and the *Assemblée Nationale* of 1790 finally made the continuance of French authority in India an utter impossibility. Their most capable men who were sent over thither fell victims to a dissolute people and a vicious Court whose Ministers and mistresses had little interest in, and less knowledge of, colonial politics. The licentiousness of the French colonial government proved of great advantage to the English. Prominent Frenchmen, dangerous rivals of the English at the Courts of native Sovereigns who were hostile to the British, often occupied influential positions there; and they, as well as former Governors, such as Dumas and Dupleix, who had distinguished themselves not only as able soldiers, but also as eminent states-

* 'The Indian Empire,' p. 426.

men, might have caused the English much trouble. But now when the English power had become fairly well established—that is, towards the end of the eighteenth century—the armies of the Indian Princes who were antagonistic to the English were commanded by French adventurers; the soldiers of the Márátha power had been drilled by the French; Tippu Sultan of Mysore, a dangerous opponent, kept up a secret correspondence with the Directorate in Paris, and as 'Citoyen Tipu' entered the republican clubs in Paris. Napoleon I., indeed, had planned nothing short of the conquest of India in order therewith to give the death-blow to his arch-enemy England. Fortunately for the English, the interest of the French in the affairs of India had waned considerably towards the end of the eighteenth century—in fact, there never had been any real national enthusiasm for the undertaking. After the power of Lally (who on account of this misfortune was executed in Paris) had been broken at Wandewash, several regiments were promptly withdrawn from the Indian possessions, and these were never replaced. When, after the breaking out of the French Revolution, the Republic declared war with England, all the high-flown plans of the Corsican General were shattered, and resolved themselves into a mere chimera.

In spite of all these dangers and adversities, the English managed to gain ground, partly through the fortunate coincidence of certain political events in Europe and Asia, which, if properly manipulated, were bound to insure the success of the English, and partly in virtue of those qualities which govern the national spirit of the English, and which, proceeding from their historical development, are upheld and promoted by the ethical and social conditions which characterise the British more than any other nation of the West.

Knowing something of the extraordinary difficulties which Clive and Hastings had to deal with, and estimating them at their true value, we cannot fail to see that the tenacious perseverance and stubborn strength of the English character formed the chief factor which eventually brought about the realisation of that marvellous scheme—the establishment of the Indian Empire. In this respect I cannot agree with Professor Seeley,* who maintains that the acquisition of India was a blind speculation, and that, of all the exploits ever achieved by the English, nothing has been more unintentional and accidental than the conquest of India.

I grant that in the beginning the East India Company had only trade interests in view, that the merchants therein concerned gave little or no thought to the acquisition of territory, and that the various wars with the native Princes were, as it were, forced upon them. But who could for a moment maintain that Clive and Hastings, the real founders of English power in India, were likely to look on with cold indifference at the state of anarchy which, after the death of Aurengzib, prevailed in the Empire of the Moguls, and which with the fall of that dynasty led to many political reversions and changes? Who can doubt that the position and the influence which the French had gained in several places had an encouraging and stimulating effect upon the English? nor can we suppose that the short-sightedness and dulness of the most prominent amongst the native pretenders to the throne of India failed to rouse the patriotic heroism of the British commanders. Personal ambition and thirst for wealth formed another mighty stimulant. India had always been famous both in Europe and

* 'The Expansion of England,' by J. R. Seeley, Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge. London, 1884, p. 179.

Asia as the land of wealth and treasures untold, and when the fame of it induced even Mahmud of Ghazni, the Moguls, the lame ruler of Samarkand, and Nadir Shah, to make expeditions to the South, we cannot be surprised that some of the best servants of the English trading company were attracted by the glamour of the gold-devil, and systematically set to work to make conquests. History relates that Mir Jafar, who in 1757 was appointed by Clive as Viceroy of Murshidabad, had to pay 6,000,000 rupees to make good the losses of the company, besides personal indemnities to Clive and other officers and functionaries. The demands of the English amounted to £2,697,750, but only £1,238,575 was paid—that is, about half.*

It is no use trying to attribute the success of the English in India to chance or blind fate. Every success, however small, must have convinced the English more and more that the exceptional circumstances in which they were placed could with patience and perseverance lead to great results, and that, apart from the primary object of the East India Company, not only very favourable commercial conditions, but also valuable territorial possessions, and finally a new empire, might be gained. Without entering into any extravagant speculations, we must not fail to consider the political and ethnical causes which so greatly assisted the work of the European invaders. It was in India that the representatives of the spirit of Western culture, rejuvenated through the Renaissance, first came into contact with the spirit of the East, which as yet was untouched by Western influences. On the plains of India the first contest took place between modern Europe and ancient Asia; for in the wars of the Slavs

* W. W. Hunter, p. 451. Mills's 'History of British India,' vol. iii., pp. 367, 368.

with Turks, Moguls, and Ugrians, our world was represented by semi-European Russia, and this was, after all, more correctly speaking, rather a struggle between the Double Cross and the Crescent. Nor did the contrast between the two worlds find full expression in our wars with the Osmanlis, because the latter were saturated with Aryan elements, and could therefore not be looked upon as pure and unadulterated Asiatics. India has always been the seat of pure Asiatic thought; its religion, its poetry, its manners and customs, and even its arts, had spread east and west long before the appearance of Mohammed, and all the faults and failings we find now in the social and political conditions of West and Central Asia have originated with the peoples and rulers of Hindustan.* When therefore we read, in the extravagant language of Oriental chronicles, of the power, the wealth, the order, the justice, and the greatness, of the Mogul Empire, we must not gauge these things by our modern European standard. A lifelong intimacy with the internal conditions of the Moslems has led me to the conclusion that even at the time of Akbar's glory (1556-1605), or in the reigns of Jehanghir (1605-1627), and Shah-Jehan (1627-1658),

* Hindustan, the land of the Indians, is now divided into the following Provinces, States, and Agencies: (1) Ajmere Merwara; (2) Andamans and Nicobars; (3) Assam; (4) Beluchistan; (5) Bengal; (6) Berar; (7) Bombay, with Sindh and Aden; (8) Burma; (9) Central Provinces; (10) Coorg; (11) Madras; (12) North-West Provinces, consisting of certain parts of the Punjab and some districts formerly not belonging to India; (13) Punjab; (14) United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, not immediately under English administration; (15) a part of Beluchistan; (16) Baroda; (17) Bengal States; (18) Bombay States; (19) Central Indian Agency; (20) Central Provincial States; (21) Hyderabad; (22) Kashmir; (23) Madras States; (24) Mysore States; (25) Punjab States; (26) Rajput Agencies; (27) United Provincial States (see Statistical Abstract relating to British India from 1891-92 to 1900-01, official publication, 1902).

this boasted peace, order, security, and justice, were not by any means adequate to protect the subjects of the Indian Peninsula against the tyranny and whimsicalities of their rulers. At all times Asia has been the seat of cruel despotism and tyranny, the tree of liberty could never flourish in its soil, and political organisation, in our sense of the word, has never been known there. In this opinion we are supported not only by the historians of Christian Europe, but also by our Moslem informants. The grievous condition of the North-West of India during the latter years of Humayun's reign, the incessant risings and revolts of single vassals against the Central Government, the devastations wrought by continuous warfare—all this has been exhaustively described by the Turkish traveller Sidi Ali Reis.* In the same manner the forty-nine years' reign of Akbar the Glorious, undoubtedly the greatest of all the Mogul Princes, was one incessant whirl of strife and insurrection; and the various reforms which he introduced in the government, in the army, and in the legislation of his realm, in spite of all the existing confusion, necessarily bore a severely Asiatic stamp. Tax-collectors could rob the peasants and merchants without being interfered with, and in spite of the Mir-i-Adl (chief magistrate) and the Kadis and Kutwals (police-officers), it was not until the English began their rule in India that life and property were securely protected. Nor had the country fared much better under Jehanghir's rule, when social scandals, palace intrigues, and endless wars, undermined the constitution. The ruin of the Mogul Empire could not be far distant, and Jehanghir's

* See chaps. vi., vii., viii., of my book entitled 'The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral Sidi Ali Reis in India, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Persia, during the Years 1553-1556.' Translated from the Turkish, with notes. London, 1899.

son, who rejoiced in the proud name of Aurengzib*—that is, Glory of the Throne—notwithstanding all his skill, was unable to stay the downfall of the empire. His reign, so highly extolled by Orientals, is depicted in rather less glowing colours by François Bernier, his Court physician. He describes the absolute precariousness of private property, the iniquitous practices of the tax-collectors, the fickleness of the Government, the absence of legislation, the tyranny and greed of the Princes, which often became so excessive and oppressive that peasants and artisans were reduced to a state of starvation. In consequence of this miserable system, most of the Indian towns, built of earth, dirt, and the foulest materials, were found in ruins and almost deserted—everything, in fact, bearing the unmistakable signs of approaching destruction.† The few remaining stately buildings—mosques, palaces, and mausoleums, remnants of the reigns of some of the more prominent Princes, and which we now admire as unique monuments of art—testify rather to the love of splendour of the Princes than to the well-being of the people.

The political condition of Hindustan at the time when the English appeared upon the scene—that is, after the fall of the Mogul Empire, and after they had gained the victory over their European rivals—left no room for doubt as to the ultimate result of the interference of a foreign Power full of energy and perseverance, with a definite object in view and abundantly provided with the necessary means. Discord, anarchy, racial and religious hatred between

* The English write Aurangzib, but we keep to the Persian pronunciation of the word, for Aureng means in Persian ‘throne,’ and Zib means ‘splendour.’

† ‘The Rise and Expansion of British Dominion in India,’ by Sir Alfred Lyall. London, 1894, pp. 44, 45.

the various authorities, all conspired to help the foreign conqueror in the accomplishment of his task, the more so as India had never at any time been a united empire, and the various constituents of the Indian Peninsula in their various ethnical, linguistic, religious, and social conditions separated them from one another as by a deep cleft. It would be easier to imagine one combined European nation with one universal language than an Indian nation with one Indian language; for in Europe the differences between the individual branches of the Romanic, Germanic, and Slavic tongues are not nearly so great as those between the seventy different tongues and dialects now spoken by the 294,361,056 inhabitants of India.* The first place in this linguistic conglomerate must be assigned to the so-called Hindi language, which, according to its origin, is closely related to the Sanscrit, and which is spoken in various dialects by about 80,000,000 people. Bengali is the language spoken by 40,000,000, Punjabi by 80,000,000, Gujerati by 11,000,000, Marathi by 19,000,000 people, while 50,000,000 Hindus use the Tamil dialects (Tamil, Telegu, Kanari, and Malay-Alam), and about 6,000,000 speak the Kolari tongue. These various languages may be classified into Aryan and non-Aryan, according to their principal characteristics; and apart from the dialectic differences of each separate division, it is interesting to note that a Dravida of South India can no more understand a Punjabi or Bengali than a Neapolitan can understand a Swede or a Russian, although the two latter are Aryan, while of the former the one belongs to the Aryan, the other to the Ural-Altai race. As regards the

* The following I have taken from the book entitled 'India: its Administration and Progress,' by Sir John Strachey. Third edition, London, 1903.

religious differences, the census of 1901 returns as follows :

Hindus	207,146,000
Animistics*	8,711,000
Sikhs	2,195,000
Dschainas	1,334,000
Parsis	94,000
Buddhists	9,923,000
Jews	18,000
Christians	2,923,000
Mohammedans	62,458,000
	<hr/>
	294,802,000

Anyone realising the importance attached to religion in Asia will easily understand how impossible it is to bridge over the gulf which separates the professors of these various beliefs in India. Religion absorbs the intellect of the Asiatic; it is stronger than his feeling of nationality, for the latter is almost everywhere of secondary importance. In India, the centre of Asiatic thought, religious differences have always been the most effective weapons in the hand of the foreign conquerors, because faith in these regions is enveloped in a fanaticism wilder in its ecstasies and its excesses than is found in any other part of the Old or of the New World. It is only on the strength of this eccentricity and exaggeration that Hinduism, as professed by the mass of the Indian people, has been able to maintain itself as a religion without any properly defined ordinances and regulations. Sir Alfred Lyall says with reference to this †: 'Hinduism is a religious jumble, a confused mass of superstition, spiritualism, demon-worship, demigods, deified saints, tutelar gods,

* The word 'Animism,' occurring in the census of 1901, is used to denote all those believing in the existence of souls and spirits on whom man is dependent, whom he fears, who are made into divinities, and become objects of devotion (see Sir John Strachey, p. 285).

† Sir Alfred Lyall, 'Asiatic Studies,' p. 2; quoted from Sir John Strachey's 'India,' etc., p. 286.

local deities and universal deities with their innumerable chapels and temples, with the clatter of unharmonious ritual, and the worship of deities who at one time abhor the death of a fly, at another revel in human sacrifices.' A faith, in short, the conception of which is quite different to our meaning of the word—just as the word 'Hindu,' from the national point of view, expresses not so much an ethnos, or geographical conception, but is merely the name given to an accidental conglomeration of sects, families, hereditary professions, and castes.

The second place in point of religion is assigned to Islam, which here has adopted quite different forms to what it has in Western Asia. After 800 years of hard fighting, it has only secured a partial victory, without exercising upon the manners, customs, and thoughts, of the motley population an impression as deep and transforming as is the case in Central Asia, Persia, and Arabia. If Islam had not from its very first appearance in India been a *religio militans*, and if from the time of Mahmud of Ghazni until the fall of the Moguls its banners had not been borne by Turks and Afghans, known to be eager and capable warriors, it could not possibly have attained even this partial success. At the present moment Islamism reigns chiefly in the North and North-west of India. Of nearly 62,500,000 Moslems, two-thirds belong to these districts—*i.e.*, about 40,000,000—while the remaining 22,000,000 Mohammedans are scattered among the 232,000,000 inhabitants over the rest of India.* The fact that the Prophet's doctrine has not spread more freely over the whole peninsula, and that its victory has been so partial, I attribute most emphatically to Western interference; for even as the conquests of Sultan Soliman, and his plans for annexation were frustrated by the better-armed Portuguese, so the power of

* Sir John Strachey, 'India,' etc., p. 302.

the Moguls, and with it the power of Islam, was broken by the persistence and the well-organised military tactics of French and English invaders. It may be argued from a political point of view that the English interference for a time saved the Mogul Empire from total destruction, although its subsequent existence was a mere phantom of its former glory.

This argument, however, is of no value as far as the power of Islam is concerned. True, we see that even now—although the land is under Christian dominion—Islam makes more proselytes among the Hindus than the faith of the ruling Power, and from this we may conclude how much greater and more intimate the influence of Moslemism might have been if the warlike element of the Indian Mohammedans had been able to carry on their Jihad (religious war) against the hated Putperest (idolaters*), unmolested by Western interference and encouraged by the awakening feeling of pan-Islamism. There is no doubt about it that Islamism in India, in spite of its 800 years' existence, was materially hindered in its progress, and can therefore only boast of partial success; and nothing is more characteristic of this half-success and this unfinishedness than the mongrel form of Islam now professed by the majority of its Hindu adherents.

As regards the aristocracy or ruling class of the Indian Mohammedans, estimated by Sir George Campbell at 5,000,000, and consisting of the mixed descendants of Ösbegs, Arab and Afghan adventurers and knight-errants and of Indian natives, their religious zeal is firmly rooted—I might say, more firmly even than that of the Persians, Turks, and Arabs of the same

* Islamism recognises Christians and Jews as Ehli Kitab, *i.e.*, possessing a holy writ, and judges them a little more leniently; but the heathen are treated with great severity, and designated as Putperest (idol-worshippers) and Medjusi (magi).

class—for the basis of their belief is caste pride, and shows itself in the power they exercise over the Hindus. Their fanaticism, derived from Bokhara and Samarkand, the principal seats of Central Asiatic dogmatism, is fully preserved amongst them. Even at the time when I travelled in Central Asia, I found in the Universities of Bokhara amongst the Indian scholars the most fanatical theologians, and the Madresses of Bokhara and Samarkand have always been in the estimation of the Hindus a purer source of Moslem learning than even the celebrated Azhar University in Cairo, and have consequently also been better attended. All this, however, does not apply to the mass of Moslem Indians—*i.e.*, to the lower classes, who profess the doctrine of the Arabian Prophet. In consequence of their close companionship with peoples of different faiths, a certain familiarity with the manners and customs of these other tribes is noticeable in them, and, as Sir John Strachey* maintains, the greater portion of the Mohammedans of India hardly deserve that name. Sir Denzil Ibbetson, who has a thorough knowledge of the country, says that the Moslem Rajput, Guyar, or Yat, as regards his social, tribal, and political condition, is in no way distinguishable from his Hindu brother. His social customs have remained unaltered, his tribal limitations undiminished, his marriage laws and rights of succession have not changed,† and the only practical difference between them is that the Moslem shaves his head and grows his beard, that he worships in a mosque, and that in the marriage rites the Moslem

* 'India,' etc., p. 303.

† Among the many customs which strike the student of the life of the Moslems of India, we would mention the great pomp and luxury of funerals, a usage quite unknown in Western Islamism, where funerals are conducted with great speed and simplicity. Any other practice would there be looked upon as sinful.

ceremonial is used in addition to the Hindu. The Indian deities receive like worship from them, and the Mohammedan mother whose child suffers from small-pox would not think of neglecting to bring a sacrifice to the god of this disease, in order to save her child.* Hindus and Moslems live on good terms together; in fact, Islamism among the lower classes of India cannot be accused of preserving that severe exclusiveness and negation of other faiths which characterises it in the West of Asia. The Anatolians, Kandioths, Bosniaks, and Herzegovinians—although descendants of Christian Greeks and Slavs, as may still be detected in their speech—are known to be the wildest and most fanatical opponents of their Christian fellow-tribesmen. Trivial prejudices and superstitions may have clung to them from pre-Islamic times; but not one single feature which might be injurious to Islam can be found amongst them, and generally speaking they are more fanatical than even the most thorough-going Arabs, Persians, and Turks.

* 'Report on the Census of 1881 in the Punjab,' p. 143. Sir John Strachey's 'India,' etc., as quoted on p. 303.

CHAPTER II

THE CONSOLIDATION OF BRITISH POWER

WHEN we consider the incessant wars, the battles and invasions to which India has been exposed at all times ; when we take into account the ethnical and religious peculiarities of the plunder-loving foreign adventurers who invaded the land from the north, it is not very wonderful that the natives of India showed so little surprise when the foreign invaders from the Christian West appeared upon the scene. The conquerors from the north had always come to kill and to destroy ; they went on their way robbing, murdering, and plundering. But the Westerners, afterwards called Frenghi, made their first appearance as peaceable merchants, trafficking from place to place and exchanging the natural products of the East for the manufactured articles of their native land. There was, therefore, in the beginning no ground whatever for the natives to take up a particularly hostile attitude towards the foreign traders, nor did any such feeling exist at first. It was the cruel and unwarrantable Catholic propaganda of the Portuguese, who came not only to conquer souls, but also land, which roused the indignation of the sleepy Hindus, and more particularly of the representatives of the Mogul power, then fast approaching its final destruction. The Dutch, French, and English, who succeeded the Portuguese and Spaniards, at first merely contemplated the establishment of factories, but very soon they also

began to take advantage of the lawless condition of the country, and secured land for themselves. When the English had ousted their French rivals—that is, after the Battles of Plassey (1757) and of Wandewash (1760)—and henceforth had only Oriental foes to deal with, their real influence in India began to assert itself for good. Up to that time their exertions had been confined exclusively to the capture of certain stations on the coast-line—for instance, in Bengal, Orissa, the Carnatic, Mysore, and Bombay; but force of circumstances led the peaceable trading company to alter their tactics considerably, and to exchange the wand of Mercury for the sword of conquest. The charter of 1683 had granted the company authority to negotiate with the heathen natives on matters of peace and war, and to take such military measures as they might deem advisable.* This change of rule acted at first advantageously for India, for in the fierce battle which, after the fall of the Mogul Empire, ensued between the Hindus, now fully roused to action, and their Moslem oppressors, the interference of the English acted as a protection to the sorely-tried Hindustanis. Seldom have the turbulent waves of religious fanaticism caused such cruel devastation as in these wars between Hindus and Mohammedans in the course of the eighteenth century, and the internal strife was yet aggravated by the plundering expeditions of the Persians under Nadir Shah (1739), and of the Afghans under Ahmed Shah (1747).

Our pen refuses to describe in detail the scenes of slaughter, torture and devastation of those days, but they who have read about them in the historical works at our disposal must recognise with justifiable pride

* See 'The Government of India; being a Digest of the Statute Law relating thereto, with Historical Introduction and Illustrative Documents,' by Sir Courtenay Ilbert, K.C.S.I. Oxford, 1898, p. 21.

the beneficial intervention of the British standard-bearers of modern culture in the East. Although Burke, John Stuart Mill, Lord Macaulay, and others, find much to censure in the stirring careers of a Clive and a Hastings, this fault-finding can only be attributed to prejudice and an insufficient knowledge of local affairs. False accusation of their countrymen, says Sir John Strachey,* has always been a failing of the English, and if the above-mentioned stars of English historical literature had more fully realised the true state of affairs and been better acquainted with the nature of the savage robber-hordes and the heartless tyrants who oppressed Asia, they would doubtless have judged differently. With silken gloves and a strategy based on humane treatment, the British at the head of affairs in India would scarcely have succeeded in bringing order into the internally rotten and absolutely disorganised condition of the land, and in building up that marvellous structure of British sovereignty in India as we see it before us now. We willingly admit that the treachery, faithlessness and petty intrigues of their Asiatic opponents sometimes drove the leaders of English politics to adopt measures altogether contrary to our ideas of justice and morality ; yet, speaking generally, no blemish adheres to the banner of Western culture as displayed in India. If during the growth of British power in India certain irregular and illegal transactions did occur in various places, these faults have been fully atoned for by the conduct of noble and philanthropic men such as Edwards, Lawrence, Mayo, and others. The lofty aim of the undertaking, it should be remembered, was to insure a better future to millions of unfortunate human beings, and this aim covers many shortcomings. We will show in the following pages what England has done for India, and in order to do this it will be sufficient

* *Op. cit.*, p. 276.

to refer very shortly to the historical events which ultimately led to the conquest.

When Clive (afterwards Lord Clive) was appointed in 1758 by the Directors of the East India Company Governor of the company's settlements, the territory protected by the English was limited to the possessions above mentioned. In 1792 further acquisitions were made in the South; in 1804 Mysore, Hyderabad and Oudh also came under the English protectorate. In 1834, with the exception of the Punjab and the Lower Indus territory, the whole of India was in the possession or under the protectorate of the company. In 1842 Ceylon and parts of Assam and Burmah, and in 1857 the Punjab and Sindh, were added, and now, since Lord Curzon has formed the new frontier province, the whole of the Indian Peninsula from Kashmir to Cape Comorin, an area of 1,766,797 English square miles, with a population of 294,361,056 people, has come under English sovereignty.*

All these acquisitions have gradually, in the course of a century and a half, grown into the present Indian Empire, after much warfare, great exertions, and many disappointments, caused on the one hand by conflict with the natives and with their European rivals, on the other hand by the directors of the trading company at home, who understood little or nothing about the state of affairs in the far-away country over the sea. Their intentions were animated by purely mercantile motives, and necessarily often came into collision with the ambitious and energetic men to whom the management of the company had been entrusted. Of a premeditated conquest of India in the real sense of the word there could be no question. When the Russians invaded the adjacent Moslem countries, they came with an army entirely composed of Russian

* 'Statistical Abstract relating to British India from 1891-92 to 1900-01,' No. 36, London, 1902, p. 1 and the latest statistical returns.

soldiers, and conquered and incorporated all the neighbouring districts into the Tsar's dominions; but the English were to a large extent assisted by foreign soldiers, induced to join in the campaign by high pay or mercantile interests. Englishmen, however, always retained the control of affairs, and always were the leaders. To-day the defence of India is entrusted to 150,000 native soldiers and 76,243 English, and this has been more or less the proportion of the military forces on all former occasions—that is to say, about one-fifth English and four-fifths native soldiers. Thus unwittingly, but none the less effectually, the natives themselves have largely contributed to put down the anarchy, the internal disturbances, and also the despotism of their native Princes, inaugurating that condition of peace and prosperity in which they now rejoice under 'Pax Britannica.' The fact that such a comparatively small number of English soldiers were employed in founding England's power in India is nothing miraculous. In the first place, there are many instances both in the past and in the present in which European valour, a strict sense of duty, and patriotism, have triumphed in the campaigns against Asiatics in spite of vastly inferior numbers.

At the capture of Tashkend under Chernajeff, 1,501 Russians opposed 15,000 Khokandian troops and 90,000 hostile natives, and although the English at various times have had large armies at their command, as, for instance, in the great Mārātha War of 1818, when Lord Hastings' army numbered over 100,000 men,* yet it was the English leadership, perseverance, and determination which gained the day. It was this determination, this singleness of purpose, and not numerical strength, which enabled Great Britain to bring its Asiatic conquests to such a successful issue. At the beginning of her Indian career Great Britain num-

* Seeley, 'The Expansion of England,' p. 199.

bered only 12,000,000* inhabitants, and her military resources were at the time considerably diminished by the campaign against Napoleon. When quoting instances of exceptional courage and contempt of death, could there be a more striking example than that of Clive at the Battle of Plassey, who with 1,000 Englishmen, 2,000 Sepoys, and 8 cannon, achieved a complete victory over the Viceroy of Bengal, who opposed him with an army of 50,000 men and 50 cannon? English history is full of instances of personal courage and sacrifice, but these brilliant acts were often favoured by circumstances.

Secondly, a good deal must be laid to the account of racial and religious antagonism, which has always played such an important part among the native Hindus; and if, favoured by these conditions, a handful of Central Asiatic adventurers under Baber succeeded in founding the great Mogul Empire, being probably no better armed than the Hindus who fought against them, how then can we be surprised that the English, so vastly superior to their Tartar predecessors, using the existing hatred between Vishnu worshippers and Moslems to their own advantage, were a match for both these adversaries?†

Thirdly, it should not be forgotten that our European conquerors, and especially the English, in their battles on Hindustani soil, first came into contact with the least warlike elements of the population—that is, with the inhabitants of South India, who are known to this day as cowardly people, enervated and weakened by the climate. Bengal is said to be the

* Seeley, 'The Expansion of England,' p. 199.

† 'The men by whom this rich tract—Bengal—was peopled, enervated by a soft climate and accustomed to peaceful employments, bore the same relation to other Asiatics which the Asiatics generally bear to the bold and energetic children of Europe' (Macaulay's Essay on Lord Clive, quoted from Strachey's 'India,' etc.).

only land in the world where the greater portion of the population does not look upon cowardice as dishonouring. The leadership of the native troops certainly was in the hands of Mohammedans, but we must remember that in Bengal even the Mohammedans lack the energy, the religious zeal, and the personal courage, which otherwise characterise the followers of the Prophet's doctrine in India. The military and civil officials of the sinking Mogul power in Bengal do not appear in a much better light, and in order to describe the armies which were sent out to oppose the English it will be sufficient to quote the remark of Sir Alfred Lyall, who says:* 'At the first we triumphed over troops not much better than a band of mercenaries, without loyalty and without unity.' How different, how much harder, would England's work have been if the first entrance had been made, not from the coast in the South, but overland from the North! The English would then have had to encounter such savage and warlike elements as Beluchis, Afghans, Rajputs, and others. And what we have said about the geographical and ethnical condition applies to religion also. Mohammedans, indeed, commanded the forces which first opposed England in India, but the majority of the fighters were Vishnu worshippers, and they were far behind the Moslems in point of valour; for in their creed war was not a Divine commandment, and they therefore had less power of resistance than the Moslem Hindus, who were encouraged by the injunction of the Koran: 'Great reward awaits him who fights in the cause of God.'

In the fourth place, it was not so much force of arms, military skill, and courage, but rather the firm rule, the justice, the forbearance of the British Government with regard to the subjugated Hindus, which facilitated

* 'The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India,' p. 133.

the work of conquest and laid the foundation of the British Empire in India. We will refer to this again later on, but would only point out here that these advantages of the English administration from the very first impressed the natives, who had never known such qualities in any of their native rulers. The conquerors of the far Western land appeared to them in quite another light than the Asiatic despots who hitherto had harassed, tortured, and plundered the Rayat (people). Whether the former were Christians, and the latter Mohammedans or Vishnu worshippers, made little difference to the placid, peace-loving farmers and labourers; all were equally unknown to them, and their affections naturally went out to the masters whose rule brought peace and blessing and order, and these gifts were first bestowed upon the inhabitants of India by the British Raj (Government).*

From whatever standpoint we view the history of the English in India, one thing will always strike us most forcibly—namely, that with the British occupation our Western civilisation obtained its first great triumph over old Asiatic culture. All European endeavours to make an impression upon the ancient world up to that time are too small and too insignificant

* In addition to my own private opinion as to the causes of the success of the English in India, I would mention the opinion of Sir W. W. Hunter on this subject. He had a thorough knowledge of Indian affairs, and attributed the signal success of his compatriots to the following causes: (1) A wonderful perseverance and moderation in their dealings with the conquered territory, so long as efficacious means for the following up of the conquest were lacking; (2) unbounded persistence in carrying out the scheme once undertaken, and a firm resolve not to be discouraged by temporary failures; (3) the mutual confidence of the officials of the East India Company in time of need; (4) the steady support of the people of England, and the prevailing feeling at home that everything must be done to make good any misadventure, and that the work done by the English in India must on no account be sacrificed to the diplomatic demands of Europe' (Sir W. W. Hunter's 'Indian Empire,' p. 441).

to be compared with the moral weight of the English triumph. Not in the victorious campaigns against Turks, Arabs, and Persians, but by the battles fought by Clive and Hastings on the plains of Hindustan, the self-conceit and the self-confidence of the genuine Asiatic received its first shaking. The dominating strength and the mighty influence of modern culture here first asserted themselves in the actions of the conqueror the reformer, and the legislator. Two diametrically opposed conceptions of life here came into collision. A mutual understanding was hardly possible; it was the question as to which of the two should gain the final victory. Two greater contrasts than existed between Englishmen and Indians can scarcely be imagined. The Englishman stands out as the prototype of modern Europeanism—restless, energetic, eminently practical in thought and act, steadfast of purpose, always looking ahead, and, above all, with an indomitable love for freedom and independence; while the Hindu is the personification of Asiaticism—slow and sluggish in thought and act, languishing in the bonds of fanaticism, thinking no further than the morrow; belonging to a people who have never known political liberty, who have never had energy to assert their independence, who have been satisfied with the protection and guardianship of their superiors, and who only occasionally have been roused to action, but for the rest have been content in their lazy doctrine of *laissez faire* and *laissez aller*.

The struggle in which these two contrasting elements were engaged is of eminent interest to the student of the history of culture, and the ensuing results may well claim our careful consideration. What England has thus far done for India is instructive as a sample of the struggle which is yet to take place between East and West. The transformations and the changes which have taken place in India in the

course of the last century will make us realise more fully what were the mistakes made in Turkey and Persia and wherever the light of European culture has penetrated, impeding the progress of the reforms in those parts. We shall then become convinced that there is yet hope of a better future for our brethren in Asia. Keeping this in mind, it may be found instructive to give our attention to the work done by the English in India, and to trace the various phases, the advantages and disadvantages of the reforms accomplished by them.

CHAPTER III

FIRST STAGE OF REFORMS

BEFORE we proceed to speak of the influence of English culture in India, we would draw attention to certain political and administrative measures instituted immediately after the new dominion had been founded and its limitations defined, inaugurating a normal European administration in place of the Asiatic mismanagement and anarchy which had hitherto existed. Some of the native officials who had been retained in the conquered and annexed territory had been infected by the mismanagement of the company's servants, and in order to counteract this evil Clive decided, in 1766, upon a thorough reorganisation of the whole administration. Thus, by doing away with the existing corrupt system he hoped to raise the standard of morality and thoroughly to cleanse the Augean stables of Asiatic government.

In these endeavours Warren Hastings showed even more zeal and skill, and we are justified in saying that, if Clive was the territorial founder of British India, Hastings must be looked upon as the founder of its administration.* He organised the State service; he introduced the system for collecting the revenues; he established courts of justice, and for this purpose the Mohammedan codes of law—such as the *Hidayet*, *Sirajia*, and *Sherifye*—and also Hindu works referring to legislation—such as the code of *Manu*, the *Mitak-*

* Hunter, 'The Indian Empire,' p. 456.

shara, and the Dayabhaga—were partly translated and partly excerpted,* and English and native judges were appointed. Warren Hastings therefore, at any rate, laid the foundation of a regularly organised administration, notwithstanding the constant opposition of his rivals and ill-wishers both in India and in London. In the course of the prolonged war with the Mārāthas and Sikhs, the work of reformation could only make slow progress in proportion as the British power became consolidated, and according to the abilities and the enthusiasm displayed by the several Governors. In this respect the English government in India was singularly fortunate; for amongst the Governors who in the three different periods† of administration stood at the head of affairs, many able men have distinguished themselves—men who fulfilled the duties of their office with great political wisdom, patriotic zeal, administrative skill, and in a true humane spirit, and consequently have largely contributed to the marvellous constitution as we see it before us now.

If Hastings laid the foundation of the civil administration, Lord Cornwallis (1786 and 1805) may be said to have built the superstructure. It was he who put the penal jurisdiction into the hands of Englishmen; for previously the administration of justice had been based upon a mixture of English and Mohammedan law, causing endless confusion and satisfying no one. Until 1859 legislation had been in a very bad condition and favoured corruption and bribery, until at last the better remuneration of judges, a sounder education of the natives, and the greater proficiency of the English,

* 'The Government of India,' by Sir Courtenay Ilbert, p. 402.

† These various periods include: (1) The time of the Governors of Bengal from 1750 to 1774; (2) the time of the Governors-General of India under the company, from 1774 to 1858; (3) the time of the Vice-Regency under the Crown, from 1858 to the present time.

brought about a favourable reaction. The Landed Property Act was revised; the Zemindars,* originally the tenant-farmers, who were at the same time the revenue-collectors, gradually merged into the position of middlemen, subordinate to the English administration, and thus assisted in the organisation of the land settlement tax. Particular care was bestowed upon the revenue tax—of special importance to the natives of India, where the amount of the tax is the chief criterion of the government, and where much more is expected in return for the money paid down than here in Europe. Envy and malice have often described the English in this period of their administration as the unconscionable vampires and blood-suckers of India; but the injustice of this suspicion is shown by the circumstance that the collection of taxes under the Moguls—from 1593 to 1761—consisted annually of 60,000,000 rupees; while in 1869 to 1879, under the English administration, with a much larger population, the total annual tax amounted to 35½ millions, and during the subsequent twelve years to 41½ millions.†

The reforms and improvements made in the various departments of public life helped the Hindus to appreciate from the very commencement of the British administration the many blessings they now enjoyed, and which they had never received under the rulers of their own tribe and religion. They were therefore at once impressed by the advantages of the foreign legislation. There can be little doubt that the real vitality and growth of these reforms in India date from the time when the British Crown took the management of affairs into its own hands, and brought the interests of India into closer union with those of

* Zemindar is a Persian word meaning 'land-owner,' from Zemin (earth, soil) and Dar (owner or possessor).

† W. W. Hunter, 'The Indian Empire,' p. 547.

the Mother State. Long before this, however, many praiseworthy efforts had been made in the same direction. Thus, for instance, the Parliamentary investigation of 1813 abolished the trade monopoly of the company, compelling the latter to concentrate its energies upon the better government of the people, with the result that in 1833 natives were admitted to State offices without regard to racial or religious differences.* Protectionism was put a stop to, and the English representatives in India were bound to be elected without preference from amongst the young English candidates. Various measures for the abolition of barbarous customs and rites belong also to an earlier date, and under this category we must mention the cruel custom of the Sati (Sutti)—that is, the burning of widows—a barbarity erroneously said to be one of the statutes of the Veda, and which year after year demanded hundreds of victims. In the year 1817, in Bengal alone, 700 widows are said to have been burned, and the small white columns still extant at the Indian pilgrim-stations are remnants of these Sati. In 1829 the Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck, abolished this murderous custom. The trade of the cut-throats, known as the Thag,† who were bound by a religious vow to practices of strangulation, was very soon suppressed under the English administration, and they are now almost extinct except for gangs of Dacoits, who still practise this trade in certain parts of India, more particularly in the territories governed over by native Princes. One of the most inhuman customs suppressed by the English at

* W. W. Hunter, 'The Indian Empire,' p. 493.

† According to Sir John Strachey, *op. cit.*, p. 309, this custom is not so much intended to avoid crime as to protect an ancient duty to ancestors. The word 'Thag' means 'traitor' or 'swindler,' and 'Phansigar' (from 'Phansi') is a 'sling' or 'lasso' (see 'Hobson-Jobson,' a glossary of Anglo-Indian colloquial words and phrases and of kindred terms, by Colonel Henry Yule and Arthur Coke Burnell, p. 696).

a very early date was the murder of infant girls, by which practice the increase of the population necessarily suffered considerably, but which to the natives seemed quite a natural proceeding. This custom prevailed throughout India, regardless of religious differences, more particularly, however, among the Rajputs, the noblest race of Indians. In the tribe of the Chauhan fifty years ago, among the 30,000 inhabitants not a single girl was to be found. As late as the year 1869, an investigation which took place in a Rajput district in Oudh revealed the fact that in seven villages 104 boys and 1 girl were found, and in twenty-three villages 284 boys and 23 girls.* Thanks to the English intervention, this terrible state of things is now considerably improved. Little wicker baskets with the dead bodies of children no longer are seen drifting down the Ganges, and where formerly girls were scarce there are now thousands. The extermination of this barbarous custom, sanctified by centuries of practice, was certainly no easy matter, especially in India, the centre of Asiatic superstition and conservative ways of thinking. It required more than ordinary patience and perseverance to extirpate these and similar abuses, as must be clear to all who have had any experience of the social conditions of Asiatic life. I think I cannot be far wrong in stating that the contest with the deeply-rooted prejudices and superstitions of old Asiatic society could not have been entrusted to better hands than those of the stern, strong-principled, discreet, icy British. Whenever the Anglo-Indian Government put forward some proposal for the alleviation of customs and the mitigation of ancient social and administrative indiscretions, there has always been a great storm of opposition, never sufficiently strong, however, to shake the resolution of the stanch British rulers. To prove my point

* Sir John Strachey, *op. cit.*, p. 397.

I might refer to the terrible dispute created by the introduction of the law relating to the marrying again of young widows. As is generally known, girls often become widows at the age of ten or twelve. They are forbidden ever to marry again, and are condemned to life-long misery. The more rational Hindus have recognised the beneficial and humane intentions of the English in passing this law, and would gladly express their appreciation of it ; but shame and the fear of their countrymen still labouring in the bonds of prejudice restrains them, and the realisation of this reform scheme has thereby been considerably hindered. In course of time, however, the native obstinacy will have to yield before the larger principle, as has already been the case with regard to the strong wall of partition existing between the castes,* and also with regard to their horror of sea-voyages. To-day there are hundreds and thousands of Hindus who, disregarding the severe laws of caste separation, freely associate with Europeans, eat and drink with them, without troubling themselves about the possible consequences of such a step, such as excommunication and other severe social punishments. As regards the crossing of the 'black water' (sea), journeys to Europe are now quite as much the fashion with the Hindus as with many other Asiatics who have intercourse with Western nations ; nay, more, for many years past Indians of Brahmin and Mohammedan faith have matriculated and obtained academical degrees at the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and on their return home are held in high esteem and occupy im-

* With regard to the castes, we seem to forget in Western lands that we also, in spite of our enlightenment, have among us society circles with very pronounced separatist tendencies. The wall of partition may not be so high and so strong as in India, but in many lands hereditary nobility keeps itself strictly apart from all other classes, and would, if allowed, uphold the caste system the same as in India.

portant positions. A hundred years ago a journey to Europe would have been looked upon as apostasy, and would have seemed as impossible to them as if a pious Roman Catholic were now to pride himself that he had received his intellectual training in the Azhar College at Cairo.

As proof of the weakened condition of the caste system we quote the opinion of a Frenchman, who, in his book about India, says : 'Aujourd'hui les soudras, comme les brahmanes, sont admis dans les collèges sanscrits et étudient avec eux les Vedas. Un professeur qui refuserait d'enseigner les livres sacrés à un soudra serait simplement remercié. Il y a une cinquantaine d'années, lorsque les Anglais s'avisèrent pour la première fois de pendre un brahmane, on craignait une sérieuse émeute : aujourd'hui le cas est relativement fréquent, et personne ne s'en préoccupe.'*

Our surprise and astonishment at the reforms inaugurated by the English, and the extraordinary results obtained by them, is yet increased when we realise the tremendous difficulties which even the native Princes of Turkey and Persia experienced when they wished to introduce the smallest and most insignificant innovations. The change in the cut or the colour of a garment, the adaptation of a new head-covering, or the introduction of some modern branch of learning, has always throughout the Islamic world roused indignation and opposition. Sultan Mahmud had to drown the anti-reform passion of the Turks in the blood of the Janissaries, and even Christian Russia could only do the work of regeneration by marching over the heaped-up corpses of the Streltzi who had rejected the reforms. In Persia Nasreddin Shah did not dare to take the slightest step in this direction. The reforms of Mehemmed Ali in Egypt led to the wholesale murder of the Mameluks. Always

* Boell, 'L'Inde et le Problème Indien.' Paris, 1901, p. 208.

and everywhere amongst Moslems, Brahmins, and Buddhists, innovations have been abominated and abhorred, and yet, notwithstanding this fact, a handful of Englishmen have succeeded, without very violent disturbances, in accomplishing quite extraordinary transformations in the political, social, and ethnical conditions of the East. Occasional riots and rebellions, such as that of the Madras Sepoys of Vellore in the year 1806, and the great Mutiny of the Sepoys in 1857, were instigated rather by political than by social and ethical motives. The scare of the greased cartridges would scarcely have led to a revolution if the British successes and the annexation politics of Lord Dalhousie had not convinced certain restless, dissatisfied, and ambitious chiefs, such as Dundhu Panth, generally called Nana Sahib, of the hopelessness of ever re-establishing their power. Nana Sahib's object was to restore the power of the Peshwas,* and it is owing to the heedlessness and the extreme self-confidence of the British that fanaticism became such a formidable weapon in his hands. If the administrative measures and reforms of the English had really appeared to the natives so objectionable, so oppressive, and so prejudicial to the well-being of the various districts concerned, as hostile opinions would have us to believe, there was ample opportunity for them to shake off the foreign yoke and to annihilate the small body of the conquerors' forces. The fact that cases of mutiny were so few and so local, and that Mohammedans as well as Hindus in time of need assisted the English in quelling

* Peshwa, or, more correctly, Pishwa, a Persian word meaning 'headman,' was the title belonging to the first Ministers of the Máraþhas; these Ministers afterwards usurped the place of their masters, and the name Peshwa was given to the dynasty which took the place of the Máraþha Kings, from Balaju, 1718, to Baji-Rao II., 1795, during which time seven Peshwas ruled in various parts of India, and were often involved in war with England. Nana Sahib was an adopted son of the last Peshwa.

the revolts, speaks for the recognition which England's endeavours received from the more discreet and peace-loving portion of the population. The Hindu, passionate, fanatical, and superstitious in the extreme, had to realise at last that the new order of things inaugurated by the foreigners, although heterogeneous, unfamiliar, and unpleasing to him, nevertheless contained the germ of the long-wished-for peace and happiness, and that the dark night of anarchy, tyranny, and endless warfare, was to be followed by a brighter morning.

And who can deny that England's supremacy, even during the period of its development, was always actuated by the honest endeavour to promote the well-being of the natives, and to insure a better future for the land which had fallen under its dominion? Even during the administration of the East India Company, amidst the confusion and the turmoil of incessant warfare, changes and reforms were taking place which foreshadowed the present improved condition of things. Two Governors-General deserve special mention in this respect. Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, who from 1828 to 1835 stood at the head of affairs, has distinguished himself less by his territorial conquests than by his administrative measures and reforms. It was he who suppressed the previously-mentioned barbarous customs of the Sati and Thag, who by a proper control of the finances eased the taxation, and who admitted educated natives to the service of the State. He fully deserves the inscription which Macaulay wrote for his statue at Calcutta, and which is as follows: 'He abolished cruel rites; he effaced humiliating distinctions; he gave liberty to the expression of public opinion; his constant study was to elevate the intellectual and moral character of the nations committed to his charge.'*

* W. W. Hunter, 'The Indian Empire,' p. 475.

The same may be said of Lord Dalhousie, Governor-General from 1848 to 1856. Apart from his successful and skilfully executed political schemes of conquest, he has contributed much to the material and moral progress of the districts entrusted to his care. He founded the Department of Public Works, and did the preparatory work for the institution of the network of canals, roads, and railways, which now intersects India in all directions. He opened the Ganges Canal; he established the steamboat connection between India and England by the Red Sea; he introduced a moderate postal tax and the telegraph; and it is no small praise when W. W. Hunter says,* in speaking of him: 'His system of administration, carried out in the conquered Punjab by the two Lawrences and their assistants, is probably the most successful piece of difficult work ever accomplished by Englishmen.' At that time the Hindus could express their thoughts more freely than many Christian European nations could until quite recently, and more freely than the Russians can do even now under the control of tyrannical censure.

* W. W. Hunter, 'The Indian Empire,' p. 482.

CHAPTER IV

INCREASE OF WELL-BEING

IF we designate the first half of the nineteenth century as the period in which the transformation of the political, administrative, and social conditions in India was inaugurated, the second half of the same century may be called the period in which, with energy, skill, and extraordinary exertion, this great work was brought near to its completion. When the administration of the country passed from the hands of the East India Company into those of the State, the interest shown in the great possession in the East assumed a more pronounced British national character, and at the same time the Government on the banks of the Thames was forced to recognise India as an integral part of the realm. It was bound to guarantee the consolidation of the possession, and to use every means in its power to promote the moral and material welfare of the Indian subjects as the best means of securing their adherence and loyalty. It is characteristic of the Englishman, when he undertakes a thing, to allow of no half-measures, no hesitation; politically a free agent, he goes straight for his object, he shrinks from no sacrifice, no trouble. The result of the work which we now contemplate, the civilisation of a country and a nation so thoroughly Oriental as India, must therefore be looked upon as the natural outcome of the character of the civiliser. We remarked before that the Russian Government,

even in its most earnest civilising efforts in Turkestan, was hampered by the unreliableness and unscrupulousness of its officials; the very reverse may be said of the English organs at work in India. Besides the strong innate sense of duty and the firmness and fairness which generally characterise English officials, there has been displayed in India at all times by State servants of higher and lower degree by a real affection and enthusiasm for their work. There have always been men who have felt a genuine national pride in the civilisation of India, and who have fulfilled their mission faithfully and with true patriotic zeal. This was particularly the case before the introduction of the accelerated means of communication with the Mother Country. A prolonged, unbroken sojourn in India often transformed Englishmen into semi-Asiatics, and a greater degree of intimacy between the foreigners and the natives facilitated the mutual intercourse and smoothed down many sharp contrasts in the social conditions. The kindly treatment, the humaneness, which distinguished many of the officials has very often left so deep an impression upon the Hindu mind that the names of certain Englishmen, even after generations, are still held in honour by the natives. Among such, those of Clive, Malcolm, Elphinstone, Henry Lawrence, John Jacob, Robert Sandeman, John Nicholson, Herbert Edwardes, Lord Mayo, Lord Dufferin, and many others, are to this day devoutly remembered by the Hindus.

Considering my many years' experience and my intimate knowledge of life in the East, I often ask myself the question: How is it that the natives have shown themselves so complacent towards the English, and have submitted to reforms such as even modern Oriental reformers have hardly dared to introduce among their own countrymen? It is my firm belief that the introduction of impartial jurisdiction; the

security of life and property, and the perfect fairness of the legislation, have from the first attracted the Hindu;* for the native governments, not excepting those of the most enlightened of their Princes, lacking these essential qualities, always lay as a heavy curse upon the people, and were consequently hated. When the farmer and the artisan are not interfered with; when they know that their property is safe; that they will not be robbed or deceived by tax-collectors, and when they can rely upon the fairness of their judge's verdict, they soon become valuable servants of the State and the Government. In India especially, the people troubled themselves very little about the faith and the nationality of their foreign masters, since from time immemorial they had been accustomed to foreign rule; for in the eyes of the Southern Indians, Pathans, Rajputs, and Beluchis are in language and outward appearance as much foreigners as Englishmen are. What the people most longed for was a staid government and national peace, in order that they might lead quiet lives under the protection of the law. In this respect the English government has fully satisfied the anticipations of the natives, for, as the several countries of the Indian Peninsula had never before been united under one and the same sceptre, there never was such a measure of peace as now exists under English administration.

As regards the general condition of the lower classes, one has but to look at Persia, Turkey, and Morocco to realise how much better off, for instance, the Indian Mohammedans are as compared with their

* In Article 91 of the 'Digest of Statutory Enactments relating to the Government of India,' it says: 'No native of British India, or any natural born subject of Her Majesty resident therein, is, by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, or colour, or any of them, disabled from holding any place, office, or employment, under Her Majesty in India' ('The Government of India,' by Sir Courtenay Ilbert, p. 237).

fellow-believers under native rule. The same may be said of the Vishnu worshippers. Judging from outward appearances, the poorly-clad or half-naked Indian field-labourer certainly presents an uncompromising picture of misery and poverty. But appearances are deceitful in this case; for this poorly-clad peasant often spends his savings on finery, which he either stores away, or with which on grand occasions he decks his wife, while he himself in his tattered garments reminds one of the Hungarian gipsy, who adorns his torn jacket with large silver buttons and drives an excellent pair of horses. Apart from isolated instances where inborn frivolity leads to dissipation, there need be no question anywhere in India of pressing poverty such as we see in certain countries of Europe. On the contrary, the general condition is improving day by day. The learned Indian Seid Hussein Bilgrami states that the peasant is now better off than he used to be, and in the Indian newspaper *The Hindu Patriot* we read that the field-labourer, who used to earn one anna* per day, now earns two. In a country where three-fifths of the population live by agriculture, and considering that this industry depends to a large extent upon the weather, fluctuations in the general prosperity are unavoidable. But how much more is this the case in a country where long habit or the tyranny of custom compels the people to extravagance; where the State functionary, with a yearly income of 150 rupees, spends 1,500 rupees upon the marriage festivities of one of his children, and where the poor peasant squanders at least 200 rupees on his wedding-day. Under such conditions it is as impossible to estimate the prosperity of India as of Europe; but considering the change for the better which has taken place in the government of India, prosperity must

* The anna is an Indian coin worth about a penny. Sixteen annas make one rupee.

necessarily be on the increase, and in many parts of the country it has considerably increased. What India now produces every year in rice, corn, indigo, and pulse, would have appeared incredible at the beginning of last century. The steady increase of these articles is quite astounding, and the enormous extent of the recent Indo-European wheat trade, for instance, proves this most strongly. In evidence of the increase of some of the chief articles of trade, we quote the official returns for the decade, 1891-92 and 1900-01 :*

			1891-92.	1900-01.
Rice (cwt.)	314,804,161	413,506,700
Wheat (tons)	5,986,531	6,765,717
Tea (tons)	123,867,902	197,460,664
Cotton (bales)	1,497,000	2,127,205
Jute (bales)	2,971,794	6,400,000

The remarkable increase of agricultural produce in its various departments has in the first place raised the price of land, its value having become as much as six times as great since the beginning of the British administration; in the second place the export trade has increased, which in most cases benefits the farmer and insures to him a degree of prosperity which he never knew before, and which the farmer in Turkey and Persia does not enjoy to this day. That the Hindu owes this improvement in his condition to the British administration is evident, for at the time when his own tribesmen and co-religionists held rule things were in a deplorable condition. Sir Denzil Ibbetson,† one of the best authorities on Hindustan, says with regard to this in his report of the Punjab, laid before the Council of the Governor-General: 'When we took over the province, the once-

* See 'Statistical Abstract relating to British India from 1891-92 to 1900-01,' No. 36, London, 1902, p. 118.

† Sir John Strachey, 'India,' etc., p. 386.

celebrated Royal Canal was long since dried up, and four-fifths of the entire surface was covered with thick wood, which served as a lurking-place for thieves, vagabonds, and beasts of prey. The inhabitants had either gone further out or were exterminated, and of the 221 villages of one district only (Pergana), no less than 178 were destroyed or depopulated.' England has spared neither trouble nor cost to raise the standard of agriculture. Before all things, the laws relating to land tenure had to be reorganised—correctly speaking, they never existed before—and under the tyrannical sway of the native Princes they were quite illusionary. The irrigation by canals next claimed attention; for upon this agriculture in India, as everywhere in hot countries, is chiefly dependent. The number and the condition of the canals have always in Asia been an index of right administration, and the name of Nushirwan* is held in esteem to this day; for in Persia there are still in existence canals which date from the time of his reign.

The excellent organisation of the present canal system in India has long since been duly recognised by friends and foes, and a passing mention of facts will therefore suffice here. In the districts of India directly under British rule, of the 137,319,732 acres of arable land, about 29,215,545 acres are dependent upon the irrigation canals, most of which have been constructed by the Government;† while 43,000 miles of canals are under the immediate supervision or control of the Government.‡ In spite of the bombastic accounts of the canals constructed by early native Princes, very little is left of these ancient irrigation works in India. In most cases the work had to be

* In several parts of Persia I have seen canals (Kanat) which are supposed to have been constructed by Nushirwan (Chosroes I.).

† W. W. Hunter, p. 641.

‡ Sir John Strachey, p. 222.

done entirely afresh, and loans had to be raised for this purpose, as only a small proportion of the costs could be defrayed by the revenues derived from the canals. The undertaking was almost exclusively financed by English capital, and the canal system, besides being a boon to the districts concerned, also became a source of profit to the Government; for, as Sir John Strachey tells us, the costs of a canal are often much below the value of one season's harvest.

Up to the year 1880 the capital spent by the State upon the canal system amounted to £20,500,000.* Although acknowledging that native Princes of the past deserve credit for their temporary efforts at irrigation—as, for instance, the Mogul Prince Sultan Akbar—we must not forget that those irrigation works were constructed almost entirely by forced labour, and not as under the British administration, without the *compulsory* co-operation of the farmers. I have seen in Khiva how the whole population of a district was forced to work day and night to cleanse a canal, and it has given me a poor impression of the fatherly care of Oriental Princes. The Indian farmer of to-day, with comparatively little exertion, can draw from the soil almost any kind of produce necessary for the sustenance of his family, and *famines* only occur where the delay of the regular rains causes unusual droughts, or where locusts, floods, or other physical catastrophes, upset all human calculations and provisions. At all times India has been subject to these terrible plagues, and, as far as human knowledge goes, many hundred thousands of people have fallen victims to them under the native rulers. In the famine of 1769-70 a third of the population of Bengal perished. Against these terrible odds the English have fought with every means at their disposal, and the timely assistance by which, during such occasional scourges, millions of

* 'India in 1880,' by Sir Richard Temple, p. 263.

lives have been saved has swallowed up immense sums of money.* The famine of 1874-1879, apart from private charities, chiefly derived from England, cost the Anglo-Indian Government £16,000,000.† Formerly, apart from these elemental disturbances, war and the unbridled tyranny of Princes robbed the farmer of the fruits of his labour. Now the former danger (war), under the protection of Pax Britannica, is done away with; and tyranny is also out of the question, because the *system of taxation* in India is more advanced than in any of the independent Moslem States, more advanced, even, than in many European lands. It is supposed that the Hindu pays 1s. 9d. per head per year in taxes, and that, including the land tax, the contribution is perhaps twice this amount—*i.e.*, 4 rupees 8 annas; this is according to Paul Boell.‡ The English at home pay six times that amount per head. The French author already quoted is of opinion that, on account of the great difference in the proportionate wealth of England and India, the Englishman pays 6 per cent., and the Hindu 16 per cent., of his income to the State; but he seems to have forgotten that, in spite of this, in England the taxes contribute five-sixths, and in India only one-fourth, to the public expenditure, and that therefore the Hindu contributes really very little to the great cost of the civilisation of his land in comparison with the advantages which he derives therefrom. That the State expenditure in India during the second half of the past century has more than doubled itself must be attributed to the fact that since 1840 six large provinces (covering an area of 500,000 square miles, and with 60,000,000 inhabitants) have been incorporated

* Sir W. W. Hunter estimates the victims of the famine of 1876-1878 at seven millions ('The Indian Empire,' p. 646).

† 'India in 1880,' by Sir Richard Temple. London, 1881, p. 332.

‡ 'L'Inde et le Problème Indien.' Paris, 1901, p. 177.

into the Indian Empire. We can only marvel that, notwithstanding the greatly increased expenses for reforms and improvements, the taxes have not been made heavier than they are. Criticism hostile to England always seems to take pleasure in pointing out the disproportion between the taxes in India and the low figure of the average yearly income of the Hindu (27 rupees per head*); but it is forgotten that the annual income of the Turkestanis is on an average much lower still, and that the assessment of the Russian taxation is considerably higher. In Russo-Turkestan the settled inhabitant pays on Kharadj and Tanab, and the nomad on tent and cattle tax, proportionately more than the Hindu, without enjoying in return the same privileges which the advanced culture of the English offers.

Moreover, it should be noted that, of the £72,272,000 annual State revenue of India,† only £20,816,000 are contributed by the taxes, while £54,456,000 are derived from other sources and from public institutions and works which benefit the tax-payer. Amongst the latter we will only mention the improved means of communication through the construction of the railways; in this respect India does not come behind even the most advanced countries of Europe. The great railway net which now spreads over the whole

* The former member of Parliament, Dadabhai Naoroji, reckons 20 rupees per head per annum. As against this, the estimate in England is 825 francs, in France 575 francs, in Russia 225 francs, and in Turkey 100 francs (Paul Boell, 'L'Inde,' etc., pp. 178, 179).

† This does not include the so-called land revenue, which amounts at present to £17,000,000 per annum, but in the Mogol period it was a great deal more. Edward Thomas, in his 'Revenue Resources of the Mogol Empire,' mentions for the year 1664-65 £26,743,000; Bernier speaks of £22,593,000; and Catrou, according to Manucci, gives £38,719,000. And this at a time when there was none of the order, peace, and justice, which now prevail in the land. The above data have been taken from Sir John Strachey's work, p. 129.

of India was commenced under Lord Dalhousie, and the first line was opened in 1853. The construction of railways advanced rapidly everywhere. In 1885 scarcely 12,279 miles had been opened, and in 1900 24,707 miles were open to traffic. The several lines have been built either at State expense or guaranteed by the State; in some cases subventioned, and in others built by the natives themselves. Thus far the costs of construction have been £52,596,779. In 1900 174,824,483 persons travelled by these various lines, and the revenues amounted to 315,967,137 rupees.* In Russian Turkestan there are, properly speaking, only strategical railway-lines; but in India the economical, social, commercial, and industrial interests of the land are benefited to an extraordinary extent, and give a new direction to the ethical and moral disposition of the people. The same applies to telegraphic and postal communication, for in communities where formerly slowness was preferred to rapidity, and rest to activity, the postages in the year 1900 amounted to 521,664,746, and the telegraphic despatches to 6,237,301. There, where formerly the popular pilgrimages used to take days, and often weeks, as many hours are now found sufficient, and the Asiatic is, as it were, compelled to recognise the value of time. The great works of a material nature which England has accomplished in India have of necessity made a deep impression upon the minds and the spirit of the Hindu, and have largely contributed to facilitate that moral transformation which it was England's intention to bring about.

The Asiatic mind was necessarily most deeply impressed by the humane institutions organised by the State and private philanthropists, and which have contributed so largely to the public welfare. To this category belong the hospitals and free dispensaries.

* 'The Statesman's Year-Book,' 1902, p. 166.

Of the former there are now about 2,000, and about 100,000,000 patients receive medical treatment every year. The decade ending with 1902 was marked by an enormous increase in Indian medical institutions, and in the number of patients treated by them. There were 3,000 hospitals and dispensaries in 1901, against 1,800 in 1891; their indoor patients rose from 300,000 to 355,000, and outdoor patients from $13\frac{3}{4}$ millions to $20\frac{1}{2}$ millions. These figures do not include private institutions established by non-professional persons or corporate bodies, intended primarily for relief of the poor. Of particular benefit are the female hospitals instituted by Lady Dufferin, where lady doctors, natives among them, attend to the needs of the suffering female sex. Formerly, when there were only male doctors, it was impossible to care for them properly, because of the great separation of the sexes. The unhappy fate of the women of India has always been a matter of deep concern to the women of England. Many of them have devoted themselves for years to the welfare of their sisters in India, and amongst these Mary Carpenter has particularly distinguished herself. Her gravestone bears the following inscription: 'Taking to heart the grievous lot of Oriental women, in the last decade of her life, she four times went to India, and awakened an active interest in their education and training for serious purposes.'*

* 'India in 1880,' by Sir Richard Temple, p. 159.

CHAPTER V

PUBLIC INSTRUCTION IN INDIA

WHAT the English have done so far for the elevation and the material well-being of India is attributed by those who bear them envy and malice to purely selfish motives; they say everything is done to get the most profit out of the country and its inhabitants, and to enrich the commerce and industry of the Mother Country. Envy truly is blind—the most glaring facts are often unable to open its eyes; and when in the course of specific investigation the fatal veil is partially lifted, this is done for the sole purpose of showing the situation more clearly, and in order that the actual material work accomplished may find full recognition. I must honestly confess that I appreciate England's endeavours in the matter of instruction, education, and mental elevation of the national conglomerate of India far more highly, and that I admire it much more than all its creations of a material nature. In the latter case England deals with inanimate objects which can be moulded, fashioned, and transformed at will; but in the former case it has to do battle with the ingrained spirit of Asiaticism, accustomed for centuries to walk in the old trodden paths of conservatism: for these Asiatics, because their culture is of older date, value it much more highly than ours. As pupils they consider themselves better informed than their teachers, and they are suspicious of the new doctrine because it emanates from the con-

queror, the foreign ruler. If the many years of close intercourse which I have had with Turks, Arabs, and Persians had not made me intimately acquainted with their strong dislike of and opposition to modern European culture, and if I did not know that the Indian is ten times more Oriental than any of the other Eastern nations, my surprise would probably not have been so great. But when I now behold the complete transformation of India, and recognise in the Pandits, Nabobs, Moulvis, Babus, not only men of European culture, but men who in the European sense of the word are eminent scholars, my astonishment cannot be called extravagant or unjustified.

The cultural transformation of India had necessarily to keep pace with the conquest of territory, for, in order to consolidate the newly-gained possession by the introduction of political, administrative, and social reforms, it was imperatively necessary to exercise at the same time an influence upon the intellect of the new subjects. It was Warren Hastings, the renowned, genial soldier, who in 1782 founded the College of Calcutta, and maintained it for many years at his own expense. His object was to educate the Mohammedan population of Bengal, in order that they, together with the Hindus, might qualify themselves for the State service, more especially for jurisdiction.* In 1791 the College of Benares was founded—primarily for the study of the law, the literature, and the religion of the Hindus—in order to render skilful assistance in legal matters to the European judges. Elementary schools for the education of the lower classes were as yet out of the question, because the authorities did not agree upon the leading principles of such institutions. Two opposite opinions arose in respect to this. The one party, represented by Lord

* Sir John Strachey, p. 241.

Macaulay, advocated the introduction of higher education and the use of the English language, upon the principle that Oriental literature and knowledge was based upon trivial, childish, and out-of-date doctrines; while the other party started from the sound principle that knowledge and culture could only be transmitted with advantage if founded on a national basis, and that therefore the mother-tongue and the national literature were the correct means for inculcating the desired knowledge. It was the same struggle over again which Russia had to face in its attempts at civilisation on the Volga; in the Kirghis Steppes; and in Turkestan, in which Professor Ilminski gained the victory. The great difference, however, between the two cases was that, while the Russians easily succeeded in making a *tabula rasa* among the Tartars, Kirghises, and Sarts, as they found there very slight, hardly noticeable traces of an older national culture, the English had to reckon with the rich Sanscrit literature and certain branches of knowledge of a juridical and philosophical nature. It is to be regretted that Macaulay, who to a certain extent was prejudiced, carried the victory over the views of Hastings, Wellesley, Sir William Jones, and Elphinstone, with the result that under Lord William Bentinck the resolution was passed that 'The Government shall undertake to spread the knowledge of European literature and science among the inhabitants of India, and that every means shall be employed to promote English education.'*

* The manner in which the great essayist has come to the conclusion that Oriental learning has produced nothing to be compared with the intellectual products of the modern world—for this is what he says in the scheme submitted for the Governor-General's approval in 1835—can only be explained by the fact that he had not devoted sufficient attention to the heroes of Oriental learning, and that the term 'knowledge' only applies to the exact sciences.

Under these disadvantages higher education, with very few exceptions, labours to this day, and under such conditions it is clear that at the first there could be no question of educating the lower classes. The primary schools were neglected, and the education of the people was left to the Mohammedan and Brahmin clergy, and under such conditions the establishment of Universities was begun. In 1823 the College of Agra was founded; in 1824 the Sanscrit College at Calcutta, and in 1835 the medical schools were instituted by Lord W. Bentinck. It was not until the administration of Sir C. Wood (afterwards Lord Halifax) that public instruction began to be seriously thought of. Amidst all the confusion of the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 three Universities were founded—namely, at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay—and the resolution was passed to form a special department of public instruction, under the management of a Director with a staff of inspectors. Quite a network of schools soon covered the land, graduating from the native village school up to the highest Universities. Many of them received financial support on condition that there should be a regular supervision, and liberal donations encouraged study, and made it possible for indigent natives to enter the University.* The members of the School Commission appointed by Lord Ripon in 1884 acquitted themselves most creditably of their task; their endeavour was to complete the work commenced by Lord Halifax in 1854, and by degrees they established the principle that in the higher schools the English language, and in the lower schools the native tongue of each respective district, should be used as the vehicle of instruction. Since that time the number of educational establishments in India, and also the number of pupils, have considerably increased.

* Sir John Strachey, p. 244.

In 1857-58 there were	2,000	schools, with	200,000	scholars.
In 1877-78	66,202	„	1,877,942	„
In 1890-91	138,350	„	3,698,361	„
In 1901-02	148,380	„	2,756,135	„

With a population of 230,000,000 under the immediate rule of the Government, this school attendance appears like a drop of water in the ocean; but when one considers the innate conservatism, the superstition, and the prejudices, with which the Government had to battle and still has to battle, it is impossible to deny that the English deserve great credit. The Government efforts would certainly have been crowned with still greater success if the largely preponderating majority of the people, or three-fifths of the whole population, had not been given over to agricultural pursuits. This class of people do not, as a rule, take easily to schooling; and famine, pestilence, and cholera, the three great plagues of India, have greatly contributed to impede the progress of the work. The movement for the education of women, so sadly neglected in the Islam world and throughout Asia, deserves special mention. Of the total population of India, amounting to 294,360,000, 149,951,000 are males, and 144,409,000 females. Of the former 134,752,000, and of the latter 142,976,000, are ignorant and illiterate, and only 1,433,000 amongst them can read and write. In this respect, however, considerable progress has been made of late years, for in 1891-92 the number of girl scholars was estimated at 339,031, and in 1901-02 it had risen to 429,490.* The greatest increase is in South India, where the seclusion of the women is not so strict; thus, for instance, in Madras the number of girl scholars has risen since 1871 from 10,000 to 128,000. Nay, more, there are cases on record of Indian ladies obtaining literary and academical distinctions; several of them have suc-

* Sir John Strachey, p. 249.

cessfully matriculated, and some have obtained the doctor's degree, which in India must certainly be reckoned among the most astonishing achievements.

The money spent by the feudal States and the English Government in 1901-02 on public education in India amounts, according to official returns,* to £2,673,278. Considering that Russia *sub titulo* 'Budget of Education,' estimating the inhabitants of Turkestan at 5,260,000, spends annually about £350,000—*i.e.*, 3,432,200 roubles—the sum of £2,673,278 may appear very small; but the following points must not be lost sight of. First, the Russian Education Budget in Turkestan covers chiefly schools in which the children of natives take a very small or no part at all, but which serve to educate the children of Russian officials and soldiers, colleges, municipal schools and Church schools, all educational establishments. Secondly, Russia has to defray the cost of the steppe schools and the boarding schools connected therewith, to which the moneyless nomads can contribute but little. Thirdly, in Turkestan the schools for natives are attended by only 2,427 pupils, while in India, according to the latest returns, 4,520,093 natives were entered. Fourthly, the English in India have to meet the strong opposition of the Moslem and Brahmin clergy, the former counting no sacrifice too great to protect their mosque schools against the intrusion of their Christian masters, and the introduction of European education; while the latter, in the interests of their caste system, have always been careful to keep the masses in darkness and ignorance. This to a certain extent is also the case in Central Asia, but only among the population which stands under the influence of the Ishans and Mollas, and does not apply to the nomads. They, from a cultural point of view, were virgin soil to the Russians.

* 'Statistical Abstract,' p. 101.

In consequence of all this, the primary schools in India can grow but slowly, nor do they flourish to the same extent in all parts of the country. In Bengal, where the English influence is of the longest standing, there were in 1871-72 only 2,451 primary schools, with 64,779 scholars. In 1874-1875 there were already 16,042 schools, with 360,322 scholars; in the year 1883 there were 63,897 schools, with 1,181,623 scholars; in 1890-91 60,342 schools, with 1,215,629 scholars;* and in 1901-02, 98,388 schools, with 3,271,379 scholars.† From this we see that the education of the lower classes makes slow though steady progress; and this is not so much the fault of the narrow-mindedness of the English, but rather of their misconceived ideas. They had hoped that the light of education would be distributed of itself from the higher to the lower stages of society. For some time the notion also prevailed in Western lands that, as the rising sun first illumines the mountain-tops, and afterwards sheds its rays into the valley below, so also in society the light of education travels from the higher down to the lower classes. In our days, of course, people are thoroughly cured of this fallacious notion. It has been convincingly proved that education should be founded upon the broadest possible basis, and in no case be dependent upon the heads of society. It was owing to this erroneous view that the promoters of education in India paid far less attention to the primary schools than to the middle-class and higher schools. In the middle-class schools, which include the secondary schools and colleges, English is spoken, and the education there given qualifies the student for the Universities, provided he can pass the entrance examination. During the decade

* 'Statement exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India during the Year 1901-02 and the Nine Preceding Years.' Thirty-eighth number, London, 1903, p. 318.

† W. W. Hunter, 'The Indian Empire,' p. 566.

1891-92 to 1901-02 the number of secondary schools increased from 4,872 to 5,507. Colleges, the training-places for the Intelligence Department and the official world, are more like the Scottish and German Universities than the English. They stand under the supervision of a Principal, several Professors, and a Moulvi or Pandit, which latter two give religious instruction. The colleges and special schools are establishments in which those who want can take degrees in medicine, law, or art, or can be trained for teachers, engineers, mechanics, technologists, etc. The number of students frequenting these schools rose during the decade just mentioned from 16,753 to 29,471.* The Universities, which are devoted more to examination than to education, are five in number—at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay (incorporated since 1857), Lahore, and Allahabad. The entrance examination stipulates for a knowledge of English, one classical or one national language, history, geography, mathematics, and physics. The average age of the candidates must be from sixteen to eighteen. Between the years 1872 and 1892 about 7,159 students have graduated, some obtaining the B.A. and some the M.A. degree,† and between 1897 and 1902 6,605 candidates have passed the B.A. degree, and 605 the M.A. degree.‡ We must not omit to mention the schools of the Roman Catholic and Protestant missions, which principally occupy themselves with elementary education. In 1890 the combined number of pupils attending these schools exceeded 300,000. The number of natives who annually attain academical titles and honours increases from year to year. Thus, at the Calcutta University, in the course of ten years, 55,610 candidates have applied, 55·6 per cent. of whom were suc-

* 'Statement exhibiting,' etc., p. 310.

† The same, p. 315.

‡ W. W. Hunter, p. 564.

cessful, and at the University of Bombay, amongst 32,120 candidates, 32·4 per cent. were admitted.* Of course, it is not so much the thirst for knowledge as the desire to make a living which brings so many applicants to the Universities. Yet anyone acquainted with Asiatic conditions cannot help being surprised at the change which has taken place in Indian society, where the spirit of antagonism, both in matters of nationality and of religion, is much more strongly developed than in any other part of Asia. In the public institutions of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the United Provinces, the Punjab, the Frontier Provinces, the Central Provinces, Burma, Assam, and Berar, the number of Hindu students attending the schools far exceeds that of the Mohammedans, for the public establishments of the various provinces return 2,779,455 Hindus, as against 731,837 Mohammedans. This can, in a manner, be explained by the fact that the Mohammedans are far more suspicious of the influence of foreign culture than the Hindus, whose religion has no definite dogmas and regulations, and who therefore cannot receive regular religious instruction; while to the Mohammedan all knowledge is centred in religion,† and he declines to be taught by those of another faith. We would not infer thereby that school learning is more developed among the Hindus than among the Mohammedans; on the contrary, the number of illiterates is

* Sir John Strachey, p. 256.

† By 'knowledge' was always understood religious knowledge. But modern Mohammedan scholars maintain that history, mathematics, chemistry, medicine, etc., were also included in this rubric. Speaking from personal experience, this is not the teaching of the Medresses of Persia and Central Asia, which are still imbued with the spirit of antiquity. Beyond rhetoric, jurisdiction, and grammar, there is no trace of any worldly erudition in any of the colleges of these two countries. Possibly it may have been different in past ages; otherwise it would be difficult to account for the brilliant results in the exact sciences, which we still admire, in the old Mohammedan school.

far greater among the Hindus than among the Mohammedans, for the smallest Mohammedan community has always a school connected with the mosque where special stress is laid upon the reading of the Koran and the elementary doctrines of Islam, but as regards general knowledge very little is taught. Among the Moslems of India, as I pointed out before, the same severely orthodox-fanatical spirit prevails as in Central Asia, and they, in contrast to the Moslems of West Asia, will have nothing whatever to do with the principle of the Bidaat (innovation), and consequently have opposed the civilising influences of the English far more strongly than the Hindus have done. The Russians also have had very unpleasant experiences in this respect, for, in spite of their strictly absolute form of government, they have not yet dared to introduce European branches of learning in the richly-endowed Medresses of Central Asia. It would be difficult to imagine a Talebe (college student) in Turkestan pursuing his theological and Moslemic studies, and being induced to take up any subject introduced by the hated Kafirs.

'Necessity knows no law,' says the proverb. The Moslem element in India, deprived of its political influence and its many centuries of sovereignty, has at last been compelled to give in, and in these latter days to accept modern views of life. The fact that the number of Hindus, who through the modern school education have attained to eminent positions in the service of the State, increases year by year, and that the Moslems are gradually being pushed into the background, has decided the latter to forsake their policy of contempt and defiance, and during the decade between 1891-92 and 1901-02 the number of Mohammedans who have applied for tuition in modern sciences has decidedly increased, chiefly at the instigation of their own patriotic co-religionists, men

who have realised the danger and the evil of a too rigid conservatism and a constant defiance, and have encouraged their countrymen to accept the new conditions. Amongst these promoters of European knowledge we would mention in the first place Newab Abdul Latif Khan Bahadur, C.I.E., who in 1863 founded the Mohammedan Literary Society of Calcutta, and through this society endeavoured to bring his co-religionists more into harmony with the English innovations and to convince them of the necessity of acquiring European learning.* This society, whose founder died in 1893, still exists. There the political, religious, and social questions of the day are freely discussed, and the measures of the Government openly praised or disapproved. The Medresse of Calcutta, founded by Warren Hastings, served as basis for the society. Until then instruction had only been given there in the subjects usually taught in Moslem establishments, but now, at the instigation of Newab Abdul Latif Khan, the English language and European subjects of learning have been introduced. Not only in Calcutta, however, but also in other parts of Moslem India, the Newab exerted himself in founding colleges—amongst others, those of Dacca, Chittagong, and Rajshahi—and in collecting donations by means of which two-thirds of the school fees of the Mohammedan scholars could be covered.† All the endeavours of the patriotic Moulvi show that his object was to improve the social condition of his fellow-believers, to

* I have corresponded for many years with this learned Indian Mohammedan. At first we corresponded in Persian, but afterwards he made use of the English language, and without exaggeration I can say that he had the most perfect knowledge of the writings of Milton and Shakespeare.

† 'A Full Report of the Proceedings of the Meeting in Honour of the Memory of the Newab Abdul Latif Khan Bahadur, C.I.E., held at the Town Hall, Calcutta, on Friday, August 11, 1903.' Calcutta, 1893, p. 50.

reconcile them to the English supremacy, and to insure their willing assistance in the government of the land. Before all things he wanted to induce his compatriots to learn the English language, and in a memorandum dated December 26, 1861, he expresses himself in the following manner on this subject: 'If any language in India could lead to the advancement in life of the learner, it is the English. At the same time, the political benefits, both to themselves and to the Government, which have resulted from the Mohammedans learning English, are many and apparent. The Mohammedan who has been educated in English can understand the good motives of the Government. He knows the power, intelligence, perseverance, and resources, of the British nation. His attachment to the Government rests on a firm basis. He cannot be misled, and no one will attempt to mislead him. He knows that the safety of life and property depends upon the stability of the British rule, and will naturally resent any attempts by his ignorant and misguided countrymen against that stability. He will do his utmost to persuade all within his influence of the benefits of the British rule; and where his representations of those benefits fail, his representation of the power of government might deter them from evil designs against it.'*

These sentiments, expressed four years after the Sepoy Rebellion, clearly point out the relation between English and natives, and are a proof of the Moulvis appreciation of the English methods of civilisation.

Of a similar nature was the work done by Sir Seid Ahmed Khan, a distinguished Mohammedan of North India, who on account of the objection of the Mohammedans to the Christian schools, advocated the founding of

* 'A Minute of the Hooghli Mudrussah,' written at the request of the Hon. Sir J. P. Grant, K.C.B., Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, by Moulvi Abdul Luteef Khan Bahadur. Calcutta, 1877, p. 3.

a Mohammedan college, in which the English language and modern sciences should be taught by Moslem Professors, in order to enable the Mohammedans to enter the official world. Thus, notwithstanding the opposition and the suspicion of the fanatics, the Mohammedan University of Aligarh was founded. Supported by the English Government and by the Nizam of Hyderabad, this purely Mohammedan institution, where, besides the Mohammedan subjects, modern sciences are also studied, materially contributes to the education of the faithful. These latter are, in Sir Seid Ahmed's opinion, the more necessary as the future of the Moslems in India is quite hopeless unless they make themselves familiar with European culture. He saw clearly that even after a hundred years of English occupation there was but little sympathy between the Moslems and the English, and that only by enlightenment and culture could friendly relations be cultivated.* With a yearly expenditure of £6,000, in 1902, about 500 scholars attended the college, and this result is the more important when we consider that it is in North India, the home of the warlike and irreconcilable Moslem element, where this assimilation with modern culture is taking place. When Lord Lytton, in 1877, laid the foundation-stone of a new college in Aligarh, Sir Seid Ahmed said, in his address to the Viceroy: 'At my time of life it is a comfort to me to feel that the undertaking which has been for many years, and is now, the sole object of my life has roused on the one hand the energies of my own countrymen, on the other has won the sympathy of our British fellow-subjects and the support of our rulers; so when the few years I may still be spared are over, and when I shall be no longer amongst you, the college will still prosper and succeed in educating my countrymen to have the same affec-

* Sir John Strachey, 'India,' etc., p. 263.

tion for their country, the same feelings of loyalty for the British rule, the same appreciation of its blessings, the same sincerity of friendship with our British fellow-subjects, as have been the ruling feelings of my life.'*

Besides the Mohammedan University of Aligarh, the Moslem Educational Conference owes its existence to the noble efforts of Sir Seid Ahmed. This association was organised for the purpose of enabling the Mohammedans to meet every year to discuss social reforms, to foster a friendly feeling between the Moslems of India, to spread knowledge, and to show the English Government that the enlightenment of the Mohammedans and the establishment of British rule in India can go hand-in-hand.† In the course of this work we shall have further occasion to quote the expressions of appreciation of various like-minded Mohammedans, but for the present the references here given will suffice to convince the impartial reader that the cultural influence of England in India has at last stirred the inherent conservatism and fanaticism of Islam, and that the spirit of reform shows itself in India more strongly than in any of the politically independent Moslem States.

* Sir John Strachey, 'India,' etc., p. 266.

† Compare the article in the *Asiatic Quarterly Review* for April, 1901, entitled 'The Nineteenth Century and the Mussulmans of India,' by Sir Khuda Bukhsh.

CHAPTER VI

RESULTS OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

THE value of work is generally judged by its results, and therefore, after explaining the nature of education in India, we will now proceed to consider the results thus far obtained. We must particularly notice the momentous changes which manifest themselves in the thoughts and actions of the Hindus of both religions, and which we may take as the natural consequence of their education. English critics, on the whole, consider the results of the education movement in India unsatisfactory, and Sir John Strachey maintains that, as regards the college system of education hitherto adopted, a feeling of disillusionment and disappointment prevails, and that the report of the Commission of Investigation appointed by Lord Curzon is, on the whole, not encouraging.* If the members of this Commission were dealing with the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, or with public schools such as Eton and Harrow, they might be justified in their feeling of disappointment. But Hindus are not yet Englishmen; between the two lies the deep gulf of a different conception of life many centuries old, which is only just beginning to be bridged over by thin and delicate threads of modern culture.

This being so, and the free intercourse between English and Hindus being thereby naturally impeded, it is not fair to say that it is the fault of the school

* *Op. cit.*, p. 259.

system that Indian students do not more readily take to scholarly pursuits, but mainly learn for the sake of making a living; that their knowledge is at best but superficial, and that none of the natives educated at any of the Indian colleges thus far have distinguished themselves in any special branch of learning. No, even at the risk of appearing *plus catholique que le pape*, and more English than the English themselves, I cannot allow this reproach to pass, for the simple reason that, to my mind, one must not compare these schools with Oxford and Cambridge, but rather with such institutions as the Rushdie and the Idadie schools of Turkey, the College of Galata-serai, and the Dar-ul-funum (University) of Teheran—schools which are all under the supervision of their own co-religionists and countrymen, and where, although for many years instruction has been given in modern branches of learning, thus far no brilliant specimens of scholarly Turks and Persians have been produced. With us in Europe also, in accordance with the ruling spirit of the age, a far greater number of men study in order to make a living than for the love of the study itself, and it is, therefore, not surprising that this is the case in India, where a State appointment always appeals far more strongly to the character and aspirations of the natives than the less brilliant, though perhaps more lucrative, position which commerce and industry offer. I have known few Orientals who have not preferred the security and the respectability of a State appointment to the probable wealth to be acquired in commercial pursuits. As time goes on the existing system of education may possibly show greater and more important results, but for the present we must be satisfied with the indirect influence exercised by the schools, and the results obtained by the unceasing efforts of the English in developing the native mind. Wonderful results, indeed, have already been

achieved in the process of intellectual evolution, and in regard to this we would first draw attention to the literary movement which has taken place in India during the last few decades, and which shows the influence of the ruling foreign element.

According to the statistical returns of 1878, the number of books published in English and in various Indian dialects amounted to 4,913, of which no less than 2,495 were original works, while the remainder were treatises of a religious, poetical, dramatic, scientific, philosophic, or moral nature. In 1883 the number of publications rose to 6,189, and in 1890 to 7,885, 5,507 of these being original works, 1,622 reproductions, and 756 translations.* In the face of these facts, why should one speak of literary sterility? Far be it from me to designate these original productions as first-class intellectual achievements; but on the other hand I would not speak disparagingly of them, for it is certain that Western Asia, which is politically independent, cannot show anything like such good results. And this applies also to the publication of daily newspapers and periodicals. In 1892 there were published in India 576 newspapers and 330 monthly and weekly periodicals; in 1900 the number of the former had risen to 675, and of the latter to 465.† When we consider that some of these papers—as, for instance, the *Bengal Gazette*—have as many as 20,000 subscribers, one can form some idea of the influence these papers must have upon the public. Sometimes the position taken up by the press may not be altogether convenient to the English Government; for in Indian journalism the so-called ‘Revolver Press’ (press conducted by rowdies) is not quite unknown, and as early as 1835 Lord Macaulay advised that a stop should be put to the outcries of Indian journalists.

* W. W. Hunter, ‘The Indian Empire,’ pp. 571-573.

† ‘Statistical Abstract,’ p. 117.

The British feeling of liberty, however, resisted such censure, and it was only under Lord Elgin that measures were taken to repress those licentious writings which encouraged rebellion and incited the people against the Government. Nevertheless, we find to this day in the Indian press expressions and comments, concerning the actions of the Government, for which in Germany their authors would be condemned to at least three years' imprisonment, and in Russia to a ten years' exile to Siberia. A people which, as far back as human knowledge goes, has languished in the bonds of the most cruel tyranny, whose every expression against the Government at once met with the severest punishment, might easily abuse the privilege of liberty of speech and writing so suddenly granted. When we read the data of Hindustani literature carefully collected by the French scholar Garcin de Tassy,* we may well be surprised at the great number of newspapers, reviews, and independent works, published in India in the seventies of last century. We are also struck by the licentious and often rebellious spirit which pervades these writings. We come upon such publications as the journal *Khairkhah Alem* (Friend of the World), published at Delhi, in which Christianity is attacked; or, again, the paper *Nur-ul-Enwar*† (The Light of Lights), which frankly and openly attacks the English and scoffs at every attempted reform, especially at the reformatory measures of Seid Ahmed Khan. Another Frenchman, the learned B. St. Hilaire, in the *Journal des Savants*‡ expresses the opinion that the most con-

* In a special appendix, entitled 'La Langue et la Littérature Hindustanie,' of the *Revue Annuelle*, edited by Garcin de Tassy, this learned French Orientalist has for many years discussed the literary movement in Hindustan.

† The above review of 1873, p. 34.

‡ See the June, July, and August numbers, 1875, of the above review.

clusive proof of the progress of modern civilisation in India is the constant appearance of new publications, and the favourable reception which they find among the natives. If this success of the English is recognised by the French, what, then, must be the impression of the impartial observer, whose object it is to compare the relative merits of the press of India with that of Turkey and Persia? In the former country the press is fettered by the most severe censure, and in Persia, so far, no newspaper worthy of the name has seen the light. In India the written word generally carries more weight and is more highly esteemed than with us in Europe, and far from attaching too much importance to the daily press, I cannot help pointing out that in Asia generally, and especially in India, the press exercises a far profounder influence than in Europe, and if properly managed might do much good work. In reference to this, I would mention the Indian journalist Dr. Sambhu Muckerji,* founder of the periodical *Reis and Rayyet* (Prince and Peasant), who could serve as a pattern to many of our journalists for intelligence, knowledge, and nobleness of character. When I look at the portrait of this genuine Oriental in his national costume, and read his correspondence† with the leading personalities of the Anglo-Indian Government, my astonishment is unbounded. This Brahmin Hindu quotes our authorities on history, philosophy, theology, politics, and natural science, as if he had received his education at one of our best Universities, and had for years moved in the society of our most

* See 'An Indian Journalist; being the Life, Letters, and Correspondence of Dr. Sambhu C. Muckerji, late Editor of *Reis and Rayyet*,' by F. H. Skrine. Calcutta, 1895.

† Dr. Muckerji corresponded with prominent Englishmen residing in India, such as Sir Auckland Colvin, Colonel Osborn, Lord Dufferin, Sir Donald M. Wallace, Sir Lepel Griffin, and others; also with many celebrated Hindus, such as Sir Salar Jung, Sir T. Madhava, Rao, Babu K. M. Ganguli, Nawab Abdul Latif, etc.

prominent intellects. My relations with India have also led me into correspondence with this man. In one of his letters he discusses the future prospects of India, and, speaking of the relationship between Hindus and Mohammedans, he says: 'My ideal is to form a nation by a harmonious social fusion of the two component parts of the population under the British Crown, which has given us such a strong and equitable government as we would never hope to form ourselves; which has advanced us to a new life and is daily improving us; and which I devoutly pray will keep us in hand until the time comes, under God's providence, when we are in a position to help ourselves.'*

Of course, all Indian journalists do not speak in this strain, and some, more especially in Mohammedan papers—such as the *Moslem Chronicle*—indulge in very strong expressions against the English régime, and eulogise the depraved and cruel mismanagement on the banks of the Bosphorus. Press opinions of this kind, although not actually dangerous to English prestige, nevertheless mislead public opinion; they hamper the work of reform, and a stricter supervision of such literary activity might be profitable both to the Sovereign and to his subjects.

Besides the sudden flight taken by journalism in India, several scientific publications claim our undivided attention, and we may confidently say that nowhere throughout the Islamic world is such lively energy displayed as in India, under the protection and encouragement of the English Government. Foremost in this respect are always the controversies upon religious questions, and the animated polemics between the followers of the Christian and the Mohammedan faiths and between Christianity and Brahminism. Next comes Belles-lettres, under which

* 'An Indian Journalist,' p. 308.

head many works upon history and other subjects of universal interest may be classed—some in English, and some in the native tongue—and which are fully discussed and criticised in the daily press.* What most strikes people acquainted with the literary activity in the western portions of the Islamic world is the unconstrained language of Indian authors. They are not afraid to extol their own religion above that of their rulers, and under the very eyes of the Christian missionaries continue to propagate the doctrine of Mohammed. There are also many works published in the English language which are of universal scientific interest. To this latter category belongs 'The Spirit of Islam,' by Seid Amir Ali, a work written upon strictly scientific principles, and in which it is maintained that the doctrine of Mohammed, like every other religion, is full of salutary counsel and instruction, and that the disregard and the neglect of these doctrines has caused the downfall of the Moslem world. Of a similar tendency are Seid Amir Ali's 'History of the Saracens,' Moulvi Abdur Rezzak's 'History of the Barmekides,' and the valuable essay of Professor Shibli of Aligarh, almost every page of which testifies to the influence of European culture.† Among the non-Moslemic scholarly works, mention should be made of Dosabhai Frangi Karaka's 'History of the Parsis,' an exhaustive account of the history, ethnography, and religion of this remarkable people.

Further scientific works by Indian natives are Rajendra Lala Mitra's 'Indo-Aryans,' a valuable contribution to the archæology, art, and ancient customs

* Very instructive in regard to this matter is the list of books published by Garcin de Tassy in his *Revue Annuelle* of 1877, pp. 24-34, which gives us an insight into the literary activity of the Hindus.

† Compare Sir Khuda Bukhsh's article, 'The Nineteenth Century and the Mussulmans of India,' in the *Asiatic Quarterly Review* for April, 1901, pp. 285-293.

of India ; Jogendra Nath Bhattacharys' 'Hindu Castes and Sects,' which book compares favourably with Risley's, Wilson's, and Sherring's works on the same subject ; and a large number of other publications, which enrich our knowledge of the country and the inhabitants of India, and for which we are indebted to the cultural influence of England. Not uninteresting are the literary productions of Hindus who have travelled in Europe, and who criticise our life in the West, our institutions, and our international relations. The oldest work on this subject is 'Travels in Europe and Asia,' by Mirza Abu Talib Khan,* written in Persian, and published in Calcutta (1812) by his son Husein Ali. The author has a sound judgment on European affairs, and is not afraid to speak out his mind. A much more modern spirit breathes in the pages of Bhagvat Sinh Jee's† book of travels. He is the ruler of Gondal, and a remarkable specimen of the influence of English culture in India. This Prince visited the Medical School of Edinburgh, took his doctor's degree there, and now rules at home upon strictly European principles. I have before me the annual report of his administration, which contains interesting data of the continuous progress of civilisation in his small dominion. Still more pregnant of this apprehension of modern culture is an essay published by Sir Salar Jung, the first Minister of the Nizam of Hyderabad, in the October number (1887) of the *Nineteenth Century* which contains highly interesting statements on the part of a refined Oriental statesman. The personality of Sir Salar Jung as regards his education, patriotism, and political insight, can only be compared with that of Reshid

* Abu Talib Khan commenced his journey in 1799, and returned in 1803.

† 'Journal of a Visit to England in 1883,' by Bhagvat Sinh Jee, Thakor Sahib of Gondal. Bombay, 1886.

Pasha, the first reformer of Turkey. In the history of modern Persia we seek in vain for his equal. Emiri Kebir* truly has his patriotism and honesty, but lacks his culture.

To this short list we would only add Lala Baijnath's 'Travelling Sketches,'† containing interesting and critical remarks upon England and Europe in general, to which we shall have occasion to refer again. There is no lack, either, of distinctly anti-English and anti-European publications — as, for instance, the anonymous work called 'Looking-Glass,'‡ in which England and everything English is censured with bitter hatred.

* Emiri Kebir (the great Emir), also called Emiri Nizam the Reformer, was the only man of modern times who could have helped the unfortunate country. Nasr-ed-din Shah was foolish enough to have him executed at the instigation of the harem.

† The title of the book is, 'England and India; being Impressions of Persons and Things English and Indian, and Brief Notes of Visits to France, Switzerland, Italy, and Ceylon,' by Lalla Baijnath, B.A., of the N.W.P. Judicial Service. Bombay, 1893.

‡ The title of this book is, 'Looking-Glass for my Poli-Comedy Actors in Europe; being a Personal History of an Indian's Tour from Moscow to Birmingham. (1) Journey homewards from London to Ceylon. (2) Journey outwards from Bombay to Europe.' Bombay, 1891. The title-page bears no name, but the letters are signed Dr. K. R. Viccarji.

CHAPTER VII

CHANGE OF NATIVE MORALS

THE cultural endeavours of England in India, more especially as regards the care bestowed upon the school system, undoubtedly bear the character of a two-edged sword; the enforced culture is considered sometimes even by the promoters of freedom and enlightenment as somewhat premature, injurious, and even dangerous. But, I ask, could England, the representative of true Europeanism, the interpreter of liberal ideas, of order and of law, the apostle of enlightenment and philanthropy, have acted, or have dared to act, differently? And our answer must be an emphatic No. This opinion is shared by all who know something of the ignominious, miserable condition of humanity in the East, both in the past and in the present. Not only we Europeans, but most Asiatics also who have thoroughly investigated the conditions of modern Europe, who have become acquainted with the spirit which animates our society, and have appreciated the tendency of our moral and material existence—all these are of opinion that an amelioration in the unfortunate state of the Ancient World is only possible by means of education, by a gradual transformation of the antiquated principles of Asiatic views of life, and by overruling the pervading prejudices and ignorances. To some the experiment may appear too bold a venture, but England, in order to uphold its national character and its rôle of culture-bearer in Asia, has been compelled to

undertake it; and if the undaunted policy hitherto adopted is persisted in, England need have no fear as to the final result. As the case now stands—*i.e.*, considering the small percentage of children who attend the schools as compared with the enormous mass of the populace—we realise that only a small and feeble attempt has thus far been made. And yet even this small beginning is encouraging and promising. We distinguish as yet only a few stars in the pitch-dark night, but these stars shine and throw a comforting glow over the path of the future development of things. It may be true that the optimistic views advanced by the Anglo-Indian School Commission in their report of 1883 have been illusory, and that the results thus far obtained are far below our expectations. But the views of life persisted in for centuries cannot be changed with a turn of the hand, and the Hindu, whether of Moslem or Hindu faith, can certainly not be changed, as by a *deus ex machina*, into a regular European. *It is something to be able to say, of the generation brought up under the English system, that if not in an intellectual, at any rate in a moral sense it favourably distinguishes itself from its predecessors.* It is this moral side of the character of the neo-Hindu which promises so much. It is not a feature often seen amongst West Asiatics brought up in European civilisation. It seldom shows itself among the Turks, Arabs, and Persians, and it is the absence of moral principle which has shipwrecked all attempts at civilisation in the western Islamic world.

Strictly conservative Orientals, and also fanatically inclined Europeans, think that with the entrance of our culture the primitive virtues of the Asiatics have been destroyed, and that the uncivilised Oriental was more faithful, more honest and reliable, than the Asiatic educated on European principles. This is a gross error. It may be true of the half-educated, but not of

the Asiatic, in whose case the intellectual evolution is founded on the solid basis of a thorough, systematic education. It cannot be denied that partial education is often the fate of Orientals brought up in our large cities ; but these half-educated persons, who after their return to Oriental society constitute themselves the bitterest enemies of Europe, can never be of any account as an influence in the evolution of culture ; everywhere they will be superseded by the earnest-minded students of our modern civilisation. This point is best demonstrated by the fact that the Anglo-Indian Government has of late years entrusted the administration of the great Hindustani possessions for the greater part to natives, and that, apart from the very highest offices, which are but few in number, the 3,700 State offices, with the exception of about 100 to which Europeans are appointed, are filled by native Hindus.* It is first of all in matters of jurisdiction that the natives distinguish themselves for fairness, impartiality, and intimate knowledge of affairs ; and this applies more particularly to the courts of appeal and the civil courts of justice, which almost everywhere are in the hands of native judges. So great is the integrity of these neophytes of modern culture that an Englishman, in case of a dispute with natives, places implicit confidence in the decision of the Asiatic judge. The confidence thus shown by the conqueror in the justice of the subjugated natives is without parallel, and the same may be said of the liberality with which the services of these native judges are rewarded. The salary of a judge in the court of justice at Bengal is £3,200 per annum ; that of a lower judge varies from £480 to £800 ; while that of the lowest class of native judge varies from £160 to £320. Comparing these emoluments with those of the judges in Algiers, we find that the first President of the Court of Appeal has

* Sir John Strachey, 'India,' etc., p. 83.

a yearly allowance of £720, the others at most £400, and the justices of the peace only £108 to £160 and a furnished house. Of the natives of Algiers none are fit to occupy the judge's office, and the Arab officer of the law receives a salary of £60 per annum.

The natives of India are also strongly represented in all civil offices, as tax collectors, overseers, and such-like, which offices used to be reserved for those connected with the so-called 'Covenanted Civil Service.'* Native Hindus frequently occupy positions as solicitors in municipal administration, in educational establishments, and in subordinate places in the provincial administration, as well as in the Department of Public Works, in which the students of the technical schools can generally find employment.

The fact that England can allow the natives of India to take such an active part in the government is chiefly due to the care bestowed upon the schools, and even England's bitterest enemy cannot accuse the Government of narrow-mindedness when one considers that in the Legislative Council of the Viceroy, native Hindus and Mohammedans take part, and that their votes often have a preponderating influence upon the administration and upon the foreign and home politics of the country. England has sometimes been blamed because thus far no native has ever been appointed as Governor of the provinces or as Commander of the army. But this criticism is, in existing circumstances, unreasonable, for it would be unjust to expect the Hindu to possess the same ability, the same strength of character, and the same energy, as an Englishman, and if on no other ground than that of the difference in their nationality, religion, and caste,

* According to the duties imposed upon this class of officials, they were not allowed to enter into any mercantile undertaking or to take presents. They had to pay board and lodging for themselves and their families, besides many other obligations.

one could scarcely imagine a warlike Sikh or Pathan taking his orders from an effeminate Bengali. England surely does enough when the native, after the ability and merit have been fully proved, is admitted to all kinds of State offices. As we said before, the greater number of official positions in India are given to Hindus; but the highest administration and supervision must remain in the hands of the English themselves, to insure the peace and prosperity of the country. Do the French in Algiers and the Russians in Turkestan act differently? Would not the Algerians and the Turkestanis consider themselves fortunate indeed if they had in the management of the country even a small proportion of the part that the Hindus enjoy under the English administration in India?

In our consideration of the civilising influences of the English upon the natives of India, what strikes us most forcibly is the spirit of freedom and nationality which, by their energy and unflagging patriotism, they seem to have inculcated upon the Oriental mind; a spirit very seldom found among genuine Asiatics, but which in India is coming to its full right under the energising influence of the foreign master. In the first place we see industrious undertakings increasing day by day, and with them the number of workmen employed therein, and this is seen in a land where three-fifths of the population are agriculturists, and altogether dependent upon physical influences, and where the progress of industry cannot be too highly commended. The objection might be raised that the old native arts and industries have been doomed to destruction by the foreign importations, but it must not be forgotten that under the native governments of Turkey and Persia a similar falling-off is noticeable, for the thousand-handed European factories have everywhere crippled the native indus-

tries. Hindus, who formerly lived in the strictest seclusion, now go in search of work all over the world,* and in the decade 1891-92 to 1901-02, 174,494 Hindus emigrated; and the number of Hindus abroad is estimated at the present time at 625,000, not including those Indians who, as merchants, have settled in Europe, Egypt, America, and Australia. The restless activity of the English, their patriotic zeal and strong sense of nationality, has entered into the spirit of the Hindus, and this Western characteristic has even left its traces upon the inhabitants of West Asia. The present-day Hindu boldly takes up the cudgels in defence of his ancient culture, and, in proportion as his self-esteem grows when he reads how our learned Sanscrit scholars glorify his ancient literature, he now becomes easily provoked to anger whenever anyone attacks his religion and his history, or dares to doubt the superiority of his ancient culture. As Lala Baijnath says in defence of his religion, 'As properly understood, as originally propounded, Hinduism is not at all hostile to progress among its followers, nor does it retard their national evolution,'† so also the Mohammedans avail themselves of every opportunity to show the superiority of the doctrine of their Prophet, and they do it with greater zeal and ability than their fellow-believers under the governments of politically independent Moslem Sovereigns. When Renan accused Islam of neglecting the cultivation of worldly sciences, and said that the excellence of Moslem intelligence had been greatly exaggerated, it was not the Mollas and Khodjas of Turkey, not the

* The places specially frequented by the Hindus are Mauritius, Natal, Demerara, Trinidad, Surinam, Fiji, Jamaica, East Africa, Ceylon, and the Straits Settlements. See on this subject the 'Statement exhibiting,' etc., under the head 'Emigration and Migration,' pp. 320-324.

† See p. 184 of the above-quoted work.

Akhonds and Muchtehids of Persia, nor the Ulemas of Turkestan, but the Moulvis of India, who attacked the French scholar and took up the defence of Islam.

Since England will not denationalise the Indian peoples entrusted to its sovereignty, as Russia does, whose object it is to amalgamate all the foreign elements under its sway into the national body, the attempts at nationality of the Hindus and Mohammedans in India are to a certain extent encouraged by the British Government; for the glorious monuments of Indian architecture are as far as is possible protected and preserved,* and thanks to the care of the English many of the valuable literary works of ancient Hindu Mohammedan authors have been saved from oblivion by republication.†

And this resuscitation is not limited to secular writings; many theological works are also included. All this eloquently testifies to the fact that the Christian conquerors are tolerant in questions of religion, and this must have a beneficial influence upon the Asiatic mind. Tolerance and philanthropic institutions cannot fail to make a good impression upon the innate conservative spirit of Orientalism. All the changes which in the course of the last few decades have taken place in India, in political as well as in social concerns, must surprise anyone who has any previous knowledge of the conditions of Asiatic society. In India, where

* A brilliant example of this trust is given in the 'Report of the Archæological Survey of Western India,' by E. Thomas, and in the valuable studies of James Fergusson about Indian architecture.

† Some of these publications are: Soyuti's 'Exegetic Studies of the Koran'; Tusi's 'History of Shiite Scholars'; Ibn Hadjar's 'Biography of the Companions of Mohammed'; Wakidi's 'History of the Conquest of Syria by Mohammed'; Tabakati Nasiri's 'History of the Medieval Dynasties of Persia and Central Asia'; Tarikhi Firuz Shahi's 'History of the Sovereign of Bengal of this Name, 1351-1388'; Tarikhi Baihaki's 'History of Sultan Mesud, the Son of Mahmud Ghaznevi,' and many others.

formerly the most cruel despotism reigned, where no one ever dared to raise his voice against the Sovereign, where every kind of insult, cruelty, and oppression, was meekly endured—in this same India, under the title of Indian National Congress, a kind of Parliament is formed in which Hindus and Mohammedans discuss the interests of India and its administration, in a manner which for boldness of expression does not come far behind the language of Parliamentary opposition at Westminster, and freely criticises the laws, ordinances, and regulations of the Anglo-Indian Government. This Parliament, first opened in 1885, is supported by prominent Hindus, such as W. C. Bonnerjee, K. T. Telang, Bedreddin Tayabchi, Firuzshah, Mehta, Dadabhai Naoroji, the venerable Pandit Adjudhia Nath, and many others, who have freely expressed their opinions there, and, as is said in the newspaper reports, ‘in pure classical English,’ with arguments and proofs which would do honour to the best Parliamentary speaker at home.* To give the reader some idea of the tendency and the aspirations of the Congress, we give here by way of example the principal items for discussion during one of the sessions. The members of the Congress in Allahabad desired—

1. The enlargement of the Provincial and Imperial Council: half of the members to be elected from the upper classes, the educated, the merchants and landowners; the other half to be appointed by the State.
2. The introduction of competitive examinations for State officials in India and in England; the maximum age of candidates to be twenty-three.
3. The separation of legal and administrative offices.
4. The appointment of a commission to inquire into police matters.
5. Permission for natives to join the volun-

* Compare ‘The Indian National Congress.’ Session at Allahabad, December, 1888. Impression of Two English Visitors. London, 1889.

teer corps. 6. Revision of the liquor laws—*i.e.*, limitation. 7. Exemption from the income-tax for the poorer classes. 8. An increased expenditure for educational purposes, more especially for the technical schools. 9. Appointment of a Royal or Parliamentary Commission to inquire into the government of India, both England and India giving evidence.

What would the Russian or the French Government say if Sarts or Kabyls were to put forward demands such as these? Nay, more, what would be said on the shores of the Spree if the Liberals were to bring such requests before their Government? The Anglo-Indian Administration has so far put no difficulty in the way of the annual meetings of the Congress; on the contrary, it has rather encouraged them, although amongst the members of the Congress there are some who owe title and rank to the English Government, and ought therefore not to appear in company with the 'malcontents.' Truly, this liberal movement, this Parliamentary procedure* and respect for the existing laws of the land, from a society which hitherto has languished in the bonds of the most cruel slavery, and to which until lately the words 'liberty' and 'self-government' were unknown, must be a marvel in the eyes of all unprejudiced beholders. When I recollect the state of servility, weakness, and patient endurance of so many Asiatic countries, I cannot adequately express my surprise when I see how the

* What deserves special attention is the neutrality and moderation observed both in the written and verbal descriptions and polemic of the different parties, which are so often neglected by the politicians of the cultured West. I have before me many writings referring to the Congress, from which I would specially select the two following: (1) 'Open Letters to Sir Seid Ahmed Khan, K.C.S.I.,' by the son of an old follower of his, Lajpat Rai of Hissar. Reprinted from the *Tribune*. (2) 'Sir M. E. Grant-Duff's Views about India, by Dadabhai Naoroji.' Reprinted from the *Contemporary Review*, August and November, 1887.

spirit of liberty has taken hold of the Asiatic mind, and what changes the cultural influence of England has wrought in India. One must read the intelligent, cultivated speeches of these Moulvis, Rajahs, Seids, Pandits, and Sheikhs—one must realise the intimate knowledge these genuine Asiatics have of the details of the history of the various European States, how they freely quote the pithy sayings of classical antiquity and of modern days, and how they embellish their language on the principle of our modern philosophers and thinkers, to understand and to justify my surprise.

The Congress movement may displease certain Englishmen or be inconvenient to them,* but the fact that culture and liberal ideas in so short a time have been able to take such hold of the Asiatic mind deserves to be acknowledged as the greatest triumph of British influence.

* In certain circles the separatist, revolutionary tendencies of the Congress are attributed to a desire for a kind of 'Home Rule,' of which, however, there is not sufficient evidence, and I believe that Lord Dufferin is right when he says: 'Indeed, so obviously impossible would be the application of such a system [Home Rule] in the circumstances of the case, that I do not believe it has been seriously advocated by any native statesman of the slightest weight or importance.' Preface of Dadabhai Naoroji to the pamphlet 'Audi Alteram Partem; being two letters on certain aspects of the Indian National Congress.' Simla and London, 1888.

CHAPTER VIII

NATIVE CRITICS OF BRITISH RULE

ANYONE reading the conclusion of the preceding chapter, with its enthusiasm at the effects of English culture in India, might possibly think that in my simplicity I accept everything I hear in good faith, and that in the educated Hindu of to-day I see nothing more or less than a regular European gentleman ; that I picture to myself the wide region between the Soliman Range and Cape Comorin, and from Beluchistan as far as Siam, as a district totally and absolutely transformed in manners and customs and ways of thinking. Against such a reproach I am bound to protect myself. After many years of intimate acquaintance with the reform movement in the Moslem world of West Asia ; after watching the painfully slow and laborious progress of Western innovations and improvements, it would hardly be possible for me to conclude from the actions and expressions of a Bengali Babu, or of accomplished English-speaking Moulvis, that the radical transformation of the entire confused conglomerate of Hindustani peoples was thereby practically achieved. No, indeed, the realisation of this possibility is far ahead yet. I am fully aware that all that has so far been done in India is limited to the heads of society, that the light of culture as yet only illumines those who have been educated at the colleges and Universities, but that the great mass of the people

are still wrapt in the thick veil of 'Asiaticism.' It could not possibly be otherwise, considering the short time that the light has shone, the immense difference between the old and the new world notions, and the strong conservative character of the Oriental in general. What has been accomplished is, as a matter of fact, no more than preparatory work, a clearing of the ground, and a modest attempt here and there as preliminary to the great work of civilisation. In some parts where the ground was ready the seed has been sown, but whether it will grow and yield fruit depends entirely upon the adaptability of the human material to civilisation, and upon the skill and patience of the civiliser. As regards the former, the results thus far obtained are a certain guarantee that the Hindu, whether he be Vishnu worshipper or Mohammedan, does not resist, and is not incapable of a cultural transformation; and as regards the second, the renowned perseverance and patience of the British insure future success. Many are the symptoms which justify us in drawing these conclusions. What Europe has not been able to accomplish in Western Asia after centuries of exhortation and coercion, the English have accomplished in a few decades in a land where greater difficulties were in the way, and where more stones and weeds in the form of old prejudices and suspicions against the foreign conqueror hindered the task of preparing the soil.

It is of the highest importance to realise that the present-day Hindus—I mean the leaders of society—are not only convinced of the advantages of Western culture, but also of the good intentions and the absolute fairness of their British masters and teachers; and in spite of the unpleasant consequences which necessarily follow the transition stage, there is comparative quiet in the land, and the experiments of civilisation do not rouse anywhere in India such violent resistance

as in other lands of Islam. Numerous proofs of this fact may be found in the expressions of natives in reference to the actions of England in India. A few of these, emanating from liberal-minded men belonging to the opposition, we will quote in illustration. The former member of Parliament Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, in his reply to the remarks of Sir M. E. Grant-Duff, says: 'If there is one thing more than another for which the Indian people are peculiarly and deeply grateful to the British nation, and which is one of the chief reasons of their attachment and loyalty to the British rule, it is the blessing of education which Britain has bestowed on India. Britain has every reason to be proud of, and to be satisfied with, the results, for it is the educated classes who realise and appreciate most the beneficence and good intention of the British nation; and, by the increasing influence which they are undoubtedly exercising over the people, they are the powerful chain by which India is becoming more and more firmly linked with Britain. This education has produced its natural effects in promoting civilisation and independence of character—a result of which a true Briton should not be ashamed, and should regard as his peculiar glory.'* Another Hindu, Lajpat Rai, also a member of the opposition and ardent defender of the Indo-national aspirations, says amongst other things: 'The natives of India are no longer, with very few exceptions, ignorant or uneducated. The rays of education are penetrating and shedding their wholesome light inside most Indian homes; hundreds of thousands of Indians are as well educated as any average English gentleman, and we see scores of our countrymen every year crossing the "black waters" to witness with their own eyes the proceedings of the great British Parliament, and

* Sir M. E. Grant-Duff's 'Views about India,' pp. 3, 4.

personally familiarise themselves with the political institutions of the British nation.* The Hindu judge Lala Baijnath, who in his proud patriotism prominently brings forward the services which old Indian culture has rendered to Europe, and for which Europe owes India a debt of gratitude, says: 'It is, however, on the side of India that the advantage has been greater, and she cannot feel too grateful to Providence for Great Britain being her ruler. Without peace and education—two of the greatest blessings which Britain has conferred upon her—she could not have hoped to keep pace with other nations in the race for progress; and her gratitude to her present rulers for awakening in it high and noble aspirations regarding its evolution cannot be too deep.†

Many other testimonies of a similar nature might easily be given, but we confine ourselves to a few. John Stuart Mill, who is not particularly enthusiastic about the English methods of administration in India, says: 'The British government in India is not only one of the purest in intention, but one of the most beneficent in act, ever known among mankind.‡ Among the non-English authorities whose opinion is of weight we would mention in the first place Prince Bismarck, who in his usual peculiarly striking manner expressed his views about the doings of England in India. He says that *if England were to lose all its intellectual heroes of the past, what it has done for India would be enough to render its name immortal.* The Austrian diplomatist Baron Hübner, in his 'Travels in India,' says that the native Indians have such unbounded faith in the justice of the English that they give preference to the English judge above their own native judge. No less flattering is the

* 'Open Letters,' etc., p. 5.

† 'England and India,' *op. cit.*, p. 229.

‡ Sir John Strachey's 'India,' p. 502.

opinion of the French author Paul Boell, when he says: 'Je crois que, tout bien considéré, l'Angleterre traite ses sujets d'autres races plus humainement, avec plus de justice et de modération, que nous ne le faisons nous mêmes. L'Algérie et l'Indo-Chine, pour ne citer que nos colonies les plus avancées, seraient assurément fondées à envier le régime politique de l'Inde.'* This is confirmed by Sir John Strachey when he relates how the inhabitants of certain villages, who were to be transferred from the control of the English to that of one of the best-ruled Indian Feudal States, were quite inconsolable about the change.†

Of course, side by side with this glorification of the British régime in India, there are among the natives many also who raise their voices in dissatisfaction and condemnation; and this should not surprise us when we recollect that the Government by its liberal gift of public education has raised an intellectual power which at any moment may rise in opposition against its benefactor. We have already noted that the number of Hindus, graduated at the various colleges and Universities, increases year by year, and that it is impossible to find official appointments for the mall. The number of *malviventi aed malcontenti*, therefore, has proportionately increased also. For some time these politicians from amongst the Hindu scholars have made speeches at the congresses and conferences, and of late years some Mohammedans have joined their ranks. The manner in which these hungry Exaltados express themselves about administrative measures, and the way in which they criticise the police, the taxation, the schools, etc., and introduce in their speeches, always founded upon strictly constitutional principles, the latent longing for self-

* Paul Boell, 'L'Inde et le Problème Indien,' p. 303.

† The same, p. 504.

government, is highly characteristic.* In all these utterances the strictest loyalty is outwardly observed. Prominent English politicians are presented with addresses of devotion and gratitude, and personal attacks are scrupulously avoided. It is chiefly political questions which are thus discussed, for even the bitterest opponent of English rule would find it hard to censure or to ignore the blessings of the humane institutions established under English sovereignty; and even in questions where they touch somewhat roughly upon sore points, they find it difficult to pronounce an unqualified adverse judgment, and to designate the English influence as *fons et origo mali*.†

We will specify one of these complaints. It is a well-known fact that the Indian people are very abstemious as regards spirituous drinks, and indulgence in strong drink is chiefly confined to the lowest class of people, but even amongst them the condition is such that in England it would be considered a millennium of sobriety.‡ The desire for drink, in the strict sense of the word, is practically unknown in India, for while in England there is one public-house to every 242 people, in India there is one

* Similar speeches are made not only in the congresses, but also in the provincial conferences. I have before me a writing entitled 'The Report of the Proceedings of the Bengal Provincial Conference held in Calcutta on the 25th, 26th and 27th October, 1888,' which gives a graphic picture of the nature of these assemblies:

† It is very strange, and much to be regretted, that there are Englishmen who incite the natives of India to opposition, and who even sometimes take the lead in the movement. The laurels won by Mr. Digby and his confrères are not enviable. Instead of serving liberal or humane ends, these proceedings check the progress of reform, the more so as the natives imagine that the English are their fellow-sufferers, and that their extravagant demands are just and reasonable.

‡ Sir John Strachey's 'India,' p. 168.

public-house to every 2,400 people.* This proportion is not unknown to the investigators of our cultural influence in Asia and Africa. We know that with the advent of the Europeans, alcohol and gambling have spread rapidly, and it appears, from a report addressed to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, that the sale of spirituous liquor, with a population of 167,405 souls, has risen in one year from 5,131 to 25,904 bottles.† This, however, does not prove that among the consumers there may not be more Europeans than Asiatics. When, moreover, the English are accused of mercenary motives, and of winking at the increase of drunkenness for financial reasons; when it is argued that the Excise has risen since 1870 from £1,250,000 to £3,937,000, it is generally forgotten that this increase in the duty is caused by the improved management of affairs, and by the suppression of the distilling and selling of spirituous liquor without a license, while the existing distilleries have been taxed at an abnormally high rate. The increase of the Excise duty is therefore no criterion of the increase in the consumption among the natives. Nor is it just, on the ground of the above figures, to draw comparisons between India as it is now and India as it was under the government of its native Princes. To begin with, we have no reliable data to go by with reference to these matters in early times, and, besides, in India, as everywhere in the East, although the number of consumers may be smaller, the quantity consumed is much greater than under corresponding circumstances in Western lands. In the modern society of the Moslemic East, I have found that all consumers of spirituous

* Among the Turks, Arabs, Persians, and especially among the Central Asiatics, the proportion is even better, only that with the latter the use of opium and other opiates, such as cocaine, hashish, bang, etc., has become popular.

† 'Report of the Proceedings,' etc., p. 73.

drink are drunkards—*i.e.*, that they go on drinking until they are quite intoxicated—also that *delirium tremens potatorum* was far more common amongst the Moslem Princes and grandees than with us in Europe.* The masses have always distinguished themselves by great temperance, and the same may also be said of Turkey, Persia, and Central Asia. If the Anglo-Indian government had done no more than attempt to stop the spread of drunkenness among the lower classes of society—an attempt which has never been made by the Russians in Turkestan—we should look upon this as a creditable and disinterested work, and one for which the government should be praised rather than blamed. There is also a good deal of mischief done for which the English administration is not directly responsible, but which is the unavoidable result of the transition stage of one culture into another. And this applies chiefly to the confused ideas of house-keeping of the modernised Hindus. They want to imitate European luxury, and in so doing go too far and involve themselves in debt. Many neophytes also are found fault with because they praise everything that comes from Europe, and despise the advantages their own culture offers.†

As regards other vexed questions, these concern chiefly such points as the taxation, the share taken by the natives in the administration of the land, certain police regulations, and the laws and restrictions relating to private life. Liberal concessions necessarily create a growing desire for more freedom. No wonder, therefore, that the present-day Hindu considers the number of natives appointed to official posts in India

* The Koran prohibition regarding the Muskirat—*i.e.*, spirituous drinks—is circumvented by bringing these under the rubric of *Iladj* (medicine); otherwise it would be incredible that pious Sovereigns, without giving offence, could freely indulge in the habit of drinking.

† Compare 'England and India,' by Lalla Baijnath, pp. 232, 233.

too small, that he requires a wider sphere of action and more license, forgetting that no conqueror has ever made greater concessions to a subjugated nation than England has done in India, and that for the highest offices of State it is not only a question of confidence, but also of ability. In relation to this, we must not forget the existing animosity between the different nationalities and religions, and that peace and order can only be maintained where the highest offices are filled by Englishman, whose neutrality puts a stop to all mutual rivalry. In order to increase their influence in the councils of the Viceroy and of the provincial Governors, the Hindus desire a larger number of members to be elected, and at various congresses the wish has also been expressed to abolish the military restrictions, and to facilitate the entrance into the army. In short, the spokesmen of the Hindus behave very much like the Opposition party in the English Parliament, but with less chance of success; for India has not by a long way reached that stage of culture when a representative body can adequately plead the cause of various nationalities, all requiring different treatment, and the foreign ruler is not yet in a position to neglect certain precautions which have been found imperatively necessary for the success of the inaugurated reforms and for the preservation of the peace and prosperity of the country. Culture in general is making progress in India, but when among nearly 300,000,000 people only about 2,000,000 have made themselves acquainted with the medium to acquire this culture (the English language),* and so

* In accordance with Sir John Strachey's data ('India,' etc., p. 256), there are 386,000 Hindustanis capable of speaking English. Lord Dufferin, on the other side, in his speech delivered in Calcutta before leaving India, remarked that the number of English-speaking Hindustanis amounts to 2,000,000. The best and most reliable information regarding this matter is furnished by the official report of

long as the percentage of those who attend the schools as compared with the mass of the populace remains so insignificantly small as it is now, no very great success can be expected to attend the efforts of the native congresses and conferences.

When, in my ardent desire to investigate the mutual relationship between English and Hindu, I inquired among the latter what their views were on this subject, two points particularly offensive and wounding to the native pride were generally advanced, and the settling of these seemed eminently desirable to them. In the first place they complained of the strictly official tone, the ice-cold treatment, and the exclusive position, of the English officials. This galls them. Whether he be Hindu or Mohammedan, the better-class native has always been accustomed to the patriarchal methods of Oriental officials, and as a Babu, Pandit, and Moulvi (of a Zemindar or Talukdar I will not even speak), consider themselves far superior to the European officials, it naturally vexes them to be treated by the latter *de haut en bas*. If the Hindu is somewhat boastful of his racial and caste privileges, the Englishman is a great deal worse when, in opposition to these pardonable Oriental weaknesses, he parades his British national pride and higher Western culture. The polished Englishman may experience some difficulty in associating on familiar terms with the Asiatic, who in colour, dress, customs, and general views of life, belongs to quite another world of culture. But the ruler must stoop to his subject if he would raise him to his own standpoint and teach him better things.*

1903 (p. 312), in which the total number of the English-learning students during the last decennium is said to have risen from 388,650 to 440,686; and considering this increase, we may well assume that the number of English-speaking Hindustanis is more than 2,000,000.

* Concerning this question a most remarkable paper has been published by Mr. C. W. Whish in the July number of 1903 of the *Imperial*

Much has yet to be altered both in England and in India in order to effect that mutual approach, and in this respect Queen Victoria set an example which cannot be sufficiently taken to heart. In her palace at Osborne there was a reception-room fitted out entirely in Indian style; she had an Indian Munshi (secretary) always in attendance, from whom the noble lady in her advanced age learned Hindustani, and the Rajahs and Indian nobles who attended her public receptions were the objects of quite exceptional distinction. So long as the chasm which until now separates the Sahib and Memsahib* from the native is not bridged over, so long there can be no question of a fundamental reform. If there be anything which might serve the English as an excuse for the lack of intimacy in their intercourse with the natives, it is the rigorous law of the caste system in India, which absolutely prevents unrestrained intercourse and familiarity. The member of one caste associates only with his fellow-members; all the rest of the world are strangers to him—and first among them, of course, are the foreigners from the West, from whom he is separated by language, customs, and religion, and with regard to whom he entertains, in addition, a certain amount of suspicious reserve, a common feature in the intercourse of rulers and subjects. This reserve I have noticed everywhere in Asia, for the power and the interference of the

and Asiatic Quarterly Review, entitled 'The Indian Problem of Social Intercourse.' The author, many years ago active as Civil Officer, is of the opinion that all preconceived notions about the foibles of the natives ought to be given up. It would be desirable to arrange festivities where Englishmen and natives could meet in friendly intercourse, and that in England, too, meetings should be arranged for those natives who visit the country, in order to facilitate the intercourse between the two elements.

* 'Sahib' is an Arabic word, and means 'master,' and 'Memsahib' is an abbreviation of 'Madam Sahib.'

West fosters a feeling of fear rather than of affection and confidence.

The second thorn in the eyes of the Hindu are the Christian missions, in which they fear the danger of falling away from the old faith, and of denationalisation. In India the Government is accused of secretly favouring the missionaries—Hindus have often told me so ; but this is not the case, for official England makes no difference between the various sects and religions, and if the missionary stations receive Government support, they do so merely as establishments of public instruction, by which the general public is benefited. As regards the usefulness of the missionaries, opinions differ even in England. Some hold that their activity may be instrumental to convert Mohammedans and Hindus to the Christian faith, although the results so far obtained are not very encouraging. In the year 1830 there were nine Protestant missionary societies in Ceylon, India, and Burma, with the result of 27,000 converts, and in 1870 there were no less than thirty-five societies at work, and the number of converts was 318,363, a figure which is hardly worth mentioning as representing Christian supremacy over a gigantic region of nearly 292,000,000 heathen.* Others, again, are of opinion that the conversion of Mohammedans and Hindus is a hopeless task, not justifying the tremendous costs connected with the work. It has been calculated what is the price in pounds sterling of every hair on the head of every Hindu convert, and it is further stated that the formality of baptism is looked upon by the natives as a lucrative business. According to Sir John Strachey, † the Christian natives of India are only Christians in name, and are not respected either by the Europeans or by their own compatriots. European culture has exercised a considerable influence

* 'The Indian Empire,' by Sir W. W. Hunter, p. 317.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 312.

over the Hindu without making him a Christian. With the Mohammedans the task is still more difficult. It is chiefly the people of the lowest castes—the so-called pariahs—who come to be baptised. But as everywhere, so here also the truth lies midway. Missionaries are valuable as representatives of our culture in the East, so long as they serve humanity, maintain schools and hospitals, and give unquestionable evidence of the philanthropic intentions, the tolerance, and the impartiality, of the Christian West over those of another faith. In this respect the missionaries are creditable apostles of humanity, and fully deserve our admiration and recognition. But it is different as regards their attempts to convert Mohammedans and Hindus to Christianity. The Christian religion may in the beginning have borne many traces of Asiaticism; but in its further development it has decidedly adapted itself to Western views, and as an amalgamation of Aryan and Semitic ideas, as Seeley expresses it,* it has become a European religion *par excellence*. As such it is a development foreign to the Asiatic mind; a faith which does not coincide with his tastes and conceptions of life, and an anonymous author in the *Contemporary Review* is about right when he concludes his instructive article, entitled 'Islam and Christianity in India,' with the remark: 'Mohammedan proselytism succeeds in India because it leaves its converts Asiatics still; Christian proselytism fails in India because it strives to make of its converts English middle-class men. That is the truth in a nutshell, whether we choose to accept it or not.'

* 'The Expansion of England,' p. 278.

CHAPTER IX

THE EFFECT OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM

FEEBLE and dull are the sparks with which, in the foregoing pages, I have endeavoured to illumine the cultural activity of the English in India; but I believe that, unpretentious as my efforts are, they will suffice, not only to give a general idea of the work done by England in India, but also give us an insight into the future development of things. The question arises, 'Will the English be able to carry on the work successfully, and what shape and form will the inaugurated reforms and innovations take in the future?' It is generally admitted that, in any process of evolution, the first start stamps its further development, and that this influence may be traced throughout the whole process unto the final result. This view is fully justified as regards the cultural transformation of a society, provided that, in our inquiries about the various phases of the work, we are properly instructed as to the mental capacity, general fitness, and natural proclivities, of the social body which has to be reformed. In India, as I have shown, we are brought face to face with two problems in sharp contrast to one another, on account of their religious, historical, climatic, and ethnical peculiarities—problems in which no common standard of procedure can be adopted, in which an amalgamation or identification of the heterogeneous factors can never be anticipated. Just as the confused mass of people in India cannot be compressed

within the framework of one common nationality, so it is impossible to bring their ethical disposition and their cultural existence under one and the same law. On the ground of their religion we may divide the people of India into two classes—Hindus and Mohammedans—but even then we have to reckon with the divergences proceeding from the differences of climate and soil, and we have to take all these various shades into account. That the English in the cultural methods hitherto adopted have not paid enough attention to these shades of difference, and, indeed, were unable to do so, is excusable; although from the very first it was clear enough that the same treatment, applied to various conditions, led to quite dissimilar results. The Hindu, whose faith is as it were an accidental conglomeration of sects, genealogies, hereditary professions, and castes, as Sir Alfred Lyall* expresses it, does not impede the influence of foreign culture in the same way as Islam does. There is no doubt about it that the Hindus have shown themselves much more accessible to the English innovations than their Mussulman compatriots. In spite of the darkest superstition, in spite of the omnipotence of the Brahmins and the most obdurate conservatism, the Hindus have at an early date drawn near to the English, attended English schools, and accepted English posts; while the Mohammedan remained insolent and sulky, and in secret shook his fist at the oppressor, and would have nothing of the infidels of the Far West.

We have pointed out† how great is the percentage of Hindu scholars in the colleges of India as compared with the Mohammedans; consequently the number of Hindu officials in English service is and always has been proportionately larger than that of the Moham-

* 'Asiatic Studies,' p. 2. Quoted from Sir John Strachey, p. 286.

† See p. 187.

medans.* It cannot be maintained that the Hindu is more intelligent, more gifted, than the followers of the doctrine of Mohammed; but the Hindu is less hampered by his religion. The Mohammedan often spends his whole youth in religious study, and while the young Hindu occupies himself with learning English and modern European sciences, his Moslem companion sits at the feet of the Moulvis in the Medresses, and devotes all his intellectual powers to the Arabic tongue, Koran exegesis, and theological subtleties. Hinduism, which has no settled dogmas and ordinances, has a less disturbing influence in public life than Islam; for the severe separatist usages, which in food and in social intercourse with those of another faith should act as a check upon the every-day life of the Hindu, are not very strictly observed by the better-class people, from which the neophytes of modern culture are mostly recruited. The barrier between Hindus and English was therefore sooner broken down, and assimilation has become easier; for experience teaches that the Hindus have not been held back by the fear of losing caste or of violating old customs, but have been in lively intercourse with Western lands for many years. They have crossed the 'black waters' and visited Europe, and even allowed the religious influences of the West to touch them, as exemplified in the religious reform of Brahmo-Somaj† and Prar-

* Sir John Strachey says, with regard to this, on p. 261 of his often-quoted book: 'As a rule, the share of the Hindus in public employments much exceeds that of the Mohammedans.' From an account of the school attendance of Mohammedans, it appears that during the forty-five years since the foundation of the Universities, among the 32,613 graduates, there were about 1,700 Mohammedans, a little more than 5 per cent.; at the University of Madras they only constituted about 1 per cent. (*The Times of India*, March 26, 1904).

† The chief idea of this sect is that Brahmanism, as well as Christianity, has in course of time lost its primitive purity, and that an amalgamation of the most useful doctrines of these two religions might be profitable to mankind.

thama Somaj. True, we cannot yet speak of a solid, deeply-penetrating civilising transformation of the Hindu, the contempt which rests on the Bengali Babu will not disappear so quickly ; but on the path of progress the palm of superiority decidedly is his.

With the Mohammedan of India, so many and such weighty matters have to be taken into consideration in passing from one culture into another, that with the best will in the world—and this will is generally wanting—he always has to fight against heavy odds, his religion, his antiquated views of life, and his historical past. For centuries the Mohammedan has occupied a commanding position in the land. On account of his religion—a *religio militans* in the strictest sense of the word—he imagines himself possessed of a certain amount of authority over the infidels ; and to fight, and if possible to subjugate, the unbelievers became, according to the statutes of the Koran, a duty, and a pleasant duty. After carrying the victorious banners of Islam deep into the interior of the land, and establishing its power over the followers of Vishnu, it must necessarily have been hard, not only to see himself robbed of his authority, but also to see how the laws and ordinances to which he owed his former power and prerogative were being shaken and overruled. Herein lies the chief cause of his long, persistent holding aloof from the English conqueror, and his stubborn opposition to every innovation and change in his intellectual life and daily habits.

‘Kullī muminin ihwa’ (All true believers are brothers), says the Koran ; and there is no practical difference in the way of regarding these innovations and reforms between the Newab, Mir and Moulvi of India, and the Mirza and Efendi, or the Molla and Akhond, of the Western Islamic world. If amongst the latter—*i.e.*, amongst the Moslems of the West—the same set purpose and energetic measures had prevailed as in

India, many things would now be quite different in Persia and Turkey; but as England could not and dared not slacken in its cultural efforts in India, the Moslem element under English dominion had to bend under the yoke, and was obliged to submit to such reforms as now distinguish it favourably from the rest of its fellow-believers in the West. The Mohammedans of India—I mean the heads of society—are now more cultured, more enlightened, more patriotically inclined, and at the same time stancher adherents of Islam, than their Turkish, Persian, and Arab co-religionists and equals in rank. This they owe exclusively to the influence of the English. The question now is, How long and in what direction will this progressive movement continue?—in other words, Will the advantages derived from modern views of life and the acquirement of modern sciences make the Mohammedans of India so strong that under the shield of their historical prestige they will attain once again a political superiority, and thus become dangerous to the English? This question is worth considering, although it has so far attracted but little attention. For the present, of course, the transformation of the Mohammedans of India is carried on by compulsion; for the poverty of the once powerful and now powerless class has forced them to submit. Possibly—nay, probably—the desire for reform will increase with them, and their progress in the near future may be more noticeable than it is at present. Yet I doubt whether this will come about entirely of their own free will; it will take long to convince the Mohammedans of the superiority of our Western culture. The spirit of Islam, as described by the learned Seid Emir Ali in his 'The Spirit of Islam,' does not oppose general reforms, scientific investigations, or the introduction of certain innovations; but even if it makes the most liberal concessions, Islam is, and always will be, an

Asiatic product, which never can become altogether European. The Mohammedans of India, judging from the specimens we now see, will always contrast favourably with half-Europeanised Turks, Arabs, and Persians; for English education does not confine itself to outward polish, but enters deeply into the soul. The Mohammedans of India will penetrate more deeply into the details of our world of culture than their fellow-believers of the West, who speak French, and in adopting the European mode of dress think themselves the *ne plus ultra* of modern culture. As belonging to an aristocratic class, they may in time excel their Hindu countrymen in earnestness of study, without—as the Japanese, for instance, have done—altogether conforming to the Western model and relinquishing all the proud reminiscences of the glory of Islam. We see this in the constant secret agitation against the intentions of such reformers as Sir Seid Ahmed Khan, Newab Abdul Latif Khan, and others, and also in the tendency of the thus far harmless Pan-Islamic Society. Not long ago the question whether Moslem India should be looked upon as a Dar-ul-Islam (Home of Peace) or as a Dar-ul-Harb (Home of War), and whether it was not a duty to keep at enmity with England, was a subject of lively discussion, and is even now not quite settled.*

* This question has led to many lively controversies both in and out of India, and, as is usual with matters of such elasticity, everyone decided in accordance with his personal sympathies or antipathies. Of special interest to us is a discussion of this subject in the meeting of the Mohammedan Literary Society of November 23, 1870. Moulvi Karamat Ali, a learned preacher of the Hanefite sect, gave an address in which he stated, on the basis of the 'Fatawa Alemghiri,'¹ that, according to the founder of the Hanefite sect, a Dar-ul-Islam only becomes a Dar-ul-Harb (1) when the laws of Islam become void under

¹ The Mohammedan code of law ('Fatawa Alemghiri') consists of six quarto volumes, and was compiled during the reign of Aurangzib by the learned Sheikh Nizam.

Moreover, the constant coquetting with the Khalif at Constantinople as the spiritual head of the entire Islamic world should not be overlooked ; and if it were not for the fact, of which the cultured Hindus are fully aware, that the Osmanli State structure creaks in all its joints ; that it is hopelessly mismanaged, and that Turkey, therefore, is not much to be depended on, the brotherly relationship and the pan-Islamic community of interest would long since loudly and emphatically have been declared.

In short, the cultural transformation of the Moslem element of India is one of the hardest problems which England has ever undertaken to solve. Yet England is bound to go on with the work once started and already in full swing. It is to be expected, from the steady perseverance of the Anglo-Saxon race, that it will gradually soften and mould the rough material and make it yield to its will. The greater the number of Moslems who by modern school education rise to eminence in the State, the greater and the more intense will become the desire, if only from a utilitarian point of view, for modern learning and academical distinctions.

Sir John Strachey* said of a genuine Asiatic and pious Moslem like Sir Seid Ahmed Khan, that 'he was in every respect a thoroughly enlightened man, fully alive to the value of European knowledge and to the fact that unless the Mohammedans could accept the

foreign dominion ; (2) when the Dar-ul-Harb is not near to any Moslem town ; (3) when neither Moslems nor Zimmi (non-Moslems) enjoy religious liberty. As, in the Moslem parts of India which have come under British dominion, none of these three conditions apply, India may not be looked upon by the Moslems as a hostile country, and the Djihad (religious war) should not be permitted. Compare lecture by Moulvi Karamat Ali of Jounpore, on 'A Question of Mohammedan Law involving the Duty of Mohammedans in British India towards the Ruling Power.' Calcutta, 1871.

* Sir John Strachey, 'India,' etc., p. 263.

results of Western civilisation there was no hope for them in the future. He felt that after a century of British rule there was still little sympathy between the Mohammedans and ourselves, and that nothing but the better education of his countrymen could bring the two into more friendly relations.' In view of this expression of opinion, it is surely justifiable to believe that this conviction will in time penetrate to the other classes of society also, and in the end produce the desired effect. Of course this cannot be accomplished all at once, but will require time and peace. Time and peace are the vital conditions by which England's sovereignty in India stands. These two important factors, unless appearances are very deceptive, seem more secure now than even ten years ago, when many external and internal dangers, like dark clouds, blackened the sky of England's superiority in India. Which of these two dangers is the greater has often been made matter for discussion; but when one looks at the position, with due regard to the causal nexus between the internal and external enemies, the internal condition of a conquered land will be of far greater weight than any danger which may threaten from outside. In order to offer active resistance to the external enemy, internal peace must be secured, and this peace appears to us not to be at present endangered in India. The cultural success thus far attained has opened the eyes of all possible native adversaries, and convinced them that the presence of the English in India is absolutely necessary to the well-being and the prosperity of the national elements of the land. We do not speak in this strain under the influence of English opinions on this subject, but rather under that of the views entertained by non-English people and by natives who stand at the head of affairs and are able to judge of the internal conditions of their land. In

his anxiety for the welfare of his co-religionists, the patriotic and enlightened Sir Seid Ahmed addresses his fellow-countrymen in the following words: 'Suppose all the English were to leave India, who would be the ruler of India? Is it possible that under those circumstances Mohammedans and Hindus should sit on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust it down. You must remember that although the number of Mohammedans is less than that of the Hindus, and although they contain far fewer people who have received a high English education, yet they must not be thought insignificant or weak. Probably they would be by themselves enough to maintain their own position. But suppose they were not? Then our Mussulman brothers—the Pathans—would come out as a swarm of locusts from their mountain valleys. Like a swarm of locusts would they come, and make rivers of blood to flow from their frontier on the north to the extreme end of Bengal. This thing—who after the departure of the English would be the conquerors—would rest on the will of God. But until one nation has conquered the other, and made it obedient, peace could not reign in the land. This conclusion is based on proof so absolute that no one can deny it. . . . Be not unjust to the British Government, to whom God has given the rule of India. And look honestly, and see what is necessary for it to do to maintain its Empire and its hold on the country. . . . Be not unjust to that nation which is ruling over you. And think also on this—how upright is her rule. Of such benevolence as the English Government shows to the foreign nations under her there is no example in the history of the world.* The French author Paul Boell expresses himself in a similar manner when

* Sir John Strachey, 'India,' etc., pp. 500, 501.

he says: 'La question qui se pose n'est pas de savoir si l'Angleterre a le droit de conserver l'Inde, mais bien plutôt si elle a le droit de le quitter. Abandonner l'Inde serait la livrer, en effet, à la plus effroyable anarchie. Où donc est le pouvoir indigène qui réunirait sous un sceptre unique hindous et musulmans, rajputs et marathes, sikhs et bengalis, parsis et chrétiens? L'Angleterre a réalisé ce miracle.* This declaration almost sounds as if the Frenchman had made a previous accord with Mohammedan scholars. We would add to this a remark of the same tendency of Sir Salar Jung, who, in the essay previously referred to, says †: 'The enlightened classes in India recognise that the rule of England has secured us against incessant strife, involving a perpetual exhaustion of the resources of our communities, and also that by a just administration of equal laws a very sufficient measure of individual liberty is now our birthright. We have lost, as some think, our national liberties, which, after all, were merely the liberties enjoyed by despots to compel their subjects to make war on one another: this so-called "liberty" is denied to us; but more than 240,000,000 ‡ of us have now the right to live our own lives or what lives we please, and to be subject only to the control of a known, a written law,' etc.

We should be indulging in false illusions were we to surmise that this Mohammedan valuation of the English rule in India is shared by the general public, and that no revolutionary sparks smoulder under the ashes. The fanatical, faithful Mohammedan of Hin-

* 'L'Inde et le Problème Indien.' Paris, 1901, p. 289.

† See p. 197.

‡ In the year 1888, when Sir Salar Jung wrote the essay here referred to, Burma, the Frontier Provinces, and Beluchistan had not yet been incorporated in the Indian Empire—hence the present difference in the total number of inhabitants.

dustan, who in point of zeal does not even come behind his Central Asiatic brethren, does not so easily content himself with the rule of the unbelievers. We have just read that, in a sitting of the Anjuman Ilmi (Scientific Society) on January 3 of this year, the following motion was passed: 1. The learned Mohammedans of India shall endeavour to oppose all innovations contrary to the Shariat (religious law). 2. The character of these innovations shall be communicated to the Mohammedans in a private writing. 3. The number of students attending the Universities for the purpose of learning modern sciences shall never exceed five per year. 4. The students attending the Government schools shall receive private instruction in the principles of religion and the characteristics of Islam. 5. The spread of maxims from the Koran by means of base tracts shall be strictly prohibited. 6. Preachers shall instruct the faithful in the commandments and prohibitions of the Moslemic faith in the Hindustani tongue. 7. Only Moslems acquainted with the Arab and English languages shall be allowed to instruct other Mohammedans. 8. Colleges can only be instituted by the directors of the society. 9. The 200,000 rupees given by the rich merchants of Bombay for charitable purposes shall be used as a contribution to the building of the Hedjazline. 10. In order to improve the conditions of the Moslems of India, the library of the society shall be put in order. 11. To encourage the study of sciences, arts and industries among the Mussulman population of India, the necessary means will be taken.*

These various items contain much that points rather to a separatist tendency than to a closer agreement with the programme as proposed by the Government.

* These points have been discussed in the Indian paper *Al Bayan* (Enlightenment), and I have taken this notice from the Turkish paper *Türk* of March 4, 1904, published at Cairo.

There may be other and stronger manifestations of the same nature of which we are ignorant, for, as has been already remarked, Islam is not easily mollified; but taken as a whole the number of Indian Moslems who are in favour of the reform movement is on the increase, and, as ignorance and lack of culture are amongst the most dangerous enemies of England in India, the progress of enlightenment must swell the ranks of natives who are friendly disposed to England.

When critics hostile to the English, speaking of the signs of loyalty among the Mohammedan population of India, express the opinion that England's power can only last as long as the hostility between Hindus and Mohammedans continues, and that an understanding between these two chief elements of the country would necessarily involve the downfall of British superiority in India, we would draw attention to one fact which is often overlooked. Difference of religion is of far greater importance and exercises a far more searching influence in the East, than difference of nationality does in Europe. With us in Europe the peculiarities proceeding from differences of nationality may in course of time become less distinct, or even entirely disappear, but in Asia the separation caused by religious difference can never be bridged over, for in the East religion is life, history, character, patriotism—in fact, everything. When two circles of society entirely opposed to one another; who for centuries have lived in close vicinity yet in the most absolute separation; with both of whom religion is the basis of all their actions and the vital point upon which everything turns, but who have no aspirations and not one single interest in common—can anyone expect them to become reconciled and to work together towards one common end? Even with us in Europe, where the age of faith has long since been supplanted by

the age of intellect, such an amalgamation would be scarcely possible ; how much less, then, in Asia, and above all in India ! We do not deny that attempts are being made by certain political Exaltados to bring about a reconciliation between these heterogeneous elements. In the furthering of this object the Congresses show great energy, as do also such men as the Indian journalist Dr. Sambhu C. Mukerji, of whose loyalty there can be no doubt. In a letter dated December 10, 1889, he writes to me as follows : ' Perhaps I am an exceptional person who has always loved the Mohammedans as brethren, and has earnestly tried to interpret between Hindus and Mohammedans, and effect a union of heart between two peoples whose social and political interests in India are identical.* Also Sir Seid Ahmed Khan, on the occasion of an address delivered at Gurdaspur on January 27, 1884, said : ' We [*i.e.*, Hindus and Mohammedans] should try to become one heart and one soul, and to act in unison : if united, we can support each other ; if not, the effect of one against the other would tend to the destruction and downfall of both. . . . Hindu and Mohammedan brethren, do you people any other country than Hindustan ? Do you not inhabit the same land ? Are you not burned and buried on the same soil ? Do you not tread the same ground and live upon the same soil ? Remember that the words Hindu and Mohammedan are only meant for religious distinction ; otherwise all persons, whether Hindu or Mohammedan, even the Christians who reside in this country, are all in this particular respect belonging to one and the same nation.† Afterwards the learned Sir Seid Ahmed Khan revoked the views expressed by him on this subject, and manifested

* ' An Indian Journalist,' etc., p. 307.

† ' Open Letters to Sir Seid Ahmed Khan, K.C.S.I.,' by the son of an old follower of his (Lajpat Rai of Hissar). Reprinted from the *Tribune*, p. 25.

a strong opposition to the Congresses. But the Congress continues in its intentions all the same, although there seems little chance of ever carrying them out. When we see the hot conflict which rages year after year between Moslems and Hindus about the vexed question of the cow-killing,* and notice how deeply the followers of Mohammed despise the idol-worshippers and Ehli-Shirk,† we realise that a reconciliation or an understanding between Moslems and Hindus is an absolute impossibility.

England therefore need not entertain any fear of possible danger arising from a union of these two religions, any more than the threatened revolutionary union between Turks and Christians has ever caused the Osman rulers one moment's uneasiness. All the endeavours of the so-called National Congresses, as regards the establishment of an Indian nationality, are chimeras, and have no more chance of being realised than an attempt to create now, at once, one united European nationality. The masses of national conglomeration lying in different layers next or on the top of one another are not, and never were, one compact national body, or capable of uniting in common action and with combined efforts to attain any object, set before them. Again, in India of all places, the promotion of one universal interest is out of the question; the land has always been a prey to greedy adventurers, has never been energetic enough to make a stand against them, and is not likely to be capable of doing

* In Brahmanism the cow is a sacred animal, and whenever the Mohammedans kill a cow on the occasion of the Kurban Feast, this is a cause of animosity between the two religions.

† Under idol-worshippers (Putperest or Medjusi) the Mohammedans include all religions which do not follow the four sacred books—Koran, Torah, Gospels, and Psalms. Christians, therefore, do not come under the category of idol-worshippers, but they are designated as Ehli-Shirk—*i.e.*, as people who, because of their belief in the Trinity, tacitly admit a Divine association.

so for some time to come : for India lacks not only the spirit of unison, but also the energy required to offer effective resistance. The Rebellion of 1857, the result of too many concessions and various other mistakes on the part of the English, has proved this quite clearly ; for if it were not so, a handful of Europeans could not possibly have defended themselves against a hundred times superior native force. But disturbances of this nature are now hardly likely to occur, thanks to the energetic measures of the Anglo-Indian Government ; and as the Government is likely to continue and to strengthen the inaugurated régime of order and justice and equal treatment of natives without regard to faith or descent, every cause for rebellion is practically taken away, and the phantom of internal danger is *ipso facto* removed. British rule in India must grow in strength in proportion as the natives become convinced of the benevolent intentions, the integrity, and the power, of the foreign masters. This conviction is growing day by day even in the circles of the enemies and fault-finders of the English administration, and in the National Congress held in Bombay in 1905, the Member of Congress Sir Pherozshah Mehta said at the close of his Phillipic oration : 'The future of India is linked with that of England, and it is to England that India must always look for guidance, assistance, and protection in her need.'

CHAPTER X

STABILITY OF BRITISH RULE

THE dangers which threatened from without can best be counteracted by securing internal peace. As we are determined not to touch upon any political question in these pages, but to confine ourselves strictly to the history of civilisation, we cannot here enter into a discussion about the rivalry and envy which England's sovereignty in India has provoked among other European Powers. It is sufficient to state the fact that the increasing desire of Western lands to find a market in the East for their ever-growing industries does not exempt the British Empire in its Indian possessions from envious looks and hostile feelings. If India were not situated as it is, surrounded on three sides by the sea, which is the true domain of the British, enemies and ill-wishers would no doubt have declared themselves much more openly, and their numbers would have been greater, too. But as India can only be approached by land from the north, from which side in times past many invasions have been made, England has thus far only *one* formidable rival to reckon with—that is, Russia, whose attacks and hostile intentions the more deserve our full consideration as the rivalry between these two Powers implies the supremacy over the whole of Asia, and neither the one nor the other is likely to yield. What measures have been taken by England to frustrate the plans of this antagonist, and whether England will succeed in

parrying the attacks which must take place in the future, are questions which can only be answered by military experts, and of which the layman can only grasp the fact—and this is a matter of no small importance—that the Indian frontiers are endangered and the Indian possessions threatened.

The extensive outworks which form the *Glacis* of defence in India; the political circumstances of neighbouring regions; the reorganisation of the Indian army, and England's defensive attitude and constant alertness, will no longer permit of a so-called *marche à la Timur*, such as Skobelev contemplated at one time. If one or other of Britain's precautionary measures were to fail, such an accident would not materially weaken or diminish its defensive attitude, because the transformation in the interior of the land—*i.e.*, the mental change which has taken place in the Hindu people as regards the value they attach to the British administration—forms a bulwark against which the heaviest guns of Russia will be powerless.

Who could or would deny the fact that the labour of well-nigh 200 years of the English in Hindustan has left indelible traces upon the mind of humanity there? Have not the schools, the colleges, and Universities caused a radical transformation in the views and aspirations of the population, both Mohammedan and Hindu? When the Indian neophyte of Western culture, although only on the threshold of the world of learning, already expresses a desire for Home Rule, and demands constitutional and Parliamentary reforms, and when the English free press, the envy of many European nations, is not liberal enough for him, who could for a moment suppose that these overstrained heroes of liberty, these ultra-liberal Asiatics, would care to exchange English supremacy for Russian dominion and wax eloquent over the Russian scourge? Russia's allurements have in India, more particularly

among the Mohammedans, long since lost their charm. As the Turkoman poet Makhdum-Kuli, in the beginning of the eighteenth century, represented Russia as Antichrist and the destroyer of Islam—*i.e.*, Deddjal—so Russia is regarded now by the Mohammedans all over the world as their arch-enemy, who never ceases to molest the true believers with his diabolical schemes. It would be preposterous, therefore, to imagine that India's sympathies could ever go with the Tsar; its most malicious antagonists could not advance such a view. Or is it, perhaps, fondly hoped that the Hindu of to-day, in spite of his numerous daily papers, weekly and monthly periodicals, and his animated intercourse with Western lands, is not sufficiently well informed as to the horrible despotism, mismanagement, and militarism, in the Tsar's dominions? At any rate, he knows as much as, if not more than, many a European, who, from political motives, forcibly shuts his eyes to the Russian abominations, and seeks excuses for every Russian freak. The misery of the Muzhiks grovelling in the dust; the offensive arrogance of the Chinovniks (officials), the fate of the victims languishing in the Siberian lead-mines; the intolerance and damnable theories of the Greek Church; the terrors of the prisons of Schlüsselberg, and many other horrors of Russian polity, are by no means unknown to the Indians. Who could be so simple as to imagine that the Hindu, even if ever so slightly acquainted with our European customs and literature, would prefer Russia's supremacy, and aid and abet the realisation of such a scheme? The Hadji of Central Asia, returning viâ India from the holy cities of Arabia, described the Frengghi (English) in the following words: 'Black is their faith, but pure and blameless is their justice;' so the Turkestani, taking his way through Constantinople to Arabia, cannot find

words adequately to describe the extortions, the abuses, and the evil treatment, to which his countrymen are exposed in their own land at the hands of the Russian officials and soldiers.

Nor can we ignore the heavy blow which Russian prestige has received through the defeats of her army and navy in the recent war in the Far East. Two extracts from Indian native papers will suffice to show what the people of Hindustan think of these Russian reverses. The *Rast Gofar* makes the following comments: 'With the annihilation of the Baltic Fleet on the heels of the decisive defeat at Mukden, Russia has lost all her authority and prestige as a foremost European Power. Before she entered into the sanguinary war with Japan, the general impression in this country was that there was not a Power in Europe which could singly hold its own against Russia. The Colossus which had hitherto posed as the supreme Power of Europe seems to have feet of clay. The Russian Bear was never happy unless he penetrated deeper and deeper into the middle of the Far East or Central Asia, and held in his iron grip territories to which he had not the slightest claim nor pretension. There are limitations set by Nature on all things in this world. Inebriated with a succession of successes in different parts of the world, she condescended to measure her strength with an Asiatic Power, which counted for naught; and we now know with what result. An untried and inexperienced Power like that of Japan was expected to be scattered by Russia like chaff before the wind; but there was the hand of Providence ready to chastise this arrogant, ambitious, and despotic monarchy, whose moral code, as compared with the other Powers, is below par. Such is the fate of all who transgress the bounds of moderation. The lessons taught by the Russo-Japanese War will not, it is to be hoped, be lost on other European

Powers who may be inclined to follow in the steps of Russia.'

On the same subject the *Gujerati Punch* writes: 'To us Indians, very truly the victory of Russia would have meant trouble and unquiet, if nothing else. But now that the fearful bugbear which loomed intensely black in the Indian Frontier nightmares has been crushed out of existence, we may safely assure ourselves and the Government that decades and decades must pass away before the spirit of Russian aggression can think of reappearing even to disturb the tranquillity of the "Pax Britannica" in this country. Not that we have ever believed it to be in the power of Russia to conquer the Indian Empire; the rulers and the ruled, making common cause in such an event, would be more than a match for even the whole world taken together! But there are politicians here and in England who are ever bent upon viewing the least moving of a straw in middle Asia as dangerous to India, and on believing it possible that Russia with the aid of the Amir could hope to succeed in India, unless it is with the help of the people themselves; and the latter, even if guided by the most selfish grounds possible, could hardly be blind enough to wish for the terrors of Poland and Caucasus, the absolutism and the autocracies of the Russian authorities, being re-enacted here.'

Far from being received with open arms, in the event of an attack upon India, Russia would find bitter enemies in the inhabitants of the land; for although there might be a few desperadoes and adventurers who, in the hope of profiting by the general confusion, would stand on the side of Russia, the preponderating mass of the people, the more discreet, the lovers of peace and order, and more especially the heads of society, would always stand on England's side. There are many proofs to confirm this statement. As often

as the phantom of Russian aggression appears on the horizon, even the hostile native press has not failed to discern danger for the Indian interests in the intentions of Russia. Most markedly the feudal Princes have always hastened to offer their services to the English Government, and in regard to this is a letter written by the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Sovereign of a land of 82,698 English square miles, with a population of 10,014,194 inhabitants and with a military force of about 45,000 men, to the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, in 1885, at the time of the threatened attack of the Russians upon Herat is very significant:

‘HYDERABAD,

‘August 26, 1885.

‘MY FRIEND,

‘No inhabitant can be indifferent to the persistent advance of another great military Power [Russia] towards India, to the necessity that exists for putting the frontier in a proper state of defence, and to the burden it imposes on those charged with its safety and the care of the Empire. All who have the welfare of India at heart are bound to consider what should be done, and to show they are heartily in sympathy with those who are endeavouring to place the frontier in a proper state of defence, so as to ward off all danger from our hearths and homes. The Princes of India have not been blind to the movement of events. We realise the financial responsibility the present state of affairs imposes on the Indian Exchequer. It seems to me that the time has arrived for showing in some open manner that India is united on this question, and for that reason I write now to spontaneously offer to the Imperial Government a contribution from the Hyderabad States of 20 lacs (20,000,000) rupees annually for three years for the exclusive purpose of Indian frontier defence.

‘This is my offer in time of peace. At a later stage you can count upon my sword.

‘Your sincere friend,

‘MIR MAHBUB ALI KHAN.’

This letter speaks clearly and distinctly of the reliability of the feudal Princes under English protectorate, and there are other still more striking evidences of the devotion of Indian Princes to the British Government. In the Boer War in South Africa, in the late war against China, during the Boxer rebellion, distinguished Hindus have offered their services, and some have even volunteered for the Red Cross work. We are therefore not giving way to illusions when we declare that, if England were threatened by Russia in its Indian possessions, it has now less to fear from the confused national elements under its sceptre than has ever been the case under any former conditions.

In times past there was some ground for comparing India with a powder-magazine, ready to explode at the touch of a spark thrown by a mighty enemy's hand. But now the conditions are considerably improved. We mentioned before that ignorance is the greatest enemy of the English in India, and in proportion as this enemy is conquered by a greater activity in public education, by useful reforms in the administration, and by a slow and gradual removal of prejudices, in that same proportion the external and internal dangers will become less. This view is the more permissible when we remember that England has, as it were, finished its territorial conquests in India, that its possessions there are rounded off, and that now the consolidation and the maintenance of the frontier defence are the chief considerations. England, whether she desires it or not, is bound to curb her desire for the acquisition of more land in the North of India. She must give up all plans for further conquest

in that direction, for there she comes in touch with a mighty and ambitious neighbour State—there she strikes solid and impenetrable ground. We quite agree with Sir Alfred Lyall, who concludes his highly interesting work upon the English possessions in India with the following words: 'Henceforward the struggle will be, not between the Eastern and Western races, but between the great commercial and conquering nations of the West for the predominance in Asia. From this contest England has now little to fear, and in the meantime we have undertaken the intellectual emancipation of the Indian people; we are changing the habits of thought, the religious ideas, the moral level, of the whole country. No one can as yet venture upon any prognostic of the course which the subtle and searching mind of India will mark out for itself amid the cross-currents of Eastern and Western influences. But we may be sure that diffusion of knowledge and changes of material environment are acting steadily on mental habits, and that future historians will have a second remarkable illustration of the force with which a powerful and highly organised civilisation can mould the character and shape the destinies of many millions of people. And whatever may be the ultimate destiny of our Indian Empire, we shall have conferred upon the Indians great and permanent benefits, and shall have left a good name for ourselves in history.'*

Yes, a good name the English will certainly leave in history. Their labours in India will form the worthy apotheosis of our Western culture, and when to-day we rightly admire Rome's cultural influence upon the Old World, what England has accomplished in India will in after-ages receive the greater recognition, as the work in its future development promises to be still more imposing, mightier, and more far-reaching,

* 'The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India.' Third and enlarged edition, London, 1894, p. 347.

in its results. Even now her influence reaches from India across the whole of South and East Asia, and in this portion of the ancient world English is considered the language of civilisation *par excellence*.

What will be the special form and nature in which the civilisation of India will show itself in the far future is beyond the reach of speculation ; but we may be safely assured that, whatever changes and metamorphoses may take place, they will bear the stamp of humaneness, liberty, and enlightenment, and will most surely contribute to the well-being of the human race.

CHAPTER XI

A COMPARATIVE SYNOPSIS

IN the foregoing pages we have endeavoured to describe the work done by our two Culture-bearers in Moslem Asia, in order to give our readers an opportunity of judging for themselves about the ways and means employed by these promoters of Western culture in the East, and to give them a clear idea of the results thus far obtained. It will, however, not be superfluous to draw a comparison between these two representatives of our culture on the lines hitherto adopted, and to look more closely into the nature of the work done by them. And this appears to us the more important as the two differ so greatly from one another in character, and in the end they have in view, so that the maxim *Si quo faciunt idem, non est idem*, here fully comes to its right. From the very first their motives and actions lay in totally opposite directions. Russia appeared on the scene of action under the sign of the Double Cross and in semi-Asiatic garb, as the champion of Christianity against Islam and Shamanism, under no conditions entering into any transactions with the manners and customs of the land, but openly declaring its intention of crushing and utterly annihilating its national existence.

Ivan the Terrible forbids the building of mosques; true believers and heathen are baptised by compulsion; the refractory are delivered over to the executioner or driven away. On the land thus cleared of its in-

habitants, fortresses and settlements are erected and occupied by Russians, and thus the Tsar's dominions have become enlarged. England appeared in India in the modest garb of a trader ; factories were established on the coasts, and gradually trade extended into the interior. It was only when the safety of its commerce was threatened by the confusion and corruption of the Mogul Empire that England took up a defensive attitude and began to make territorial conquests. The English never meant to attack the religion of Hindustan, or in any way to behave in a hostile or unfriendly spirit. On the contrary, we find that the natives assisted the English in their struggles against the common enemy, and the victory was won by their support. Considering the different cultural level occupied by the two nations, no other procedure could well be expected. In the days of Ivan the Terrible Russia occupied the very lowest stage of culture in the Christian world ; it was more Asiatic than European, and in its political aims and actions it was scarcely distinguishable from its Asiatic opponents ; while English society, basking in the sunshine of the Elizabethan Age, represented the cultured West, and has remained true to this principle despite the calumny of its ill-wishers. Russia in the course of its conquests has never failed, as soon as its power was sufficiently established, to exercise a disquieting influence, not only upon the political, but also upon the ethical, social, and religious life of the people, in order to simplify the process of absorption. But in the proceedings of the English we notice the reverse. Moslems and Hindus are not in the slightest degree disturbed in their ethical and religious life. Christian missions were permitted to establish themselves, sometimes even received Government support, but only for the maintenance of the schools and hospitals. The same Christian Government also sent its soldiers to preserve order

at the processions on the Feast of Jagannath* and at the Tabut† of the Moslems in Moharram. No one was ever forced to accept the religion of the foreign conqueror, and denationalisation was out of the question, because in England the idea of colonising India was never, and could never be, seriously entertained. Even in these early stages we discern the underlying motives which animated the two conquering hosts, and their first steps clearly show the end each one had in view.

The Russian Empire, always desirous to acquire territory and to increase the number of its subjects, may be satisfied with the results of the work done in the course of 500 years. The grand-duchy of Moscow has grown into the present gigantic Russian Empire. The Slav ethnos has swallowed up many millions of foreign elements, and it appears still quite willing to and capable of continuing the process; but whether the Russian Moloch will in the future find these incorporated fragments of nationality as digestible as in the past is a matter to which, so far, the Russians pay little or no attention. To us this process of absorption seems more serious to-day than it was before, since even in Asia the feeling of national co-operation is astir; but Russia, having once successfully started on the path of conquest and annihilation, intends to carry it through to the bitter end.

England also wants in the first place to make conquests of men, and not merely of territory, for it needs the human element as an outlet for its trade. 'Trade follows the flag' is the leading principle of its politics; and as commerce demands in the first place

* Jagannath, in the literal sense 'Lord of the World,' is an idol which on festive occasions is carried about in the town.

† Tabut (literally 'Coffin') represents the obsequies of Imam Husein, mourned in Moharram.

peaceful and well-ordered conditions of life, and as the favourable condition of her market depends upon the cultural development of the consumers, England's chief endeavour has necessarily always been to raise the intellectual level of the peoples entrusted to its care, and under 'Pax Britannica' has endeavoured to serve its own purposes as well as the welfare of its subjects. This difference in the initial intentions of the two great Powers, as shown in their colonial policy, involved the application of very different measures also. The Russian conqueror is content when he finds his subjects tractable, quiet, punctilious tax-payers and willing tools. In his endeavours in the field of general national culture and enlightenment, his chief care is to teach the Asiatic the elements of school learning in the Russian language, and amongst the Tartars, Kirghises, and Sarts, only those whose intention it was to become entirely Russified have devoted themselves to higher education. Russia had never concerned itself much about the sympathies of its foreign subjects; its iron grasp is never slackened by any softer considerations, and in the whole length and breadth of its conquered dominions we seldom come across any Asiatics who express themselves pleased with the Russian régime, and voluntarily conform to the new regulations under the Tsar's administration; enthusiasm is certainly never entertained. With the English it is quite different. They have always consulted the welfare of the people under their charge; they are anxious that the reforms and innovations introduced should be just and fair; wherever possible they have exercised charity and forbearance; and as regards public education, we have seen that the number of University graduates, students of Law, Medicine, and Arts increases among the natives from year to year, that there is even danger of an intellectual proletariat. The English

are not nearly so much hated and feared in India as the Russians are in Central Asia, for the most thorough-going, anti-foreign Hindu cannot shut his eyes to the justice, the impartiality, and the good intentions of the sahibs. Perfect undivided affection can hardly be looked for, for the foreign ruler is never an object of devotion; but the respect which the Hindu cannot withhold from his foreign master may in time turn to sympathy, and the relation between master and subject may before very long become quite tolerable. If, in opposition to this view, the idea ever became prevalent in Europe that the Englishman, on the strength of his superior culture, with his characteristic stiffness, coldness, arrogance, and national pride, is less beloved by the Asiatics than the semi-Asiatic Russian, this supposition has been sufficiently confuted by many striking facts. In spite of the caste system, in spite of Moslem and Hindu separatism, there are many more points in common between the Hindus and the English than between the Russians and the Kazanis or Turkestanis. If it were not so, we should not see the most unusual spectacle of an empire extending over 1,087,404 square miles, and with 294,361,056 inhabitants, held in check by 76,243 English soldiers. If there were not a certain degree of confidence between the English and the Hindus, how would it be possible for the Anglo-Indian Government to rely for the defence of the land and the maintenance of order upon 150,000 native soldiers, amongst whom there are a few native officers also? Thus far Russia has not dared to form even a regiment of native soldiers, with the exception of the Turkoman militia, consisting of a few hundred men; and when we consider that the English in India employ whole regiments of natives, many in high positions, in the Civil Service, while the Russians entrust to the natives at most only such subordinate

positions as that of interpreter or justice of the peace,* the great difference between the systems adopted by the two Culture-bearers is very conspicuous.

In conclusion, we must remember that the number of Russians in Turkestan is in proportion to the native population much larger than that of the English in India.† Lord Curzon, in his book of travels in Central Asia,‡ says, with reference to the security of England's position, that he knows a large Indian town with 80,000 inhabitants whose fanaticism is universally known, and where four English officials maintain order without the assistance of one single soldier. Are not these abundant proofs of an ever-growing closer union and intimacy between rulers and subjects? Even before their misadventures in East Asia, when the Russians, on account of their greater military readiness and display of power, were held in higher esteem, and inspired more fear than the English, the justice, the wealth, the liberality, the magnitude of their undertakings, the strong individuality, and the steadfast persistence, of the British have always appealed to the native mind, and from the very first excited the admiration and awe of all Easterners. These characteristics have acted as a powerful charm upon the feelings and the imagination of the Hindus. They have, as it were, chained the natives to the banners of the conqueror, and even during the terrible days of the Sepoy Rebellion in 1857 we have seen how Hindus at the storming of Delhi sacrificed their own lives to save wounded English officers.§ With reference to the liberality of

* Mirowoi-sud.

† Among the 5,260,000 Turkestanis there are 219,658 Russians, while, as stated above, among the 187,223,481 Indians there are altogether only 200,000 English.

‡ 'Russia in Central Asia in 1889,' p. 387.

§ See 'Delhi, Past and Present,' by H. C. Fanshawe, C.S.I. London, 1902, p. 208.

the English, one need but compare the pensions granted by the two great Powers in Asia to those who have merited reward, or to native Princes who have been deprived of their dignity and position. Upon the wife and sons of the dethroned Khudayar Khan, ex-Emir of Khokand, Russia bestowed a miserable pittance of 30 roubles per month, scarcely enough to keep them alive; and when Abdurrahman Khan, the late ruler of Afghanistan, with his 500 men, became the guest of the Tsar at Samarkand, he received a monthly allowance of 1,250 roubles—*i.e.*, about £4,000 per annum. As against this we find that the annual pension of Vajid Ali, ruler of Oudh, amounted to £120,000. That of Baji Rao, ex-Peshawur also of Oudh, amounted to £80,000, and that of Dhulip Singh, the son of Ranjit Singh, to £52,000. Equally munificent was the pension granted to the conquered and dethroned King Thebau of Burma.

Much as the English system inspires respect and increases the English prestige in India, it is the sincerity and reliability of the English which have most impressed the Asiatic magnates, for they do not themselves particularly shine in that respect, nor have they found those qualities among the Russians. Thus we see how Djura Beg, the late Prince of Shehri Sebz, who in 1868, in the fight against Bokhara, gave himself up to the Russians, and afterwards in the war against Khokand rendered them good service, is now sulking in his country-seat not far from Tashkend,* carefully avoiding all contact with the Russians. It is the same with the Afghans, who in 1888, after the defeat of Ishak Khan, sought refuge with the Russians. They have long since tired of Russian hospitality, and have for the greater part returned to Kabul. 'The Russian Nan-u-Nemek (bread and

* See 'K'istorij narodnago obrazovaniya v' Turkestansko, kraj.' Tashkend, 1899, p. 30.

salt) has never agreed with anyone' is a common saying in Central Asia. Russia has never taken the trouble to make itself agreeable to the Asiatics, and they who have felt the weight of the conqueror's heel can never rise again. Discretion forbids me to bring forward many just complaints against Russian faithlessness and ill-treatment, communicated to me by friends in Turkestan. Suffice it to say that the brotherly intercourse and intimacy between Russia and the subjugated Asiatics is not by a long way so great as is often believed here in Europe. True, there are certain things which Russians and Asiatics have in common—things relating to manners and customs and ways of thinking—especially in the northern portion of the continent; and in the historical process of evolution they retain much which bears the stamp of the common ethnical, Eastern origin. But in Asia religion, the great wall of partition, rules everything, and in all shades of social intercourse Christians and Mohammedans, Buddhists and Shamanists, will always remain separated by an abyss which cannot be bridged over. If this were not so, the connection of Russia with Turks, Tartars, Ugrians, and Mongols, extending over many hundred years, ought to have had a greater influence than is the case, for experience shows that the latter-named peoples have only adopted Russian culture through forced denationalisation and change of religion—that is, they have simply been merged into the Russian State.

The English influence in Southern Asia, and especially in India, shows quite different results. They did not make Anglification and conversion to Christianity the *conditio sine quâ non* of reform, and the Moslems and Hindus of India have therefore in many respects shown themselves more accessible to modern culture: they have divested themselves of many Asiatic notions, and acknowledged the superiority of European culture

without giving up their religion or their individuality. On the contrary, the followers of Mohammed and Vishnu hold the more tenaciously to their nationality and their faith, as they find that their views are not endangered by the new doctrine. Indeed, among the half- or entirely-civilised Hindus there are at present but few who have changed either their faith or their nationality.* The advantages of tolerance and liberty are further illustrated by the fact that, while Russia can only exercise influence upon the districts actually subdued by force of arms, England, without conquest—that is, without force, but merely in the strength of its higher culture—has been able to influence independent neighbouring lands. In Asia Minor, Persia, Afghanistan, China, and Korea, countries which for a considerable time have been in touch with Russia, hardly any traces of Russian culture are discernible; while England's influence in language, commerce, and politics, is very conspicuous in Siam, South China, and Japan, so much so that to-day we may consider the whole of Southern Asia to be under the cultural influence of England, all European productions being accepted as English.

The view that Russia will be better qualified than England to civilise Asia is therefore altogether false. A politically free nation, occupying a higher cultural level, has more active measures at its disposal, has more strength and perseverance, and has nobler ends in view, than a nation which has scarcely emerged from infancy, which is as yet in the first period of cultural transition, and which, moreover, held fast in the bonds of a despotic, absolute monarchy, has been unable to acquire the knowledge necessary for cultural

* Dhulip Singh, the son of Ranjit Singh, is so far the only known Christian convert among the upper classes of India; but baptism does not seem to have agreed with him, for he has more than once denounced the faith and afterwards again accepted it.

activity. It is scarcely to be expected of a nation which itself has still so much to learn, that it will be able to teach others to work with better results than Russia has done so far. It would be unjust to put greater obligations upon Russia; what it has done to improve the condition of the Old World every impartial critic will gladly recognise, and no one would think of belittling or ignoring the credit due to Russia on this score.

In the rôle of civiliser of the East which has fallen to the lot of Russia, it has acquitted itself of the task in conformity with its own standard of culture, its geographical position, its political organisation, and its ethnical condition. It would certainly be more in accordance with the ideals of pure and unselfish philanthropy if Russia had merely civilised the peoples entrusted to its care, and had not at the same time absorbed, that is, ethnically destroyed, them. But everyone has to act according to his light and abilities. England was the first to begin the work, had the start on the road of culture; attained maturity much earlier, and has necessarily come forward with much better results, for, as the proverb says, *Potentes potentius agunt*; and Russia will have fulfilled its historical mission if on the field of action appointed to it, without always seeking to extend its dominions, it will proceed quietly to transform and to improve the condition of humanity. It is this insatiable greed for territory which has such a disturbing and irritating effect on Russia's intercourse with other Western Powers, pursuing similar cultural aims in Asia.

Considering the present state of things in the great Russian Empire, the European, burning with zeal for the advancement of culture, cannot be indifferent to the fact that Russia's political schemes always tend to the weakening and endangering of British interests in Asia; that its one aim and object seems to be to hinder

and to aggravate the difficult and noble work which the neighbouring State has undertaken to do. By the successes of the Russians the power of a tyrannical, despotic government grows. This system, which reminds one of the Dark Ages now fortunately past and gone, might, however, even in our enlightened days become dangerous to the freedom-loving West. England's victories are the victories of freedom and humanity; they can never be dangerous to anyone. On the contrary, they stir up a feeling of self-esteem and of pride in the power of Western culture.

It would be difficult to misapprehend or to deny the difference existing in the results obtained by the two Culture-bearers in Asia; but it would be equally hard to change the present state of things. This could only be done if the two great Powers in the superiority of Western culture worked together in peace and unity. Both England and Russia have already created for themselves a sufficiently large and independent sphere wherein to follow their own political and economic ends, without interfering with one another, and, without any feeling of animosity, but rather assisting and enriching one another, faithfully performing the task entrusted to each separately. Only thus can the saying of the celebrated English statesman be realised: 'Asia is big enough for us both.' The one in the North and the other in the South of the Old World might then spread that beneficial enlightenment which is so urgently needed in order to make those regions now lying in ruin once more into a fruitful land, and to lead down-trodden, disconsolate humanity, gazing round in apathy and despair, to a better and nobler future. This is the ardent wish of every humane European, and particularly of such as have seen with their own eyes the miserable condition of the Moham-medans, the most afflicted of all these miserable creatures; and who, comparing their brilliant historical

past with their present wretched condition, ask : What is the cause that the followers of Islam have sunk so deep ? how can their deliverance be effected ? and, Is it still possible to cleanse them from all the existing evils ? These questions will be considered in the third and last part of this work.

PART III
THE FUTURE OF ISLAM

CHAPTER I

OLD AND NEW ISLAM

THE picture I have endeavoured to give of the influence of Western culture upon the Mohammedan world in Asia would be incomplete, and not sufficiently convincing, if I did not also throw some light upon the position taken up by the Mohammedans themselves with regard to our intervention and our labour amongst them both in the past and in the present. For Asia is not as clay in the hands of the European potter, and least of all can this be said of Islam. The first signs of emotion evinced by the Moslem world with regard to our attempts at reformation, the manner in which the almost forcibly introduced culture of the West has been criticised by them, and the ways and means by which the Mohammedans of the nineteenth century have become reconciled to the reforms inaugurated—all this has been dwelt upon at length in my work on this subject published in 1875.* I have there pointed out the mistakes and errors committed by ourselves as well as by the society whose cultural transformation we had in view. My opinion, based upon personal observation and upon an intimate intercourse of many years' standing, was to the effect that Europe had as yet only a superficial knowledge of the East, and that therefore grievous mistakes on both sides were unavoidable, and have hindered the progress of evolution; that avarice and greed for territory have

* 'Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert,' p. 321.

done quite as much harm as obdurate conservatism and blind prejudice ; but that, in spite of these obstacles, a change for the better has set in, and that we are therefore not justified in condemning half the world to hopeless ruin, and in predicting the dissolution of a society counting many millions of people.

The facts upon which I chiefly founded my assertions at that time, date back to that early stage of our intercourse with the East when the increased facility of communication had brought Europe into more frequent and closer touch with the Asiatic world, and more especially with the western portion of it. Correctly speaking, this first phase commenced with the Crimean War, and concluded not many years later with the Anglo-French campaign against China. Until then our attempts at interference in the political and economic conditions of the Old World had been feeble and timid, for even in India it was not until after the Sepoy Rebellion that the English energetically undertook the great work of transforming Eastern society. At the end of the first half of the nineteenth century, Japan was roused from its many centuries of sleep by Commodore Perry, and China was brought to consciousness by the burning of the Summer Palace of Ming-Yuen-Ming. The western half of Asia—*i.e.*, the Moslem world—had earlier than this been made to feel the superiority of Europe, but our influence was not of a continued and consistent nature until the second half of the nineteenth century. Our knowledge of the position taken up by Islam with regard to our reform plans in the first half of the nineteenth century must of necessity be weak, irrelevant, and problematic. But as those plans became more decided, steadfast, and concrete during the latter half of the century, our views have been enlarged, and the Oriental has been compelled to forsake his deceitful and dissimulating ways, and to cease playing at hide-and-

seek. The life of the Moslem in the Near East now lies open and clear before us; we have fathomed his innermost mind; we know his aim and purpose, his thoughts and aspirations; and, no longer deceived by his impostures, we can with the greater certainty form a picture of the future development of Islam, and indulge in such speculations as will form the subject of this third part of our work.

Fifty years, half a century, is, one might say, no more than a second of time in the life of a nation, and far too small a period to bear convincing evidence in a social evolution such as Islam is now passing through. But in this fast-living age of steam and electricity, fifty years represent far more change than many hundreds of years under the old régime, and we may safely be permitted to say that the present short period of time is equal in point of events to the preceding much greater one, and, in order to make the object of this our study clear, we ask the question: Has the Moslem world, in the second half of the past century, made such progress on the road of modern culture as to show a possibility of assimilation with Europe, and will such eventual renovation take place under foreign protectorate or in national independence?

This question, inseparably connected with the object of our mission, has often been asked, but never satisfactorily answered; in the first place, because our labour has always had an essentially material tendency, and an objective, unselfish aspect of the case has therefore been impossible. In the second place, the investigations thus far made have lacked intimate knowledge and objectiveness, and a cursory observation necessarily stands in the way of sound judgment. Only a comprehensive view, an accurate knowledge and appreciation of the various stages of the cultural

process already passed through, with due regard to the ethnical and ethical characteristics of the various component parts of Islam society, can help us to a fairly satisfactory solution of the problem before us. I would even venture to go a step further, and say that, in consequence of the diverse preponderating national interests concerned, it would be difficult for either English, French, Germans, Russians, or Italians, to form an unbiassed opinion ; for there will always be political or social problems to consider which blind us to the truth and stand in the way of an impartial judgment.

As in many other things, so in the matter before us, a comparison of the past with the present gives us the best solution. After thoroughly inquiring into the position of the Islamic world during the first half of the nineteenth century, and comparing this with the present condition of things, in the various departments of human thought and activity in Moslem lands, we come to the conclusion that a decided intellectual evolution has taken place ; that the foundations of the ancient structure have been shaken, that the building itself shows deep rents and tears, and that great changes in this wide sphere of action are imminent. The generally prevailing idea that this crisis only manifests itself in the upper circles of society, and that the great mass of the people has remained untouched, cannot well be maintained. The movement has been noticed everywhere, but in Asia all things proceed slowly, and the indolence and apathy of the Eastern people does not permit them to betray their internal feelings by vivid outward signs, as is the case in Western lands. Not without its effect in this respect may be the circumstance that with us the light of culture has travelled from the bottom to the top, while in Asia, in most instances, the sun of knowledge

has first illumined the mountain-tops—*i.e.*, the higher circles of society—and afterwards has penetrated into the valleys. The old saying, 'El nas ala dini mulukuhum'—*i.e.*, the people follow the faith of their leaders—is still true for Asia, with this difference, that the so-called highest circle of intelligence is no longer limited to the leading dignitaries and officials, but also includes the lower grades of the official world, even the so-called Esnaf and Kasib, or middle class, because in modern times, through the ever-increasing thirst for knowledge, Islam society has attained to a degree of intelligence which quietly advances in the path of modern culture, gradually freeing itself from the bonds of the old conservative ways of thinking, and inaugurating a new and promising epoch in the intellectual life of the Mohammedan world generally.

What most astonishes those who have been familiar with the old conditions of Islamism is the notable decrease of conceit and unreasoning preference of old Moslem culture, and with it a steadily increasing appreciation of the excellence and usefulness of Western civilisation. Fifty years ago, discussing these matters with Moslem scholars or semi-Europeanised officials, I found, even amongst the most advanced thinkers of Western and Central Asia, not a single one who would admit the superiority of modern European views of life above those of Islam. How different it is now! True, there are still many Moslem literati whom it pleases, not only to look at everything through the spectacles of the Koran and ancient tradition, but who even go so far as to discover the original source of all science in the past golden age of Islam, and wherever possible underrate and discredit our modern learning. Sometimes also we come across Mohammedans who, after drinking their fill at the source of modern culture, from motives of malice and envy, condemn everything European, and speak disparagingly of our institutions,

our manners, customs, and morality.* But side by side with these fanatics, some Mohammedans have of late years stood out boldly in protest. Convinced of the advantages of Western culture, they have frankly declared that their culture did very well in the past, that it has rendered excellent service to humanity, but can now no longer compete with the demands of modern times. They admit that the Moslem world, if it is not to be utterly annihilated by the West, must of necessity accept the proffered innovations, and that this is the easier as the fundamental principles of the doctrine of the Arab Prophet in no way forbid or hinder the cultivation of arts and sciences and modern progress in general.

Curiously enough, this latter assertion, in spite of an enmity between Christians and Mohammedans existing for over a thousand years, still forms a subject of lively discussion amongst ourselves, and not only strictly orthodox Christian divines, but also sceptics and agnostics, have fallen into the error of thinking that the professors of the doctrine of Mohammed are cut off from the cultivation of arts and sciences by the tenets of their religion. The witness of the many monuments of a past culture is as vain as it is to prove that in the Middle Ages we ourselves went to school with the Arabs, or to quote passages from the Koran, pointing to the value, the usefulness, the indispensableness, of science. The old prejudice cannot be overcome, and the obstinacy with which it is maintained finds an illusory support in the present miserable condition of the Islamic world. Volumes have been written upon this subject, but it is beyond the scope of this

* Mohamed Adil Schmitz du Moulin appears as such in his work 'Islambul: The Islam. The Horror of Devastation,' etc. He had a thorough knowledge of Europe, and his judgment is therefore all the more surprising.

study to advance the many arguments for and against it. It seems to us more to the purpose to illustrate the true state of the case by a few dry, unquestionable facts.

Anyone wishing to convince himself of the progressive spirit of the awakening of the Moslem world should not judge by outward appearances. Passing tourists cannot possibly have a true insight into these matters; it requires careful, earnest study, free from all religious and national prejudices, and only a deep, steady research, theoretical and practical, can lead to a clear understanding of the true state of things. For it does not do to base our judgment upon the manner in which some Mohammedans have adopted our mode of dress, our table manners, and similar social customs. The imitation of certain forms of government, of military defence, and many other conspicuous innovations, does not decide the question, but these are all unmistakable signs of an internal change, of an approach to Western culture, not by compulsion, but arising from a firm inward conviction.

These signs gain in prominence as we proceed from the eastern frontiers of the Moslem world towards the West. The true believer of Central Asia compares with the cultured Osman and Arab in the same manner as the strict Catholic of the Middle Ages compares with the half-enlightened European of to-day, for nothing can stem the mighty rush of intellect once set in motion. Just as orthodox Judaism, notwithstanding the 613 hedges with which it had surrounded itself, has at last been brought to a forcible evolution, so Islam, through the ever-closer intercourse with Christendom, has already divested itself of many of its dogmatic doctrines of a peculiarly exclusive and separatist nature, under cover of which its adherents have considered themselves for centuries safe from all interference of any foreign world of thought.

A few examples may be given in illustration. In the beginning of the past century a journey to Europe was looked upon by the pious Moslem as a most risky undertaking, for, in the first place, he would have to eat food prepared by Christians; secondly, he would have to neglect his prayers five times a day, as he could not be sure whether the spot on which he might spread his carpet might not have been defiled by the spilling of swine fat or spirits; and, thirdly, a visit to Christian lands would be to him as a sojourn in Dar-ul-harb, a breach of the ordinances of his religion.*

During the reign of Sultan Mahmud a diplomatic mission to a European Court was equivalent to banishment, and, as we learn from the papers of the late Rifat Pasha, Turkish Ambassador at the Court of Vienna under the reign of the Emperor Ferdinand V., his first impressions of life in the capital on the Danube were marked by aversion and dislike, anxiety and fear. In Persia, Feth Ali Shah could find no Moslem willing to undertake a mission to Europe, and he had to entrust the Armenian Daud Khan, of whom more presently, with a message to Paris. To-day it is the reverse. In Turkey, Persia, and Egypt it is considered a piece of special good fortune to be sent to Europe either for study or in the diplomatic service, for the wealth and splendour of our capitals and modern discoveries have a fascinating influence upon Orientals. The pleasures and dissipations of our great cities possess, alas! also far too great an attraction for the lively Oriental, who at home is restrained by the ordinances of his religion, but, when he comes over here, feels free to indulge his wildest passions. Moreover, there are many young Mohammedans who, with a passionate desire for knowledge, have put up with many privations in

* See p. 230.

order to attend European schools, and who have distinguished themselves in various branches of learning. I know several young Turks and Persians who, against the wishes of their Government, secretly visit Europe for the sake of improving themselves. It is not only ruling Sovereigns, Princes, and high dignitaries, who permit themselves the pleasure of a journey to Europe. We lately made the acquaintance of a high-placed Mohammedan cleric, Sheikh Mohammed Abdu, Mufti of Egypt and Head of the College of Al-azhar, who went to school at Geneva to learn French, and afterwards gave lectures at the Cambridge University in defence of Islam. What Protestant or Catholic Archbishop would take the trouble to visit a Mohammedan University in order to get an intimate knowledge of the inner spiritual life of Islam? Of Indian Moslems I need scarcely allude to, for they attend English colleges at home, and many of them have distinguished themselves in modern sciences in England, Germany, and America. Quite recently a Turkish diplomatist, the late El Seid Mehemmed Feridun Bey, left a considerable sum of money to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences for the benefit of studious young Turks.

Before all things I would draw attention to the wonderful progress made by the Turks in public instruction during the last few decades. Fifty years ago the Rushdie schools, in which modern sciences were taught, had a hard battle to fight with the existing Mektebs (Koran schools), for with the latter education meant only religious education. According to the statistic returns of 1896, among the 18,000,000 Mohammedans in Turkey there are now about 250,000 who visit the higher and middle schools in which modern languages and sciences are taught; and not only are there a considerable number amongst them who can read and speak two European languages, and

who are versed in natural sciences, geography, and history, but even of the women, whose education was formerly totally neglected, many now distinguished themselves in school learning, and thereby facilitate the introduction of reforms into the home-life, which used to be hermetically sealed against all external influences.

Even among the Moslems under the Russian protectorate, and the so-called Tartars, we discern this spirit of progress emanating from the West, and conveyed to them through Russian channels. In this respect Ismael Bey Gasparinski, the owner and editor of the Tartar paper *Terdjuman* (Interpreter), published at Baghche-sarai, deserves great credit. Under his auspices the schools have been improved, national literature has increased, and whereas formerly Tartars attended the Russian normal and middle schools compulsorily, there are now over 200 Tartars studying to become doctors, engineers, solicitors, etc., at Russian Universities. Some Mohammedan women have also gone in for University education, and have been appointed as lady doctors. It is a remarkable fact that this spirit of reform spreads from South Russia towards the Upper Volga territory, into the steppe region, and as far as East Turkestan—weakly, maybe, but none the less unmistakably.* It is but natural that the slowly but surely awakening spirit of the East should gradually find expression in all regions of human intelligence, in the spiritual and in the material life, anywhere and everywhere. Half a century ago the Turkish language was the clumsiest possible vehicle of literary information. People wrote in an incredibly bombastic and metaphorical style, introducing so many Arabic and Persian words that

* See the supplement to No. 40 of the paper *Terdjuman*, first appearing in 1901. This paper has a circulation of 6,000 copies in the Crimea, the Caucasus, Siberia, Turkestan, and China.

often, in a page of so-called Turkish, hardly a single Turkish word could be found, and the text therefore remained unintelligible to the mass of the people. Now the written Osman tongue has been considerably simplified, made clearer and more accessible. Consequently the reading public has also increased, and where formerly literature was confined to religious, stylistic, philosophical, and poetical disquisitions, carefully written so as not to take one step beyond their allotted precincts, now much is written on modern sciences, and not only modern novels and travelling accounts, but also books on natural history, political economy, medicine, and military subjects, are translated into Turkish and largely read.

The more the Oriental becomes acquainted with the intellectual productions of the West, the more his circle of vision is widened, and the more easily he shakes off the trammels of his own antiquated views of life. In my time—that is, when I moved in Turkish society—the etiquette of the harem was so strictly preserved that I never dared to look at a veiled woman, much less speak to her. Even to escape from a fire women were not allowed to enter the *Selamlık*, the portion of the house reserved to the men, and the education of the women was so neglected that, among the forty or fifty inmates of the harem of a high dignitary, there were at most two or three who could read or write. Now the girls are compelled to go to school; young Turkish women are well up in geography and history; there is a Turkish ladies' newspaper, and many Turkish ladies distinguish themselves as authors.* All this in a society where a short time ago an educated woman was looked upon as a witch! Moslems are allowed to marry Christian women; even Sultan Murad I. married a Servian Princess, and gave

* See my pamphlet 'La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant quarante ans.' Paris, 1898, p. 35.

her a Court chaplain ; but until recently mixed marriages were not liked, and occurred very seldom. At present many Ministers of State and other high officials have married European wives.

I remember once dining with the Minister of Public Instruction, Munif Pasha. The head of the table was taken by his wife, formerly a German governess, and among the guests were many thickly-turbaned learned Mollas. During my earlier visits to Turkey such innovations would have been looked upon as an offence against Islam. But what is most surprising to me, who have known the old conditions of Turkey, is the lively interest which is now shown in politics, and the eagerness with which the newspapers are read. Fifty or sixty years ago there was no daily press worth speaking of—no one would have dared to criticise the measures of the Government ; and now there are a fair number of daily, weekly, and monthly papers, which, although in veiled language, often indulge in very sharp criticisms. If it were not for the extreme severity of censure, which prohibits all free expression of thought, the number and the influence of the newspapers would be greater still. What I said of the Osman tongue also applies to the Tartar dialect, the style of which has become greatly simplified, and consequently much more popular. In the Tartar speech, and in modern Persian also, a large number of Russian, French, German, and English words have been introduced, which must puzzle those accustomed to the ancient literary language.

It would be difficult to enumerate the various innovations and reforms which have taken place in the course of the past fifty years in the political and social life of Turkey. They may not strike the layman and casual visitor, but they become all the more striking when one begins to draw comparisons between Turkey as it was and as it is. The transformation is naturally

more perceptible among the educated, but it is noticeable also among the masses, particularly as regards the fast-disappearing animosity existing towards those of another faith. Who could have believed fifty years ago that the time would come when Turco-Mohammedan newspapers would speak in terms of praise and admiration of such obnoxious heathen as the Japanese are in the eyes of the Moslems. Yet lately, after the Japanese successes, this has been the case. The Japanese, in point of faith despicable Medjusis, have become even in the language of the Prophet heroes worthy of imitation, a nation possessing many virtues, and Allah's blessing has been invoked upon them. During the time of my incognito as a Turk there was not a trace of national feeling to be found in Turkey. The word *Turk*, indeed, was used only as a term of reproach, an epithet of barbarism and brutality. Now the Turks are proud of being Turks; they boast of the large geographical dimensions of their tribe; they recite in dithyrambs their military prowess and political genius, and they hope great things of their future national unity and the awakening of the other Turkish tribes.

A periodical has recently appeared under the name of *Turk*, which in eloquent language preaches the necessity of a national awakening, glorifying the founders of the Ottoman Empire, and placing the Turkish tribe even above the tribe of the Prophet—*i.e.*, the Arabs. All this is evident from the polemics between the Turkish paper, the *Turk*, and the Arab periodical *Al Monar*, appearing in Cairo. Such a controversy would formerly have been regarded as blasphemous, but now it has an elevating effect upon the Moslem people. Our anti-Moslemic critics therefore, either from Christian religious fanaticism or from ignorance, go too far when they attribute the present national decline, the political ruin, and the

slowness in all matters of culture, solely and absolutely to Islam. If Islam were in reality such an inveterate opponent of arts and sciences as Mr. Malcolm Maccoll, the Duc d'Harcourt, and many others want to make the world believe, and as the peace-loving and disinterested (?) Christian Church has preached for centuries, how could the Islam of the Middle Ages possibly have been our instructor, and how could Emir Abdurrahman in Spain, and a Humayun or Akhbar in India, have dared to raise such splendid monuments of architecture and sculpture as the Alhambra in Spain, the Friday-Mosque (Jumma-Musjid) in Delhi, the Taj (a mausoleum to the favourite wife of Akhbar), and many other glorious structures, which to this day are a delight to the art critic? Were the above-mentioned Sovereigns perchance not strict enough in the Mohammedan faith, or were the learned Moslems of those days totally indifferent to the ordinances of the Koran? Certainly not. Blind superstition and mutilation of the doctrine of Mohammed have fostered certain abuses founded on misinterpretation, and have made a caricature of the faith not at all in keeping with the true spirit of Islam. The ancient Mohammedan Sunnite sect thought it a sin to draw pictures of living objects. I remember once seeing a mother faint when the photograph of her son, who studied in Paris, was shown to her. To-day Turks, Persians, and Arabs freely allow themselves to be photographed or painted in oils, and one feels inclined to ask why, if it is really true that the representation of living things is prohibited by the Koran, as is generally accepted, the Moslem rulers of India have had their portraits taken? Why did Mohamed II. sit for an Italian painter? and why did Sultan Abdul Hamid, who certainly cannot be accused of neologistic tendencies, found a school of art, and ordain that the students, after passing through a course of study there, should

be sent to a European academy to perfect themselves in their art? The misunderstanding which exists with regard to painting applies to other things also. The sublime doctrine of Gautama, which inspired the English poet Edwin Arnold to write his 'Light of Asia,' has now been degraded to a confused mass of superstition, deceit, and Lamaic tyranny, and in the same way zealotism and ignorance have attributed to Islam many things absolutely foreign to the Prophet's views, and which have been sternly denied by modern theologians and exegetics.

What has been said of the Turks of Osman nationality applies also in a lesser degree to the Turks under Russian sovereignty, the so-called Tartars. In their case it is not particularly convenient to the despotic proselytising Russian Government that another civilising influence has come into touch with Islam, and is steadily gaining ground there, as this will necessarily hinder their contemplated absorption of those regions into the Russian Empire. Notwithstanding this, however, especially among the small fraction of Southern Turks that is in Kazan, Orenburg, Baghche-sarai, an awakening is noticeable, which, as has already been said, fully deserves our attention. In a little book published at Orenburg in 1904, entitled 'Kirima Siahat' (A Journey to the Crimea),* wonderful things are told of the progress made in modern culture by the Mohammedans of that place. Mohammed Fatih bin Gilman al Kirimi, the author of this work, is a Tartar accomplished in all branches of European learning. The object of his journey was to take part in the twenty-years jubilee of the newspaper *Terjuman*, and apart from his charming description of the places and towns of South Russia visited by him,

* The full title of this little book is 'Kirima Siahat eseri Mohammed Fatih bin Gilman al Kirimi.' Typografiya, M. F. G. Karimoff. Orenburg, 1904.

the spirit of progress pervading the whole book is worthy of our highest esteem. The author is of opinion that the Moslem clergy are the chief cause of the sluggish progress of the Islam world. In their deplorable obscurantism, fanaticism, and narrow-mindedness, the Mollas try to find the strength of Islam in the puerile details of ritual observances. Modern knowledge, modern discoveries, are repugnant to them, and, supported by the conservatism which stamps all Eastern lands, they have succeeded in keeping the masses in ignorance of all non-religious knowledge, and in discrediting everything that comes from Europe.

Yet examples are infectious, and, in spite of the persistence of the Mollas, modern culture is gaining ground even among the Tartars. In the capitals of Russia there are many benevolent institutions entirely supported by Tartars. The modern schools, also, established and supported by Tartars produce brilliant results. There are Tartars who take positions as doctors and solicitors, and even among the Tartar women several have become prominent as teachers and lady doctors. 'According to my modest opinion,' thus writes the above-mentioned author, Mohammed Fatih, 'the ordinances of the Koran can easily be reconciled with culture and civilization. Unfortunately, there are now no Ulemas capable of inspiring Islam and bringing it into unison with civilisation. Our present-day Ulemas only occupy themselves with the external things; they do not understand the philosophical spirit of Islam, and can therefore derive no practical good from their religion. Our ignorant clergy interpret Islam according to their own ideas, and instead of benefiting us they harm us. You Europeans have with tremendous effort wrested your religion out of the hands of ignorant popes and priests, and you have diffused light. You have your world of faith in your own power, your conscience is free, and

your mind is enlightened ; while our religion is still priest-ridden, and as long as we do not follow your example, and extricate ourselves from the clutches of the Mollas and desist from empty formalities, decline is unavoidable.'

We will refer again to this movement ; for the present it suffices to prove that a spiritual awakening is noticeable even among the Tartars living under the despotic rule of Russia. To counteract the movement, Russia has taken the trouble to publish a newspaper in Tiflis called *Shark Rusi* (the Oriental Russian), written in the Azerbaijani dialect, in which the Turks and Moslems of the Caucasus are represented as having become, through this spokesman of Asiatic Russians, an independent nationality quite distinct from their Anglo-Indian and Osmanli co-religionists and tribesmen, and speaking in the most glowing terms of the Tsar's government. Of course, the advocates of these views are hated and ridiculed by the other Moslems, and are looked upon as apostates and enemies of Islam.

These few examples, indicating the beginning of a new development in Islam, do not by any means prove that the professors of this faith are exerting themselves to the utmost of their ability to raise their intellectual level, to animate their political and social relationships, and to advance modern culture. No, far from it ! We have only so far attempted to prove that they are fit and willing to receive culture, and if in regard to this I refer chiefly to the Turks, I do so because the Turks are always held to be the most vindictive representatives of Islam, and totally unfit for modernisation. The progressive spirit of the Mohammedans of India and Egypt is sufficiently known to the European reader. They have yielded easily to the powerful influence of the West, and are consequently often quoted as showing the result of our labour. But although they are not so conspicuous,

it would be most unjust to deny cultural fitness to those Moslems still languishing under the tyranny of their native Princes. They do as much as their oppressed condition and their poverty allow them to do, and they deserve all the more recognition for what they have achieved in this respect. Whether the movement will gain in strength, and to what extent it will increase depends entirely upon the internal and external relations of the groups of humanity under consideration. *But as it is impossible to stand still, there will and must come, some time, such an awakening as will upset many future plans of our great Powers in Moslem Asia.*

CHAPTER II

THE STRUGGLE OF REFORMS

WHEN we question the correctness of the idea prevalent in Europe, that Islam is hostile to and unfit for cultural development, one is justified in asking: If this be so, how comes it that the Moslems of Asia, in spite of their comparatively long and lively intercourse with Europe, have as yet yielded so little, and only sporadically, to our cultural influence; that the political and economic decline of the Moslems is assuming such alarming dimensions; that there is no sign of a pulling of themselves together as a nation, and that already two-thirds of the Mohammedans have lost their individuality under foreign supremacy?*

The answer to this question practically involves the entire problem of Moslemism, and if we succeed in pointing out the true causes which hitherto have stood between power and purpose, and which act as the real symptoms of disease, we shall be able to arrive at a fairly accurate estimate of the future of events in the Islamic world, and picture to ourselves Moham-

* The total number of Mohammedans in the whole world is difficult to estimate, as the confessors of this faith, both in Africa and in Asia, have only been numbered in the districts which are subjected to foreign sovereignty. Thus, there are under foreign rule in India 62,458,061, in Russia 13,889,421, in China about 20,000,000, in the Dutch colonies 15,000,000, making a total of 111,347,482 souls. As against this number, there are in Turkey about 25,000,000, in Persia 9,000,000, and in Afghanistan 5,000,000, showing that more than two-thirds of the true believers are under non-Moslem dominion.

medan society as it will appear to future generations. We offer no prophetic revelations, but only sober reflections, built upon dry and unadorned facts, and the conclusions at which we shall arrive are such as any intelligent reader might form for himself. Most Europeans are naturally struck by the slowness and clumsiness of the reform movement, and hence the doubt whether any satisfactory results will ever be obtained. Even if we admit that the political independence of Islam is very unstable, and is probably doomed to destruction, the scepticism as regards its cultural transformation is not thereby justified. The oft-quoted saying, 'Non datur saltus in natura,' and still less 'in cultura,' has the greater force in Asiatic countries, because the inhabitants of the Old World have strongly conservative principles, and, like all people at a low cultural level, hold tenaciously to the old institutions and customs. We see this even among the lower classes in Europe. Not only Islamism, but also Brahminism and Buddhism, and even Christianity, in Asia suffer from this evil. Japan alone makes an exception. What Japan has done cannot be put to the credit of the Buddhist religion, because China, where the same faith is professed, shows itself even more hostile to our culture than Islam does.

We can hardly expect the disciples of Mohammed's doctrine, after living in seclusion for hundreds of years, wrapt in ecstasy and admiration of their own world of faith, which they regarded as the highest ideal of human existence, and condemning everything outside as wicked, despicable, and deceptive, all at once to admire, praise, and receive a culture to which hitherto they have been altogether antagonistic. This indeed is asking too much. Against such a sudden transition the proud self-esteem of the Moslem must rebel, and does rebel. However much the Mohammedan may be convinced of the superiority of our culture, he will

always find points in Islam by which he tries to prevent the entire putting on one side of the Koran. 'In chemistry, mechanics, astronomy, medicine, etc., Europeans now have a very wide view, they say; but they stand on our shoulders, and that is why they can see so much further; without the preparatory work done by our investigators of past ages, they would not easily have reached such a height.' These and similar thoughts reflect themselves in the work of Emir Seid Ali upon Islam,* also in the reply of the learned Kassim Emin,† member of the Court of Appeal at Cairo, to the arguments of the Duc d'Harcourt;‡ in the writings of Ahmed Midhat Efendi at Constantinople; in the above-mentioned rhapsodies of Mohammed Adil Schmitz du Moulins, and in all the statements with which Mohammedans educated in Europe attempt to ward off the attacks made on the doctrine of Mohammed. The modern generation in the Islamic world cannot be blamed for possessing this self-esteem. On the contrary, we ought rather to praise them, because in so many instances they have overcome their prejudices, and because the word 'Kufr' (negation, or the world of unbelievers) with them has lost its former stinging, scornful meaning, and they are slowly beginning to walk in the new direction.

To be just, then, we must above all be patient with the Mohammedans, and we should not forget that we ourselves have needed centuries to pass from the black darkness of medieval barbarism, ignorance, and fanaticism into the present age of light and freedom. For us the transition was made easy by the Renaissance, and by the precious legacies of Greece and Rome; after that dark night of the Middle Ages we

* See his work 'The Spirit of Islam.'

† 'Les Egyptiens. Réponse à la Cour d'Appel du Caire.' Le Caire, 1894.

‡ 'L'Egypte et les Egyptiens,' par le Duc d'Harcourt. Paris, 1893.

had nothing to sacrifice, nothing to forget, while the Islamic world has the traditions of a glorious period of native culture to look back upon, has to conquer many a feeling of wounded pride, and has much to forget, if the work of assimilation with modern culture is to succeed. Let us assume the case of a European society compelled to renounce its old ideas of culture, and to adopt, say, Chinese culture, which is culture of a certain sort. Would such a transformation be more easily effected, and could it be accomplished in a shorter period of time and without great disturbances? I am one of the few Westerners who have been eye-witnesses of this struggle of negation and self-sacrifice, and I have found that the self-control and the strength of purpose of the Moslem pioneers of the reform movement really deserve admiration, and that we Europeans are wrong when, ignoring the obstacles connected with all stages of transition, we accuse the Mohammedans of negligence, or, what is worse, of animosity, with regard to modern culture.

It cannot be denied that, apart from historical, ethnical, and to a certain extent, also, climatic conditions, many causes can be brought forward as an excuse for the dilatoriness of the Islamic world, which hitherto have not been sufficiently taken into account. The impartial observer cannot fail to recognise that both the foreign and the native teachers of the Moslems have lacked the earnestness, honesty, and ability, necessary for the successful education and instruction of the, in reality, very pliable elements entrusted to their care. We will begin with ourselves, and show that our Culture-bearers in the East, in most cases, had material gain, the acquisition of land and the extension of power, in view, and that the spread of modern culture, the liberation of Eastern humanity from the thralldom of foul mismanagement and tyranny, were not matters of first importance with them, but only excited their

sympathy when and where it suited their interests. These are well-known facts, and have no need to be specially dwelt upon here. No Government has been guided by purely humane motives, and the underlying principle has always been—*Do ut des*. It is said that the labourer is worthy of his hire, and if this is true in private life, it is certainly no less true in the life of nations. Why should it be perfectly honest and legitimate for an individual to claim a reward for his services, but unpardonable—nay, almost criminal—for a State to do the same? The maxim *Salus reipublicæ suprema lex* is often quoted as the leading motive for all our actions, and so the well-being of the State has often been made an excuse for the grossest injustice. No one could or would blame a Government, after the occupation of a barbarous or half-civilised land has been accomplished, for compensating itself for all the trouble and sacrifices involved, and for expecting to be remunerated for the labour of instructing the natives. Natural and legitimate as such a demand appears, it is only right that, in return for such payment and reward, real and practical service should be rendered. And this, unfortunately, is not always the case. Wherever the banners of our civilisation have hitherto been planted, in all places where we have appeared either in the garb of friend or foe, we have thought that all that could be expected of us in our rôle of reformers was to be ready at all times with wise counsels, or in the case of a pending transformation, to advance our cut-and-dried prescriptions for counteracting the existing evils.

A deeper insight into the actual relationship between East and West, a thorough testing of the ethnical characteristics and the ethical conditions of the elements that had to be reformed, was seldom thought necessary; it was enough to have laid out the programme of the reforms and innovations which were

to take place, and afterwards we wondered why the Asiatic, dressed in clothes far too big, too wide, and too heavy for his corporeal dimensions, should drag himself along so painfully and laboriously. It was an initial mistake both on the part of the European master and of the Oriental pupil, that the modern doctrines were not made more compatible with the local, ethnical, and ethical conditions, and also more popular. If many of the new customs and notions, which must have appeared monstrous to the Moslem mind, had been made a little more attractive, the transition would have been easier. But Europe has never taken the trouble to inquire into these matters, and the Oriental does not understand such things; the several conditions of the two worlds have not been sufficiently taken into consideration, and from the consequences of these initial mistakes the Islamic world, and Turkey in particular, suffers to this day.

A similar mistaken procedure characterises our cultural influences in all lands of Asia which we have entered not as conquerors, but on a friendly footing. In those portions of the Old World, however, where European supremacy has taken firm root, the evil can, and will in time, be remedied, and in many places, as, for instance, in India, Egypt, Algiers, Tunis, a change for the better is already perceptible. This circumstance is looked upon by many, and perhaps not unjustly, as an indication that the Mohammedans, left to themselves, have not the energy nor the ability necessary to affect an assimilation with Western lands, and therefore cannot do without our guardianship. This is a sad prognostication, and in order that we may be perfectly impartial in our judgment we will, in the first place, cast a cursory glance upon those Islamic lands where the cultural process has been carried on for some considerable time, and the future of which is of special interest to Europe.

I am referring more particularly to Turkey and Persia.

Turkey, on whose poor body so many qualified and unqualified physicians have tried their skill, on whom all possible remedies and wonder-cures have been tried, is the first and chief victim of the European attempts at civilisation. Among the many causes which aggravated the reform movement, the internal rottenness of the land takes the first place. In an empire composed of so many conflicting ethnical elements, harassed by the fanatical mutual hatred of many different religions, and where the ruling element has only been able to maintain itself by force of arms—in such a land a cultural transformation would in any case have been a gigantic task, even if the neighbouring States had been friendly disposed, and had in a straightforward manner assisted the process of reformation. But in Turkey it has always been the reverse. The individual fractions of the population were always at war with one another, and even during the so-called Golden Age the Government had always to guard against external and internal foes, for neither the one nor the other was satisfied with Turkey, and both hoped to benefit by the dissolution of the State. In addition to this, we must remember that a peculiarly warlike race like the Turks understood better how to handle firearms, required for the founding of a State, than those peaceable weapons of the intellect which are needed to sustain a State.

In Turkey the decline showed itself at a very early stage, and in proportion as the danger from outside increased, the secret and open resistance of Christian and other centrifugal elements in the interior of the country grew, so that the Ottoman State ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century has only been able to maintain itself through the prestige of its past and the discord of its several

antagonists. The reforming efforts of this early period are mere spasmodic attempts at pulling themselves together, sudden fits of reforming and modernising without definite aim or object, instigated and forced upon them by Western lands. As for a thorough regeneration of State and society, such a thing was never earnestly contemplated, for it was well known to the Powers that the ground was not sufficiently prepared, that the soil was unsuited to the exotic plant, and that it would be vain to expect it to thrive. Nevertheless, the reform process went on, and is going on now; and it is owing to the peculiar disposition of the Osmanlis, their intuition, and blind obedience to authority, that the teachings of the foreign world of culture have here and there found an entrance, that intellectual changes have taken place in all directions, that the better classes of Turkish society form a kind of bastard between East and West, and that, of all the Moslems of Asia who have maintained their independence, the Turks may be regarded as the most advanced on the road of Western culture. The reform movement in Turkey might have had a totally different result if, instead of the ethnical disorder which prevailed, a united national body had existed, and if the hand stretched out to them by Europe, instead of further dispersing and confusing them, had drawn them together and helped them to improve themselves.

A second cause of the miscarriage of the attempts at reform made in Turkey seems to lie in the severely autocratic and absolute form of government, which, considering the internal decomposition of the State and the fact that Asiatics are more accustomed to patriarchal methods of rule, might under certain conditions have prospered, if there had been at the head of affairs Princes possessing those qualities which are indispensable to the prosperity

of a nation—viz., an intimate knowledge of affairs, patriotism, wisdom, and unselfishness. Unfortunately, this was very seldom the case in Turkey. During the whole time that reform experiments were being made in Turkey, it was only under the government of Sultan Mahmud that radical changes in the internal condition of the land were seriously contemplated. This monarch was thoroughly convinced of the necessity of reform, but he was thwarted on all sides, both from within and from without, and the reforms which he finally did carry through are to be attributed to his iron will and great strength of character.

When I was staying with Rifaat Pasha, who enjoyed the special friendship of the Sultan, I saw documents revealing most astounding facts about the antagonism existing even in the Court circle against the inaugurated reforms. Thus, for instance, a certain Sunbul Hanim, the influential Khaznadar-usta (Lady Treasurer) and first favourite, supported by the Mollas, insinuated a secret agitation against the reforms, and paid with her life for her fanaticism. Sultan Mahmud, however, in spite of secret antagonism, remained immovably firm in his purpose. His successor, Sultan Abdul Medjid, a good-hearted man, did not possess his father's strength of mind. The inaugurated era of reform was continued; but the innovations forced upon the Turks by the Western Powers were empty show. Credulous Europe was deceived for a while, and when its eyes were opened claimed with all the more vehemence the realisation of the promised improvements. Of course Turkey had to acknowledge its impotence. A turn of the hand cannot make a society give up all it has held dear for centuries, and move it to accept a foreign, and hitherto hated, order of things. Europe was undeceived; even the few friends who remained to the Turks turned away, and during the reign of Sultan

Abdul Aziz, an incapable and half-witted Prince, the confusion had reached a stage in which the arch-enemy of Turkey might easily have struck a blow which would for ever have crippled the Ottoman Empire in Europe, and made its existence in Asia very precarious. Sultan Abdul Hamid, who ascended the throne in the midst of this terrible turmoil, did all in his power to raise Turkey both intellectually and materially. He earnestly wished to benefit his land and his people, but the times were against him, and there were serious drawbacks in his education and in his general individuality which made it absolutely impossible for him to continue the work of reformation in such a manner as the conditions which meanwhile had arisen rendered necessary. It is almost a wonder that this unfortunate country—financially bankrupt long ago, and further involved in heavy debts through unfortunate wars—had still enough vitality left to prolong its existence. On the verge of destruction, persecuted and calumniated by all the world, Turkey has still had strength enough even during the sad period it passed through some few decades ago, not only to present a bold front to its misfortunes, but also to make steady, though slow, progress on the road of culture, and has thereby been proved to possess a tenacity which deserves admiration.

In these circumstances we are justified in asking whether, possibly, another form of government, or, rather, a restriction of the Sultan's power and more liberal institutions, would not have been of greater benefit to the land than the mere palliatives which the Western Powers always suggested to cure the evil. It is difficult to give a direct answer to this question, for it concerns an experiment the final result of which cannot be foreseen. As regards the position of the Powers towards liberal movements in

Turkey, an honest, well-meant support on the part of the European Cabinets could hardly be expected, for almost every country that has intercourse with Turkey has not only economic, but also political, interests at stake in the Near East. Turkey possesses many of the fairest, richest, and most fruitful districts of the world ; and although crusades against the Crescent are now no longer binding upon the European Powers, yet none of them would hesitate, when opportunity offered, to occupy or to annex one or other of the provinces belonging to the Turkish Empire. So Turkey is practically left to fend for itself, and the Asiatic spirit of the people as well as the absolute character of the Sultan's power have put a check upon all active attempts at self-support.

Modern Turkey, under the honest and patriotic Midhat Pasha, endeavoured, it is true, to form a Constitution and a Parliament, to settle the ethnical difficulties by creating one politically united Osman society, and to limit the power of the Sultan. But with the exception of England none of the European Powers encouraged or supported Midhat Pasha in this project. Again, considering the deep chasm which has existed for centuries between Christians and Mohammedans, and remembering the oppression to which the Rayas were exposed at the hands of their rulers, an amicable settlement of the old dispute between masters and subjects was out of the question, and even an explanation between the two parties could not be thought of, as the Christian population were constantly encouraged and stimulated in their feelings of aggrivement by the compassion and the occasional moral and material support of Western lands ; and, moreover, the successful operations of the separatist and revolutionary parties of Greeks, Roumanians, Servians, and Bulgarians, keep the Armenians, Albanians, Syrians, and even the Moslem Arabs, in a state of restlessness.

The future of the Ottoman Empire is certainly neither brilliant nor without danger; nevertheless, the impartial critic cannot help seeing that *the danger would have been smaller if the Turkish Government had been roused sooner from its lethargy, had applied itself more earnestly to advance on the road of modern culture, and, by strengthening the national Turkish element, had increased that power which stood the test so brilliantly at the time when the State was first founded, and certainly could have done the same under the new conditions; for the Turks still excel all other Moslems in military and political skill, and have proved themselves in all generations to possess a wonderful ability in establishing their power.*

But now it is altogether different. The lower classes, weakened by the ceaseless demands of war upon their vital strength, have suffered most of all the ethnical elements of the land; they have lost their former power of absorption, and in proportion as the provinces of the old empire crumble away, the poverty of the Ottomans increases, and now that the idea of a united nationality is awakening even among the non-Turkish Moslems, Turkey can hardly any longer command the necessary strength and hegemony to take the lead.

In Persia things are even worse. The Iranian national element forms the majority here, and the Turks in the north-west of the country are united in the common bond of the Shiite sect. As regards intellectual gifts, Persians take precedence of Turks, and the remembrance of a cultural past should still be strong enough to stimulate them to advance in modern culture. But what avails all this? Persia is imbued even more than Turkey with the ancient spirit of Asiaticism, and, in spite of the much-vaunted strength of Aryanism, belongs more to Asia than does Ottoman Turkey, which has become permeated with Slav, Greek, and Albanian elements. Practically speaking, nothing has as yet been done in Persia to indicate a

real, earnest desire to advance in the way of modern civilisation; there is nothing to show that people and ruler, conscious of the threatening danger of political destruction, are earnestly seeking for means whereby to avert the evil. The little that has been done with regard to modern institutions in State and society is all delusive and fallacious. It is from first to last self-deception and sham, and the advancing conqueror will scarcely be hindered in the accomplishment of his plans. In spite of a diplomatic intercourse with Europe extending over more than 100 years, our culture has hardly made an impression yet, even upon the highest ranks of Persian society. In consequence of its inland position, far away from the main roads of traffic between East and West, Persia even in the nineteenth century has never felt the immediate influence of Europe. Only an impression, an echo as it were, of Western culture has travelled thither, and while on the one hand the egotistical pride in the long-since vanished cultural epoch of the Sassanides is still too firmly rooted in the spirit of the nation for them to see the necessity for transformation, the poverty, anarchy, and misery caused by the despotic administration of the land have, on the other hand, increased to such an extent that only very few have energy enough left to think of the future. They live by the day, and await with resignation whatever is to come.

Unless a miracle takes place—and miracles are not likely to happen nowadays—but a short space of time separates Persia from political annihilation; and as to the future of the Persian people, this is even more hopeless than that of their neighbours, the Afghans, who have been roused from sleep by a gifted and ambitious conqueror, and who, thanks to their virgin strength and courage, will maintain their national independence in their mountain home longer than their Western neighbours.

In spite of the great natural wealth of the country and the splendid intellectual endowment of its people, Persia occupies now a lower level than it did in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Of the various innovations introduced in the administration, the army, the public institutions, and the social life of Turkey, Persia can show nothing. Even literature, which at one time evinced a good deal of activity, has now come to a standstill. Translations of European works are scarce, and while the Turks have quite a respectable daily press, so far not a single newspaper in Persia has found a circulation of any importance. A few papers, as, for instance, the *Ihtiadj* (Necessity), *Ferheng* (Science), *Nassrie* (The Victorious), subsided soon after their appearance; while others, such as *Iran Kemal* (Perfection), *Edeb* (Custom), *Ruznamei-Terbiet* (Educational Newspaper), *Ittila* (Investigation) and *Sheref* (Nobility), have either been suppressed or have a very limited circle of readers, and do not exercise nearly as much influence upon the masses as in Turkey, India, and Egypt. It is even worse with the schools. Beyond the so-called Dar ul Ilm (University) at Teheran, where medicine, languages, and military sciences are taught, there is in all the land no educational establishment on the modern system worthy of the name, and they who want to attend European schools go at their own expense either to Europe or to India. Under such conditions not much can be said for the advancement and the reform movement in Persia. Our efforts as Culture-bearers have left no trace behind them. A black night of ignorance, mismanagement, and heedlessness broods over the land, and it would be a miracle indeed if Persia were saved from utter destruction.

From all this it is clear that, in the political condition of the Moslem lands of Asia, great and important

changes are pending. We will refer to this again; suffice it here to say that a change of system in the government would by itself have little effect as long as the rulers will not agree to place themselves on a different footing with regard to the people, and so long as the maxim, *A capite fœtet piscis*, is justly considered to be the chief cause of the decline.

CHAPTER III

DESPOTISM OF MOSLEM RULERS

As chance has brought me into personal contact and prolonged intercourse with many Princes of the Moslem East, I reckon it my duty to utilise the experiences which these exceptional opportunities have offered in the course of my studies, and I would particularly draw attention to the difficulties proceeding from the relations of royal personages in Islam with their subjects, and their bearing upon any proposed changes in the system of administration.

When we in Europe speak of a Sultan, a Shah, an Emir, or a Khan, we picture to ourselves, generally speaking, a Prince with absolute rights and autocratic power, who, aided by his Viziers, Ministers, and Councillors holds the reins of government, who has the welfare of his people at heart, and is open to good advice. Possibly there may in past ages have been such Princes in Asia, but at present they are difficult to find. Tyranny, despotism, haughtiness, and immoderate vanity, are the chief characteristics of most of them. The weal and woe of their subjects is quite subordinate to their personal pleasure and well-being—much more so, even, than it was with us in the Middle Ages, for in our case the Pope was the only representative of Christ upon earth; while in Islam all Sovereigns appropriate the title of 'God's Shadow upon Earth,' and profess to be the direct representatives of Mohammed. Whenever

I read in the European press of Turkish or Persian Ministers or of a State Budget, I cannot help smiling, for the former are merely servants doing their master's bidding; and as regards the Budget, this is purely a chimera, for all revenues belong to the Sovereign, who considers himself the lawful owner of all the country possesses, and woe to the Minister who dares to refuse his lord any pecuniary assistance from the State treasury. The word 'State treasury' is equivalent to the expression 'Padishah Mali' (property of the Padishah), and all that we hear of civil lists, imperial domains, settlements on Princes and Princesses, is empty talk, for what in the medieval West was understood by 'Le roy le veult' is still applicable everywhere in the East. The Sultan freely disposes of the State revenues; he appoints high officials, and distributes favours as he pleases; often on one and the same day various Generals, Colonels, and other high dignitaries, are appointed, but never entered in the official lists, and perhaps receive their pay once or twice only. It is only for the sake of appearance, and to figure in the eyes of Europe as modern Sovereigns, that they stoop to introduce certain conventional expressions and official terms, and to keep up the comedy of a Ministerial Budget. It need hardly be said that this arbitrary appropriation of the public funds is contrary to the principles of Islam. In the early days of the khaliphate the Khaliph could exercise no prerogative over the public treasury,* and its outlays were most scrupulously controlled, a practice, however, which was discontinued in the early days of the sultanate.

All these abuses have been systematically ignored in Europe, and we have so often allowed ourselves to be deceived by appearances that we have looked upon these Oriental potentates as on an equality

* Beit ul Mal; literally, 'the House of Wealth.'

with our own. The same false relationship characterises the political intercourse between the Sovereigns of East and West. We are very liberal in bestowing exalted titles upon Turkish and Persian rulers, who figure with us as Emperors, Kings, and Majesties, while in Turkey and Persia the Christian heads of government are not called 'Shewket' (majesty) but 'Hashmet' (fierceness, pride), an epithet likewise applied to beasts of prey. This question of title is, of course, irrelevant, yet we would point out that the implied slight on the office of non-Moslem Princes is not ordained by the Koran, and might now, at any rate, easily be avoided, since Turkey and Persia are both dependent upon Europe.

The personal intercourse of Oriental Princes with the Sovereigns of the West has of late years been lively enough on the part of Europe with Turkey, at least. Our Emperors, Kings, Princes, and Princesses have paid frequent visits to the Court on the Bosphorus, but except for Sultan Abdul Aziz's journey through Europe at the time of the Paris Exhibition in 1868, and that of Nassreddin Shah and his son, so far no Sultan or Imperial Prince has paid a return visit to our Courts. Sultan Abdul Medjid understood, however, how to break the ice. He was the first Khaliph (lawful representative of Mohammed) who offered his arm to a Christian Princess, and the elegant manner in which he in 1858 acquitted himself of the task of conducting a Russian Grand-Duchess through the gardens of the Kiosk of Kandilli has been greatly admired. His son Sultan Abdul Hamid even surpasses him in this accomplishment. His chivalrous bearing towards the European ladies who appear at his Court, and his amiability towards the royal guests he so frequently entertains, have found due recognition. But in all these expressions of friendship the keynote of sincerity and heartiness is wanting. It is

an official urbanity, and underlying it all is fear of the superior power of Europe; and this fear is not altogether unjustified. The amiable host knows quite well that the Christian West is all the time contemplating the destruction of Turkey and the fall of his throne.

The same suspicious, strained and cold relationship exists also between the Oriental Princes and their own magnates, even the so-called confidants in their immediate circle. Underneath the mask of reverence and esteem lurk almost always anxiety and fear, and under the guise of bombastic titles and hypocritical eulogies intrigues and plots are hidden. Of mutual confidence and trust there is not a sign. No wonder, then, that Sultan, Shah, or Emir, living in constant uncertainty of his throne and life, becomes suspicious of everyone, scents danger everywhere, and has no rest day or night. Well do I remember the precautions Nassreddin Shah used to take even in his hunting-lodge at Djadjerud, or in his palace at Teheran, before he retired for the night—he, before whom all trembled; and I am therefore not surprised that Sultan Abdul Hamid, who is known to be very timid, is guarded all night by a military patrol, and that he starts at the slightest noise. The weak and sickly Muzaffareddin, son and successor of Nassreddin Shah, suffers even more from ceaseless fear, and only Oriental Princes who, like Sultan Abdul Medjid, leave the government to their nobles, or Sovereigns of energy and personal courage, like Sultan Mahmud II. and the Afghan Princes Dost Mohammed Khan and Abdurrahman, whose personality and determination were strong enough to make the whole world tremble before them, make an exception to this rule.

We in Europe have no conception of the boundless license of these Oriental despots. Emir Nassrullah

of Bokhara, upon his return from the mosque after Friday prayers, used forcibly to draw away youths from their fathers' side, detained them at the palace, and disgraced them. And if some rich merchant attracted his attention by his wealth, he would without cause cast him into prison, rob and execute him. Nassreddin Shah once nearly did the same at Teheran, but the intended victim found an asylum in the English Legation. Many rich Armenian bankers have in previous times been put to death in Turkey, and their goods confiscated. Courtiers and officials were even worse than the rulers themselves. I know of cases where bargains were struck with the intended victim, who was glad thus to save a small fraction of his possessions. Much might be told of the inner life of Oriental Princes, and of their relations towards their own people, to prove that it was often force of circumstances which made them, sometimes against their will, tyrants and the cruel instruments of the most unbridled absolutism.

If these autocrats had had the opportunity of moulding their character in free intercourse with the outside world, and of increasing their knowledge by a suitable education, they would doubtless, assisted by the brilliant intellectual endowments which most Orientals possess, have better been able to fulfil their duties as leaders. But one can scarcely credit how neglected the education of Princes is even now. The sad picture given by Ahmed Saib Efendi in his pamphlet,* 'Causes of the Decline,' is word for word true. Of the eighteen now living Princes of the Osman house mentioned in this pamphlet, there is—perhaps with the exception of Yussuf Izzeddin, the son of the late Sultan Abdul Aziz—not one who has

* 'Rehnumai inkilab. Ummeti osmanie ile Khanedani Saltannatin Muhakemei Efkiarine m'aruz resale dir.' Cairo.

had a regular education. And the numerous Princes of the Kadjar Dynasty have not fared much better. Of the sons of Abdurrahman Khan of Afghanistan, not one has followed in his father's steps in the matter of education. Ignorance, wantonness, and tyranny are the prominent characteristics of every one of them. So it is now, and so it always has been. These Princes spend their youth in amusements and excesses of all kinds amongst a fanatical and dissolute army of servants and the intriguing inmates of the harems. No one encourages them to study, or to take a more serious view of life, and the future successor to the throne, like his companions, has no notion of the importance of his office; he does not even properly know the literary language and the history of his own country, and of modern learning he is absolutely ignorant. Sultan Abdul Medjid knew a little French, but was a perfect ignoramus in the geography, history, and literature of his land. His son Sultan Abdul Hamid, who is now on the throne, the most sagacious Oriental I have ever known, has learned even less, and his natural intelligence has to make up for many deficiencies. His heir-presumptive, Prince Reshad Efendi, is not nearly so intelligent, but tries to find compensation in his affection for the Persian tongue.

The late Nassreddin Shah of Persia was a praiseworthy exception, for in point of European culture he was one of the most accomplished men of his land. In his youth he was made acquainted with the European world of culture through his Armenian friend Malcom Khan and his Court physicians, Drs. Cloquet, Polak, and Tholozan. The late Amir Abdurrahman of Afghanistan also was very proficient, and had a deep insight in the political relations of Moslem Asia and Europe. It is possible, even highly probable, that in the past Moslem Princes received a more careful education,

and, in the Oriental sense of the word, distinguished themselves by a high degree of culture. Thus we find in Central Asia, Baber Mirza, Prince Mehemmed Salih, Hussein Mirza Baikara, and Abulgazi Khan; in India, Humayun and Akhbar, who have distinguished themselves by their splendid intellectual gifts and sovereign virtues; and among the Ottoman rulers, Mohammed the Conqueror, Sultans Selim and Soliman the Law-giver, have been distinguished poets: the former is even supposed to have known Greek and Latin.

But no matter how accomplished these rulers may have been, it would still have been difficult for them, considering their exceptionally elevated position and the almost divine reverence paid to the crown, to restrain themselves in making an excessive use of their autocratic power. If even in Europe it has taken so much fighting to persuade some of the crowned heads—blinded by the glitter of their exalted position—that there are limitations even to their authority, that they must beware not to overreach the mark—in other words, that Kings are made for the people, not the people for the Kings—one may imagine how hard it must have been, and still is, to curtail the power of Eastern Sovereigns. The Old World has always been the seat of tyrannical caprice and cruel despotism. Liberty is an outcome of civilisation and enlightenment, and because Asia has never known these fairest of all human attainments—for the light of self-esteem has first arisen in the West, in spite of the old maxim: *Ex oriente lux*—the tree of liberty has never flourished in Asiatic soil. It is sad but true that thus far the Asiatic has not desired political liberty: the gift appears to him useless and dangerous; he has always dreaded it, as a child dreads to lose his father's protection. Even as the medieval European would have thought it a monstrous and unpardonable

presumption if he had been called upon to fix the sum to be allotted to his Sovereign for his household expenses ; to make laws regulating his attitude with regard to the Crown ; to decide such questions as the number of soldiers to be kept, the terms of relationship with neighbouring States, or other similar matters within the province of modern constitutional law—so the Oriental of the present day scrupulously avoids all interference in the sphere of his Padishah's authority, and he even looks upon it as a sin to criticise the character and the actions of his divinely appointed master.

Considered from this point of view, a constitutional régime must be a horror in the eyes of Oriental Sovereigns, and we can understand why Feth Ali Shah asked the English Ambassador, Sir John Malcolm, how his master could call himself a King when he had to obey the orders of so many hundreds of members of Parliament. His grandson, Nassreddin Shah, expressed himself much in the same manner to me when he called the French Republic a terror and an abomination ; and the later Sultans of Turkey have without exception found their highest ideal of government in the old Turkish system. The beautiful example of the Japanese Emperor Mutsuhitu, who in 1888 of his own accord gave his people a constitution and renounced all personal rights, has so far found no followers in the Moslem East. Asiatic Sovereigns of the nineteenth century have neither the desire nor the ability to bring their sovereign rights into harmony with the demands of the times, and, by the grant of liberal concessions, to create a form of government in correspondence with the spirit of the age and with the moral and material advancement of the nations entrusted to their guardianship. The outward form, the pretence of acquiescence, is only kept up to deceive the West ; for even in Turkey, the most advanced of independent Moslem lands, the

Ministers are but puppets in the hands of the Sultan. If one of the so-called Viziers should ever dare to have a will of his own, he would at once be dismissed, as we saw in the case of Khaireddin Pasha, Kemal Pasha, and others; yet these men, thanks to their modern education, had a far keener insight into the condition of things than the Sultan himself.

In Persia it has not even been thought necessary to keep up appearances. There the Ministers have acted the part of *valets de chambre*, and the dignity of their office has been entirely lost sight of. The word 'Vizier' means literally 'burden-bearer,' one who helps his master to bear the burden of the State; but the rulers of Islam have only allowed their Viziers to carry such burdens as they found inconvenient to bear themselves. Caprice, intrigues, vanity, and greed, regulate even the most important matters of State; honest and really capable Ministers are unscrupulously sacrificed to these demands, as, for instance, Mohammed Taki Khan, known as Veziri-Kebir (Great Vizier), who took the government of Persia seriously to heart, and in return for his zeal was put to death by Nassreddin Shah.

Persia, which in our annals figures as a State, and is represented at our Courts by diplomatic missions, has even now, as already intimated, no settled laws, no State organisation, not even an attempt at systematic government. No one has any rights besides the King, and his authority is paramount, resembling that of a Turkoman Sirdar or chieftain over the tent-dwellers under his command. Intrinsically, therefore, not much is changed since the Kadjar chief Aga Mehemmed Khan first assumed the reins of government. The administration of the land is conducted on the most iniquitous lines; offices are bestowed upon the highest bidders; the poor farmers, traders, and artisans look upon those set over them as unscrupulous tyrants and

oppressors, against whom they cannot protect themselves. So it was in times past, and so it is still, and it is in the consciousness of the hopeless mismanagement and tyranny at home that Persia has from the first tried to deceive Europe by forced representations, and by pretending that the government of the Shah was a pattern of order and justice.*

In vain the moralists and historians of the Moslem East eulogise the justice, the uprightness, and impartiality of some one or other ruler of the past; in vain the Golden Age of peace and prosperity is depicted in glowing colours and described in beautiful metaphors. Those who have made a profound and impartial study of the people and the conditions of the East, of the social and political structure, and of the relations between master and subjects, will find it hard to believe that it can ever have been otherwise in the East, and that humanity there has ever enjoyed even an approximate measure, of order and justice, in the sense in which these fundamental principles of cultural life are now understood.

In Islam the rulers of the so-called *Wakti-Seadet* †—that is, 'Age of Blessedness'—are credited with quite extraordinary virtues and love of justice. It is said of the first Khaliph, Abubekr, that after his election he addressed the people in the following words: 'O nation! you have chosen me, the most unworthy among you, for your Khaliph. Support me as long as my actions are just. If otherwise, admonish me, rouse me to a sense of my duty. Truth alone is desirable, and lies are despicable. They that to you appear

* Compare the '*État actuel de la Perse*,' by Mir Dawud Zadour de Melik, Persian envoy to France in 1816, translated from the Persian by the Armenian Cirkied. This account describes the condition of Persia as excellent, although at that time there were no signs of any organisation in the government of Persia.

† *Wakti-Seadet* indicates the age of the Prophet and his immediate followers.

strong are in my eyes feeble, and they that to you seem powerful I look upon as weak. As I am the guardian of the weak, obey me only as long as I obey the Sheriat (Divine law). But if you see that I deviate but in the minutest details from this law, you need obey me no more.' Khaliph Omar also is supposed to have said once in a public speech: 'O ye true believers! if in my words or actions ye detect the slightest error or deviation from the truth, tell me of it.' When thereupon one in the assembly put his hand to the hilt of his sword, and exclaimed: 'O Omar! if any such fault should be found in thee, this sword will show thee the right way.' Omar, lifting up his hands towards heaven, is said to have answered: 'O Allah! I thank thee a thousand times that there are men amongst the people of Islam who will dare to judge me with the sword.'* Many other instances, proving the liberal views and the love of justice of the early Khaliphs, are quoted nowadays by Moslems who desire liberal institutions; but even granting that in the first period of Islamism such conditions did exist, they were certainly very soon abandoned. In proportion as the earthly power, splendour, and wealth of the Khaliphs increased, and the khaliphate became transformed into a sultanate, so absolutism and tyranny pushed the virtues of the patriarchal dispensation into the background. And when the Khaliphs, the successors of Mohammed, and the spiritual heads of Islam, could fall into such errors, how much more must the earthly rulers of the Islam world have failed!

* These words are quoted in the Turkish paper *Turk* of January 21, 1904, from the work of Khairuddin Pasha entitled 'Akwam ul Mesalik'; and in order to prove the constitutionalism of the Moslems of those days, the Turkish author remarks that the French in 1789 also called Louis XVI. to account, and that this action had resulted in the great French Revolution. The comparison is not bad, but the liberal Osmanli might also have borne in mind the English Revolution.

The excessive tyranny and cruel absolutism of these monarchs are the chief causes of the rapid decline of the Moslem East. This decline showed itself as early as the time when we in Europe were contemplating crusades against the Crescent, and when our predecessors lived in constant fear of being overrun and annihilated by Asiatic hordes led by Islam. A total ignorance on either side of the true state of affairs has fostered these mistaken views with reference to the relations existing between East and West. The professors of the Moslem faith considered it superfluous—nay, even sinful—to concern themselves about the affairs of Western lands, or to take any interest in their progressive measures. Christian fanaticism and ignorance, on the other hand, have contented themselves with the childish depreciation and slandering of Islam, and only rarely, if ever, have really tried to understand the people and the conditions of Moslem Asia. It is not Islam and its doctrines which have devastated the western portion of Asia, and brought about the present sad state of things; but it is the tyranny of the Moslem Princes, who have wilfully perverted the doctrines of the Prophet, and sought and found maxims in the Koran as a basis for their despotic rule. They have not allowed the faintest suspicion of doubt in matters of religion, and, efficaciously distorting and crushing all liberal principles, they have prevented the dawn of a Moslem Renaissance.

CHAPTER IV

ISLAM CAPABLE OF REFORM

THEY who make Islam the scapegoat for all the wrong done by the confessors of this faith should first of all be clear in their own minds how far the culture and enlightenment of the West, and its superiority over the East, are due to religion in general and to Christianity in particular. According to the most eminent philosophers and thinkers of modern times, such as Gibbon, Buckle, Draper, Nietzsche, Huxley, and many others, whose views are now shared by the majority of cultured Europeans, religion has had a disturbing and hindering rather than an animating influence upon our search for light and improvement, and the dawn of a new era only arose in the West when the age of faith had been superseded by that of intellect. This period in the history of Europe we rightly call the Renaissance, or Regeneration, the rousing, the awakening from the sleep in which humanity had been wrapt since the decline of classical antiquity. The Renaissance was an epoch marking the termination of the period in which Europe had been in bondage to religion, wasting its time in theological speculations under the auspices of the Church, and possessing neither the power nor the desire to emerge from the dark night of ignorance and superstition into the clear light of intelligence and truth. This awakening cannot be attributed to the superior intellect or the greater privileges enjoyed by European society,

but is rather the result of a revival of the wisdom of ancient Greece and Rome ; and it took long before the influence of the Church upon the minds of the people was sufficiently weakened to allow Christian men to look for the truth outside the Bible and the Gospel. In the Middle Ages we Europeans stood under the mighty influence of the Church, and in the same way Islam labours to this day under the stubborn opposition of its heads, against all doctrines and views not immediately proceeding from the Koran or the Sunna. Judging Islam by what it is now, warped by the conservatism, the slowness of intellect, and the subtle craftiness, of its theologians, one might almost think that it had always groped about in the darkness, that no attempt had ever been made to apply the sharp knife of criticism to the maxims of Koran or Sunna, and that scepticism never was, and under no conditions ever could be, contemplated.

This, however, is not the case. When we assume this position of superiority, and accuse Islam of blind and boundless fanaticism, we forget that Christian fanaticism has shown more loathsome and detestable eccentricities than Islam, and that in the Islamic world the struggle between reasoning and blind faith commenced much earlier than with us.* At the time of its glory, when the banners of Islam encompassed half Asia and a portion of Europe and Africa, when the excrescences and errors which now disfigure it did not exist—even then there were among the faithful those who questioned one or other point of orthodoxy, who put a wall of partition between Koran and tradition, and even began to query those principles which

* Vasil Ibn Ata (131 A.H., 748-749 Christian era) must be designated as the founder of the doctrine of the Motazilites. The name of this sect is derived from the verb *ʿtīzal* (to separate), because Vasil had separated himself from the other believers. Compare Von Kremer, 'Geschichte der Herrschenden Ideen des Islams,' p. 27.

to this day are held to be the fundamental pillars of the faith. Scepticism, therefore, was not unknown in Islam even at a very early date, and there were many freethinkers of the type of Abu Ala al-Muarri.*

Improvements were attempted and innovations introduced which tended to a simplification and freer development of the faith. The reformation might, as a matter of fact, have been expected to take place in the history of Islam earlier than in the history of Christianity, for with us the Church maintained its absolute authority over the human mind for 1,500 years, without any serious resistance being offered; while Islam met with strong opposition as early as the second century of its existence, and that without having provoked its devotees by extortions, wanton despotism, and tyrannical violence, such as the Papacy of the Middle Ages exercised over Christian Europe. In Islam there were no Canossas, no Tetzels, no indulgences, and no Inquisition; there was not even a Church in the general acceptance of the word, for the most autocratic Khaliphs would never have presumed to use the statutes of the Koran as an excuse for interfering in the worldly concerns of Moslem lands to such an extent as was done by the Popes and the *Ecclesia militans* of the Middle Ages. The opposition, the objections, the attempts at reform, of Motazilites, Morgites, Kharidjits, etc., turned principally on certain theological questions, on the exegesis of the Koran, on jurisprudence, etc. There was no desire to curtail or to limit the rights of the Khaliph, although there would have been ground enough for doing so when the khaliphate passed into the sultanate. All that was intended was to purify the faith from any double interpretations, from the spread of theocratic dogmas, and to bring faith as far as possible into harmony with intellect. This freethinking movement, however,

* Born 373 A.H., 976 A.D.

has only been short-lived. It has exercised no influence upon the later development of Islam, and the labour of these reformers is branded in the present generation as blasphemous and sacrilegious. In my long intercourse with Moslems I never heard the words 'Motazilites,' 'Morgites,' 'Kharidjits,' etc., mentioned, except occasionally by learned Mollas.

Various causes have contributed to retard the breaking out of the great struggle between faith and intellect, and to prevent the people from reaching beyond the sphere of fanaticism and lofty speculation into the region of realism. In the first place, humanity in Asia inclines naturally far more to fanatical and theosophic contemplations than is the case in Europe. The Asiatic goes about supported by the crutches of religion, rather than uses the healthy legs of common-sense. He prefers to explain the natural phenomena, the system of the world, and the laws of daily life, according to the direction of the Koran and of tradition, rather than to attain the right understanding of these things through scientific investigation. Secondly, as far as its foundation is concerned, Islam has a much firmer basis than Christianity. It will go hard with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity in combat with the strictly monotheistic principles of Islam; and the miracles which confirm the Divine mission of Christ, these hardly bear comparison in the Asiatic mind with the marvellous fact of the brilliant victory and the rapid spread of the doctrine of Mohammed. Thirdly, Islam has paid far more attention than Christianity to the physical and psychical requirements of its confessors, and Christianity, although of Asiatic origin, has never developed in Asia, and has been moulded to suit the ideas of Western lands. In the precepts of thé Ghaza (religious war), the enticements of a future life, the numerous concessions and privileges which the faithful enjoy above the unbelievers, Islam reckons with the human passions and

desires, as no other religion has done. Even the four fundamental principles of the faith—viz., prayer, giving of alms, pilgrimages, and fasts—are looked upon by the true believer partly as pleasant and partly as hygienic duties. For the faithful includes in the five daily prayers the five daily washings of the body; alms include general benevolence and ease of the poor; pilgrimages satisfy their desire for travelling; and fasts are wholesome for the stomach. Islam acknowledges no clergy, no monks, no nuns, no ascetics, no corporal castigation; anything of this nature found in modern Islamism is a later addition and quite foreign to the doctrine of Mohammed. Even the miracles attributed to the Prophet have been condemned as erroneous by the Moslem divines of the first century of the Hejira. This was pointed out by the French Orientalist Huart, at the religious congress at Basle in 1903. In short, in the beginning Islam was free from all exaggeration, and found an easy acceptance with all primitive nations, as exemplified in Africa and various parts of Asia, where even now, after the total destruction of its temporal power, it still finds an open field for proselytising.

Islam, then, was not so easily upset as Christianity, which at the first assault of science was shaken to its very roots. Religion in modern society is only artificially kept together and upheld by the Church and by those Governments to whose social or private interest it is that it should flourish. The thing that has harmed Islam—*i.e.*, that has made it stand still and retrograde—was not the spirit of its doctrine, but the tyrannical caprice of its Princes, who could easily lay hold upon any anti-religious movement. The free-thinkers have found no response among the populace, because ever since the foundation of the sultanate the religious and worldly power of their Princes has been closely united in one hand, and has given these

rulers far greater authority than any Sovereigns in Christendom have ever possessed. Among the Khaliphs there have been men who gave free play to the boldest religious speculations, which, as they were the heads of religion, they had the right to do. The representatives of the sultanate, on the other hand, have anxiously quenched all liberal emotions in matters of religion, and have scrupulously guarded Islam against any contact with free-thought. They have surrounded it with a threefold wall of puerile restrictions and rituals, and have thus cut it off from all intercourse with the outer world. The Mollas persistently bring into prominence such views as cripple human activity; they condemn any display of energy, and insist on an implicit faith in fatalism. Every day at the hour of Ezan (call to prayers) the true believer hears the words, 'Labour is better than sleep,' and yet at the same time the Fani dunya (the transitoriness of all worldly things) is constantly preached, and the maxim 'Ed dunya djifet we talibiha kilab' (The world is carrion; only dogs appreciate it) is always impressed upon them.

Then, again, the laws of the harem and the separation of the sexes are held up as prescribed by the Koran, although it is sufficiently well known that many Moslem women have appeared in society unveiled and have given public lectures at Universities. It is even said that when Musa bin Tarik invaded Spain a division of the troops was commanded by a woman. Clearly, then, the endeavour of the spiritual as well as of the worldly powers in Islam has always been to protect their world from all external influences and enlightenment; and so the followers of the Prophet, in the darkness of their seclusion, have known nothing of what was going on outside; they have had no idea of the progress made by the Christian West in science, arts, and free investigation; they know not that

Europe is gradually shaking off the trammels of religion.

The following quotation from an article by a well-informed Turk, dealing with the decline of his land, applies also in some measure to the decline of Islam in general: 'Separated as we are from the West, no one knows whence we came, where we are, and whither we are going. We live in the present, and do not trouble ourselves about the future—granted; but that is no excuse for our ignorance of what is actually taking place around us. In Europe there is progress; discoveries are made, a new era of light has dawned. We know nothing of it. A great movement is taking place in Europe; Protestantism unfolds its banners, a nation falls, a new world is discovered—we know nothing of it. It is as if a high and mighty wall separated us from the West. This wall has been broken through from time to time to make war, and we have seen the outer world, but only from our strongholds and entrenchments. For centuries we have known nothing of the advance of Western culture; indeed, we did not want to know, until at last we saw the beginning of our decline. Before we realised this it never entered our minds to profit by the progress of Europe.'*

It was not Islam which prohibited intercourse with Europe, for the Koran says: 'Look around you, for God's earth is large.' It was not Islam which forbade its followers to seek knowledge in the West, for the Prophet says: 'Knowledge is the ideal of the Mussulman; he must seek after it even if it be conveyed by the mouth of an atheist.' The following passages from the Koran† further effectually show that Islam

* The *Turk*, No. 12, published at Cairo.

† We borrow these partly from the above-mentioned work of Kassem Amen (pp. 228, 229), and partly from our own notes relating to this subject.

does not take ignorance and obscurantism under its protection :

‘ Seek knowledge, even, if need be, on the borders of China.

‘ Seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave.

‘ One word of knowledge is of more value than the reciting of a hundred prayers.

‘ The extinction of a whole tribe is less to be regretted than the death of one sage.

‘ The ink of sages is more precious than the blood of warriors.

‘ The wise man is seven times more deserving than the hypocrite.

‘ One word of wisdom, learned and communicated to a Moslem brother, outweighs the prayers of a whole year.

‘ God, the angels, the inhabitants of heaven and earth, bless him who teaches his fellow-men to do what is right.

‘ Two persons have no equal : the rich man who is charitable, and the sage who imparts knowledge.

‘ Wise men are the successors of the Prophet.’

We have only quoted these ten maxims, although there are plenty more urging and encouraging the search for knowledge, and we venture to ask : Does the Bible, does the Gospel, give greater encouragement to those who seek to acquire and to spread knowledge ? Surely not, and if the Christian world in spite of this—we might almost say in opposition to the injunctions of the Church—has emerged from the darkness of the Middle Ages into the broad daylight of intelligence, and has succeeded in building upon the ruins of blind faith and superstition a new era of enlightenment, how much easier such a transformation would have been for the followers of the Prophet, if only the people of Asia had had the strength to extricate themselves from the double yoke of hierarchic tyranny, even as Europe has done, roused by the rays of light emanating from the study of classical antiquity ; if the Moslems had only better understood the instructions contained in the doctrine of the Prophet, to search for and to acquire knowledge ! While the West, favoured by climatic con-

ditions, showed much more energy and power of resistance, and created a new world of culture on virgin soil, the East, including Moslems, Buddhists, Brahmins, and Shamans, had to battle with the deeply-rooted prejudices of a society several thousand years old. Europe therefore, in the full vigour of its youth and strength, raised its cultural level far more easily than slow-going old Asia. It is not the doctrine of Islam that is to blame for the procrastination of the Moslems, but religion in general—religion, which in Asia still acts the same part as it did with us in the Middle Ages, absorbing all the vital strength, taking possession of all human thought and aspirations, entering into the smallest details of everyday life, regulating a man in his going and coming, his eating, drinking, sleeping, loving, etc.; enclosing him as in a magic circle, outside of which he never dares to step; compelling him, like a child in leading-strings, to walk always in the direction in which ecclesiastical or worldly authorities pull him. Unfortunately for humanity in the Moslem East, the authorities have always looked more after their own interests than after the welfare of those entrusted to their care; and even when their authority declined, and their thrones one after the other began to totter, they still persisted in their régime of tyranny and caprice, in using religion as a cloak for keeping the masses in ignorance and in suppressing by fire and sword every attempt at free thought.

The evil results of the existing relationship between Church and State are now beginning to be realised by the Mohammedans themselves. A learned Molla from India writes me on this subject as follows: 'The Church and State have been allies in Christian Europe, and the subjection of the people has been the policy of both. What is the condition of priest-ridden countries like Spain? It is true that the

Mollas are the allies of the tyrannical Moslem rulers. But, fortunately, there is no priesthood in Islam. . . . If Europe can become civilised and progressive in spite of the absurd dogmas of Christianity, there is every hope of regeneration and renaissance of Moslem Asia, for the dogmas of Islam are less absurd and less rigid than those of Christianity. . . . The alliance between Church and State rests in Islam merely on an act of violence which has to be removed first of all.'

That we are right in attributing the decline of the Islamic world to the tyranny and the overmastering power of religion is best proved by the marvellous advance made by Japan. When the Japanese, although in many social and political points preserving a severely Asiatic character, have, as by the act of a *Deus ex machina*, become Europeanised; have accepted our sciences, our arts, our form of government, and our manner of thought, this is because they were indifferent in matters of religion—in fact, are practically atheists. The national religion, Shintoism, is not a religion at all, but merely an apotheosis of heroes, Kings, ancestors, and the powers of Nature, culminating in the precept, 'Follow thy natural inclination, and obey the commandments.'* The Japanese who is at all educated laughs at religion in general, and wonders how it can continue to exist in Western lands.† The spirit of liberalism which prevails in

* 'Handbook of Modern Japan,' by Ernest W. Clement. London, 1904, p. 239.

† Characteristic of the religious notions of the Japanese is the following remark of the Marquis Ito in his commentary on the Japanese Constitution of 1888: 'To force upon a nation a particular form of belief by the establishment of a State religion is very injurious to the natural intellectual development of the people, and is prejudicial to the progress of science (knowledge) by free competition. No country, therefore, possesses by reason of its political authority the right or capacity to an oppressive measure touching abstract questions of religious faith.'

Japan excludes all possibility of despotism. The present Emperor, Mutsuhito, was in no way restricted when in 1888 he gave his people a Constitution. No Divine command, no prophetic word, prevented him from accepting or imitating the good he found in the administrations of Western lands. The Japanese recognise no Kafirs and no heathen, whom it is their duty to hate and to despise, as is the case amongst pious Christians and Mussulmans. In the same proportion as he keeps at a safe distance from the narrow world of faith, he is able to get nearer to the light of liberty and progress. The latest history of Japan contains a solemn word of warning for all Islamic nations.

It may surprise some readers to learn that even the Mohammedans under the despotic rule of Russia are beginning to recognise the harmful effects of the orthodoxy preached by the Mollas. Mohammed Fatih bin Gilman expresses himself on p. 18 of his book, already referred to* in the following words: 'Our spiritual teachers trouble themselves only about the outer form of religion; the philosophical side of it they do not even know, and consequently they derive no benefit from it. As their understanding is so imperfect, they naturally use religion to suit their own purposes, and instead of doing good they do serious harm. You Europeans have with much labour and many sacrifices attained to liberty of thought; you have freed yourselves from the tyranny of a foolish priesthood. To-day you stand free in thought and in conscience; your mind is enlightened. But with us faith is still bound in the hands of ignorant priests. We cannot rescue our religion out of their hands, and as long as we have not liberty of conscience we can have no real religion and no political existence.'

* See p. 31.

I will refer again to the advanced views of these Tartar pioneers. Here I would simply confirm the fact that there is awaking in the Islamic world, although still suppressed, a great longing for liberty and for reform, and the language of those Moslems who have made even a very little progress in modern culture is often astonishing. 'Instead of entering into absurd details how to bear smaller or greater bodily purifications,' thus writes Mohammed Fatih bin Gilman, 'and instead of instructing young people in matters the very mention of which makes us blush with shame, the Mollas would do better to teach us the intrinsic and real spirit of Mohammed's doctrine. For the cavilling about ritualistic differences is not religion; these only make a mockery of Islam, and impede the true enlightenment and elevation of mankind.' No less unconstrainedly an Osman expresses his views in the periodical *Turk*. 'Instead of building Koran schools, send your boys to Europe that they may learn something useful,' he says.

The free expression of these and similar opinions becomes more general from day to day, while in my time even to hint at such notions was looked upon as apostasy, and was most severely censured by the Moslems.

CHAPTER V

THE AWAKENING OF LIBERTY

IT is due to the boundless tyranny of the Moslem rulers alone that the people of Asia have so far not attained liberty of thought, and they who have an intimate knowledge of the iniquitous rule of Asiatic despots, who have been eye-witnesses of the wretched condition of those pitiable victims of Asiatic tyranny and mismanagement, may well be surprised that the people do not revolt against the cruelty and injustice of those set over them, but that they always quietly submit to all these wrongs. Yet the explanation is simple enough when we remember the almost Divine reverence in which the Sovereigns are held, and the patience and slavish submission which characterises all Orientals. Authority and despotism have always been words of the same meaning to the adepts of Asiatic culture; only in extreme cases, when misrule had utterly exasperated them and exhausted their patience, they have resorted to self-defence and mutiny. Considering that with us in Europe it has taken centuries to mature the ideas of liberty and human rights, and that even now we have in our midst nations who voluntarily bend the neck under the yoke of an absolute government, the situation in the East should not greatly surprise us.

The light of progress and liberty does not suddenly leap forward—it travels slowly from neighbour to neighbour, from one State to another; and as in the

course of the nineteenth century the Mohammedans of the Near East were induced to show an interest in our languages and our sciences, our social and political life, the desire for a free and independent existence could not fail to follow soon. Among the Moslems living under the immediate authority of European States, as in India, Egypt, and Algiers, the appreciation of political liberties was bound to show itself much sooner than in the Imperial Ottoman States, where the awakening only took place in the second half of the past century. I have watched it very closely, and have followed the various phases of this interesting movement with the greatest attention. In order to stimulate the desire for political freedom, the consciousness of nationality had first to be roused. In Islam this had never been appreciated, because the Koran says: 'All true believers are brethren.' The first thing that had to be established was, therefore, to prove that Islam and Christendom are of equal capability, and that what the one had done the other could do; and so, although smarting under the painful consciousness of the superiority of the Christian West, the Moslem leaders of the movement tried to impress Europe with the merits of Islam's cultural past, and to demonstrate that the Moslem world was quite worthy and ready to be set free. In Constantinople, Zia Pasha, Khairullah Efendi, Djevdet Efendi, and Aali Pasha, took an active part in the matter, and by eulogising their cultural past, tried to hide the present intellectual poverty of Islam. For a short period they proudly compared the achievements of their ancient religious world with those of the modern Christian world, but very soon they had to realise that comparisons were illusory, because in Europe knowledge and faith are kept distinctly separate, and also because the Turks began to realise that the laurels of Moslem culture were of Arabic growth, and could never bring glory

to Turckdom. Thus, they were led to try what could be done on the ground of nationality ; for although Islam zealously excludes all idea of national separation, these zealots decided that Turkey must at any cost be brought into prominence. Shinasi Efendi, Kemal Bey, Saadullah Pasha, and other members of the literary world of Turkey, were the apostles of this movement. They simplified the language and relieved it of the unnecessary ballast of Arabic and Persian words. At first this measure was cried down as heretical, but after a while it met with partial success, as already noted. These literary reforms naturally reacted upon the political life, and as the intellectual products of the West became diffused in the native literature—and modern Osmanism has done much to further this—the consciousness of national feeling grew steadily, and with it the desire for political liberty, never understood before, although the Koran says: 'Kulli Islam hurra' (All Moslems are free).

All this activity necessarily roused the suspicion of the despotic Court circle and the chief dignitaries of the State. Sultan Abdul Aziz, mad with self-conceit, and thinking himself unapproachable, raged with anger when he heard of the agitation which was stirring his Moslem subjects. The agitators of these liberal views had forthwith to leave the country, and it was in Paris—at that time the refuge of all revolutionary spirits—that Turco-Moslemic liberalism first took form. Mustafa Fazil Pasha, an Egyptian Prince of the house of Mehemmed Ali, undertook the leadership in this movement. He was well qualified to do so, for in Egypt liberalism was further advanced, because the Khedive, revolting against the suzerainty of his Sovereign on the Bosphorus, had tried to remove the seat of the khaliphate to the shores of the Nile, with a view to curing its disease in this manner. Thus, Mehemmed Ali and his relatives, by a freer and

livelier intercourse with Europe, had grown more accustomed to Western ways and methods of working than the high circles at Constantinople liked to see. Those who ranged themselves round the enthusiastic and patriotic lead of Mustafa Fazil Pasha were mostly young people, and the society was consequently called 'Young Turkey.' As there is in Turkey no real middle class, and all Moslems, however wealthy, seek to be fed from the State, the Young Turk party formed a very small minority compared with the 'Old Turks' basking in the sunshine of sultanic favour, and the movement itself seemed at first so strange and extravagant that people did not take it seriously. In the beginning of the sixties of last century I made the acquaintance of these Young Turks in London, and contributed a few articles to their then existing newspapers, *Mukhbir* (Messenger) and *Hurriet* (Liberty). Although thoroughly convinced of the necessity of the movement, I had little hope of the success of this undertaking, because their revolutionary plans, based upon European principles, were not likely to find favour with an Asiatic Moslem society. In Turkey the ground was not sufficiently prepared; only young people sympathised with the political refugees, while Turks of riper age either lacked the courage for so venturesome an undertaking, or did not care to risk losing their position and sacrificing the happiness and prosperity of their families upon the altar of nationality.

It was only when the madness and extravagance of Sultan Abdul Aziz had reached its uttermost limits, and Turkey stood literally on the brink of ruin, that some older and wiser men joined the revolutionary party; after that, under the leadership of Midhat Pasha, followed the dethronement of the Sultan and the proclamation of constitutional rights for all Osmons—*i.e.*

for all inhabitants of the Turkish Empire, without difference of creed and race. The greatest Moslem State was now to have a Constitution,* a Parliament, a responsible Government; and as all religious books are elastic in their meaning, texts were easily found in the Koran to prove the legitimacy of these innovations, which in reality were borrowed from Christian Europe, but interpreted to be of Islamic growth. 'Ye shall take counsel with one another' was the prophetic exhortation supposed to point to the necessity of a parliamentary régime. So a Parliament was established; the representatives of the various ethnical and religious elements of the country met together, and nothing better illustrates the intelligence and adaptability of Orientals than this first Parliament and the speeches which were held on that occasion. Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Bosnians, Albanians, Arabs, and Kurds, met together in one common bond of unity, and they who formerly would not have dared to criticise, even in secret, the actions of the Sultan and his Ministers now made public speeches with perfect composure, and displayed an intimate knowledge of the most complicated and delicate State questions which would have done credit to a sitting at Westminster.

Ahmed Vefik Pasha, the President of the House, found it difficult at times to suppress the hot temper and the volubility of some of these members. He had often to call them to order, yet it is said that there was less unsuitable and unparliamentary language used than in many European Parliaments. Strange to say, it was the Moslem members whose speeches mostly testified to the true constitutional spirit which animated the movement, who most strongly protested against the existing régime of absolutism and unlimited power

* The word 'Constitution' is circumscribed in Turkish by *Kanun-essasi*—*i.e.*, foundation of the laws. The European word 'Parliament' has been retained.

of the Crown, and, basing their advocacy for the rights of the people to a liberal Constitution upon quotations from the Koran and the Sunna, they were the first to call the Sultan a usurper. When in progressive Christian Europe there are still Princes in whose ears extreme liberal speeches have an unpleasant sound, one may easily imagine what impression such utterances must have made upon the Padishah of all true believers, the absolute autocrat on the Osman throne, and 'God's shadow upon earth.' To Sultan Abdul Hamid the movement caused the greatest horror. He always had been a prey to fear, suspicion, and mistrust; he had witnessed the deposition of two monarchs, he scented danger everywhere, and saw a foe and an antagonist in every man he met. No wonder, then, that he, as soon as his throne was to some extent established, set to work to do away with the constitutional Parliament and every institution showing the slightest tendency to liberal views. The whole new régime was at once obliterated, the originators and co-operators of the scheme were sent into exile or delivered over to torture and execution, and the old system of government, with all its cruel appendages and faults, was reinstated.*

In all this Sultan Abdul Hamid was undoubtedly chiefly animated by personal motives and a love of absolute rule, common to all Sovereigns, but particularly prominent in Oriental Princes. The question is whether, in doing so, he acted also in the interests of his dominion, and whether the introduction of moderate liberal institutions would really have been so fatal to

* About the accusation, condemnation, and death of Midhat Pasha and his companions, a book has lately been published, entitled 'The Life of Midhat Pasha: a Record of his Services, Political Reform, Banishment, and Judicial Murder, derived from Private Documents and Reminiscences,' by his son, Ali Haidar Midhat Bey. London: John Murray, 1903.

the existence of Turkey as the Sultan and certain politicians in Europe have made out. For my part, I think the Sultan has made a grievous mistake, and he and all who doubt the possibility of regenerating Turkey through the introduction of liberal institutions have committed a signal error. There is no gainsaying the fact that the centrifugal Christian elements of the empire will be hard to reconcile even by liberal concessions, for the oppression of centuries is not lightly forgotten. On the other hand, however, soil, climate, and the historical past, have created so many points in common between Christians and Moslems, in manners and customs and general views of life, that if strict fairness in legal matters was observed, and equal rights granted to both, Oriental Christians—*i.e.*, Armenians and Syrians—might easily have been won over to the Porte, the more so as political independence is in any case impossible for them, and the fall of the Turkish Empire would only aggravate their situation. Moderate liberalism would undoubtedly have been most useful here, and as regards the Turks themselves, it is certain that the Mohammedan subjects of the Sultan were hardly educated enough for a parliamentary government, and it would have been a doubtful benefit for them to fall from extreme Asiatic absolutism all at once into extreme European liberty. But there is a middle way. There are certain progressive reforms, suited to the spirit of the age, which might have been introduced to prepare the way and to facilitate the process of transformation; but as Sultan Abdul Hamid has not followed this course, but on the contrary has accentuated the former hateful régime of despotism and mismanagement, has strengthened his autocratic power by unwarrantable measures, appropriating all official authority and filling the land with spies and detectives, he has hastened his own fall and weakened

the Turkish national element, the chief support of his throne and dynasty, in a measure which has never been equalled by any of his predecessors. This false step is the more to be regretted as Sultan Abdul Hamid is one of the most gifted, energetic, and indefatigable Princes who have ever ruled over Turkey, and he came to the throne at a time when much might yet have been done for the benefit and prolonged existence of the Ottoman Empire.

Although Sultan Abdul Hamid has succeeded in quenching liberalism in Turkey by atrocities and police regulations unequalled in history, absolutism has by no means yet gained its object; for the movement goes on in secret none the less vigorously, and must sooner or later lead to revolutions. The provisional victory gained by reaction was chiefly due to the poverty of Turkish society. Pauperism has increased so terribly since the last Turco-Russian War that wealth is no longer known in the Efendi world; everybody lives on the State, and no one, therefore, dare oppose the State or hold liberal views. Young Turkey, however, exists as before; almost all Turks, high dignitaries not excepted, secretly belong to it. All Turckdom longs for deliverance from the present miserable and cruel tyranny, but for fear of serious political consequences all dread to hasten the catastrophe. They are convinced that it is the neighbouring States which will profit by confusion in Turkey. The activity of Young Turkey in Paris, Geneva, London, and elsewhere, is only a faint reflection of what is stirring in the interior of Turkey. In spite of the draconic severity of the censorship, the Turkish revolutionary papers, smuggled in from other lands, circulate rapidly, and of late years the following revolutionary papers have found a large number of readers:

	Printed in
<i>Mukhbir</i> (Messenger)	London.
<i>Kanun Esasi</i> (Constitution)	Cairo.
<i>Hurriet</i> (Liberty)	London.
<i>Meshweret</i> (Counsel)	Paris.
<i>La Turquie libre</i>	Paris.
<i>Yildiz</i>	Paris.
<i>Kurdistan</i> (Kurdistan)	Geneva.
<i>Hakk</i> (Justice)	Cairo.
<i>Enini Mazlum</i> (the Wailing of the Oppressed)	Cairo.
<i>Sandjak</i> (Banner)	Cairo.
<i>Turk</i> (The Turk)	Cairo.
<i>Kukumay</i> (The Owl)	Cairo.
<i>Osmanli</i>	Cairo.

This list shows that the greater number of these papers is printed in Cairo, which fact is due not so much to the hostile intentions of the Khedive, as to the liberal régime of the English administration. With regard to the literary merit of these periodicals, the only two really worth mentioning are *Meshweret*, lately renamed *Shurai Ummet* (National Council) and the *Turk*. The editor of the former is Ahmed Riza Bey, a highly cultivated, distinguished, and patriotic man, much esteemed at home, and who has the interests of his native land really at heart. This cannot be said of all the other political fugitives who have occasionally visited Europe. Many of them make patriotism an excuse for promoting their personal interests, and when they have accomplished their degrading purpose they return home. The *Turk* is a very well-managed paper, a weekly periodical, which can compare with any European organ of the same nature. Its object is to rouse feelings of nationality in the Turks, to spread liberal views, and to induce the Islamic world to accept Western culture. Amongst the writers who contribute

to this excellent publication, those who adopt the pseudonyms of Oguz, Torgut, Siasi, Refik, and Orkhan deserve special mention. Independent publications of a decided liberal tendency and published abroad are largely read in Turkey, and always favour the cause of freedom and modern culture.

The Mohammedan world, however, shows signs of activity not only in Turkey, but also in Russia, and in a memorandum lately published by the Russian Moslems, and addressed to the Sultan, the Tsar, and the European Powers, it is clearly shown that amongst the Tartars also feelings of freedom are gradually awakening. This memorandum opens with the following words :

‘At the present time, when everybody enjoys liberty of thought, why should the Moslem alone be deprived of his freedom? The Moslems of Russia have well-nigh lost all their rights, and are still losing them day by day. In time past special regulations were made to order their spiritual concerns, and the Mohammedans enjoyed certain privileges. But the Russian Government of to-day disregards the spirit of culture of the twentieth century, strengthens absolutism, abolishes the rights of the Moslems. Among the many *gravamina* we would mention the following: (1) Some time ago—that is, in the year 1787—a religious tribunal was established at Ufa, consisting of one Ulema, one Mufti, and three Kadis, whose business it was to settle all questions of religion and to enforce religious law. (2) It was ordained that Moslem nomads (Kirghises and Cossacks) were to receive religious instruction from the Ulemas; it was decreed that Moslems journeying from Bokhara and Khiva to Siberia should be exempt from taxes and tribute money. (3) The Mohammedans of the Crimea were to have a special religious tribunal; the management of their *Ewkaf* (pious foundations) was to be kept quite distinct, and the Mussulman military contingent was to form a

separate squadron, for all Mohammedans in the Russian Empire were to be free in the exercise of their religion and enjoy equal rights with the other Russians.

'Of late years the Government actions have been altogether contrary to these stipulations. In 1893 the Muftis and Kadis were chosen from among Mohammedans educated at Russian schools, and so we find that, for instance, the present Mufti of Orenburg is not only unacquainted with the Sheriat language, but cannot even write or read the Mussulman (?) tongue correctly. . . . Nay, more, zealous Russian officials not long ago forced some Mohammedan Kirghises to enter the Christian Church, and told them that for the future they were to obey the Gospel and not the Koran, and henceforth never to speak one word of Sheriat. Many blood-curdling stories are related of the atrocities committed by Russian officials, showing that Russia is guilty of the most flagrant breach of promise, and is determined to extirpate Islam and the Turks.'

It may be somewhat surprising that the Tartars, apparently so submissive and quiescent, should dare to speak in these strong terms; but we must remember that the press has been busy in South Russia also. Witness the periodical *Terdjuman* (Interpreter), appearing at Bagdjesaraj, as previously mentioned. The editor and proprietor of this paper is Ismael Bey Gasparinski, who, with true patriotic zeal and intimate knowledge of affairs, is stirring up the dawning intellect of his co-religionists. This paper celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary in 1903, and the celebrations were attended by deputies from Orenburg, Troitsk, Werkhnoye-Ural, Kasim, Astrakhan, Odessa, and other places. All this speaks for the national liberal tendencies of the Moslems even under the Russian régime, and even now it would be hard entirely to suppress the exercise of liberal thought among them.

The anxiety with which Sultan Abdul Hamid tries

to prevent any expression of national or liberal feeling is the more to be regretted, as the Sultan himself is on the whole not averse to culture, only his idea of culture is improvement within the confines of religion and autocracy—*i.e.*, he thinks a good Mussulman should study all branches of modern learning, with the exception of philosophy and history, in so far as these sciences criticise the actions of Sovereigns. Politics and social science should also be carefully avoided.

Efforts to promote the Turkish national spirit, then, are prohibited by the Sultan because he has great faith in pan-Islamism, and because he fears by showing sympathy with the national movement in Islam to rouse the jealousy of other national aspirations, and thus to provoke dissatisfaction. Naturally, the stricter the prohibition the greater the desire to acquire the prohibited knowledge; and the Young Turks of the present day eagerly pursue every kind of study that points to political and liberal ideas. The urgent necessity for a constitutional régime can therefore certainly not be suppressed much longer. European culture and Asiatic despotism cannot agree for very long together, and that the latter will have to give way is sufficiently evident from the very earliest declaration of the Turkish neophytes of Western culture.

The writings of Kemal Bey, the most gifted Turkish poet of modern times, have created a perfect revolution in the minds of his compatriots, and have led men in the highest circles of society to give expression to their liberal views. Thus, for instance, Saadullah Pasha,* in his 'Numunei Edebiat' (Literary Samples),

* Saadullah Pasha, First Secretary of Sultan Murad (who was deposed shortly after his accession to the throne), was a deep-feeling Turkish patriot, who took so much to heart the miserable condition of his country after the last Turco-Russian War, and so much regretted the despotic reign of Abdul Hamid, that he committed suicide in Vienna, where he acted as Ambassador.

describes the wonders of modern culture, and indulges in the following contemplation: 'All that we admire in European culture as the fruit of science and art is simply the outcome of liberty. Everything derives its light from the bright star of liberty. Without liberty a nation has no power, no prosperity; without liberty there is no happiness; and without happiness, existence, true life, eternal life, is impossible. Everlasting praise and glory to the shining light of freedom!'

I could quote many other passages in praise of liberty from the pen of other Turkish writers no less enthusiastic than this one; but what has been already said will sufficiently convince our readers that the Turks are by no means indifferent to liberalism and political freedom—that, in fact, all is in readiness to overthrow the structure of tyranny built entirely upon religious despotism. It would not be fair to apply the proverb 'Every nation has the rule it deserves' to the Turks, and to say that they must be incapable of, and averse to, culture and enlightenment, and that because they do not unanimously embrace liberty they can have no future before them. I repeat that the Turks are by no means insensible of the liberal tendencies of our times. This, I think, has been sufficiently proved in the foregoing pages; but they have not the strength to resist the arbitrary tyranny of their despotic masters, because they do not form one national, ethnical unity; because, instead of being supported from outside, they are scoffed at and treated with disdain; finally, because great political revolutions are not effected all at once. It has taken centuries and streams of blood to free us from the oppression of tyranny, and Turkey, which, politically speaking, is still in the stage of the Middle Ages, cannot skip over the appointed period necessary for its historical development. In

process of time the Turks must also become a free nation.

Proceeding from Turkey eastward, we note a steady diminishing of the traces of Western culture in the social and intellectual life of the Moslems of Asia: at last we only meet with isolated instances. The semi-nomadic, plundering Kurds seek independence more for the sake of carrying on their robber trade without disturbance, than for the sake of liberty itself, of which, considering their low cultural level, they are as yet wholly unworthy. Abdurrahman Bey, the son of Bedrkhan Bey, the renowned rebel, who revolted against the Porte in the forties of last century, has sought to convince us in his revolutionary paper *Kurdistan*, published at Geneva, that there is such a thing as a Kurdish national question; but it is difficult to believe that the Karduchoi of old Herodotus have become so far civilised as to desire national political independence, and the national literary campaign on the shores of Lake Lemman appears to resolve itself into an intention to terrorise Yildiz, where the relations of Bedrkhan Bey had endeavoured to obtain certain privileges. The whole agitation, however, was of short duration, and the paper *Kurdistan* soon ceased to appear.

Of much more interest is the intellectual fermentation which is taking place in Persia. It had long been preparing, and the soil was far more promising than that of Turkey, for in Persia the Iranian national element is far stronger than the Turkish. The Persians are livelier, more gifted, and more excitable. Tyranny, mismanagement, and lawlessness are certainly far more oppressive in Persia than in Turkey, which is at least a hundred years in advance of its Eastern neighbour; and in Persia no attempt has as yet been made to form a State organisation. But, strange to say, it was the reigning despot himself who first

showed any inclination towards liberalism, for shortly after his accession Nassreddin Shah was so taken up with liberal ideas that he was induced to found a Freemasons' Lodge, and for a time he was pleased to decree that his Ministers, disregarding all bombastic titles, should address him simply as 'Brother.' Of course this whim of the young monarch did not last long. The 'House of Oblivion'* was soon forgotten, and in time Nassreddin Shah grew to be a regular Asiatic tyrant, and even the serious warning given him by the secret society of the Babis had no effect upon him. The motives and actions of these Babis have always been misunderstood in Europe, and have only lately been shown in their right light by Professor G. Browne.† The basis of their endeavours has been from the first the establishment of law and order in the State, the abolition of tyrannical arbitrariness, and the mitigation of existing barbarous customs. The Moslemic prophetic revelation was only a pretext for the introduction of certain innovations, such as the abolition of the harem laws, a fair distribution of taxes, limitation of the power of the Mollas, and liberation of the masses; and how strong the influence of the West has been upon these proposed reforms is clearly visible from the writings of the spiritual head of Babism, now living in exile. 'Babism—at one time supposed to be a dangerous religious movement, inciting the most flagrant fanaticism and carried on with great enthusiasm—was in spite of its outward character merely a violent struggle against the barbarity and cruelty of the Government. Whether

* From the French word *franc-maçon* the Persians have construed the word 'Feramush,' meaning 'oblivion,' probably so called because of the upheaval of the old order of things; hence the Lodge was called Feramush-khane—the 'House of Oblivion.'

† 'A Traveller's Narrative, written to illustrate the Episode of the Bab,' by Edward G. Browne. Cambridge, 1891.

Mirza Mohammed Ali of Shiraz—afterwards called Bab, the founder of this religious movement—acted upon the principles above indicated would be difficult to prove, notwithstanding the strong communistic tendencies attributed to him. But it is certain that his successors soon changed their attitude of dogmatism for one of political and social reform, and the present head of that portion of the Babis known as the section of Bahai, in his epistles, touches chords which remind one rather of the doctrines of our democratic leaders and socialists than of the admonitions of pious Mohammedan Sheikhs. These religionists have hitherto been much misunderstood in Europe, but Edward G. Browne has given us an insight into their thoughts and aspirations which comes as a revelation to those who know Asia, and especially Persia. Sheikh Bahai, now in exile at Cyprus, in his history of the Bab Revolution, treats religious matters as of secondary importance, but lays the greater stress on the political and social questions of the Iranian people, and on the general deterioration, which he takes to be the natural outcome of the wicked tyranny of the Persian Government. Anyone familiar with the situation in Moslem Asia must be surprised to see how this religious leader, the head of a sect, does not hesitate to base his argument for liberty, fraternity, and equality, on the past and the present history of the Christian West. As regards the injurious effect of the encouragement of sectarian hatred on the part of the Mohammedan Government, the learned Persian Sheikh expresses himself in his address to the Shah as follows:

‘It is the first duty of a Government to cultivate freedom of conscience and peace of mind, for these have always been the chief principles of progress and superiority over other nations. Only by desisting from sectarian disputes and by giving equal rights to all classes have civilised countries attained supe-

riority, power, and influence. You represent a people, a nation, a species, a kind. Your common interest demands perfect equality, for equality and justice act as expanders, they enlarge the borders of the realm. Times have changed, and with them the views and the needs of mankind. Tolerance in matters of religion has made the State in the North-west of Europe the owner of large possessions in all the five continents. What is Great Britain, the small island in the north of the Atlantic Ocean, in comparison with the immense empire of India? It is by just laws, liberty of conscience, and a just and fair treatment of the various peoples and nationalities, that the English have extended their power over well-nigh the entire globe, and it is only by upholding these principles of equity that they have strengthened and increased their power and gained for themselves the reputation of being just. Steadfastness of purpose and the constant practice of noble virtues is the true test of religious zeal and piety; these are in truth the greatest ornaments of the human soul. In the Middle Ages, beginning with the decline of the Roman Empire, and ending with the taking of Constantinople by the followers of Mohammed, intolerance and oppression prevailed in all lands of Europe, because the Church reigned supreme. The whole structure of humanity began to totter; fear and unrest prevailed everywhere; civilisation was threatened with destruction; worldly power was shaken, but the Church kept its influence. Then followed the age of tolerance and liberty of conscience. Persecution and bigotry were done away with; legal equality was preached in all lands, and the light of glory and of power began to shine on the horizon and exacted progress in every direction. Formerly the greatest nations of Europe trembled and humbled themselves before the invading Asiatic hordes; now no country of Asia can defend itself against the smallest

European State. These are strong and convincing proofs of the holy right of liberty ; liberty enlarges the mind, it improves the morals, it expounds the secrets of creation, and reveals the hidden truths of the visible—*i.e.*, the material—world.'

Anyone who has any knowledge of the Moslem world must be struck by these views, this language of Sheikh Bahai, and all his works abound in pithy remarks of a similar nature. During many years of intercourse and correspondence with persons of all classes of society in various parts of Moslem Asia, I have never found anyone quite so advanced as he is. I have, on the contrary, noticed that both to the secular and the spiritual heads in the Mohammedan world the recognition of Europe was always more or less an act of self-denial and humiliation. However far advanced in Western culture, however familiar with the prevailing ideas of the nineteenth century, Turks, Persians, Arabs, and Hindus, find it difficult to speak of the civilisation of Europe in terms of appreciation, and to recognise it as the only means by which mankind can be truly benefited. Liberal thoughts, equal rights for all religions and all peoples, views which even in Europe still belong to the *pia desideria*, appeared to me forty years ago quite beyond the reach of Asiatics ; and even admitting that Sheikh Bahai possibly still stands alone in the views which he expresses in a letter to the King of Persia urging him to desist from tyranny, we gladly recognise in him a *signum temporis*, and welcome him as an earnest of the influence of the West upon the East. It is doubtful whether the followers of Bab have imbibed any of the advanced notions of their present chief, but the possibility is not excluded that his doctrines may spread, and in the future have a large circle of influence.*

* Extract from my article 'Freiheitliche Bestrebungen im moslimischen Asien' in the *Deutsche Rundschau*, October, 1893.

A further proof of the awakening of liberal ideas in Persia is the appearance of the Persian periodical *Kanun* (Law), published in London. Its principles are not always very sound, but many original Persian contributions, by people of all classes, unmistakably testify to the internal longing for a liberal government and thorough reform. The cry for law and order vibrates through every column of this paper, and the loyal men of the revolution, who attribute all the misery and the distress in the land to the mismanagement of the King's councillors, addressed these dignitaries in one of its issues in the following terms :

‘Ye confidants, viziers, and magnates of the realm ! why do ye hesitate to put the true state of things before the King ? Ye are aware of the growing hatred and dissatisfaction of the people ; ye know that officials and subjects both together are being brought to misery, and that the country is given over to desolation. Ye see how the interests of the realm and of the people are being destroyed ; ye are aware what the Ambassadors of foreign Courts say about us, and that within our borders everything is confusion. Many a time ye have agreed among yourselves that this cannot go on ; why do ye not make haste to tell the King the truth concerning these things ? Ye fear that such information might make him angry. What, then, is your idea of patriotism ? what do ye understand by it if trivial personal interests are preferred before the common good ? What difference is there between you and treacherous cowards ? Look around you, if but for a moment, and see how in our age everything is given over to destruction. How many Sovereigns have deserted their land, how many thrones have fallen, and how many proud lives have been laid low in the dust of contempt ! These monarchs have met their fate because treacherous courtiers would not allow any but themselves to approach their Majesties and

gain influence over them. If there be in you one spark of gratitude towards your benefactors, ye ought not to delay now, seeing how imminent the danger is; and if perchance ye lack the courage to say the truth straight out yourselves, ye might at least have the conscience not to pervert the statements which we make. Considering that we, either in madness or from motives of loyalty, choose the path of patriotic martyrdom, at any rate allow the wishes of the dumb wretches whom we represent to be brought before His Majesty's throne without being outvoiced by your numbers. Instead of debasing our noble, wise, and kind-hearted Shah into a leader of a miserable troop of beggars, permit us to raise him, through his own excellent qualities, into the glorious ruler of Iran society.'

Another correspondent, in his frantic excitement, addresses his fellow-countrymen living abroad in the following terms:

'O children of Iran, ye who live far from our beloved home! be filled with compassion at the cries of your suffering brethren who languish in slavery at home. Ye who, under the protection of foreign laws, share the peace and the security of the people among whom ye dwell, surely ye are convinced in your innermost mind that all the disorder and the misery existing in our native land are caused by the stupidity and the unconscionableness of our leaders, who refuse to make provision for the safety and general well-being of the people. Neither angel nor king can give us these laws if the people do not exert themselves. The spirit of reform alone can help us, for it teaches humaneness, and this spirit no foreign power can give us: it must come from within. The primary source of all humane principles is centred in Islam; therefore follow its doctrines closely, faithfully, zealously, and our object will be attained.'

The idea of constituting Islam the fundamental principle of all reforms is, to say the least of it, a convincing one, in so far as by this means every innovation will much more effectually appeal to the faithful, and is more in accordance with the historical development of the movement than the process of proselytising which is recommended by our missionaries. In this sense an article from the pen of a learned Seid, appearing in the columns of the *Kanun*, is of some importance. To prove the futility of forbidding the introduction of Bidaat (innovations), he writes: 'It is beyond all doubt that after Mohammed no new prophet will appear upon this earth. But while believing this truth we need not dispute the force of another truth. Is it possible to imagine that this world could exist even for one moment without the providence of God? This providence in the days of ignorance and barbarism sent us prophets, and if their number has been accomplished in the appearance of Mohammed, it is clear that only the personality, but not the spirit, of the prophetic office has thereby been completed: this prophetic spirit, this light, continues to live in the efforts of pious and gifted men, in patriotic endeavours to ennoble mankind and to promote the general welfare. . . . Surely the men who have invented the telegraph and the steam-engine have done a work more pleasing to God than those fakirs who, from a mistaken notion of piety, chastise and disfigure their bodies.'

The struggle with despotism and the wrestling for liberal institutions must of necessity be far greater in Persia than in Turkey, for in Persia, where the Government has always been hated, the Mollas alone have preserved their authority and maintained their influence over the people; and anyone who is acquainted with the thickly-turbaned Akhonds, Mollas, Seids, and Muchtehids of Persia will not entertain any great illusions as to the successful introduction of reforms.

On the occasion of the proposed concession for the tobacco monopoly, we saw that the priests had far more power than the Government. The ever-growing influence of Russia is a thorn in the eye of the Mollas, and every attempt to introduce such reforms as would lessen the influence of the priesthood must become dangerous to the Government.

CHAPTER VI

WESTERN CULTURE ACKNOWLEDGED

AN awakening has undoubtedly taken place among the Mohammedans who have come, if ever so slightly, in contact with Western culture, but nevertheless the future of Islam continues to be a matter of serious speculation to these pioneers of liberal ideas, on account of the predominating influence of Europe. The majority of orthodox believers is content to abide by the unalterable decrees of fate. 'Allah exalts whom He pleases, and humbles whom He pleases,' says the Koran, and any effort on the part of man to change the sad course of events is considered useless and vain. If the orthodox Moslem does perchance inquire into the causes of the decline of Islam, he finds the answer chiefly in the pollution of the faith, in the sinful imitation of Christian institutions, and in the adoption of Christian views of life. The patriotic, Europeanised Moslem, however, no longer meekly submits to the dispositions of fate; he no longer shuts his eyes to the advantages of modern culture, but he looks round for the means by which the pending catastrophe can be warded off, and tries to discover a way by which the same cultural level which Christendom now occupies may be attained by the Islamic world.

Philosophical discourses on politics or history, such as flowed from the pen of Ibn Khalidun or Kochi Bey, can hardly be expected of modern Mohammedan writers, for their eyes have been opened, and whereas

half a century ago even the most enlightened Moslems were loth to admit the superiority of Western culture, they now speak frankly and freely of the errors and the faults existing in the Asiatic world of culture. In the Turkish press of Constantinople such opinions cannot find expression, for all criticism upon matters of politics and administration is strictly prohibited; even the printing of the word 'Hurriet' (liberty) is punishable. But in Turkish journals printed abroad these things are discussed quite openly, and an article on this subject appearing in No. 32 of the *Turk*, published at Cairo, is very instructive.

'Five-and-twenty years ago,' writes an accomplished Osmanli, 'Sophia was full of crooked and dirty streets, such as we still see in Adrianople, Yanina, Monastir, etc., without any features to commend itself either for beauty or convenience, and with the exception of several places of worship, barracks, and prisons, there was nothing to denote any degree of culture. Since Sophia has been under Bulgarian government, one would scarcely recognise the place on account of the many improvements and changes which have been made. It now possesses straight wide streets, public squares, theatres, museums, zoological and botanical gardens, electric light, tramways, telephone, etc. And not only Sophia, but also Varna, Philippopolis, and other towns, have been Europeanised. Roumania, Servia, and Greece, as well as Bulgaria, have been illumined by the light of civilisation since they have become independent States. Crete will soon follow suit. When we look round in our own land and see how Adrianople, Brussa, Aleppo, Damascus, and Bagdad, all once centres of the empire, have failed to maintain their former glory and beauty, and have become desolate through utter neglect of the spirit of modernisation, we pity them for the darkness and ignorance into which they have sunk. At Brussa and

Adrianople, situated at very short distances from the capital, we still find the primitive waggons pulled by oxen, and omnibuses, even, are an unknown convenience. But why quote instances from provincial towns? Let us take Constantinople itself, with its million inhabitants, and in point of natural beauty excelling all other capitals. On the roughly paved streets dirt and filth lie deep, and dogs prowl about. Barracks abound, but the military are only there to suppress revolts; for personal safety little or no provision is made. Stamboul has no theatres, no botanical or zoological gardens—modern institutions which have found their way even into Australia and Siberia. Naturally, Europe says the Turks are only tolerated among us: they are not of us; they are averse to civilisation; they never intended to take up their permanent abode here—therefore let us drive them back into Asia! For God's sake,' thus concludes our liberal-minded Turk, 'let us have done with this slowness, this negligence. Let us not turn our eyes away from the light of culture. We blush with shame before the former Tuna Vilayeti,* the Servians and Bulgarians, whom a short time ago we branded as swineherds. Yes, and let us be governed, not by violence and tyranny, but by justice and wisdom!

An article in No. 50 of the same periodical—the *Turk*—drawing a comparison between the political situation in Morocco and in Abyssinia, is also very characteristic. 'Morocco,' it says, 'notwithstanding its close proximity to Europe, is given over to the grossest anarchy and mismanagement. There are no paved streets, there is no order, no justice—nothing, in fact, denoting advancement; while in Christian Abyssinia, although much further away

* Tuna Vilayeti—*i.e.*, Danube Province—was the name formerly given to the northern part of the present Bulgaria, with the capital Rushchuk.

from Europe, and which not long ago was a wild and barbarous land, modern civilisation is steadily gaining ground; a railway connects the capital with the shore, and both Sovereign and people are animated by the spirit of progress, and go continually forward.'

If half a century ago a Turk had ventured to *write* in this spirit, he would certainly have been put in an asylum or prison, for even to *speak* of such matters was denounced as heresy, and only in the greatest secrecy did people venture to express their views to one another. Now all false shame has been laid aside, and as is frequently remarked by the Central Asiatic returning home from the holy cities of Arabia by the way of India: 'Black is the unbelief of the English, but white is their justice.' In the same strain a cultured Turk has expressed himself about the English occupation in Egypt in the following words :* 'However hard it may be for us Turks, we are bound to acknowledge that the consolidation of English power in Egypt has been a blessing to the Egyptians. The news of the *Entente Cordiale* between England and France has caused a tremendous rise in the market. In the Nile Valley there is prosperity; the people are rich, the country is rich, and all enjoy their riches in peace and security, as the saying is: "Her kes kendi aliminin padishahidir" (Everyone is king—*i.e.*, in his own domain). Although the taxes swell the State treasury, the tax-payers carry the burden easily. No force is used, and one tax-collector suffices to do the work. The people improve themselves by their own industries and their natural tendencies; agricultural, financial, and commercial societies are formed; everything is done to maké the best of the soil, the climate, and the existing conditions, and there is harmony and concord between rulers and people. It is to be re-

* See No. 25 of the Turkish paper *Turk*.

gretted that not the Turks, but foreigners, derive the greatest benefit from this happy state of things, for, unfortunately, not the Turks and the Turkish Government, but the English, have accomplished all these wonders.

‘At the time of the American Civil War the price of cotton is said to have risen abnormally, and a Feddan (an Egyptian measure of land) yielded a profit of 50 lire. In spite of this, however, no one would take up land, even as a gift, because the Government, in its arbitrary tyranny, had put a tax of 50 lire upon every Feddan. To-day, under English management, the land produces only from 10 to 15 lire, and yet now the value of a Feddan is 150, sometimes even 200 lire. Thus we see how justice and fairness contribute to the prosperity and happiness of mankind.

‘But it is too late to lament over the past; we must face the truth, and, however painful it may be, we must learn to realise it. Although we have lost the Nile Valley, we must at least try to save the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates, and make them profitable to our own interests.’

Amongst the Persians, as well as amongst the Turks, such signs of self-accusation, of open preference for Western culture, and merciless condemnation of the conditions at home, have frequently manifested themselves. Ibrahim Beg, a Persian born at Cairo, full of enthusiastic devotion to his people and his faith, undertook a journey to Persia in order to become more familiarly acquainted with the ideal of his youth. He made a pilgrimage to the holy places of the Shiites, and visited the principal cities of the land, but he could not find words adequately to express his bitter disappointment, the horror and the anger which filled him when he saw the devastation, the corruption, the tyranny and the mismanagement, the crying injustice, the naked poverty, the misery and the general forlorn-

ness, of his beautiful land of Iran. No sadder picture of the condition of Persia as it now is could well be conceived than the one here given us by a genuine Persian. Of course this enthusiastic patriot and zealous Shiite immediately began to make comparisons between the life and the customs of his own land and of the cultured West, and sorrowfully he was obliged in every instance to give the preference to the West. The book is one of the most remarkable phenomena in the evolution of the spirit of the East.*

This acknowledgment of inferiority, which has found expression in many other Turkish and Persian writings, clearly proves how painfully the cultured Mohammedan is aware of the deficiency and the inadequateness of his old-world institutions, and how thoroughly he is convinced of the necessity of Western civilisation. The admission of deficiency naturally led to a serious consideration of the best methods to be employed to correct the evil. The number of qualified and unqualified advisers has always been considerable, but during the time of my sojourn among the Moslems of Asia the proposed means of cure were only talked of in the strictest privacy, while now the question is freely written about and openly discussed. What interests us most in this movement is not so much what is thought of it by the Moslems of India, who live under the liberal régime of Great Britain, but rather what is the opinion of the politically independent followers of the Prophet; for these latter still believe that, by the remedies they suggest, their own political independence, and at the same time the political existence of Islam as a whole, can be secured. The scheme chiefly contemplates the future of Turkey, which, as representative of the khaliphate, is looked upon as

* See 'The Situation of Persia as it is now, as disclosed in the Book of Travels of Ibrahim Beg,' translated from the Persian and elaborated by Dr. Walter Scholz. Leipzig, 1903.

the greatest and most influential State of the Islamic world; and not unjustly so, for with the political fall of the Ottoman Empire the political independence of Islam would cease to exist. Although all the remedies hitherto put forward are based upon a total assimilation to Western culture, the Turks have adopted another method by which they fully expect to mitigate the evil.

1. Osmanism as the basis of a political nationality is to unite all the ethnical elements of Turkey into one political body, a plan which, as already indicated, is impracticable, and therefore need not be discussed.

2. Pan-Turkism—*i.e.*, an association of all the Turks all over the world. This also is a chimera: for in the first place the general cultural level of the separate elements is far too low to admit of a political association; and in the second place most of the branches of this tribe (the Turks) are under Russian dominion, and they will not easily free themselves from its iron grasp. Pan-Turkism, moreover, is at a disadvantage through the want of respect always shown to the Turks by Arabs and Persians. The Arabs have hitherto looked upon the Turks as a coarse and unpolished people, hence the expression 'Kesafeti-Turki' (Turkish coarseness); and in the controversy lately carried on between the two journals *Turk* and *Almonar*, the Arab paper reproaches the Turks for never having rendered any real service to their religion and to civilisation: to which the *Turk* replied that Turks have always been the defenders of Islam; that without the Turkish arms Islam could never have existed, as illustrated by the fact that since the decline of the Ottoman power large portions of the Islamic world have fallen into the hands of the Christians; that intellectually, also, the Turks are not altogether to be despised, for that Albokhari, Farabi, Teftazani,

Zamakhshari, and others, were Turks;* and, lastly, that in the acquirement of modern culture the Turks have in many respects anticipated the Arabs and Persians. These arguments of the *Turk* are quite correct, but the old hatred between Turks and Arabs will always continue to exist. Of late years the antagonism has greatly increased, although the ring-leaders are at present mostly Christian Arabs, as we see from a pamphlet published in Paris in 1905, and entitled 'Le Réveil de la Nation Arabe,' by Nedjib Azouri.

3. Pan-Islamism to all appearance promises to become in time the best weapon for successfully carrying on the struggle against Christendom, and in the eyes of the great majority of the faithful, pan-Islamism will be the life-buoy of the future. We say to all appearance, for the Europeanised Mohammedan does not set special store by this expedient—and not without cause, as I will show. In the first place, the proposed association and the united action of the various component parts of an ethnical body dispersed in many different climates, and divided into many nationalities, presupposes a cultural level and a political fitness which is certainly not yet reached by the Islamic world extending from the interior of China to the Atlantic Ocean, and from Tobol to Java and the interior of Africa. The historical past, ethnical and ethical characteristics and natural proclivities, have formed a chasm which will be difficult to bridge over either in the present or in the near future. True, the Koran gives the watchword 'Kulli muminin ihwa' (All true believers are brothers), and the Prophet also forestalled the pan-Islamic scheme when he ordained the Hadj (pilgrimage),

* The intellectual heroes here mentioned were Turkestanis, but not of Turkish nationality. The *Turk* would have done better by quoting Hadji Khalfa, Kochi Beg, Saadeddin, and other genuine Turks.

which he also intended to lead to an annual meeting of Moslems of different lands, and to form a bond of fellowship between his followers. Yet, strange to say, the scheme only holds good in theory. Practically it has not been of any benefit to the cause, for, in spite of all the struggles, all the hardship, all the ill-will, which Islam has had to endure in the course of the 1,323 years of its existence, there is no record of one single united action in defence of, and in sympathy with, the much-afflicted Islamic world in its entirety.

Neither the Moors in Spain nor their fellow-believers in Egypt, India, and Persia, have ever had a helping hand from the Turks—not even at the time when the Osmanlis were at the zenith of their glory—and the power of the Moors was broken by the Christian sword. The same fate awaited the Turks later on, for as the Persian Princes of the House of Sefi, when fighting against the Ottoman power, coquetted with Hungary and Venice, and as even Timur the Mighty sought an ally against the Western Turks in Henry III. of Spain, so Turkey again quietly looked on when Russia broke the power of the rulers of the Crimea and in the Volga district, when the Czars took one province after another from the Kad-jars, and brought Persia to the brink of destruction. The true believers who, wrapt in their funeral pall, reach Mount Ararat in the course of their pilgrimage, and in their ecstasy cry as with one voice, 'Lebeik ya Allah!' (So please God!), are undoubtedly brethren in the Islamic faith. In one common act of reverence they press their brows against the Kaaba; on the journey to or from the sacred places they are united in one common bond of brotherhood, and the respect and reverence paid to the Sultan on the occasion of the Selamlik in Constantinople by the motley crowd of pilgrims was undoubtedly due to his being uni-

versally acknowledged as the Head of Islam. But further proofs, or rather more practical proofs, of this religious brotherhood and common bond of interest have thus far not been seen, although there has been no lack of occasional attempts to make the bonds of religion serviceable to the State.*

Quite lately, thanks to the adoption of the European association system, pan-Islamism has given some signs of vitality. The first instigation came from Stamboul. As far as I remember, it was at the house of Aali Pasha at Kanlidjia, on the Bosphorus, that I heard for the first time of the expediency of an association of the entire Islamic world, and it was at the same place that I met one of the missionaries from the interior of Moslem Asia. It was the task of these messengers, belonging for the greater part to the Molla world, to maintain the spiritual connection between the Khaliph and the other Princes of Islam, to proclaim far and wide the greatness and the power of the Sultan, and as a matter of course to prevent the friendly intercourse with unbelievers. South Russia, Central Asia, Afghanistan, China, Java, and India, formed the field of action of these emissaries, and quite lately the interior of Africa has also been included. The energetic spirit of Abdul Hamid was particularly interested in the movement. He is known to have a great predilection for dark machinations, which he personally superintends. The building of the Hedjaz line, which is to facilitate the communication with the centres of the Islamic world, is his work, and undertaken with a view to the promotion of pan-Islamic interests. †

* See my article in *East and West*, January, 1903.

† As a modest attempt at reunion, we may also mention the Pan-Islamic Society established in London in 1886, under the protection of the Sultan of Turkey, the Khedive, the Amir of Afghanistan, the Sultan of Morocco, and others, with the professed object of bringing

The results thus far obtained, however, have not justified the confidence placed in the pan-Islamic agitation. True, the Amirs of Central Asia and Afghanistan have hitherto always posted on the doors of their mosques the golden-lettered Ferman of the Sultan, being an authorisation from the Khaliph to say the Friday prayers, and certain Court functions have been gratefully accepted by the Khans of Central Asia; but no great political weight can be attached to any of these Court charges.

The influence of the Khaliph upon the great mass of believers in the interior of Asia is confined to a very limited circle. At the time of the last Turco-Russian War the Moslems of India, Java, and South Africa sent voluntary contributions of money and rice to Turkey; they also assist in defraying the costs of the Hedjaz line: yet all these contributions are sadly disproportionate to the number and the prosperity of the believers in those parts, and their religious zeal and enthusiasm for the pan-Islamic scheme only go as far as the string of their purses, and no further. We therefore may justly ask whether time is likely to bring any improvement in the situation. The answer is given by the situation itself. The degree of enthusiasm expressed for the common interest of Islam is closely connected, as previously explained, with the intellectual and material progress of the various nationalities involved; but even if the cultural level of these people could be raised, the practical value of the fraternising movement is very questionable, as the strong position occupied by the Christian Powers in opposition to Islam could nip in the bud any coalition hostile to European interests.

about a fraternisation of all Moslems all over the world, but which so far has only a very limited circle of activity. The society has not the necessary means, nor is London the place from which a sufficient influence can be exercised upon the Islamic world.

In Russia, where it is compressed within the iron grasp of a despotic Government, and in Turkestan, Islam cannot give any sign of vitality. Even in the British Empire in India, with its 60,000,000 Mohammedan subjects, there is as yet no immediate danger, as long as the principles of justice and humanity are maintained, and as long as the hostility between Moslems and Vishnu-worshippers acts as a safety-valve to the foreign rule. As regards the other Moslem countries—Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan—clothed with the threadbare robe of political independence, in spite of all the endeavours of the khaliphate they have lost every chance of active influence upon their fellow-believers who live under Christian supremacy. Among the Mohammedan Princes of modern times, the ambitious and gifted Amir Abdurrahman of Afghanistan took up the plan of a pan-Islamic fraternisation, and for this purpose adopted the title of Zia-ul-Millat v'ad Din (the Splendour of the Nation and of the Faith). With this political object in view he sent emissaries to Constantinople, although at the time the decline of the Turkish State was no secret to him. His efforts, however, were unavailing outside the borders of his own dominion, and this is another proof that pan-Islamism is not nearly so dangerous as it often is supposed to be. Moreover, the pan-Islamic idea is denounced by the Mohammedans who have advanced in European culture, for they fear, and not without cause, the rise of theocracy, which, whether in Islam or in Christendom, must always be dangerous to the development of liberal views, and the society which stands in need of progress and enlightenment would thus go from bad to worse.

All things considered, therefore, the political future of Islam is not particularly brilliant, and if there be enthusiasts who see a ray of light in the sudden

growth of the Prophet's doctrine in Africa, and who build their hope for the future upon the uncounted millions of Mohammedans in the Dark Continent, they will find that they are living under a delusion; for in Africa the influence of Europe is even stronger than in Asia, and will increase in strength as time goes on.

CHAPTER VII

THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF ISLAM

WHICHEVER way we look, and from whatever point of view we consider the present position of Islam, one thing remains absolutely and unalterably true—namely, that the reform movement, as it has been carried on thus far, will not lead to a radical political regeneration of the people who profess the Islamic faith, and that a transformation for the better will only be possible when the leadership is taken out of the hands of the present weak and lazy rulers, and given to strong, energetic and capable men. Judging from our past experiences and from what has been said in these pages, the course thus far pursued by the Turkish, Persian, Afghan, Moroccan, and other independent Moslem Governments must end in the total collapse of the reform agitation, because the rulers of these countries fear that the least yielding towards a more modern view of life will weaken and imperil their absolute autocratic power. Consequently they are hostile to all serious and radical reforms. This does not exclude the possibility, however, although an unlikely one, that at some future time some Moslem Prince, in imitation of the Emperor of Japan, may become reconciled to reasonable reforms, may conform to the spirit of the age, and say to himself: ‘Better go of my own accord than be driven.’ But the question now is, first, can a voluntary abdication of all absolute rights reasonably be expected of any Oriental Prince,

considering that in Europe many Sovereigns have yielded only under the pressure of public opinion and through force of circumstances? Secondly, do Oriental Princes of the Moslem faith possess the strength and the wisdom and the necessary preparation to constitute a regularly organised Government? All attempts hitherto made have been shipwrecked against the social deficiencies and the overbearing influence of religion. Thirdly, who knows whether Europe, in its impetuous desire for colonisation, in its attempts at establishing everywhere markets for its industries and settlements for its over-population, is likely quietly and patiently to await the eventual arrival of so capable a Prince and the commencement of such an era? Is it not more likely that Europe will hasten the slow course of Asiatic circumstances by forcible intervention?

Such forbearance, such altruistic policy, can scarcely be expected of Europe—would, indeed, be incompatible with the existing conditions; and because this is so *the still independent Moslem countries will sooner or later have to buy their moral and material union with modern culture at the cost of their political independence, and the transition from one culture to another will have to be accomplished under foreign rule.*

This is a hard verdict, and it is a sad prognostication for a nation which for centuries has occupied a politically independent position, and played an important part in the history of mankind, that it will have to put its destiny into the hands of another, and that a foreign Power. But how can it be otherwise when it has been convincingly proved that in every case where the Moslems have been deprived of their political independence, and have come under the dominion of Christian Governments, they lead a happy and quiet existence, make intellectual and material progress, and have less to suffer from chicanery and unfair dealing

than under the sceptre of their native Princes and co-religionists? That this view, founded on irrefutable facts, is repudiated by Mohammedans who have come under Christian dominion is quite comprehensible from the point of view of national egotism and political independence, but the repudiation cannot be justified. If, in a spirit of antagonism against the mighty West, they assert that their native government, with all its sad consequences, is preferable to the liberty and the prosperity which foreign rule has brought them, they only express their personal opinion, not the feeling of the nation, and can only be looked upon as expressing their fanatical hatred. What surprises us most is when views of this nature are forwarded by Mohammedans in India, who thus use the liberty of the press, granted by the English, to blacken the British administration and declare their native régime of the past, destitute as it was of all order and rule—nay, even the frightfully mismanaged government of Turkey—to be preferable to the law and order and tolerance which prevail in British India. Of the advantages and the excellence of the Mogul rule history gives exhaustive evidence, and as regards the eulogies which Indian journals, such as the *Moslem Chronicle*, shower upon the present Government on the Bosphorus, one wonders what would be the feelings, and what would become of the patriotism of some of these learned Moulvis if they were in the position of Turkish State officials, who often for months together receive no pay, or of Turkish citizens watched night and day by spies and detectives, and not allowed to read a book or a newspaper without special permission from the authorities. If those slanderers and calumniators of the British administration would read some of the Turkish journals published outside Turkey, expressing the complaints and the despair of the people against the crying injustice, the tyranny, and the

corruption, of their native Government, they might perhaps be induced to see things in a somewhat different light. Many, indeed, have already altered their opinion, and more than one modernised Moslem of India has come to my way of thinking as regards the advantages of European sovereignty, and openly declared that the cultural elevation of Islam is only possible under the guidance of a European Government. A distinguished Mohammedan of India writes to me as follows on this subject: 'I am firmly convinced that the English in India will render good and profitable service to Islamism, and that we under the protection of their liberal institutions will gradually come to the conclusion that the tyranny of our Moslem Princes has been and is an insurmountable obstacle to progress and improvement.'

In still more striking terms the tyrannical government of the Moslem rulers is condemned by a Turk, who, in No. 4 of the periodical *Idjtihad*, published at Geneva, discussing the memorandum addressed by the Moslems of Russia to the European Powers, says: 'You accuse the Russian Government of tyranny, and take refuge with the Sultan of Turkey! Beware! Abdul Hamid is a greater and more terrible tyrant than the Tsar, and Turks, Arabs, and Kurds have more to bear from him than the Tartars suffer under Russian rule. You say the Tsar compels you to eat pork, but Abdul Hamid starves his people, and they perish in misery. At the Russian Universities the Moslems can perfect themselves in arts and sciences, while the Turks, if they want to learn anything, must go to Europe—that is, if they can get permission from the Sultan to do so. You complain that your soldiers are sent out to fight against their own tribesmen. Does Sultan Abdul Hamid act any better when he sends Turkish Moslems to kill Arab Moslems in Arabia?' And so on. Expressions of this nature increase

from day to day, and the cultured and patriotic Mohammedans are firmly convinced that under Moslem rule their position could never be improved.

Patriotic effusions and deliberate misrepresentation of facts cannot palliate the present sad state of things in Moslem lands. The sooner radical measures are taken to stop the evil and to remove the causes of the prevailing misery, the better it will be for hard-pressed humanity in Moslem Asia. Although admitting that Buddhistic Asia also needs reform, it must be acknowledged that China, for instance, has never been in quite so miserable a plight as the Islam lands of modern times. The misfortune is attributed partly to the unavoidable difficulties of the transition period, and partly to the intervention of Europe, which, it is said, has always selfish ends in view. But when we consider that Japan also has had to go through a period of transformation, without showing such terrible consequences, and that the intervention of Europe in her case cannot be attributed to purely disinterested and humane motives, the futility of these excuses becomes apparent. One thing, however, that can justly be laid to the charge of European intervention in Moslem Asia is the decided preference shown for the Christians in Turkey above the Mohammedans, although the latter suffer much more under the misrule of their government than the Christians, who are often too much pampered by the Great Powers, while the Mohammedans have no one to stand by them, no one to intercede for them. In this respect the policy of Europe is based on medieval notions, and we must not close our eyes to the truth that, if the regeneration of Moslem Asia had really been a matter of great moment to them, the European Powers would before now have discovered some more active means to cultivate the newly-awakened liberal feelings of the Moslems and to put a stop to the absolutism of the Moslem

rulers, thereby opening a better future to Moslem humanity, without necessarily depriving it of its political independence. But, alas! humane principles play a very secondary part in the conflict of nations; sentimentality is altogether excluded, especially in modern times. Material interests take the first place, and the bread question pushes all idealism into the background.

There is little hope, therefore, that Europe will assist in an unselfish manner in the recovery of Moslem Asia by making its own interests subordinate to the well-being of humanity. It is much to be regretted that, partly from insufficient knowledge, and partly from egotism, no accurate diagnosis has been made of the disease from which Islam is suffering. Observing the course of events from an objective point of view, we shall see that the Mohammedan under the beneficial influence of Europe shows but little of the obstinacy and fanaticism always ascribed to him, and that he is not nearly so averse to reformation as is generally believed. Obstinacy and stubborn resistance are characteristics of the Moslem rulers rather than of the people. In India the Mohammedans have embraced our civilisation much earlier and much more energetically than in Turkey, and we notice the same in Egypt, where since the English occupation a decidedly progressive spirit has been awakened among the Moslems. The Egyptian scholar Kassem Amin, already referred to in his 'Defence of Islam,' gives a long list of prominent Egyptians who have distinguished themselves as solicitors, mathematicians, physicians, engineers, and politicians.* In Algiers also there are a few Mohammedans who under French rule have become eminent in their profession. Even in Russia, where intellectual pursuits are not greatly

* 'Les Egyptiens. Réponse à M. le Duc d'Harcourt,' by Kassem Amin. Cairo, 1894, pp. 262-272.

encouraged, there have been Mohammedans educated on strictly European principles, who have advanced their modern ideas, if not actually in Russia, at any rate in neighbouring Turkey. It is also noteworthy that many Osmanlis who have made a name in politics, literature, and various branches of science, belong to the Caucasian or to the Volga Turks.

I do not wish to eulogise the Russian administration, but I am bound to admit that in the Tsar's dominions, and particularly among the Moslems of South Russia, considerable progress has been made. In a Tartar paper called *Mebadi temeddun Islamiani Russ** (Beginning of the Civilisation among Russian Moslems) some interesting details are given of the progress made during the last twenty-five years. The writer states that this progress is not the result of external influences, but of internal conviction. A short time ago there were hardly any books written in Tartar; now, after five-and-twenty years, there are more than a hundred on various subjects: hygiene, fiction, theatricals, poetry, etc. The Tartar youths, who formerly wasted their time in the study of Arabic and theology, now attend grammar-schools and Universities, not only in Russia, but also in Germany and France. After describing the growth of Tartar schools, printing-offices, and other means of education, the writer concludes his account by saying: 'Among the women also, generally more diffident than the men, a decided progress may be noted. In proof of this statement, instead of quoting many examples, I would remind you that there is a little white flower which grows under the snow towards the end of winter—the *Akchichek* (snowdrop?). You know that when this flower raises its head it does not mean that summer has actually come, but it is a sign,

* This article, appearing both in Russian and Tartar, was first published in the paper *Terdjuman*, No. 40, 1901.

a harbinger of summer. The same argument applies to our state of culture. Five-and-twenty years ago there was only one woman amongst us, the wife of Hassan Beg, who distinguished herself in writing. Now there are more than twenty learned ladies whom we could point out. This world is a world of hope; why, then, should we Tartars be despondent?

I mention all this to show that we are not yet justified in pronouncing sentence of death upon the cultural fitness of the Moslems, and that the defenders of Islam are perhaps not altogether wrong when they say that in course of time, and with patience, much may yet be accomplished which now seems impossible. But, as we said before, Europe cannot be expected to sit still and quietly await the course of events. Time, our ethnical, political, and economical conditions, all urge us to activity, and our aggressive measures towards those who are not as far advanced as we are, are looked upon as the unavoidable consequences of the laws of Nature. Of course this view is not consistent with the principles of humanity and justice; but here, as everywhere, the principle of the survival of the fittest holds good. We *might* wait, but we *will* not and *dare* not wait; political events are hastening towards a crisis, and the light on the horizon is already strong enough to show us the impending evolution in outline, and to give us an idea as to how things will shape themselves in the future.

It was unfortunate for Islam that Turkey, which had been more continuously and more severely exposed to the attacks of the Christian West, could during the last century no longer show that strength and energy which had been the pride of the true believers. Formerly, when the banners of Islam had to be carried into distant parts, or Christian lands had to be conquered, the Turks were in their element, for they were a peculiarly warlike race; but when

a new State had been founded, and its government had to be arranged for, their want of organisation always manifested itself. Only in the early stages of its existence did the Ottoman Empire realise the necessity of incorporating the motley and heterogeneous elements into one ethnical body. Afterwards, in the intoxication of success, this necessity was forgotten. In increasing riches and prosperity the leading elements of society lost their vigour and energy, and thought that their triumphal march would never come to an end. In the beginning the subjugated nations were compelled by force of arms to join themselves to the Turkish State without being actually incorporated with it, and so, instead of forming one compact, homogeneous Power, which as national and religious unity would have been better fitted to resist the attacks of the Christian Powers, the heterogeneous and centrifugal elements seriously accelerated the process of decline. As Europe grew in power and importance, and began to triumph over Turkey, this internal dissension amongst its various elements increased the danger of the situation. It first showed itself and took serious proportions in European Turkey. One province after another was lost, defence was useless, and the condition became the more alarming as the army, chiefly drawn from the primitive tribes in Asia Minor, became a constant drain upon the national resources, so that at present Turkey has not only lost its European possessions, but also in Asia its power is weakened and broken. The Sultan has been advised to relinquish the European possessions as useless ballast, and to concentrate his power in Anatolia; but such abdication would not only be the death-blow to the prestige of Turkish sovereignty, but also an offence against Islam: for the Koran represents the possession of Constantinople as the reward of faith, and the Crescent will never be

removed from the cupola of the Aja Sophia unless it be by violence.

Whether Turkey will in course of time, and with the scattered remnants of the former empire, build up a small modernised State in Asia Minor is a question which cannot be unconditionally answered in the affirmative. So long as the present system of government, with its hierarchical and autocratic measures survives, it will not be possible, for a modernised European State structure cannot be built with the materials of Asiatic institutions, and the intelligence of the growing generation of Ottomans is already so permeated with European ideas of political liberty that their patriotism will not tolerate the continuance of the absolute form of tyrannical government. But one cannot help being sceptical about the establishment of a modernised, constitutional, culture-loving Turkish State, considering that the basis of the transformation would be the Moslem association, and all non-Turkish Moslems would have to conform to Turkish rule, a state of things which at present seems difficult to contemplate. In the first place, all rivalry between Arabs, Kurds, and Turks must cease, and as European civilisation gains ground in the East, the various ethnical elements of Islam must declare their consciousness of nationality. But granting all this, the Powers of Europe, who even during the lifetime of the owner have cast longing glances upon the rich inheritance, are not likely to stand aside and meekly fold their arms should the dying man suddenly wake up again and deprive them of the so ardently longed-for spoils.

It is very difficult, therefore, even taking into account all the extenuating circumstances, to paint the future of the Ottoman Empire in less sombre colours than the picture actually presents to our view. Political, national, religious, economic, and ethnical

obstacles arise on all sides to prevent an energetic and healthy regeneration; even the boldest speculation would find it hard to discover a way out of this labyrinth of problems.

Whether the future Turkish capital will be at Brussa, at Damascus, or at Bagdad; whether the khaliphate will continue with the Osmanides, or pass on to the soi-disant direct descendants of the Prophet in Arabia; and whether the present dynasty of the Osmanli will be able to maintain itself much longer on the throne—these are all irrelevant questions in the face of the existing difficulties, and we cannot hide from ourselves the certain conviction that, even after the Turks have vacated Europe, the spectre of the Eastern Question will continue to haunt the political horizon of the West. In vain the fanatical enemies of Turkey cry 'Back to Asia'; in vain the 'bag and baggage' policy has been proposed: for the rivalry between the Western Powers will rage quite as furiously on Asiatic soil, and impede the natural development of things as much there as it has done in Europe during a period of over 400 years.

I am not pursuing a chimera when I maintain that the future of Turkey in Asia lies not so much in the hands of Turkey as of Europe; for if we want to help the Turks to overcome the obstacles which prevent them from recovering their political existence, we must begin by clearing away the greatest of all obstacles, the rivalry of the Powers. Otherwise discord and strife, envy and suspicion, will not depart from among us. A continuation of the present petty jealousies on Anatolian soil would be harmful both to ourselves and to the Turks, and the more we aggravate the process of evolution in Asia, the smaller become the chances of an amicable understanding between the Powers of Europe.

Sooner or later this fatal rivalry in Asia—and we

refer here more particularly to the rivalry in Asia Minor—must be put a stop to. Judging by the present political constellations, which also hold good for the immediate future, the motley crowd of national elements in Asiatic Turkey can only be kept under control and led onwards to a brighter future if they remain under Turkish rule. The supremacy of this race commends itself, if only on the ground that the Turks surpass their fellow-believers of other nationalities in point of number, and have for centuries taken the lead. They, of all the Moslems of Asia Minor, have made the greatest progress in Western culture, and are therefore best qualified to direct the reform movement. But this can only be accomplished when Europe combined or some one European State extends the necessary moral support to whichever faction of the Turkish community is cultured, patriotic, and strong enough to inaugurate a new era of order, liberty, and true progress, after the old system has been done away with. Now, it is only the heads of society who, animated by the spirit of modern culture, press forward; but as time goes on their numbers will increase, and the isolated sparks will grow into a blaze strong enough to supply the light which is needed for the regeneration.

I repeat that only Turks can take the lead in the Western Islamic world; Arabs may pride themselves on their intellectual privileges, but as politicians, warriors, and rulers, the Turks have always been their superiors. Turkish mercenaries in the service of the Khaliph were for centuries the mainstay of the worldly power of Islam, and if the Omayyades in Spain had had Turkish troops at their disposal, they would not so easily have been driven away from the Iberian Peninsula. Heathen Turkish hordes under Helagu—for in the Mongol armies the Mongols themselves were but weakly represented—drove the khaliphate from

the throne of Bagdad; and not only have the Turks been the arbiters of fate to the Arabs in Syria ever since the founding of the Ottoman Empire, but also in Egypt, at first Turkish Mamelukes, and afterwards the Turk Mehemmed Ali, have resuscitated the old Arab element and created modern Egypt.

The future of *Persia* is perhaps even more hopeless than that of Turkey in Asia; in spite of the splendid endowments of the Persian people, its political situation has become so strained that mitigation of the evil seems only possible under the immediate direction of some European Government. A prolongation of the Kadjar Dynasty and of the present situation can in no way be contemplated. The Turkoman family of the now reigning dynasty has never made the slightest attempt to introduce a regular form of government, and never opened the way for the earnest and well-intentioned reforms of Europe. Whatever Persia has done so far has been done with the intention of deceiving Europe; there has been no trace of an earnest endeavour on the part of the Government to improve matters. They live at enmity with their own subjects, and never give a thought to the future of the land, their only object being to extort as much money as possible, and never in the least to slacken the reins of tyranny. Persia occupies to-day about the same position as it did after the final collapse of the Sefides, when the government passed into the hands of the Turkoman Afshar chieftain Nadir Shah and the Iranian Kerim Khan Zend. Now, however, there is no independent Turkoman chieftain; and of the Zend Dynasty, which is held in high esteem in the South, there is no one who advances any serious claim to the throne. But even if there had been, his pretensions would have no chance of success against the two formidable Christian claimants who meanwhile have made their

appearance on the scene. The fate of Persia lies at present in the hands of Russia and England. Whether these two mighty rivals will come to blows over the division of the spoils is of small importance to the people of Iran; for them the end must be inevitably a partition of the land between these two Powers to suit their several spheres of interest. For reasons of courtesy or from fiscal considerations, one or other portion of the land may for the time being be placed under the sovereign protection of either of these Powers; but in any case the political independence of the Shehinsahs will soon be at an end, although 200 years ago their authority extended from the Northern Caucasus as far as the Suleiman range, and from Hindu Kush as far as the Tigris. Apart from the political ignorance and unfitness of the Persian Princes since the death of Shah Abbas II., the implacable hatred between the Shiites and the Sunnites has hastened the ruin of the land. Every victory of the Christian world over the Sunnite Turks was greeted and celebrated as a joyful event in the land of the Shiites, just as the Porte looked on, not merely with indifference, but with vindictive joy, when the Russians robbed their Mussulman neighbours of one province after another, and when, by the Treaties of Gulistan and Turkmanchai, Persia was left crippled.

An attempt has recently been made to bring about an amicable understanding between Persia and Turkey, and to inaugurate a policy of combined Moslem interests. The visit of Muzaffar-eddin Shah to the Court of Sultan Abdul Hamid was intended to re-establish—too late, alas!—a kind of alliance between them; but it failed altogether, for personal vanity and the old sectarian hatred stood in the way. A union of these two Moslem lands could, after all, at most have retarded the triumph of the Cross, but never have prevented it.

In order to complete our review of the politically independent Islam lands, we would say a few words about Afghanistan. In the comparatively recent history of this country European reforms have entered, under the English flag. When the Afghans still lived a purely primitive Asiatic life, the Russian Double Eagle had already spread its wings over the three khanates of Central Asia, and India had for more than a century enjoyed the privileges of the new régime under English occupation.

Amir Abdurrahman, a grandson of the famous Dost Mohammed, however, succeeded in bringing some kind of organisation into the affairs of the State. He went to school with the Russians, and, as he brought Muscovite despotism into Afghanistan, his iron hand created a degree of order hitherto unknown in the mountainous home of the plunder-loving and rebellious Pashtu race. In his reforms he naturally made a special point of the defences of the land. He organised a regular standing army, he founded arms factories, and promoted general industry in so far as it contributed in perfecting his military preparations. A cultural transformation and an intellectual elevation of his people never entered his mind, and as the sole result of his labours we find that the former rough native warriors are changed into disciplined, well-drilled regular soldiers. For the rest, everything remains as it was. As father so son, and the one aim and object of the present occupant of the throne, Habibullah, is to prepare his people for the coming struggle with one or other of his neighbours. Whether it will mean fighting with the English in the South or with the Russians in the North is immaterial. War is imminent in any case, and it is equally certain that the Afghans will have to yield before one or the other of their powerful adversaries, and sooner or later lose their political independence.

Thus, Afghanistan will share the fate of the other independent Moslem States of the East, and unless a new Moslem State arises in Africa, where Islam is making considerable progress, but which is hardly likely in view of the predominating influence of Christian Europe, the political independence of Islam is inevitably doomed to destruction.

CHAPTER VIII

CRESCENT AND CROSS

THE opinion that the political independence of the now self-governed Moslem lands will soon be at an end is rapidly gaining ground. No wonder, therefore, that the question frequently arises: What will be the future of the Moslem people? Will their political independence for ever be destroyed under the pressure of the Christian and Buddhist forces, bearing down upon them from all sides; will the Mohammedans become homeless like the Jews, and drag out a miserable existence among foreign nationalities; or in course of time, and by means of the inaugurated reforms, will a new society develop itself, which, occupying a higher cultural level and being in constant communication with the West, will be able to recover its independence? As regards the first part of this question, the fate of the Moors in Spain and of the Arabs in Sicily are not encouraging examples. On the other hand, we must remember that in these latter countries the Moslem conquerors were far fewer in number than the original inhabitants of the land, and that they were therefore afterwards easily subjugated by the Christian Powers. The influence of Islam in South Russia was destroyed in a similar fashion. As the Slav conquerors advanced from North to South, the Turkish and Ugrian nomads, not bound to any settled abode, gradually retired, and Islam, which never at

any time had taken deep root amongst them, was forced to give way to the Double Cross. But in the towns, and subsequently established colonies, where Mohammedans formed the chief element, as, for instance, in Kazan, Astrakhan, Ufa, and various places in the Volga district, Islamism, although oppressed and straitened in many ways, continues to exist, and will live in spite of the Russian attempts to destroy it. In the Crimea and the Eastern Pontus territory it is different; there the Moslem population, in spite of the large preponderance of true believers, has been considerably thinned through the close vicinity and the religious influence of Turkey—so much so, indeed, that the tribe of the Nogays has now become almost extinct.* Towards the middle of the nineteenth century the number of Moslem Circassians, Chechentzes, Abkhases, Lazes, etc., was at least five times as large as it is now, and in the Crimea the voluntary emigration to Turkey has also considerably assisted in diminishing the Moslem population. It seems strange that here, in the midst of this Moslem minority, the desire for culture and enlightenment and national unity has most strongly manifested itself. Whether this small company will be able to stand its ground against the overwhelming majority is very questionable, for the stream of migration to Turkey has of late years assumed extraordinary dimensions.

Something of a similar nature has recently taken place in European Turkey. Since the last Russo-Turkish War more than a million Mohammedans from Bosnia, Servia, and Bulgaria have emigrated

* With regard to this, Nicolas Bravine, in the *Bulletin de l'Association Internationale pour l'Exploration Historique, Archéologique, Linguistique et Ethnographique de l'Asie Centrale et d'Extrême Orient*, No. 3, p. 12, says that the greater part emigrated to Turkey in 1860, and that only a small contingent has settled in the districts of Perekop and Melitopol.

to Turkey.* It is quite natural that the Moham-
medan, where he used to be master, cannot brook
to be treated on an equality with the Rayas, who
formerly were subject to him, and especially where
the Christian element which has assumed the mastery
is not distinguished for charitableness and forbearance.
The Mussulman of India or Algiers would not dream
of emigrating, nor yet the true believer of Russo-
Turkestan; for, in spite of its harshness, the Russian
régime is preferable to the misrule of the Amirs of
Bokhara and Khiva.

When the Crescent can no longer maintain itself on
European soil, or no longer cares to remain there
under the supremacy of the Cross, then the ques-
tion becomes: What dimensions will this movement
assume in Asia, the cradle and chief seat of the faith,
taking into consideration the increasing influence
of Western Powers in the East? Are we, perhaps, in
the Old World on the eve of an evolution which will
result in the total and radical transformation of the
ethnic and religious relations between Europe and
Asia? Let us be under no illusions on this point.

* In one of my previous works (see 'Die neuesten migratorischen
Bewegungen im westlichen Asien,' Deutsche revue, June, 1881) I have
discussed this question at large, and pointed out, among other things,
that in the former Tuna-wilayeti (Danube Province) there remain
scarcely 200,000 of the 800,000 Moslems. Since that time the emigra-
tion of Mohammedans from Servia, Bulgaria, and the Austro-
Hungarian occupation districts, has steadily increased. The difference
between then and now, as regards the Mohammedan population, is as
follows:

				Formerly.	Now.
Bosnia-Herzegovina	600,000	548,632
Bulgaria	1,800,000	530,275
Servia	10,000	2,849

The returns dating from the time of the Turkish occupation are only
conjecture, but there is no doubt about it that the decline of the
Moslem element in European Turkey has assumed extraordinary
proportions.

We must remember above all that things go slowly, very slowly, in the East, and that the ethical element with which we have to work—*i.e.*, Christian religion—is not strong enough yet to extirpate, or even to do any real harm to, the Islamic faith, deeply rooted as this is in Asiatic soil. The followers of the Arab Prophet, although they have retired from many points of their former territory, have never relinquished their faith, and they certainly are not likely to do so where they live in close contact with one another, where historical reminiscences, connected with special cities and places, shine forth as beacons of past greatness and glory, and fill the breast of the believer with pride, urging him on to persevere and to resist. Our observations regarding the boundary districts of the Moslem world do not apply to the centre and ancient seat of the faith, but it is hardly likely that the advance-guards of Western culture will there make a deeper impression. If we study these boundary districts a little more closely, we shall find that, for instance, in Asia Minor Islam has nothing to fear either from Armenia or Greece, Russia or Germany.

As regards the Armenians, they could only vindicate themselves by totally annihilating their former masters with the assistance of foreign help, and it is to be hoped that none of the European Powers will lend their aid to such cruel and iniquitous proceedings totally unworthy of the spirit of Western culture. Nor could such violent measures be employed by the Greeks, who recently have been emigrating in large numbers from the islands towards the interior of Anatolia, but are nevertheless greatly inferior, both in numerical strength and religious enthusiasm and courage, to the Mohammedan elements which are constantly being reinforced by immigration. Russia and Germany have still smaller prospects of success in Anatolia. The former State, indeed, has made up its mind to the

destruction of Islam; but the result of its endeavours in the Caucasus, where Islamism after more than 100 years of Russian occupation still remains intact, is not encouraging for orthodox propaganda. And with regard to the recent interference of Germany, it would be too risky to form any conclusion as to future possibilities from these preliminaries. Germany's intentions are so far of a purely economic nature, and they will remain so into the far future. The idea of strengthening German prestige by weakening Islam will never present itself to the German mind. Such a proceeding would be both foolish and useless, because all intermeddling with the religious life of a people at once makes the representatives of the foreign culture into arch-enemies. Moreover, no religious interference would be possible until after the total subjugation of the land in question.

Our remarks about Anatolia apply also in the main to Syria, and more still to Arabia. It would be difficult to say how far the French and the English may in time extend their political sphere of authority in these parts, but we can state with certainty that neither of these two Western Powers has religious aims in view. Even admitting that they will grant the Christians all possible support and protection, any deliberate offence or injury against the followers of the Prophet is out of the question, as such injustice would at once revenge itself upon the offender.

In short, Islam, as the religion of the present Ottoman State, has nothing to fear. Nor is there any danger for its future on Persian soil; for, firstly, the followers of the Shiite sect form a compact force there, and among the nine and a half million inhabitants only 60,000 confess the Christian faith; secondly, the Shiites, erroneously supposed to be the Protestants of the Islam faith, are distinguished by strong fanaticism, and, considering that the orthodox propaganda in the

Caucasus has never succeeded in making any proselytes among the Mohammedan subjects of the Tsar, any attempts made by foreign rulers in Persia are not likely to lead to better results, always on the supposition that Russia and England are eventually to divide the land of Iran between them. As regards the position of Islam in Central Asia, we have already indicated* that the Russian orthodox propaganda will have more difficulty in shaking the faith of Sarts, Tadjiks, and Ösbegs than that of the Crimean and Volga Tartars; and if the latter escaped forcible conversion by emigrating to the neighbouring Turkish territory, such an emigration will not be necessary for the Central Asiatics. In the Caucasus Islamism will not be endangered by the establishment of Russo-Christian colonists.

In Afghanistan the situation necessarily assumes a much more pregnant form, for both Amir Abdurrahman and his son and successor Habibullah have on every occasion favoured the religious side of political life, and both have laid great stress upon the strengthening of the faith. Amid all the cares connected with the establishment of his throne, the late Amir found time to prepare a catechism for the instruction of all true believers, and in order to clear himself in the eyes of his devout subjects from all blame in introducing the worthless innovations of the hated Christians.

The question now is: How long will Afghanistan be able to maintain its independence, and which of the two European rivals will triumph in the end? But whatever form the political future of Islam may assume, the faith is safe enough in the care of these strongly conservative and fanatical mountaineers. They receive spiritual support on the one side from Central Asia, and on the other from India, and in both directions the

* See p. 126.

religious zeal displayed can but act as an encouraging example.

When speaking of the cultural movement in India, I pointed out the strong position of Islam, and drew attention to the energetic and continuous spread of the Moslem faith under the very eyes of the English. It would, therefore, be superfluous to enter into further speculation with regard to the future of this religion in India. More will be said presently about the mutual religious relationships, but we would remark here that Islamism in India, notwithstanding Christian supremacy and the overwhelming majority of the Brahmins, is not in a precarious condition; on the contrary, there is a future before it. In China the doctrine of the Arab Prophet is at present safe from all interference, nor is a falling-off of its numbers at all likely. The nearly 20,000,000 Mohammedans of the Empire of the Middle occupy a curiously isolated position among the 400,000,000 subjects of the Emperor. These Hui-Hui, as the Moslems are called in China, are better off than their fellow-believers in other lands. As the confessors of a *religio militans*, they have always been distinguished for their warlike spirit, and have consequently attained to high military distinction in the State. We notice this particularly in our days, as the Christian West is constantly at variance with the Buddhist world, and the Moslems thus have an opportunity of revenging themselves upon the arch-enemy of Western Islamism. As far as my knowledge goes, the Chinese Mohammedans dread the strong and energetic Westerner (Russia) far more than the indolent, unwarlike Chinese Buddhists, who in matters of religion are tolerant, and therefore not dangerous.

Some of my travelling companions, natives of Chinese Turkestan, have told me that they have less to suffer from their Buddhist masters than the Moslems

under the Russians, and the only thing they find fault with is the custom (or obligation) of having to bow before the image of the Bogdo Khan (Emperor). I heard the same from Dungan and Chinese Mohammedans, who, on the whole, are less antagonistic to the Buddhists than the Christian Rayas are to the Mohammedans in Turkey and Persia. This, to a certain extent, explains the influence which the Hui-Hui have in China; but whether they will ever be fit to act as mediators between European and Chinese culture, a theory advanced by Professor Martin Hartmann in his instructive pamphlet on 'China and Islam,'* is very doubtful; for the Moslems of West and South China have least of all their brethren in the faith been brought into contact with Western culture: they are still held in the bonds of dark fanaticism, and are therefore about as little fitted to fulfil the part of mediator as the zealots of Bokhara. When we contemplate the impending political changes in the North and North-West of China, the political future of Islam in those regions does not look particularly brilliant, for Russia has taken up a threatening position all along the line, and the occupation of East Turkestan, where the Moslem element is most strongly represented, will doubtless take place before long.

I trust that I have sufficiently proved in the preceding pages that Islam under Russian protectorate can never come to full development; and in conclusion I would remind my readers that, with the ever-increasing influence of Japan in China, the little influence which Islam has so far had must necessarily become still less. As I have endeavoured to show that no special danger threatens the existence of Islam in the whole length and breadth of the Asiatic

* 'China und der Islam.' Zwei islamische Kantondrucke. Strassen durch Asien. Berlin, 1900.

world, and that the decline of its political power must not by any means be looked upon as the death-blow to its spiritual energy, I may now proceed to answer the question, raised at the commencement of this chapter, whether the Mohammedans will become, like the Jews, a homeless people, and have to linger out a miserable existence among foreign nations. The fate of the Mohammedans in Russia first gave rise to this suggestive comparison, for it is a well-known fact that the followers of Mohammed in Russia often occupy very subordinate positions as drivers, servants, retailers, etc.; that everywhere they distinguish themselves by their industry, sobriety, honesty, and humility; and as long as they are not hindered in the practice of their religion, they hardly ever give a thought to regaining their political liberty. This acquiescence in the ordinances of destiny is common to all Mohammedans who have come under the rule of the Double Cross, not excepting even the wild, warlike Lezghians of the Caucasus, accustomed to the most licentious freedom, and the Turkomans and Kirghises of the steppes. To none of these tribes has it ever occurred to free themselves of the foreign yoke by a systematically-organised revolt.* They all quietly submit to the inevitable, and are content to abide by the destinies of Fate. Only in places where the Mussulman subjects of Christian Sovereigns live in community with those of another faith—as, for instance, in India and in Java—have attempts been made to shake off the foreign yoke, of course without attaining their object, for to fight against the Powers

* The so-called riot of Namangan (see p. 196) must be looked upon as an attempt of a company of Kiptjaks, stirred up by fanatical Mollas, which, however, has found very few adherents among the population. The revolt of the Kirghises under Syrym Batir and Kenisarin was also more of the nature of a Baranta (plundering expedition) than of a deliberate revolution.

of the West is a hopeless undertaking, but it shows that it is the unbending severity of the Christian ruler which suppresses the feelings of independence and liberty among the people; and where this severity has been found superfluous, or where liberal principles of government have opened the way to free thought, as in India, Egypt, and Algiers, a quite unexpected mental transformation is quietly going on, and a new world of thought is being developed such as was never heard of in the history of the people of Israel after the fall of Jerusalem.

To begin with, the Jews were too few in number to take up the struggle with their adversaries, and any attempt to regain their political independence was therefore out of the question. This consideration does not come into force in the case of the Mohammedans. Again, the followers of Islam have always been noted for their eminently warlike spirit, a feature which none of the other Old-World religions possessed. Although the meaning of the word Islam is 'resignation to the Will of God,' the Koran says: 'They who are killed in God's service will have a great reward.' Hereby war is declared to be well-pleasing to God, and as piety and valour are considered to be virtues which complete one another, or rather which flow out of each other, the Moslems will maintain a warlike attitude towards all unbelievers until they ultimately shake off the foreign yoke, an eventuality which amongst the Jews always was, and still is, excluded, for Zionism aims not so much at the foundation of a Jewish empire as at the establishment of colonies as places of refuge for the persecuted and scattered Jews.

It remains to be seen whether such a renaissance in the condition of Islam can take place through the adoption of Western culture, and when and under what conditions this evolution is likely to

show itself. Both these questions have already been partially answered in the foregoing pages—that is, we have shown, firstly, that some portions of the Moslem world are distinctly drawing nearer to the West; secondly, that this process can only take place and be hastened under the protection of liberal institutions and by improved education; and, thirdly, that in the whole of the Islamic world the Ottoman State is the only factor from which a political regeneration could be expected, if the Government and society pull themselves together, and if Europe would give them the necessary time and opportunity to do so. Judging from observation, the process of regeneration, both in the independent Moslem States and among the Moslems under the protection and the humane administration of liberal European States, goes steadily forward. In Turkey, where misrule, absolutism, and constant outside hostilities retard and aggravate the process, the final result of the present evolution remains doubtful. A decided change for the better would only take place if some enlightened and gifted Prince were to place himself at the head of the movement, conducting it with all the energy at his disposal, and pressing forward with unflinching determination. This task would not be hard for a patriotic Turkish ruler, for the loyalty and devotion of the Turks is unbounded.

The outlines of the coming transformation are already clearly discernible in India, Egypt, and also in Algiers. In the two first-named countries Moslem society gives unmistakable evidence of an awakening and a right perception of the situation. Their endeavour at present is to rouse the national self-consciousness by trying to reconcile modern knowledge and free inquiry with the spirit of Islam. And this is not a difficult problem—in fact, it is much easier in Islam than in Christianity. In Aligarh, in

India, and in other places, schools have been established where European branches of learning and Moslem subjects are taught together; the endeavour is to clear away all obstacles which have had a disturbing influence by infecting the pure doctrine of the Koran, and under the ægis of the liberal institutions of Great Britain, an association of Mohammedans has risen which, adhering firmly and faithfully to the precepts of the Koran, recognised the necessity of a modernisation and simplification of certain principles, thus becoming a medium between East and West. This school, the tenets of which we have discussed elsewhere, gains ground from day to day, and, thanks to the care bestowed by the English on the educational department in India, it will continue to flourish. I will not deny the possibility that this annual increase in the number of Mohammedan students at the different colleges and universities of India, and the fact of their being roused to self-consciousness, will probably end by their breaking with the old doctrine of strict exclusion from the outer world. Young people, full of energy and desire for knowledge, as the Hindus generally are, who are well acquainted with our classical and modern literature, versed in philosophy, history, and all modern branches of learning, will not easily again be satisfied with the meagre fare which exclusive Moslem learning offers. A new social spirit, a new view of life and a new world of thought, must in time declare itself, or, rather, is already manifested, and, considering the great elasticity of all religions, Islam will become modernised, or, rather, brought back to its original purity, and consequently become more accessible to the teaching and to the spirit of modern culture.

What we see in India presents itself in even clearer outline in Egypt. The work of reformation commenced under Mehemmed Ali has made rapid progress under

British suzerainty, for what the single Khedives timidly undertook has been lavishly supported by the ample means and energy of the English. It is astonishing how beneficial has been the influence of the firm but just government of England in raising the social and intellectual standard of Egypt. A considerable number of young Egyptians, having received an entirely European education, now show a clear insight into the economic, political, and social future of the Nile lands; and step forward, perhaps a little prematurely, with the watchword 'Egypt for the Egyptians,' and indulge in the fantastic dream of a future great African Moslem Empire. Truly liberty elevates even as slavery lowers. The Europeanised Moulvi in India and the enlightened Arab in Egypt are the best evidence of the marvellous effect of well-organised, liberal institutions, and what has taken place in the aforesaid lands during the last few decades shows that in Moslem lands a change for the better can only be accomplished under the immediate guidance of European mastery. If left to themselves, the nations of Islam will undoubtedly continue in their present state of indolence. They have not the strength to build up their social life upon a new foundation and to introduce really liberal institutions into the Government, so long as the hierarchic and worldly power remains united in the hands of one man, and so long as these so-called 'representatives of God on earth' remain unconvinced of the necessity of radical reforms, and decline to renounce spontaneously their principles of autocratic absolutism as no longer compatible with the demands of the times.

To be sure, the Princes of the Christian West have not made this sacrifice voluntarily, and certain attributes pointing to the Divine character of kingship are even now used as the empty symbols of a long-past glory. Yet even so the title 'By the

Grace of God' is not equivalent to that of 'representative of God on earth'; it does not involve infallibility, such as the Moslem Sovereigns and the Popes of Rome claim for themselves. With us in the West, enlightenment and liberal views have long since reduced these Divine prerogatives to their proper worth, but the people of the Moslem East have not yet reached this stage of self-help, and as they lack even the means of attaining it, they are dependent upon the co-operation and support of Europe, in the same manner as we in times past were dependent for our intellectual incitement upon classical antiquity. And herein lies the strongest proof of the irrefutable fact that *it is only through the immediate influence of Europe—i.e., under the protection and direct administration of Western powers—that the Moslem East can be regenerated and hope for a better future.*

How long the nations of Moslem Asia will have to be under this guardianship of foreign government, and which part of it is likely to be first renovated and made strong enough to stand by itself on the world's stage, depends upon the abilities and the intentions of the leaders, as well as upon the longer or shorter period the people have been under the influence of culture. For the time being we can only point to a few individuals who stand out prominently in the reform movement, and serve as sporadic instances of the cultural revolution that is going on. But who can doubt that the number of converts will increase, and that these neophytes of Western culture will exercise an improving influence upon the minds of their tribesmen and fellow-believers? Any unprejudiced judge having sufficient knowledge of the true state of affairs will confirm this statement.

We have already more than once referred to the fact that the future of the Mohammedans under Russian tutelage is not particularly brilliant. Yet the

imperial despot has not succeeded in checking the mental activity, and a few persons, such as the Tartar Ismail Bey Gasparinski and Mohammed Fatih Gilmani, have come forward to stand proxy for their brethren, and are busily engaged in preparing the way for the general reformation.

The Mohammedans under the sovereignty of Western Europe will certainly fare better, for they are being brought up in freedom and culture, and will end, regardless of the desires or the intentions of their tutors, by regaining their political liberty. The heads of Moslem society in Turkey, Egypt, and India are already so imbued with the spirit of modern institutions, and so filled with the ideas of national independence, that their total annihilation is an absolute impossibility. Our rulers in the Moslem East may perchance entertain the hope that their rule will be continuous, but the time must come sooner or later when our cultural efforts will bring about a result contrary to our wishes—*i.e.*, the end of our political authority in Asia. As the mentor cannot prevent or stem the intellectual growth and ultimate maturity of his pupils, so also is a similar result impossible in the mutual relationship between a higher and a lower society. The seed which falls from the healthy tree upon productive soil grows first into a sapling and afterwards becomes a strong tree, and what once has been conceived must be brought to fruition.

What we see enacted in Japan, where the Asiatic scholar has become the equal of his European teacher—in many respects even surpassing him—may also some day be the case in the Moslem East. Japan has reached its present position solely through the liberal views and tendencies of its ruler, and if Islam could once rid itself of the heavy shackles—which now, in the form of a tyrannical Government, mistakenly sanctioned by religion, prevent its free motion—I

cannot see why mankind in West and Central Asia should not participate in those privileges which their fellow-men in the Far East have attained. That Islam is capable of reform, that its confessors begin to see the necessity of it, and that already here and there a few rays of light are breaking through the dark night, we have endeavoured to prove in the foregoing pages. The process of evolution will necessarily be slower in Islam than among the Buddhist Japanese, but the transformation and renaissance must come at last, whether we will or not.

CHAPTER IX

EUROPEAN POWERS IN MOSLEM ASIA

IN the foregoing chapters I have attempted to show the important position occupied by the representatives of Europe as teachers and transmitters of our culture in the East, and it now remains to speak of the political dominion which one or the other of these representatives must one day assume in Moslem Asia. And herewith I enter *nolens volens* upon purely political ground—no very tempting task indeed, but difficult to evade, for, according to the maxim ‘Si duc faciunt idem, non est idem,’ the means, motives, and actions of the various factors differ from one another, and these diversities must be kept in mind when considering their several spheres of action, and also in regard to the length of time occupied in the labour of reformation, for cultural results always depend largely upon the longer or shorter period of influence.

To discuss the question how long the influence now exercised by Western Powers in Moslem Asia will continue, and what changes will take place, may at first sight appear bold, if not presumptuous. Yet this is not so. After carefully considering the present political and economic spheres of interest of our great Powers in West and Central Asia—and as we may accept on fairly safe grounds that in these relations no serious changes and surprises are likely to occur—we are justified in saying that an actual displacement

of the present frontier lines and any extraordinary change of scenery are quite out of the question.

The strife for material advantage rages furiously enough, the desire for colonies as the best means for dealing with the difficulty of over-population and the surest way of providing new markets for its ever-increasing industry has entered into the marrow and bone of all European States, but the ardent longing for greater territorial possessions is somewhat cooled by the dread of military complications; and modern Europe, more cautious than before, will now not so readily resort to the arbitrament of war. In the territories which the various States have parcelled out for themselves, some small, unimportant changes and fictitious frontier displacements may take place; also, the appearance of new Culture-bearers on thus far unappropriated ground may be expected, but a radical transformation in the rôles of the civilising Powers appears to us highly improbable.

It is not very likely that Russia will extend its frontiers, which already reach from Batum to Vladivostok, and from the Arctic Ocean to Paropomus, still further southward. Possibly it may in time improve its position on the upper sources of the Euphrates and in Turkish Armenia, but as regards any plan of forcing its way as far as Mesopotamia, Germany would have something to say to that, unless, indeed, some strong Ottoman power puts in its veto. But it is all the more certain that Russia will push its way from the Araxes towards Lake Urumia, and along the whole line of Northern Persia, where, to a certain extent, the Russians already feel at home, and from whence they will not easily be driven away by any rival Power. Persia, as we have already said, unless something quite unforeseen happens, will soon have to be divided between England and Russia, in which case the northern portion will fall to Russia and the southern to England.

The exact line of demarcation of the two spheres of occupation is the only point which is likely to cause any difficulty. Whether Russia will advance further eastward—that is, through Afghan territory from Kushk toward Herat, and from the right bank of the Oxus to Hindu-Kush—and thus go beyond the line of demarcation fixed by the boundary limitation of 1898, is from the point of view of its cultural influence an irrelevant question, and belongs to the domain of political speculation. I only wish to point out that it would scarcely be worth while, for the sake of extending its dominions in a southward direction, for Russia to risk the danger of a universal war, firstly, because the future strength of its position in the Old World does not depend upon further conquests in the direction of the Indus; secondly, because the incorporation of a portion of Hindustan into the Tsar's dominions would result in more or less than profit to the Russian State Treasury; thirdly, because the carrying out of such a scheme, which virtually means the expulsion of the English from India, would involve extraordinary difficulties, and may be said to be well-nigh impossible. But we do not think that Russia would observe any such restraint with regard to China, or would hesitate to annex East Turkestan, should occasion offer. Where it concerns Asiatic States, the ambition of our great Powers seems to be insatiable, but where two European rival States with equal title oppose one another, great caution has to be observed, and the universally growing dislike to violent measures will doubtless ward off the great calamity of a war between England and Russia.

England has certainly no desire to submit its rivalry with Russia to the decision of the sword. The English do not intend to extend their dominions in India beyond the Suleiman Range, much less over the Hindu Kush; on the contrary, they shudder at the idea of

having to make fortifications in the Afghan mountains for the protection of the frontiers of India, and the recent reconnoitring expeditions to the south and south-east of Persia are not the preliminaries of a bloody campaign—they are rather of the nature of a journey of inspection, and for the establishment of a boundary-line, indispensably necessary to the security of India. This precautionary measure England would gladly have foregone, but certain things connected with the future development of events had compelled her to do so. If Persia had been in a position to manage its own affairs, and if the unavoidable fall of the Iranian Empire would not expose its neighbour on the South to manifold dangers, London and Calcutta would gladly have refrained from all interference in the affairs of Persia. But when the house of one's next-door neighbour is on fire, one is bound to look after one's own property, and this necessity has often compelled the most peace-loving Western nations to interpose in the affairs of its Asiatic neighbours.

Formerly Albion's motives were of a different nature, but now she is satisfied. She does not desire to make any further conquests; she reckons herself fortunate when she can remain in peaceful possession of the territories which have come under her civilising influence, and can develop these intellectually as well as materially. Where English polity in Moslem Asia aims at a further extension of territory, it is chiefly a question of the pacification of the outlying boundary districts for the establishment of peace and order within its own dominions. This, at least, is the tendency of England's polity in the Gulf of Aden and in the hinterland of Arabia, where the depraved condition of the Southern Yemen endangers the position of the English, and where the Turkish Government unfortunately has not sufficient power and authority to restore order. Some people, always ready to suspect

everything that England does, have lately suggested that Britain is laying secret plans for the conquest of the whole of Arabia, and they see in the King of England, who rules over a greater number of Moslem subjects than any other Sovereign, the future protector and potentate of Mecca and Medina, the sacred places of Islam. They say that for the sake of appearances the rule will nominally be given into the hands of the Khedive of Egypt, because it was from Egypt that Selim II. took away the khaliphate, while all the time the actual government is in the hands of the British. The idea may seem preposterous, and certainly is fanciful; yet, if such an event were to take place, it would be no loss to Islam, for when one reads in Turkish Moslem papers about the political state of things in Mecca and Medina, and hears how His Holiness the Shereff of Mecca, Sheikh Awn ar Rafik, the direct successor of the Prophet, in company with the chief officers of State, taxes, robs, plunders, plagues, and waylays the pilgrims in every possible way, one cannot think it a great hardship for such a society to be transferred to the hands of a just, humane, and well-ordered government, even though that be a Christian one. But we will not enter into these futile speculations, but simply state that, unless appearances deceive us, England and Russia have both completed their conquests in Moslem Asia, and both, each in her own sphere and according to her own ideas, henceforth intends to occupy herself solely with the consolidation of her own power and the education of her subjects.

It now only remains to speak of a third European Power which quite recently has made its appearance in the Moslem East as a civilising factor, and which, considering the power at its command, its size, and its splendid qualities, fully deserves our attention. We refer to the German Empire. It is as yet in the

first stage of its civilising activity in Moslem Asia ; but, in spite of the many difficulties which surround it on all sides, it has a future, the importance of which should not be underrated. If Germany had not been so late in joining the ranks of the civilisers of Asia, and if the Mother Country were not so far away from the scene of action, the evidences of German industry and German thoroughness would manifest themselves quicker and better. But, separated by large tracts of land, the influence of German culture, in spite of the railway-line which is to connect Constantinople and Bagdad, will have a hard fight not only with its rivals, but also with the ossified conservatism of the natives ; for while the names of Fransiz, Inghiliz, Nemse,* and Urus have long since been household words to the Turks, Kurds, and Arabs, the name of Aleman (German) is as yet little known in the outer circles, and it will take time to make it familiar to them. How difficult it is for the Oriental to discard an old well-known word for a new one we see illustrated in the use of the word 'Genevese' with which the Osmanli designate the ancient monuments of architecture, because in the Middle Ages the Italians were looked upon as the masters of architecture, industry, etc. 'Trade follows the flag,' says the Englishman ; and as Germany has, so far, only economic ends in view, has no territorial possessions, and neither will nor can display the ensign of its power, the process of its cultural influence in Western Asia will necessarily be very slow, a fact which in the interests of humanity is to be regretted.

In opposition to this view, it is whispered that Germany has secret political aims in Anatolia, that the German settlements near the various railway-stations will gradually develop into colonies, and that these

* Nemse was the name of what is now Austria, but in reality the word means 'German,' and is derived from the South Slavic Nyemetz (plural Njemtzi, 'German').

colonies afterwards will lead to the Germans taking possession of Anatolia ; but everyone who knows anything of Asiatic conditions must see the absurdity of this theory, which only shows an insufficient knowledge of the actual state of things. In the first place, it will take many years before German colonists are strong enough to overcome the compact masses of Asiatic Autochthones and create a German majority. The Russians, truly, have succeeded in bringing about such an ethnical revolution in the Lower Volga territory and in the Crimea, but this was only made possible because those regions were inhabited by nomads without social habits or cultural demands. But it is different now in Asia Minor, which for many centuries has had a settled population ; and of a political hegemony of Germany, or of a Germanising of the medley population of Anatolia, there can therefore be no question.

Whatever may be the future of the representatives of European culture in Moslem Asia, and however long and far their authority may extend over the several portions of the Old World now subject to them, in the interests of humanity, of culture, and of universal peace, everyone must entertain the hope that their harmonious intercourse may remain undisturbed—that each one of them in his own way may work for the good of the ancient world, ruined by mismanagement, ignorance, and tyranny, in order that the miserable condition of mankind in Asia may at last come to an end. With a view to the violent controversy on political economy now going on, one might almost say that this wish is a *pium desiderium* and impossible of realization ; but they who have been acquainted with the sad state of things in certain parts of Asia, and who have had an opportunity of convincing themselves from personal observation of the possibility and the desirability of well-organised

reforms, will recognise that the honest endeavours of our Culture-bearers will benefit not only the Asiatics, but also ourselves. The sooner the ruined districts of the Old World are reclaimed and made to flourish again, the larger will be the field for our industries, and the greater the riches drawn from the soil where they have lain hidden. When fanatics and enthusiasts profess that our culture in Asia has only engendered poverty and misery, and that the coming of the Westerners has been a curse to mankind in the East, these expressions are merely the outcome of a morbid fancy, or of total ignorance of the real situation. Wherever, and in whatever garb, the influence of the modern world of culture has asserted itself, the transformation period may have caused a temporary disturbance in social and economical life; but, as soon as the time of trial was past, peace, prosperity, and contentment have taken up their abode there, and even poverty, which still shows itself here and there in spite of the prevailing well-regulated conditions, is less oppressive than in the time when these countries were dependent upon themselves. Only arrant malevolence or wilful blindness can persist in seeing a disadvantage in the activity displayed by Western lands in favour of the Asiatic world; for, even supposing one or other of our representatives be not sufficiently prepared for his task as reformer, or has only material ends in view, even then the price paid is small in comparison to the blessings received through the inauguration of order and justice; for the objection that our Culture-bearers only use the territory which it has fallen to their share to emancipate, for their own selfish gain, and that they give no corresponding equivalent for the profits received, must be rejected as unworthy by all unbiassed critics, as such a proceeding would not only be unjust, but most detrimental to the interests of Europe itself. What Rudyard Kipling has said

about 'the burden of the white man' is strictly true ; for the lot of the Westerner toiling under the scorching sun of the torrid zone, battling with hardened conservatism and blind prejudice, is not exactly a pleasant one.

The picture here disclosed of the situation as it now is shows clearly that nothing could be more unjust than to designate our cultural endeavours in Moslem Asia as temporary and not lasting. On the contrary, we are only at the commencement of our task as teachers and mentors. The pupil, thanks to his natural gifts, has here and there shown signs of progress, but it will be long, very long, before he can let go the guiding hand, and can be able by himself to reach the final goal. In due course this time must come ; but, in order that Asia may not look down upon her younger sister Europe with hatred and resentment, but with love and gratitude, our Culture-bearers should fit themselves for their exalted mission, and not soil the standard of our modern culture with the stains of exclusively material interests.

Sometimes it is argued with reference to past ages that history repeats itself, and that even as Rome was at last overpowered and utterly annihilated by the raw masses which it had endeavoured to initiate into the mysteries of its culture, so our present mighty Europe will one day be overrun, humbled, and subjugated by the superior numbers of its pupils. In illustration of this they quote Japan, which has come to the foreground like a *deus ex machina*, and the phantom of the Yellow Peril is held before our eyes as a *mene tekel*. I have already elsewhere* given my views upon this question, and therefore only add now that, with regard to the people of Islam, an eventuality such as we see enacted in Japan is still in the very distant future. To the faithful Mohammedan the words

* See my 'Yellow Peril : a Cultural Study.' Buda Pesth 1904.

of the Koran, 'To hurry is the devil's work, to linger is well-pleasing to God,' are conclusive. Everything moves slowly and quietly with them, and, if here and there some signs of progress have manifested themselves, the total transformation is a long way off yet, and the limitations of our influence in Moslem Asia cannot yet be defined.

INDEX

- AALI PASHA, 321, 351
 Abbas II., the Shah, 368
 Abdul Aziz, the Sultan, 290, 298,
 322, 323
 Abdul Hamid, the Sultan, 276,
 290, 298-99, 325, 330-37, 351, 358,
 368
 Abdul Latif Khan Bahadur, the
 Newab, 189
 Abdul Medjid, the Sultan, 289,
 298, 301
 Abdurrahman Bey, 333
 Abdurrahman, the Amir of
 Afghanistan, 255-301, 353, 369,
 376
 Akhases, the, 119
 Alramoff, General, 59, 110
 Abramoff, N., 104
 Absolutism in the East, 297
 Abubekr, the Khaliph, 305
 Abulghazi Khan, 99, 302
 Abulkasim Khan, 76, 91
 Abulkhair Khan, the submission
 of, 35
 Abyssinia, 344
 Addighi, the, 119
 Adrianople, 343-4
 Afghan princes, the ignorance of
 the, 301
 Afghanistan, 369-70, 376
 Afghans, the, 293
 Aga Mehemed Khan, 304
 Agra, the College of, 182
 Agriculture, improved state of,
 172
 Ahmed Midhat, 283
 Ahmed Riza Bey, 328
 Ahmed Said Efendi, 300
 Ahmed Shah, 149
 Ahmed Vefik Pasha, 324
 Akhbar, 139, 140, 276, 302
 Al-azhar, 271
 Albanians, the, 291
 Albokhari, the, 348
 Alcohol, the sale of, in India, 218
 Aleppo, 343
 Algiers, 286, 360, 381
 Alhambra, the, 276
 Aligarh, Mohammedan schools
 at, 381
 University at, 191
 Allahabad, the Congress in, 209
 Almonar, the, 275, 348
 Alquist, Professor, 106
 Altinsarin, Ibrahim, 45, 113
 Anatolia, 363, 365, 374
 Germany's aims in, 392, 393
 Anglo-French campaign, 264
 Anglo-India School Commission,
 203
 Anjumani Ilm, the, 235
 Arabs, the, 291-366
 Ararat, Mount, 350
 Argentoff, 105
 Arif Khodja, 76
 Aristoff, N. A., 33, 43, 111
 Armenians, the, 291, 300, 374
 Arnold, Sir Edwin, 277
 Ashkabad, 120
 College at, 120
 ASIA :
 Western influence, 4
 Necessity for European in-
 fluence, 4-5
 Conservatism in, 8
 Religious census in India,
 143
 Necessity for education in,
 202
 Islamism, the product of, 229
 Forced denationalisation in,
 256
 European rivalry desirable
 in, 259
 Brought into closer touch
 with Europe, 264-5
 Comparison between Mos-
 lems of Asia and those of
 Turkey, 269
 Home of tyranny, 297 *et seq.*

Asia—*continued*

- Notable rulers of, 302
- No desire for political liberty in, 302-4
- Slavish submission to rulers, 319
- Despotism in Asia must give way to Western culture, 331
- Asia, Central:
 - Progress of, 1
 - Cruelty of Turkomans in, 9
 - Check to nomadic hordes in, 11-14
 - End of nomadic life in, 17
 - Cowardice of, 49
 - Russian rule in, 50
 - Russian railways in, 53
 - Russian abuses in, 55-64
 - Gradual acceptance of Russian interference in, 86
 - Russian influence in, 117
 - Russian progress in, 120
 - Past and present in, 121
 - Russification a failure in, 122
 - Hatred to Christianity in, 123
 - Census of 1897 in, 125 *et seq.*
 - Beginning of British rule in, 131
 - Home of despotism, 140
- Asia Minor, 364
 - Rivalry must be stopped in, 365-66
- Astrakhan, the khans of, 11
- Aurengzib, 141
- Authors, eminent Indian, 197-201
- Autocratic power of Eastern princes, 303
- Azerbaijani dialect, the, 279
- Azim Bey, 81
- Azouri, Nedjib, 349

- 'Bab,' the, 335
- Baber, 153
- Baber Mirza, 302
- 'Babism,' 334
- Baghche-sarai, the, 272-277, 330
- Bagdad, 343
- Bahai, the Sheikli, 335-6, 337
- Baijnath, Lala, 201, 207, 215
- Baji Rao, 255
- Bakhshi, the, 40
- Banzaroff, Dardji, 109, 113
- Barantas, the, 44, 379
- Barmekides, history of the, 199
- Bashkirs, the, 15, 22, 33
- Batu Khan, 118
- Bedrkhan Bey, 333

- Benares, the college of, 180
- Bengal, 153
- Bengal Gazette*, the, 195
- Bengali, 142
- Bentinck, Lord William, 161, 166, 181-82
- Bernier, François, 141
- Bhattacharys, Jogendra Nath, 200
- Bible Society, the, 110
- Bismarck, Prince, 215
- Boell, Paul, 164, 175, 216, 233
- Bokhara, 15, 99, 146, 300
 - Representatives from, 87
- Boldanoff, 113
- Bombay ceded to England, 133
 - Congress in, 239
 - University of, 182, 187
- Bonnerjee, W. C., 209
- Books published in India, 195
- Brahminism, 282
- Brahmins, the, 316
- Brahmo-Somaj, the, 227
- Brandy distilleries, 55
- Bravine, Nicholas, 372
- Browne, Professor E. G., 334
- Brussa, 343
- Buddhism, 108, 115, 282
- Buddhists, the, 316, 377
- Budget in Asia, the, 297
- Bukhsh, Sir Khuda, 199
- Bulgaria, 343
- Bulgarians, the, 291
- Buryäts, the, 108, 113, 115

- Cairo, 328
- Calcutta:
 - College of, 180
 - Mohammedan Literary Society of, 189
 - Medresseh of, 189
 - Sanskrit College of, 182
 - University of, 182, 186
- Campbell, Sir George, 145
- Canal, the Ganges, 167
 - The Royal, 173
- Canals, 173, 174
- Carpenter, Mary, 178
- Caste, 227
 - Loosening of, 163-4
 - System of, 222
- Catherine II., 44
- Caucases, the, 119, 126
- 'Causes of the Decline,' the, 300
- Chauhan, the, 162
- Chechenzes, the, 119
- Cheremises, the, 11, 15, 19
- Chernajeff, General, 47, 69, 152
- Chestakoff, 30
- China, 5, 264, 282, 359, 389

- Chinese, the, 70
 Chinovniks, the, 242
 Chittagong, College of, 189
 Cholet, M. de, 67
 Chosroes I., 173
CHRISTIANITY:
 Enforced conversion of Ugrians to, 18
 unsuccessful among the Kirghises, 45
 enforced in Siberia, 105
 among the northern Siberians, 106
 Ugrian converts to, 107
 accepted by the Altaiers, 107
 accepted by the Yakuts, 107
 Dislike of, by Buryäts, 109
 opposed by the Moslem Tartars, 110
 in Tobolsk, 110, 112
 a failure among settled Tartars, 111
 increasing in Siberia, 115
 hated by Moslem Asiatics, 123
 opposed by Islam, 126, 276
versus Islam, 131
 not stronger than Islam, 145
 in Asia, 224
 Russia champion of, 249
 Mistaken views of Islam by, 268
 Conservatism of, 282
 Fanaticism of, in the East, 307, 309
 contrasted with Islam, 311
 more easily disturbed than Islamism, 312
 opposed by Pan-Islamism, 349, 351
 not strong enough to harm Islamism in Asia, 374
 Chuvashes, the, 11, 15, 18
 Cirkied, the Armenian, 315
 Clement, Ernest W., 317
 Clive, Lord, 137, 151, 153, 156, 158, 169
 Cloquet, Dr., 301
 Cochrane, 109
 Colbert, 135
 Colleges, 71, 72
 Colonisation, centres of Russian, 17
 Congress, the Indian National, 209
 Congresses, national, 238
 Conolly, 2
 Constantinople, 119, 321, 344
 Constitutional régime an impossibility, 303
 Cornwallis, Lord, 159
 Cossacks, the, 118
 Cotton, the price of, 346
 Cow-killing, the, 238
 Crete, 343
 Crimea, the khans of the, 11
 The political influence of the khans of, 32
 Curzon, Lord, 68, 151, 193, 254
 Dacca, College of, 189
 Dacoits, 161
 Dalhousie, Lord, 165, 167
 Damascus, 343
 Dandhu Panth, 165
 Danube Province, the, 344
 Daud Khan, 270
 Dayabhiya, 159
 Delhi, 276
 Dervishes, the influence of, 40
 Despotism of Oriental princes, 299, 300
 Dhulip Singh, 255
 Djadjerud, 299
 Djighites, the, 46
 Djevdet Efendi, 321
 Djura Beg, 255
 Doctors lady, 272, 278
 Dorjoeff, 109
 Dorozheyeff, the Lama, 109, 113
 Dost Mohammed Khan, 299, 369
 Dubeux, 1
 Duckmeyer, Professor F., 55, 62, 65
 Duff, Sir M. Grant, 214
 Dufferin, Lady, 178
 Dufferin, Lord, 169, 220
 Dumas, 135
 Dupleix, 135
 Dutch in India, the, 132, 134
 East, changes in the, 2
 East India Company, 131, 137, 149, 151, 161, 166
 The Dutch, 132
 Edeb, the, 294
 Edict of Toleration, the, 45
 Education, 179
 in the Steppes, 36, 39, 40, 45
 in Turkestan Schools, 73
 incomplete in Russia, 122
 Education Conference, the Moslem, 192
 Edwardes, Herbert, 169
 Egypt, 286, 381, 382, 391
 The Mufti of, 271

- Egypt, Liberalism in, 322
 The English in, 345-6
 The progress of, 360
- Elegies on death of Alexander III., 83
- Elgin, Lord, 196
- Elphinstone, Mountstuart, 133, 169, 181
- Emir, an, 296
- Emiri Kebir, 201
- Empire, the Mogul, 139, 140
- Endijan, 120
- ENGLAND:
- Competitive power of, 6
 - Russian hostility to, 60
 - Reasons for success of
 - English in India, 136 *et seq.*, 158, 167, 169, 177, 253
 - Peaceful invasion by, 148
 - Lofty aim of, 150
 - No premeditated conquest by, 151
 - Cause of success, 152 *et seq.*
 - Abolition of barbarous customs, 161, 162, 163
 - Indians educated in, 164
 - Reforms carried out by, 165-67
 - Patriotic zeal of, in India, 168
 - Establishes system of public instruction in India, 182 *et seqq.*
 - permits freedom of Press in India, 197
 - Enforced culture by England a necessity in India, 202 *et seqq.*
 - retains highest offices in India, 205-6
 - does not denationalise the Indians, 208
 - tolerant in questions of religion, 208
 - encourages national Indian congresses, 210
 - Indian loyalty to, 217
 - Influence over Mohammedans in India, 229
 - Most difficult problem of, in India, 231
 - Essentials to, sovereignty in India, 232
 - Mohammedan opposition to, 235
 - Russian hostility to, 240
 - Contrast between England and Russia, 249 *et seq.*
 - never attacked a national religion, 250, 251
 - desires a trade outlet, 251
- England—*continued*
- Generosity of, in India, 255
 - Influence of Japan, Siam, and South China, 257
 - Moslem testimony to England's government in India, 358
 - No desire for further conquests in India, 389-91
 - Reasons for expedition by, into Afghanistan and Persia, 390
 - Enini Mazlum*, the, 328
 - Entente Cordiale*, the, 345
 - European rulers feared, 299
 - Ezan, 313
 - Factories, 133, 250
 - Famines, 174, 175
 - Farabi, 348
 - Ferdinand V. of Austria, 270
 - Ferghana, colleges and schools in, 72
 - Ferheng*, the, 294
 - Feth Ali, Shah, 270, 303
 - Firuzshah, 209
 - Freemasons' Lodge, a, 334
 - French in India, the, 135
 - Frenghi, the, 148
 - Gama-Vascodi, 132
 - Gasparinski, Ismail Bey, 272, 330, 385
 - Gautama, 277
 - 'Genevese,' 392
 - Genghis Khan, 14, 16
 - Geoktepe, 120
 - Georgi, 102
 - Gerasimoff, Major, 69
 - German Empire in the East, 391
 - 'Ghaza,' the, 311
 - Ghaznevides, the, 22
 - Ghenghizides, the, 99
 - Gilman, Mohammed Fatih bin, 318
 - Gilmani, 385
 - Glavatski—the Metropolitan, 110
 - Glukhoff, General, 36
 - Gomboyeff, the Lama, 109
 - Greece, 343
 - Greek Church, the, 242
 - Influence of the, 309, 310, 315
 - Greeks, the, 291, 374
 - Grigorieff, 17
 - Grodyekoff, General, 61
 - Gujerati, 142
 - Gulistan, the treaty of, 368
 - Gunib, 119
 - Guri, St., 14

Habibullah, 369, 376
 Hadj, the, 349
 Hadji of Central Asia, the, 242
 Hadjis, increase in number of, 51
 Hakk, the, 328
 Halifax, Lord, 182
 D'Harcourt, Duc, 276, 283
 Harem, the, 273
 Laws of the, 313
 Hardinge, Lord, 133
 Hartmann, Professor, 378
 'Hashmet,' 298
 Hassan Beg, the wife of, 362
 Hastings, Warren, 137, 156, 158,
 180
 Hayward, 2
 Heathenism, 107, 147
 Hedjaz railway, the, 351
 Helagu, 366
 Henry III. of Spain, 350
 Herat, 245
 Herodotus, 333
 Hidayet, the, 158
 Hindi, 142
 Hindu Castes and Sects, 200
 Hinduism, 143
 Hindus, the, 166, 167, 226, 228,
 242, 257
 Emigration of, 207
 Hindustan, the divisions of, 139
 Holland, 132
 Horde, the golden, 8 *et seq.*,
 100, 118, 131
 Hospitals, 177
 'House of Oblivion,' the, 334
 Huart, the Orientalist, 312
 Hübner, Baron, 215
 Hui-Hui, the, 377
 Humayun, 140, 276, 302
 Hungarians, the, 118
 Hunter, Sir William, 132, 133
 et seq., 155, 158, 160
 Hurriet, the, 323, 328
 Hussein Mirza Baikara, 302
 Hyderabad, the Nizam of, 191, 245

Ibbetson, Sir Denzil, 146, 172
 Ibn Batutah, 10
 Ibrahim Beg, 346
Idjtihad, the, 294, 358
 Ikonnikoff, 18
 Ilbert, Sir Courtenay, 132, 149, 159
 Ilminski, Professor N. I., 26, 28,
 181

INDIA:
 British Interference in, 131
 First factories in, 133, 148
 The meeting-place of Eastern
 and Western thought, 138

India—*continued*
 Tyranny of native rulers in,
 139, 142
 Miserable condition of, under
 the Moguls, 140
 never a united whole, 142
 Variety of languages and
 religions in, 143
 Moslems in, 144
 Size of the Empire, 151
 Military strength of, 152
 reorganised by Clive, 158
 First English governor in, 159
 Early legislation in, 159
 Collection of taxes in, 160
 Difficulties in reforms in, 164
 Desire by India for a firm
 government, 169
 Condition of the peasants in,
 170
 Canal system in, 172
 Famines in, 174
 Taxation system in, 175
 State revenue of, 176
 Improved communication in,
 176-77
 Hospitals in, 177
 Education in, 178 *et seq.*
 Number of schools in, 183, 185
 Population of, 183
 Colleges in, 186
 Universities in, 186
 Hindu and Mohammedan
 students in, 187
 English language taught in,
 189
 Education results criticised,
 193
 Press statistics, 195
 Influence of the press, 197
 Native publications in, 199
 Moral improvement in, 203
 et seq.
 Emigration from, 207
 First Congress in, 209
 Radical transformation of
 natives not effected, 213
 Native criticism of England,
 214, 216
 Increased excise duty in, 218
 Imitation of European luxury
 in, 219
 Native desire for larger repre-
 sentation, 220
 Exclusiveness of the English
 officials in, 221
 Missions in, 223
 Effects of European educa-
 tion in, 225

India—*continued*

- Contrast between Moslems and Hindus in, 226 *et seq.*
- Presence of England a necessity in, 232
- Native attempts to reconcile Moslems and Hindus, 237
- England essential to, 238
- An united nationality impossible in, 238-39
- Frontiers of India, threatened, 241
- Russia powerless, 241, 246
- Loyalty of India to England, 245-46
- Benevolence of England's rule in, 248
- Security of England in, 254
- Religious freedom in, 256
- The progressive spirit of Moslems in, 279
- Two notable rulers of, 302
- Islamism in, 353
- Moslem opinion of European government in, 358
- The awakening of Islam in, 381
- Difficulties of a Russian invasion of, 389
- Indo-Aryans*, the, 199
- Inordzi*, 98
- Iran Kemal*, the, 294
- Iranians*, the, 292
- Ishak Khan*, 255
- Isker*, the, 99

ISLAM:

- Russia the antagonist of, 7
- Eccentricities of, in Turkestan, 47
- The moral conqueror of Siberia, 99
- Conversions to, in Siberia, 102
- Fanatical spirit of, 188, 199, 229
- Mistakes made by Europeans, 263-64
- Difficulty of testing the progress of, 265
- Intellectual awakening of, 266-69
- Contrast between past and present, 270-71
- Spread of modern education in, 272
- Intermarriage with Christians, 273
- Turkish press, 275
- Not opposed to culture, 276
- Fanaticism of the clergy, 278-79

Islam—*continued*

- Progressive spirit of, in England and India, 279
- The future of, 281-82
- Reform movement in, 283-84
- Mistaken culture, 284-286
- Struggle in Turkey for reform, 287-292
- Backwardness of, in Persia, 292-95
- Pending changes in Moslem Asia, 294
- Difficulties in, between rulers and subjects, 296
- Non-Moslem rulers, slighted, 298
- Ignorance of rulers, 300
- A few exceptions, 301, 302
- Despotism of the rulers of, 302-7
- Decline of the Moslem East, 307
- Warped by its conservatism and its rulers, 309, 312, 313
- Scepticism not unknown, 310
- No church, 310, 312
- Struggle between faith and intellect, 311
- Firmer foundation than Christianity, 311
- Fundamental principles of, 312
- Intercourse with other nations not forbidden, 314
- Doctrines of Islam not responsible for Moslem backwardness, 315-7
- Desire for reform in, 319
- Comparison between past and present, 320
- Rise of Turko-Moslem liberalism, 322-27
- checked by the Sultan, 331
- culture at a low ebb in Asia, 333
- 'Babism' and Islam, 334-7
- Failure to appreciate by Europe, 337
- The future of, 342-55
- Need for Western civilisation in, 347
- Schemes for political independence of, 347
- The Hadj, 349
- The Sultan the head of, 351
- Position of Christian powers against, 352
- No vitality in Russia and Turkestan, 353
- In British India, 353

- Islam—*continued*
 in Afghanistan, 353
 Political future of, not
 brilliant, 355-56
 hostile to reform, 355
 under Christian govern-
 ments, 356, 359
 The political future of, 360-62,
 370
 Turks must lead the Moslem
 world, 363, 366-67
 The future of its believers, 371
 Strength of, in European
 Russia and European
 Turkey, 372, 373
 Strength of, in Germany,
 374-75
 Strength of, in Arabia, 375
 Strength of, in Syria, 375
 as a State and Dynasty, 375-76
 Its position in India, 377
 Its position among the
 Brahmins, 377
 Its position among the
 Chinese, 377-78
 Political decline of, not a
 death-blow to spiritual in-
 fluence, 379
 Submission of, to fate, 379
 Warlike spirit of, 380
 The political future of, 381
 Beginning of the regeneration
 of, 381-83
 Some defects of, 383-84
 Result of Western culture
 upon, 385-86, 394
 Islamism, 110, 115
 The aloofness of, 23
 The spread of, 28
 in the Steppes, 36, 40, 45
 losing ground in Siberia,
 98, 100
 Ito, the Marquis, 317
Ittila, the, 294
 Ivan, Bishop of Smolensk, 29
 Ivan Kolzo, 98
 Ivan the Terrible, 12, 14, 18, 98,
 100, 103, 118, 249
 Ivanoff, General, 59
 Ivanoff, the merchant, 69

 Jacob, John, 169
 Jagannath, the feast of, 251
 Japan, 264, 282, 317, 385, 395
 Constitution given to, 303
 Japanese, the, 275
 Japanese War, the Russo-, 243
 Java, 379
 Jee, Bhagvat Sinh, 200

 Jihanghir, 139, 140
 Jews, the, 380
 Jones, Sir William, 181
 Judaism, 269
 Jumma Mesjid, the, 276
 Jung, Sir Salar, 200, 234

 Kaaba, the, 350
 Kadjar Dynasty, the, 301, 367
 Kadjars, the, 22
 Kalmuks, the, 115
Kanun Esasi, the, 328
 Extracts from the, 338
 Kapyalti, the, 67
 Karaka, Dosabhai Frangi, 199
 Karakum, the desert of, 1
 Karamat, Ali, 230
 Karamsin, 10, 13, 15, 101
 Karapapaks, the, 119
 Kardukhoi, the, 333
 Karimoff, M. F. G., 277
 Kasim, Prince, 8
 Kasimoff, 8
 Conversion of house of, 25
 Kassim Amin, 283, 314, 360
 Katanoff, 45, 114
 Katenin, General, 37
 Kaufmann, General, 39, 49, 59
 Kazan, 8, 15, 22, 277
 The Khans of, 11
 The fall of, 12, 15
 The campaign against, 18
 The Academy of, 28
 Kemal Bey, 322, 331
 Kemal Pasha, 304
 Kenisarin, 379
 Kerim Khan (Zend), 367
 Khaireddin Pasha, 304, 306
Khairkhah Alem, the, 196
 Khairullah Efendi, 321
 Khalfa Hadji, 349
 Khalidun, Ibn, 342
 Khaliphs, the, 297-98, 306
 Limited influence of, 352
 Khan, a, 296
 Khans, the, 43
 Khangaloff, the Lama, 109
 Kharidjits, the, 310
 Khazars, the, 118
 Khiva, 15
 The Khan of, 49
 The Khanate of, 9
 Khodjas, the, 75
 Khokand, 120
 The Khanate of, 9
 Khudai-kul, the Tartar Prince, 23
 Khudayar Khan, 63, 255
 Kiani, the Taskhend poet, 84
 Kipchaks, the, 97, 379

- Kirghises, the, 64, 102, 115, 379
 Address from the, to General Kaufmann, 41
 War gifts from the, 42
 Numerical strength of, 43
 Christianity not suited to the, 42-46
 Insolent treatment of, by Russia, 64
 Moslem missionaries to, 99
 oppose Russia, 423
Kirima Siahat, the, 277
 Kizil Arvat, 120
 Kizilkum, the, desert of, 2
 Kochi Bey, 342-43, 349
 Kolari, 142
 Koran, the, 68, 310, 313, 314, 315, 321, 322, 325, 342, 349, 363, 380, 382, 396
 K roglu, 100
 Kossacks, the, 12
 Kostenko, General, 94
 K tch m Khan, 99, 101
 Kremer, von, 309
 'Kreshcheni Tartars,' 25
Kukumay, the, 328
 Kuma, 15
 Kumanians, 118
 Kurdistan, 328, 333
 Kurds, the, 333

 Lajpat Rai, 214
 Lally, 136
 Lama, the Dalai, 109
 Lama, the Khambo, 108
 Lamas, the, 108
 Letter from Nizam of Hyderabad, 245
 Lewchine, A. de, 42
 Lezghians, the, 379
 Lhasa, 109, 115
 Liberty, the outcome of civilisation, 302-3
Looking-Glass, the, 201
 'Love,' the 'Abode of,' 120
 Lyall, Sir Alfred, 133, 141, 154, 226, 247
 Lyikoshin, M., 92
 Lawrence, Sir Henry, 169

 Macaulay, Lord, 181
 Maccoll, Malcolm, 276
 Madjars, the, 118
 Madras, University of, 182
 Mahmud, the Sultan, 160, 270, 289
 Mahmud II., the Sultan, 299
 Mahmud of Ghazni, 138
 Makhdum Kuli, 242

 Malcolm, Sir John, 169, 303
 Malcom Khan, 301
 Mameluks, the, 164
 Manu, the Code of, 158
 M r tha War, the, 152, 159
 Marathi, 142
 Margary, 2
 Mayo, Lord, 169
Mebadi tcmeddun Islamiani Russ, the, 361
 Medjusus, 275
 Mehemmed Ali, 164, 322, 382
 Mehemmed Ali Ishan, 97
 Mehemmed Feridun Bey, 271
 Mehemmed Salih, 302
 Mehta, Sir Pheroz, Shahi, 209, 239
 Mekteb, the, 271
 Melik, de, Mir Dawud Zadour, 305
 Melik Tahir, 24
 Memorandum by Russian Moslems, 329-30
 Mergolan, 120
 Merv, 120
Meshveret, the, 328
 Midhat Bey, Ali Haidar, 325
 Midhat Pasha, 291, 323
 Mill, John Stuart, 215
 Mills, 138
 Ming-T be, insurrection in, 96
 Mir, Jafar, 138
 Mirza Bukharin, 82
 Mirza Mohammed Ali, 335
 Misail, Archbishop, 20
 Missionaries, Russian, 106
 Missions, Christian, 186, 223-24, 250
 Mitakshara, the, 158
 Mitra, Rajendra Lala, 199
 Mogul Empire, the, 145, 153
 Moguls, the, 160
 Mohammed Abdu, the Sheikh, 271
 Mohammed II., 12, 276
 Nassir, Ambassador of Bokhara, 87
 the Conqueror, 302
 Fatih, 278
 Taki Khan, 304
 Mohanmedans in India, the, 226, 228-29, 233-36
 Number of, 281
 Mollas, the, 29, 40, 65, 74, 313, 316, 340
 Mongols, the, 11, 16, 366
 Monuments, preservation of, in India, 208
 Moors in Spain, the, 350

- Mordvines, the, 11, 15, 18
 Morgites, the, 310
 Morocco, 344
 Moscow, the Grand-Dukes of, 8,
 17, 131
 Moser, Henri, 54
Moslem Chronicle, the, 198, 357
 Moslem conservatism, 123
 Mosque, the Friday, 276
 Motazilites, the, 309
 Moulin, Mohamed Adil Schmitz
 de, 268, 283
 Muarri, Abu Ala al, 310
 Muckerji, Dr. Sambhu, 197, 237
 Muhyieddin, the Khodja, 75, 81,
 87
Mukhbir, the, 323, 328
 Munif Pasha's wife, 274
 Munkácsi, 104, 115
 Murad I., 273
 Murad, the Shah of Bokhara,
 43
 Murder, suppression of infant,
 162
 Musa bin Tarik, 313
 Mustafa Fazil Pasha, 322
 Mutiny, the Indian, 165
 Mutsuhito, Emperor of Japan,
 303, 318
 Muzaffar-eddin, the Shah, 299,
 368
 Muzhiks, the, 242

 Nadir Shah, 138, 149, 367
 Nalivkin, W. W., 45, 56
 Namengan, 120
 The riot of, 379
 Nana Sahib, 165
 Naoroji, Dadabhai, 209, 214
 Napoleon I., 136
 Narody, 15
 Nassreddin, Shah, 164, 298, 299,
 301, 303, 304, 334
Nassrie, the, 294
 Nassrullah, the Amir, 299
 Nath, the Pandit Adjudhia, 209
 Newspapers in Persia, 294
 Turco-Mohammedan, 279
 Nicholson, John, 169
 Nihani the poet, 84
 Nikolayeff, 108, 113
 Nikon the Patriarch, 20
 Nogays, the, 22
 Norman, Henry, 57
 Novgorod, 98
 'Novo Kreshcheni,' 26
 Nowosilzoff, 12
Nur-el-Enwar, the, 196
 Nushirwan, 173

 Obermann, 2
 Oguz, 329
 Omar, the Khaliph, 306
 Omayyades in Spain, the, 366
 Opium, 56
 Orenburg, 277
 The military school at, 37
 Orkhan, 329
 Osmanides, the, 22
 Osmanism, 348
 Osmanli, the, 12, 21, 139, 328
 Religious zeal of the, 18
 Ostroumoff, Professor N. P., 36,
 59, 76, 86, 90, 92
 Ostyaks, the, 101, 104, 106, 107,
 115
 Ottoman Empire, the weaknes
 of the, 292
 Ottoman Princes, two learned,
 302
 Özbegs, the, 100

 'Padishah Mali,' 297
 Palace, the burning of the
 Summer, 264
 Pan-Islamic Society, the, 230
 Pan-Islamism, 349
 The duties of, 351
 Pan-Turkism, 348
 Parsis, history of the, 199
 Pathans, the, 233
 Pauli, 15, 19, 32
 Pechenegs, the, 118
 Perry, Commander, 264
 Persia, 270, 287, 304, 338
 Liberalism in, 333-34
 Difficulties of reform in, 340
 Power of the priests in, 341
 Terrible condition of, 346,
 347
 Degeneracy of, 367
 The fate of, 367, 368
 Future division of, 388
 Danger from, 390
 Persian Empire, the, 292-95
 Language, the, 274
 Persians, cruelty of the, 149
 Desire for improvement
 among the, 346
 Peshwas, the, 165
 Philippopolis, 343
 Philotheus, Archbishop, 103
 Pilgrimages, 177
 Piroshkoff, 113
 Plassey, 149, 153
 Polak, Dr., 301
 Portuguese, the, 148
 in India, 132-134
 Postal system in India, the, 177

- Prarthama Somaj, the, 227
 Press, freedom of, in India, 196
 in South Russia, 330
 in Turkey, 274, 275, 294, 327-
 29, 342
 Proskowetz, M. von, 55
 Prostitution, 55
 Protectionism, 161
 Public Works Department, 167
 Punch, the Gujerati, 244
 Punjabi, 142
- Rahmetullah Bi, Ambassador of
 Bokhara, 87
 Railway, the Batum-Baku, 119
 The Transcaspian, 51
 Railways in India, 176
 Rajputs, the, 162
 Rajshahi, College of, 189
 Ranjit Singh, 255, 257
 Rast Goftar, the, 243
 Rayat, the, 291, 372
 Rayat, the, 155
 Refik, 329
 Reinaud, 3
Reis and Rayyet, the, 197
 Renaissance, the, 308
 Renan, Ernest, 207
 Reshad Efendi, the Prince, 301
 Reshid Pasha, 74, 200
 Ripon, Lord, 182
 Ritter, I
 Rittich, Professor, 16, 17, 18 *et seq.*,
 23, 26, 27
 Rosenbach, General, 59, 87, 91
 Rossi, 15
 Roumania, 343
 Roumanians, the, 291
- RUSSIA, 360
 Competitive power of, 6
 the antagonist of Islam, 7
 in touch with the Ural-Altai
 race, 7
 Eastern derivation of Russian
 words, 8
 Reasons for early success in,
 9, 11
 Refining influence of, in
 fifteenth century, 10
 Medieval extension of, 15
 Difficulties of colonisation of,
 in eighteenth century, 5
 Movement eastwards of, 16
 Proselytising zeal of, 18, 24
 et seq.
 favours Islamism, 28
 Methods of conversion by, 29
 Population of Kazan Tartars
 in, 31
- Russia—*continued*
 European Moslem population
 in, 32, 33
 Emigration of Tartars from,
 33
 Interference in Asiatic Turko-
 Tartary, 35 *et seq.*
 opposed by the Kirghises, 43
 pushes into Turkestan, 47
 Reforms by, in Central Asia,
 50
 Self-aggrandisement of, 53
 Purpose of railways, 53
 Neglect of irrigation in Tur-
 kestan, 54
 Evil effects of government in
 Central Asia, 54, 57, 61, 63
 not a civilising influence, 55,
 57
 hostile to England, 60
 Contemptuous treatment of
 Asiatics, 64
 a failure in Central Asia, 66
 Corruption of authorities, 68,
 70
 Chinese hatred of, 70
 Asiatic hatred of, 75
 Samarkhand merchant's ac-
 count of, 82
 Sham loyalty to, 80-88
 The Sarts amenable to, 89
 et seq.
 Emigration into Turkestan,
 95
 Supremacy of, in Central
 Asia, 90
 Turkestan a source of wealth
 to, 96
 Annexation of Siberia by, 99
 et seq.
 conquers Northern Siberia,
 100
 Population in North Siberia,
 101
 proselytises in Siberia, 102
 Difficulties in Siberia, 103,
 108, 110, 112
 enforces Christianity in
 Siberia, 105, 107, 110
 Neglect by, of Voguls,
 Ugrians, and Ostyaks, 105-
 106
 Annexation of Siberia by, 114
 Complete conquest of Siberia
 by, 114
 Influence of, in Asia, 117
 et seq.
 stayed the Tartar hordes,
 118

Russia—*continued*

- Benefits conferred by, on Moslem Asia, 121
- Lack of education, 121
- not a civilising power, 124
- Population in south frontier districts, 124
- Limitations of, in Turkestan, 126
- deliberately invaded Moslem countries, 151
- Difficulties of, in Turkestan, 169
- the rival of England, 240
- Enemy of Mohammedans, 242
- Blow to prestige of, 243
- Enemies of, in India, 244
- Contrast between Russia and England, 249 *et seq.*
- more Asiatic than European, 250
- Greed of territory, 251, 252
- hated in Asia, 253
- Meanness of, 255
- Faithlessness of, 256
- not qualified to civilise, 257
- dangerous to British interests, 258
- Islam under protectorate of, 272
- Tartar institutions in, 278
- Efforts for liberty in Mohammedan Russia, 329, 330
- Growing influence of, in Persia, 341
- Tyranny of the Tsar, 358
- in Central Asia, 369
- in Anatolia, 375
- Islamism cannot develop under, 378
- Eastern frontiers of, 388
- moving eastwards, 389
- Rushdie schools, the, 271
- Ruznamei-Terbiet*, the, 294
- Rytchkoff, 42
- Saadeddin, 349
- Saadullah Pasha, 331
- Sablukoff, Professor, 28
- St. Hilaire, Barthélemy, 196
- Salaries in India, 204
- in Algiers, 205
- Samarkand, 120
- Schools and colleges in, 71
- Sandeman, Sir Robert, 169
- Sandjak*, the, 328
- Saracens, history of the, 199
- Sarts, the, 39, 56, 61, 75, 76, 77, 89

Sarts, the—*continued*

- Russian treatment of, 64
- Russian opinion of, 90
- amenable to Russia, 92
- Neglect of religious observances by, 92
- Innovations among, 93
- Sassanides, the, 293
- Sati (Sutti), the abolition of, 161
- Sattar Khan, 81-91
- Schlagintweit, 2
- Schlüsselburg, 242
- Schools in Turkestan, 71-72
- Asiatic dislike of Russian, 76
- The medical, in India, 182
- The medical in Persia, 294
- Schwarz, F. von, 47, 53, 61, 68
- Seeley, Professor, 137, 224
- Sefevides, the, 22
- Sefides, the, 367
- Seid Ahmed Khan, 190, 191, 196, 199, 231, 233, 237
- Seid Ali, the Emir, 229, 283
- Seid Azim Bey, 76
- Seid Burhan, 25
- Seid Hussein Bilgrami, 171
- Selamluk, the, 273
- Selim II., 12
- Selim the Sultan, 302
- Semenoff, 33
- Semiryeche, schools in, 72
- Sepoy Rebellion, the, 254, 264
- Serai, the Princes of, 8, 10
- Servia, 343
- Servians, the, 291
- Shah Ali, 24
- Shah, Jehan, 139
- Shah of Persia, tyranny of the, 305
- Shamans, the, 18, 28, 316
- Shamanism, 19, 36, 40, 102, 103, 107, 115, 249
- Shark Rusi*, the, 279
- Shehinsahs, the, 368
- Sheikh Shamil, 119
- Sheref*, the, 294
- Sheriff of Mecca, 391
- Sherifye, the, 158
- 'Shevket,' 298
- Shibli, Professor, 199
- Shinasi Efendi, 322
- Shintoism, 317
- Shuiski, Prince, 14
- Shurai Ummet*, the, 328
- Siasi, the Indian writer, 329
- Siberia, 126
- annexed by Russia, 99, 100, 114

- Siberia—*continued*
 converted to Islamism, 102
 Conversions to Christianity,
 103 *et seq.*
 Neglected Christians in, 106
 Extreme poverty in, 107
 English mission to the Bur-
 yäts, 109
 Geographical Society of,
 109
 Census of Moslems in, 111
 Ignorance in, 113
 Higher education in, 114
 Population of, 114
 Size of, 114
 Peace among inhabitants of,
 115
 The railway in, 116
 Sidi Ali Reis, Admiral, 140
 Sikh war, the, 159
 Silau, the, 68
 Sirajia, the, 158
Sketches, travelling, 201
 Skobelegg, General, 241
 Skrine, F. H., 56, 77
 Slaves, 119
 Slavism, the progress of, 131
 Slavs, the, 15-16
 of Eastern Europe, 7
 Influence of the, 16, 17
 Softa (Sukhta), 74
 Soliman, the Sultan, 12, 302
 Solowieff, the historian, 90
 Sophia, the condition of, 343
 Spain invaded, 313
 'Stari Kreshcheni,' 26
 Starorussenikoff, Archbishop,
 104
 'State treasury,' the, 297
 Steamers, establishment of, 167
 Steppe, the Famine, 54
 The Hyrkanian, 1
 The Kirghis, 17
 The Tartars of the Kirghis,
 35
 Russian schools in the Kir-
 ghis, 36
 Strachey, Sir Jolin, 142, 144, 147,
 150, 161, 162, 174, 193, 216, 220,
 223, 227, 231
 Stryelzi, the, 17, 164
 Students, Hindu and Mohamme-
 dan, 187
 Sultans, arbitrary power of the,
 297
 Sultan Soliman, 144
 Sunbul Hanım, 289
 Swiyask, the convent of, 27
 Syr Darya, schools in, 71
 Syrians, the, 291
 Syrym Batır, 379
 Tabut, the, 251
 Tadjiks, the, 75
 Taj, the, 276
 Talib, Mirza Abu, 200
 Tamil, 142
 Tartars, the, 9, 15, 272, 277, 278,
 329
 The baptised, 22
 The Crimean, 22
 Islamism among the, 23
 Christianity forced upon the,
 23, 28 *et seq.*
 Return to Islamism of, 27
 Russification of the, 28 *et*
 seq.
 Hatred of Russia by the, 31
 Emigration of the, 32, 33
 The language of the, 274
 Progress among the, 361
 Tashkend, 120, 152
 The taking of, 35, 47-48
 Streets in, 53
 The prison of, 61-62
 Coronation festivities in, 62
 Difficulties in, 74
 Russian schools in, 76
 Chernayeff's assault upon, 82
 Forced loyalty to Russia in,
 86
 Revolt against Russia in, 97
 Tashkenetz (Tashkender), 58
 Tassy, Garcin de, 196, 199
 Taxation, contrast between India
 and England, 175
 Taxes, the collection of, in India,
 160
 Tayabchi Bedreddin, 209
 Teftazani, 348
 Teheran, 294, 299, 300
 Telang, K.T., 209
 Telegraph system in India, 177
 Telfer, 32
 Temni (Vasili the Blind), 10
Terdjuman, the, 272, 277, 330
 Terekmes, the, 119
 Thag, the, 161
 Thebau, King of Burmah, 255
 Thibetans, the, 109
 Tholozan, Dr., 301
 Thomas, E., 208
 Timur the mighty, 14, 350
 Timurides, the, 22
 Tippu Sultan, 136
 Tobolsk, 99
 A missionary centre, 110
 Tolstoi, Count D. A., 30

- Torgut, 329
 Tsars of Moscow, the, 8
 Tunis, 286
 'Turan,' 99
 Turco-Tartars, the, 16, 21
 Conversion of the, 18-24, 103
 et seq.
Turk, the, 275, 328, 343-45, 348
Turkenstanskiya wyedomosti, the, 81
 Turkestan, 42, 47 *et seq.*, 126
 Cotton-growing in, 52
 neglected under Russia, 53
 Irrigation in, 54
 Failure of Russian Govern-
 ment in, 58
 Cruelty of the Russians in,
 61, 65 *et seq.*
 Miserly treatment of, by
 Russia, 63
 Bribery in, 67
 Russian venality in, 69
 Schools in, 71, 72
 Education system in, 73
 Ignorance in, 77
 Russian lady doctors in, 77
 Russian lectures in, 78
 Native poets on Russia, 83-6
 Spread of the Russian lan-
 guage in, 93
 Indolence of the natives, 93
 Increase of the Russian popu-
 lation in, 94
 Russian census in, 94
 Fertility of, 95
 Changes in, 120
 Incomes in, 176
 Railways in, 177
 Education in, 184, 188
 Number of Russians in, 254
 Eastern, 389
Turkestan Gazeti, the, 81
 Turkestanis, the, 64, 242
 Turkey, 274, 298
 The reform movement in, 287-
 89, 292
 Despotism in, 304
 Decline of, 314
 Literary reforms in, 322
 Suppression of liberalism in,
 322
 A Parliament established in,
 324
 Suppression of the Parlia-
 ment, 325
 Poverty in, 327
 Liberalism quenched in, 327
 National spirit crushed, 331
 Hatred of Europe by, 344
- Turkey—*continued*
 The future of, 347, 364-65
 No help given to co-religion-
 ists, 350
 The press in, 357
 The collapse of, 362 *et seq.*
 Attempt to be friendly with
 Persia, 368
 Turkish language, the, 272-3
 Turkmanchai, the treaty of, 368
 Turkomans, the, 9, 118, 379
 Turks, the, 12, 16, 23, 119
 impervious to Russian civil-
 isation, 22
 Number of, in Siberia, 101
 Progress of the, 271, 274, 277,
 279
 'The Young,' 321, 327, 331 *et*
 seq.
 'The Old,' 323
 hated by the Arabs, 348
 more cultured than the Per-
 sians, 349
 The Volga, 361
Turquie libre, la, 328
 'Tuzemtzi,' the, 98
 Tzybikoff, the traveller, 109
- Ufa, 27
 Ugrians, the, 11, 16, 20, 22, 100,
 103
 Ulema, the, 278
 Universities in India, 182
 Ural-Altaics, the, 7, 11, 15, 34
- Vajid Ali, 255
 Valmont, 1
 Varna, 343
 Vasili the Blind, 10
 Vasil Ibn Ata, 309
 Velikhanoff, 113
 Victoria, the Queen, 222
 'Vizier,' 304
 Voguls, the, 101, 104, 105, 106,
 115
 of Pelym, 106
 Volga, Russification of the, 14 *et*
seq.
 Vologda, the Archbishop of, 103
 Votyaks, the, 11, 15, 19
- Wandewash, 136, 139
Wakti-Seadet, the, 305
 War, the Crimean, 264
 Weale, B. L. Putman, 70
 Welikhanoff, Captain, 45
 Wellesley, Lord, 181
 Welyaminoff, Zernoff, 23, 32
 Werioffkin, General, 39

- Whish, C. W., 221
 Widows, remarriage of Indian, 163
 Witch, 273
 Women, education of, in India,
 183
 Moslem, 272, 313
 Turkish, 273
 Wrevski, 59
 Wyburd, 2
- Yadrinzeff, N. M., 102, 106, 111,
 112 *et seq.*
 Yakovleff, Y. P., 45, 113
 Yamakowo, the village of, 111
- Yanoff, General, 69
 Yellow Peril, the, 395
 Yermak, General, 98, 100
 Yildiz, the, 328
 Yussuf Izzeddin, 300
- Zakaspiskoe Obozryenie*, the, 120
 Zakir-Jan, the Khokand poet, 85
 Zamakhshari, 349
 Zemindars, the, 160
 Zend Dynasty, the, 367
 Zia Pasha, 321
 Zionism in Turkey, 380
 Zolotnitzky, 30

THE END

96665

HAS

V2162W

Author Vambéry, Arminius

Title Western culture in Eastern lands.

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY

Do not
remove
the card
from this
Pocket.

Acme Library Card Pocket
Under Pat. "Ref. Index File."
Made by LIBRARY BUREAU

Sever

